






CLIFFORD E. BARBOUR
LIBRARY

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2011 with funding from
LYRASIS Members and Sloan Foundation

<http://www.archive.org/details/pittsburghpers196667pitt>





P I T T S B U R G H
P E R S P E C T I V E

Volume VII

MARCH, 1966

Number 1

PITTSBURGH THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

PITTSBURGH PERSPECTIVE

Volume VII

MARCH, 1966

Number 1

Published four times yearly in March, June, September and December, by the Pittsburgh Theological Seminary, 616 North Highland Avenue, Pittsburgh, Pa. 15206, one of the seven seminaries of the United Presbyterian Church in the U. S. A. Second-class postage paid at Pittsburgh, Pa. Changes of address should be sent to the Seminary, care of the Director of the Mailing Department.

Editor: James Arthur Walther, Th.D.

Publications Committees

Faculty

Malcolm S. Alexander
Lynn B. Hinds, *Chmn.*
J. A. Walther

Student

David Kearns-Preston, *Chmn.*
J. Rowe Hinsey, *ex. off.*
William R. Atkins, *ex. off.*
William R. Phillippe, *ex. off.*

Circulation: Rev. E. D. McKune

Secretarial Assistant: Mrs. Elizabeth Eakin

Cover Photo—Seminary Chapel: Raymond J. Marquette

Contents

<i>Ad Hoc</i>	2
From the President's Desk	3
The Original and the Present Function of Confession Books	5
by Dietrich Ritschl	
The Authority of the Bible as Reflected in the Proposed Confession of 1967	17
by William F. Orr	
The Concept of Reconciliation in the Proposed Confession of 1967	31
by George H. Kehm	
The Proposed Confession and Social Ethics	40
by Walter E. Wiest	
Subscriptional Authority	52
by William A. Nicholson	
Book Reviews and Notes	
Neufeld, <i>The Earliest Christian Confessions</i>	59
J. A. Walther	
Cochrane, <i>Reformed Confessions of the 16th Century</i>	60
Dietrich Ritschl	
Berton, <i>The Comfortable Pew</i>	61
Iain Wilson	
Bainton, <i>The Horizon History of Christianity</i>	62
Hillerbrand, <i>The Reformation</i>	63

Ad Hoc

THIS ISSUE is a modest attempt to make a contribution to the discussion of the proposed *Confession of 1967*.

The Publications Committee has responded to a plea for editorial help by securing faculty committees to assist in planning some special issues of *Pittsburgh Perspective* to treat moot contemporary topics. The committee for this present issue has been Professors Markus Barth, George Kehm, and Iain Wilson. The Editor records his appreciation to these men, to the colleagues who responded to requests for the particular articles, to Professor John Gerstner for special help, and to the members of the Publications Committee.

Professor Ritschl has written an historical examination of the background against which we treat our confessional stance today. Professors Orr, Kehm, and Wiest have dealt with three out of a number of possible critical areas of discussion stirred up by the new proposal. And Professor Nicholson writes about the matter of subscription, a critical point for the minister who would assess "the new confession."

Among the reams of writing that have been expended on our topic, we commend two for your special attention. Clifford R. Hawkins, Class of 1946, has prepared a *Study Guide* for use with the "Proposal." This fine booklet has been well received and merits wide use. It may be secured from the First United Presbyterian Church, 225 South Valley Road, Paoli, Pennsylvania 19301, at 50¢ per copy. The January number of our sister publication *McCormick Quarterly* (Volume XIX, Number 2) is devoted to a study of the new "Proposal." Professor Elwyn Smith of our faculty is a contributor. This journal may be obtained from the Seminary Publication Office, 800 West Belden Avenue, Chicago, Illinois 60614, at 40¢ per copy. Another resource soon to be available is noted by Professor Ritschl in our Book Reviews and Notes.

While we have no formal subscription rate, persons who want additional copies of this journal (as available) may wish to defray the Seminary's expense at the rate of 50¢ for single copies, 40¢ in quantities of five or more.

—J. A. W.

From the President's Desk—

CONFESIONS OF FAITH are as old in the church as the days of our Lord. Some men who knew Jesus were convinced that He was the Messiah, and said so while He lived. His death and resurrection, without reducing the confidence in His Messiahship, added to it an equal confidence in His Lordship. To the simple affirmations of Jesus' Messiahship and Lordship were added more elaborate statements of who this Jesus was—such as His pre-existence, His unique relation to God, etc.—and of what His significance was to the world, to history, and to the whole cosmos.

The various confessions served many purposes. Broadly speaking, they pointed in two major directions. First, they spoke to the church, in order to articulate that by which the church lived in such a fashion that its life would be continually nourished, that its health should be preserved from the virus of heresies, and that Christians would remain faithful during persecution. Second, the various confessions spoke to the world in order to evangelize, to catechize, to explain and defend against misunderstanding and hostility.

These two major functions of the early creeds have been carried forward throughout Christian history. Again and again the church has had to speak to itself and to its world in the light of ever-changing historic circumstances. The constant element in the ever-changing process has been Jesus. He stands at the center of every creed of the church. The forms by which the church has sought to explain Him, however, have been modified from age to age in order to speak the language of the various periods of the church's life. What the church has had to say to the world has been articulated in the light of the particular needs of the world at specific times.

Creeds are necessary, as new efforts to make them are often necessary. It is neither new nor startling, therefore, for the church to seek a reformulation of her faith in a form adaptable to the time and issues which we now face. The aim should be to seek the broadest possible consensus consistent with the Scriptures, and to do this in the mood suggested by the Scriptures: "Be humble always and gentle, and patient too. Be forbearing with one another and charitable. Spare no effort to make fast with bonds of peace the unity which the Spirit gives. . . . So shall we at last attain to the unity inherent in our faith and our knowledge of the Son of God—to mature manhood, meas-

ured by nothing less than the full stature of Christ" (Eph. 4:2,3,13 NEB). Whether the present effort to restate the church's faith shall be unifying or divisive, edifying or debilitating, will depend largely on the extent to which the above apostolic admonition is heeded.


—D. G. M.

"The evil habit of **men** in all times to criticize their predecessors for having seen only half of the truth hides from them their own partiality and incompleteness."

—H. Richard Niebuhr, *The Kingdom of God in America*.

The Original and the Present Function of Confession Books

by DIETRICH RITSCHL*



nificance of such Reformation Confession Books for the Church today we deal automatically with the presuppositions of the question whether it has become necessary and possible to write a new Confession Book in addition to the old ones. I take it that our series of articles is concerned with a combination of these two questions: what significance do the Reformation Confession Books have for the Church today? and what should our attitude be toward a new Confession Book? We will deal here with the first question only, bearing in mind that it provides the basis for the second.

I

RATHER THAN ASK in general terms, "Should the Church today still 'confess' in the form of Reformation Confessions?" we ask concretely, "What is the place of the classical, European Confession Books of Reformation and post-Reformation theology in contemporary American theology and Church life?" The designations "European" and "American" should be taken seriously right from the beginning of the discussion,

CONFESsion BOOKS are an invention typical of Reformation theology, especially of Melanchthon's concept of the Church with its "doctrinal corpus." His idea of the necessity and the importance of a *consensus de doctrina* in the Church has influenced most branches of the Reformation Church, certainly the Lutheran and the Reformed. In discussing the sig-

* Dr. Ritschl is Professor of History of Doctrine and Systematic Theology.

for in recent years we have maintained that it is not our task to transport European theology to the American scene. There seems to be a consensus that we should *learn* from the Europeans but no longer *copy* them if we want to *do* theology which is organically connected with the American mentality in general and the American Church in particular.

Having emphasized the European origin of the Reformation Confession Books, we examine our concrete question by breaking it down into two groups of special problems, one systematic-theological, the other historical. A simple list of these two blocks of problems will clarify our question and bring to light its implications.

A listing of basic *systematic-theological issues* will entail the following questions:

1. What is a Confession Book? Does it state what God in Christ has done and has promised to do, or does it formulate what the Christians are supposed to believe and to do? Is it a *creed* or a *program*, or are these theologically ultimately the same?

2. Who is supposed to *hear* the confession expressed in a Confession Book? Those who adhere to it, or other Christians too, or non-Christians?

3. If a Confession Book is the expression of one denomination's understanding of faith, is it *non-ecumenical* in intent, or is its theological intent *catholic* and only its *de jure* authority

limited to a denomination?

4. Are the sentences contained in a Confession Book of *juridical character* (like those of conciliar decisions and much of medieval theological language); and if so, would this not mean a clear departure from the "confessions" contained in the Bible?

5. Who can write a Confession Book: an individual (leading the Church into a new direction), or many Church representatives (expressing what the Church already stands for)?

6. Is not theology "by definition" *time-bound* to such great extent that Churches at later periods and in different places cannot "repeat" earlier confessions?

These dogmatical problems have been relevant constantly since the Reformation. The various Protestant denominations have answered them in different ways. But in addition to these dogmatical questions we today face some *historically conditioned problems*. They come into focus when we compare the 16th and early 17th centuries with our situation today:

1. With few exceptions the Churches of the Reformation were tied to certain territories; their Confession Books, consequently, bear the names of cities or countries. Our Churches today in America (and in Europe for that matter) no longer are structured in this fashion. The territorial jurisdiction and ecclesiastical apparatus of the Reformation century

have no parallel in America.

2. Connected with this simple observation is the most complex question: who in our modern world occupies the place of the emperor on the Continent or the king in England or France, or the magistrates in the various cities? Without such authorities these Confession Books would never have been written. In other words, the classical Confession Books presuppose what we today call the "Constantinian Era," an era in which absolutely everybody was considered a Christian, though often a Roman Catholic Christian, but nonetheless a Christian. This is certainly no longer true in our situation.

3. Again connected with this fact is the still more complicated question: can we today still assume that the theology of a denomination, even of a single congregation, can be formulated, i.e., articulated in written sentences which say precisely what they are supposed to say? Admittedly this is a controversial question, but most theologians here and in other countries would say today that we no longer can "use language" in this way. An indication of this is the generally accepted fact that neither the ruling bodies of our denominations nor our theological faculties can "define heresy" and "condemn heretics" with the same optimistic directness that characterized the actions of our ancestors in the Reformation Churches.

4. Protestant denominations in

America face a special problem because of the historical fact that America never "had a Reformation." Most of the denominations in this part of the world are continuations or prolongations of European denominational bodies. This would theoretically permit a given denomination in America today—many generations after its "re-founding" on this continent—to select freely from the great number of Reformation Confession Books whichever ones its members would like best. This freedom with regard to the Reformation tradition has its truly ecumenical aspects and problems, but there is no denying that the Churches which came out of the Reformation did not, as a matter of course, have this freedom. We must realize that this freedom constitutes a decisive difference between our denominations and the territorial Churches of 16th and 17th century Europe. (To the package of the "Confession of 1967" belongs the adoption of the Scots Confession, the Heidelberg Catechism and the Second Helvetic Confession; if not an ecumenical witness, this is at least a testimony that our denomination belongs to the Reformed family of Churches; but why just these three out of the more than sixty Reformed Confession Books?)

It is by asking these dogmatical and historically conditioned questions that the implications of our topic can be clarified. The classical Reforma-

tion Confession Books were meant to be a help and tool in the daily struggles of those by whom and for whom these books were written. Often they were a life necessity; for without them the worldly powers would not have permitted the juridical existence, worship, and teaching of the various branches of the Reformation Church. To us, however, the Reformation Confession Books often seem to be a burden, an unfortunate heritage which, in its historically conditioned heterogeneity, seems to create and perpetuate divisions within Protestantism, not to mention the perpetuation of anti-Roman Catholic sentiments. What then is the place of these European Confession Books of a time long past in today's Protestant denominations in America?

II

OUR EXAMINATION SO FAR has resulted in the emphasis on the enormous difference between the Reformation century in Europe and our time in America. But could it perhaps be that beneath the surface there is more of a similarity and inner connection between these two periods? Are the general theological reasons that prompted our fathers to write their Confession Books unacceptable or incomprehensible to us? If we no longer understand their reasons, then surely the Confession Books have no place in our time. If however, we

understand their motives and intents but find them unacceptable or inapplicable in our time and situation, it is by no means to be concluded that we can throw overboard the ancient Confession Books.

As already mentioned above, the idea of writing a Confession Book had grown out of the early Reformation movement. The reasons for their actual publication were largely political. This can be seen clearly in the history of the earliest Reformed Confessions, e.g., those of Zürich in 1523, and of Bern in 1528, but especially in the history of the origin of the most influential Lutheran Confession, the Augsburg Confession of 1530. Some lesser known written confessions of the (unfortunately) so-called pre-Reformation period may have paved the way to this development. It is generally agreed that the early Reformed and Lutheran Confessions were the expression of what these Churches actually believed (although individual theologians were the authors); the Confessions were *not programs*, telling the Church members what to believe. The 19th-century view that the Confession Books "founded" Churches and denominations has been refuted with good reasons, although of course in retrospect it often looks as though certain documents had initiated and preserved denominational structures. The better theologians in Reformation and post-Reformation times,

however, always knew that a group of congregations, a "demonination" as we call it today, does not "have" a confession but rather *is* part of the Church of Jesus Christ *in* its confession. A confession is by biblical-theological "definition" an *event* and not a possession. This insight is obscured, however, by the rather "legal" language, typical of most of the classical Confessions. The Lutherans, although being aware of the danger, tried not to make a difference between what we may call the "credo" part of a Confession and the "Church order" part. This was in keeping with the earliest tradition of the Early Church. *The Didache*, for example, does not differentiate between theological-credo sentences and practical instructions concerning the order of congregational life and worship. Only later developments show a split between the two. The Lutherans tried to avoid this. The Reformed, however, seem to have followed the tradition of the later Early Church by continuing the medieval Church's interest in legal structures and juridical propositions. They usually wrote two types of Confession Books, a proper "Confession" and a "Church Order." But both groups, the Lutherans and the Reformed, used legal language for the writing of their normative books.

Despite this basic similarity between the Lutheran and the Reformed Confession Books, there is an

interesting difference which, however, is not noticeable to the reader of one single Reformed Confession, but only to the historian who knows most or all of them: the Reformed Churches of the 16th century produced over sixty Confession Books whereas the Lutherans merely added explanatory books to their basic Confession, the Augsburg Confession. This is an important difference. It indicates that the Lutherans had a concept of the unity of the Church which demanded a unified and uniform theological formulation. The Augsburg Confession was (and still is) considered the basis; and the subsequent books are structured along the main topics of this basic document, serving as commentaries, amplifications and clarifications. The total sum of them is contained in the Book of Concord of 1580. The later parts of the collection reflect the controversies with other Protestant groups, such as certain Lutheran branches, and of course with the Reformed Churches. It is only natural that these documents are more technical-theological than the early Augsburg Confession, and this means that they are even more "propositional" and "legal" as far as the character of their language is concerned. Parts of their content are in fact so technical and specialized that many Lutheran Churches in later centuries (and today) almost disregard these later additions or at least ascribe to them a lesser degree of authority.

The Reformed, however, obviously had a different concept of the Church. This is partly due to the different political situation in the Western European countries, but nonetheless it is a theological difference. The Reformed Church bodies that came into being in various parts of Europe, especially Western Europe, but also Poland and Hungary, were familiar with the earliest Swiss Confessions, *but it never occurred to them to copy these confessions or to declare one of them to be the basic confession.* The Scottish Church, for instance, found her identity and theological integrity through the help of various Continental Confession Books, and her theologians praised these books and found nothing wrong in them, but they soon wrote their own confession! This attitude shows considerable theological responsibility and independence, but it is of course at the same time the origin of dangerous developments. Within one century the Reformed produced over sixty different Confession Books which were not meant to be in competition with each other. But this was unfortunately the seed for later divisions and splits. In fact no Protestant Church has seen in her historical development as many divisions and offshoots as has the Reformed Church. And this was possible although the Reformed had the chance to learn from the development of the Lutheran Church; for with the exception of

the Formula of Concord all Lutheran Confession Books were completed by the year 1555, but most of the Reformed Confessions were written in the decades following that year. This means that the Reformed knew what they were doing when they decided not to follow the Lutheran pattern of declaring one Book to be normative. And this must be understood as an expression of their concept of the Church: the Church is *not* divided by a multiplicity of confessions, but this multiplicity is a *necessity* since it is *theologically impossible* to adopt the earlier Confession of a Church body in another geographical area.

This, in turn, indicates what the original Reformed concept of a Confession Book is: a Confession does *not* lay down for good and forever a *principle* of doctrine which is to be accepted by other and later groups of Reformed congregations. This thought was already expressed by Ursinus, the co-author of the Heidelberg Catechism, when he said that a Confession is not laying down principles, but is a witness and "pointer" to the understanding of faith, an understanding which must be articulated in accordance with a given historical situation. One must not forget, however, that Luther had a similar insight when he explained in his essay "On Councils and Churches" in 1539 that each confession must be understood in its historical context.

Why then could it happen that

both the Lutherans and the Reformed despite these better insights treated their Confession Books as though they were "legal documents" expressing once and for all the correct understanding of the faith? For both groups did this in their own way, the Lutherans by declaring the Augsburg Confession to be the *norma normata* (further clarified in the later Confessions) as distinct from Scripture, the *norma normans* (—who really understands this difference?—), and the Reformed by absolutizing their particular historical Confession Books. Comparing, for instance, the Lutherans with the Presbyterians, we can observe that the former declared their *earliest* confession to be most important and normative, whereas the latter ascribed all dignity and authority to the *latest* of their confessions, the Westminster Confession.

This brief historical excursus has shown that both the Lutherans and the Reformed in their earliest history have by all means been aware of the theological impossibility of articulating the understanding of the Christian faith in once-and-for-all fixed terms, but that both Church bodies have nevertheless moved in this direction. The Confession Books themselves were written in rather "legal" and propositional language, probably because from their inception the earliest of them had to serve as instruments of defense and as bases for debates. This unfortunate histor-

ical inevitability invited later readers to assume that it is a theological necessity to lay down the normative understanding of the faith in legally binding documents, written in propositional language.

We conclude, then, that we today are by no means unable to understand why our fathers have written Confession Books. As members of Reformed or Lutheran Churches we appreciate and respect the reasons and intents that have led to the writing of these theological documents. Moreover, as members of a Reformed Church we are willing to learn from the early Reformed theologians what we should think of the function and task of a specific part of the Church in a specific geographical and historical situation. And more than this: we cannot disconnect ourselves from the content of the Confession Books which have been the witness of the early fathers of our historic denominations, as though we had nothing to do with their work, or as though there were no unity of the Church between past and present. (It is dangerous to think of the unity of the Church merely in the "horizontal" direction.) This understanding of our solidarity with the Reformed fathers, even with the particular authors of but one Confession (as unfortunate a development as this may be), does not mean that we must agree with all the points which they felt it necessary to stress in their particular time. By this I do

not mean that we should "select" from their works some passages which we will not "accept" and others which we will declare to be still "normative." Rather we should do what these fathers did themselves: learn from earlier confessions, taking them as truly catholic confession of faith *expressed in and by a particular part of the catholic Church* (a part with which we are intimately connected through historical development), and contribute our own confession. This will imply that we do precisely what these fathers did, namely leave out some of the emphases of earlier Confessions and add new ones. Naturally, the few decades during which the main Reformed Confession Books were written were the classical period of numerous formulations and re-formulations of "justification by faith." After many centuries, we today will not merely rearrange the structure of the earlier Confessions or re-formulate what they have said; rather we will be forced to concentrate on topics that were entirely left out by the 16th and 17th century theologians, such as ethics and ecclesiology. But this approach is well in line with what they themselves had done on a smaller scale within the period of a few decades.

III

HAVIDING ANSWERED THE QUESTION whether we today can understand, ap-

preciate, and respect the intentions and actual formulations of the authors of early Confession Books, though without copying or merely repeating these formulations, we must raise the difficult question whether the *form* of a Confession Book is perhaps obsolete. There is no doubt that the classical books were a novelty in the history of the Church. The early and medieval Church lived for many centuries without such confessional books. The so-called symbols of the Early Church have little in common with the confessional books of the Reformation era. Not only were they much shorter and centered around the Trinity rather than the doctrine of justification, but the primary difference is in the original purpose of the early symbols: they were intended to be understood "doxologically," i.e., used primarily in worship—although at a later time they received recognition as dogmatical formulations. Of the various Churches that came out of the 16th century Reformation, only the Anglican Communion has preserved this insight in the organic and original connection between theological "statements" and worship. *The Book of Common Prayer* truly serves as a Confession Book.

The decision of the Lutheran and Reformed theologians to write carefully-worded theological documents may appear problematical if seen in the light of the total history of the Church. If it is true that a "confes-

sion" in the original sense is an *event* (e.g., like Peter's confession which was literally addressed to Jesus himself as an *answer* to Jesus' person and work in general and to his question in particular), do we have the right to cast our confession in the form of a written, theological *document*? Moreover, if it is true, as I Cor. 12:3 says, that no one can confess "Jesus is Lord, except in the Holy Spirit," the undertaking of formulating a kind of "essence of the biblical message" must appear as highly problematical. But the idea of formulating a "summary" seems to be a necessary part of the definition of a written confession. Already Luther said this when he spoke of a *summa doctrinae fidei* in his Larger Catechism; and the Formula of Concord (preface to Epitome) speaks of Confession Books as "the layman's Bible"! The Reformed did not disagree with this; although theoretically they were more reluctant than the Lutherans to assign Scripture-like place of authority to the Confession Books, practically they often did nothing short of this (especially the Presbyterians whose estimation of the Westminster Standards is much higher than the European Reformed Churches' attitude toward their Confessions).

Despite the Reformers' concentration on the doctrine of justification, and the subsequent interest in this doctrine, the Confession Books attempted to do more than merely

stress and expound this central biblical message. Had they only done this, we could categorize the confessional documents as proclamations and explications of but one much neglected and ill-conceived biblical insight, highly necessary to be brought to light in that particular time of Church history. To understand this would not present any problems at all, and we today could simply say that we too must stress in an appropriate form whatever must be brought to light in *our* time. But the Confession Books indeed present more than this one emphasis. There must have been—rightly or wrongly—an awareness that the *whole* doctrinal apparatus of the Church needs revision and re-interpretation. Consequently the authors of these books, though neglecting some important *loci*, really attempted to rewrite the theology of the Church, presenting truly what they directly or indirectly had learned from Melanchthon, a *summa doctrinae fidei*. It may be that it was really the task of these men to attempt this enormous theological work; and if it was, then the century of the Reformation is indeed qualitatively in some way parallel to the century during which the New Testament was written. But few Protestant theologians would advocate this view, especially today when we are made aware of genuine theological and congregational activities in the Roman Catholic Church, of which genera-

tions of Protestants had such a dim view. In other words, although we can *understand* that and why the fathers of the Reformation attempted to rewrite the whole theology of the Church, we are amazed at their self-confidence and optimism that they were able to accomplish such. Leaving open the historically meaningless question as to whether they should or should not have attempted this task in the first place, we must admit that we today certainly do not feel able or obliged to plan a repetition of this most daring enterprise.

We now face an unpleasant dilemma. On the one hand we concluded that we can and must do precisely what the authors of the classical documents did: learn from earlier Confessions and respect them, and add our own confessions to them, though stressing different *loci*. And on the other hand we expressed severe doubts as to the possibility and theological legitimacy of formulating "the whole theology" in form of a document. We are probably left with but one alternative: we ought to resist the temptation of re-writing the whole of theology, either by making the product a substitute or an addition to our inherited Confession Book or Books, and we should restrict our theological and confessional activities to work on *specific* issues, such as "basic human rights," peace and war, food distribution, international relations, ecumenical

contacts—in short, to ethical questions seen in relation to the task of the Church. By doing this we will not claim that these *loci* exhaustively circumscribe the total confession or even the task of the Church; but we will indicate that these are the areas which have been badly neglected by both Christians and non-Christians, and that this neglect can no longer be tolerated in the light of our "total confession," although we admit that at this time we are unable to articulate this total confession in the form of a written document.

This approach is suggested not only by our obvious "theological helplessness," so typical today of the various Protestant denominations and also of large quarters of the Roman Catholic Church. Another reason also supports this deliberate self-restriction: we no longer face the need of stating "all of our beliefs" to be critically evaluated by worldly rulers, such as emperors, kings, or magistrates, with whom we disagree but who by definition are "Christian," and who have the right to permit or to forbid our existence. This situation may exist elsewhere in the world, but it certainly does not exist in America at this time. The classical Confession Book was only possible during the "Constantinian Era," and that means the era before the Enlightenment when the traditional territorial and parochial structure of the Protestant Churches collapsed, and when the

optimism regarding the possibility of articulating a unified theology began to disappear.

There seems to be a consensus among responsible Protestant theologians today that we cannot afford to disconnect ourselves from our confessional heritage. In fact the more ecumenically minded churchmen have recognized during the past few decades that true ecumenical work, i.e., mutual confidence and understanding, even "confidence beyond understanding," is possible only for Churches that are aware of and faithful to their confessional heritage. Moreover, there seems to be an increasing awareness that our task today consists of facing the *specific* issues that trouble our fellowmen in the broadest sense of the word, not merely our fellow-Christians. The Church's "confession" is needed in these specific areas, and this confession will at least partly consist of confessing our sins and omissions. It is a strange and unique mark of the Church that she is called to confess in one and the same breath her omissions of the past and new directions for the future. This doubleness creates an enormous tension, both inside the Church and in the minds of those non-Christians who try to understand us.

Thus completely new insights seem to begin shaping our theological thinking today. We are no longer unaware of the unique his-

torical situation which certainly never existed before: that Christians and non-Christians alike face the same questions, although they give different answers. In other words, our time is unique in that Christians (hopefully of all denominations), humanists, Communists, psychiatrists, *et al.* are deeply concerned with the same questions and problems: peace, food for the world, birth control, housing, labor, etc. These *questions concerning man* seem to unite mankind today, and this is the most positive result of the end of the Constantinian era although there is no denying that the *answers* to these questions still create the deepest divisions in mankind.

It is in the realm of these questions that we today must make our "confession." We will do this in the awareness that we cannot and should not separate ourselves from our denominational heritage, but we will also hope that Churches of different denominational traditions will not produce different "confessions" concerning the present issues on account of their different heritage. This is to say that the traditional divisions of the Reformation century perhaps no longer constitute the decisive differences between Christians. Our "specific confessions" concerning the present issues will draw new lines of separation through the Protestant Churches, even through the Protestant and the Catholic Churches. When we

nevertheless make these "specific confessions," we do it not with the intent to exclude from the Church the ethically and politically uninterested or "reactionary" members; but we do it *in the hope that what we now confess is vicariously valid for the whole Catholic Church.* All confessions, the all-embracing Confession Books of the Reformation as well as our specific confessions, are proposed *in hope* and not in the naive certainty that they express today what all members of God's household actually stand for. In this sense we can say that confessions are always of "catholic dimensions" although they were written by a minority within the Church, either by a particular denomination (as in Reformation times) or by a particular group which may be composed of members of various denominations.


IV

BY WAY OF SUMMARIZING we can say that the present Protestant denominations in America will probably always express their solidarity with their European ancestors and consequently will honor particular Confession Books. But they will be aware of the important historical and theological differences between the Reformation century in Europe and their present situation on the other side of the Atlantic. They will feel free to

"enlarge" their confessional basis by declaring publicly that they have recognized the authority and strength of some Confession Books which in the past they have neglected to take seriously and to honor as part of their tradition. They will feel compelled to follow the pattern set by the Reformation fathers themselves of adding new confessional statements to the ancient documents, realizing that each time in history presents new tasks for the Church and demands new articulations of these tasks. But the present Protestant denominations should restrict their confessional statements to what we have called "specific confessions," accepting the fact without lamentations and fear that at this time in history we are not in the position to formulate anew the whole list of theological *loci*, such as Christology, justification, hermeneutics, the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, the doctrine of God, and the like. If we nevertheless tried to attempt this, the product would in all probability be either a repetition of what our fathers have already said, or it would have to be a compromise version of what a theological committee "feels" to be the average opinion of all the members of the denomination, necessarily disregarding the many open questions and unanswered problems with which academic theology concerns itself at this time.

The Authority of the Bible as Reflected In the Proposed Confession of 1967

by WILLIAM F. ORR*



THE NEW CONFESSION now being considered by the Church for possible adoption in 1967 expressly accepts the historic reformed confessions, such as the Heidelberg Catechism, Scots Confession, the Second Helvetic Confession, and the Westminster Confession, together with the

modern Confession of the Church of Germany called the Theological Declaration of Barmen. In all of these, statements concerning the Scriptures are made which are not repudiated by the new Confession, but rather are accepted. Any discussion of the paragraphs on the Bible in the new Confession,¹ therefore, must bear in mind the Protestant emphasis upon the unique authority of the Bible already specified in these various historic confessional statements. However, in view of the new situation produced by the development of science in the last 400 years and by the tremendous growth of historical study of the ancient civilizations which surrounded the land of Israel, it is deemed advisable by those who have formulated the new statement to make some affirmations about the Scripture for the modern world.

The paragraphs on the Bible affirm that "Jesus Christ is the Word of God Incarnate and the one sufficient revelation of God." This seems to me to make a valuable shift from the

Dr. Orr is Professor of New Testament Literature and Exegesis, and is the senior professor of the faculty.

Proposed Confession of 1967, Part I, Sec. III, Par. B.

older emphasis upon the written Scriptures to an emphasis upon the living Christ as the sufficient and unique revelation of God. In fact, in the New Testament, the term *the Word of God* refers to Jesus Christ in the prologue to the Gospel of John, in the first chapter of the First Epistle of John, and probably in the sixth chapter of Hebrews. Wherever the term *Word of God* is employed in the Book of Acts and Epistles of Paul, it usually refers to the message of the Gospel, which is spoken by the apostles as they evangelize the pagan world. So far as I have been able to discover, the term *Word of God* is never, I believe, identified with the Scripture.

JESUS IS CALLED the Word of God in John 1:1f. "In the beginning was the Word and the Word was with God and the Word was God." And 1:14, "the Word became flesh and made his dwelling among us." Rev. 19:13, "his name was called, the Word of God." In Hebrews 4:12, "for the Word of God is active and sharper than every double-edged sword, and piercing into the division of life and spirit, of joints and marrow, and (is) the judge of the thoughts and purposes of the heart; and no creation is hidden before him but all things are laid bare and exposed to his eyes, about whom our message speaks." Here, just as in the other passages, the Word of God is

not the Scriptures, but a personal Being who operates in the consciousness of men and who has eyes to see all things laid bare. This is undoubtedly the living Christ. 1 John 1:1f. identifies the word of life with the manifest or revealed life that we saw and heard. The author is referring to Jesus whose earthly career grants to us life eternal. He is, therefore, the Word of life.

References to the Scripture in the NT generally employ terms like "the Law and the Prophets," the "Scripture," the Logia or oracles, and the Prophetic writings. The paragraph in the New Confession follows NT usage when it states that the Church has recognized the Old and New Testaments as Holy Scriptures. The function of the Holy Scriptures in the NT is (1) to preserve the law or the commandments of God; (2) to convict men of sin and to expose their condition of guilt; (3) to describe God's dealings with Israel under the Covenant with Abraham and with Moses on Mt. Sinai as a preparation for and contrast to God's dealings with men under the new Covenant ratified by Jesus Christ; (4) to serve as a *pedagogue* to lead us to Christ; and (5) to anticipate by prophetic insight the salvation which God works in Christ's life, death, and resurrection. Also the NT preaching employs the OT as a means of commanding monotheism to the pagan world and of condemning various

kinds of social corruption and iniquities that existed among the Gentiles.

ALLUSIONS TO THE OT as the Law, or the Law and the Prophets, or the Law, the Prophets, and the Psalms are exhibited in the following references. "I came not to abolish the law or the prophets" (Matt. 5:17). "Not one iota shall pass from the law" (Matt. 5:18). "This is the law and the prophets" (Matt. 7:12). Here we have an instance of an allusion to the law and the prophets which reduces them all to one basic principle: "all things whatsoever you will that men do to you, you shall do to them, likewise." The statement that the Golden Rule is the Law and the Prophets is equivalent to affirming that you may regard all of the miscellaneous commandments of the law and all the teaching of the prophets to consist in the injunction to treat other men as you would like to be treated. This certainly does not exhibit any slavish literalism or insistence upon following the detailed specifications of the OT but rather as a sovereign reduction to their fundamental principle. Many biblicalists of his day were highly offended by Jesus' freedom in so dealing with the Scriptures.

"The prophets and the law prophesied until John" (Matt. 11:13). "Did you not read in the law that the priests profane the Sabbath in the temple?" (Matt. 12:5). "As it has been written in the law of the Lord"

(Luke 2:23). "What has been written in the law; how do you read?" (Luke 10:25). "The things that have been written in the law of Moses and the prophets and the Psalms concerning me" (Luke 24:44). "Whom Moses in the law and the prophets described" (John 1:45). "In your law it has been written" (John 8:17). "Has it not been written in your law that I said you are gods?" (John 10:34). These two verses are instances of Christ's reference to a law as belonging to his opponents. A similar passage is found in John 15:25, "But in order that the word which is written in their law might be fulfilled 'they hated me without cause'." The use of the second and third personal possessive pronoun indicates a separation between Jesus and his opponents in which he consigns the law to them and seems to remove himself from their sphere. Also the last two verses share an interesting feature of quoting from the Psalms while entitling the book from which they quote "the law." "Does not the law say these things? In the law of Moses it has been written, you shall not muzzle the ox that treads the grain" (1 Cor. 9:8). "In the law it has been written, I spoke to this people with foreign languages and foreign lips" (1 Cor. 14:21). This is another instance of calling a book outside the Pentateuch "the Law," for the quotation is taken from Isaiah 28.

The Scriptures are called the *Logia* or the words of God in Romans 3:2, "What is the advantage of the Jew? first that the oracles (or words) of God were entrusted to them." The law is called the *logia* or oracles in Acts 7:38, "This is what happened in the congregation in the desert while the angels were speaking to him on Mount Sinai who received living oracles to give to us." An interesting variation in the usage of the word *logia* is found in 1 Peter 4:11, "If anyone speaks as speaking oracles of God." This injunction bids the readers when they speak in the church to speak God's words rather than their own, which would imply the spirit-guidance of the speakers, and would equate in value what was said in the churches by those so guided with the ancient words of the Scripture.

THE NT MOST OFTEN REFERS to the OT as the Scripture or it cites passages from the OT with the introduction "it has been written." The word Scripture itself is a Latin translation of the Greek word *γραφη*, both of which mean, *that which has been written*. There are 51 uses of this word to refer to the OT. Obviously, the writers of the OT distinguished the *Scriptures which had been written down from the Word of God which came to the various prophets*. In the

OT the phrase "word of God" is never used to describe a book² or a collection of books, but is used for the communication made by God to the mind of the prophet. The word of God always comes to this-or-that prophet. The book written may quote what the word of God communicated, or it may describe the situation of the prophet receiving the communication or of the people to whom the message was to be proclaimed. But there is a careful scruple about calling the book the word of God. This seems to rest upon the conviction that God communicated with certain men on special occasions in a manner which is like a speech, an address, or a conversation. It is his message so conveyed to the prophet which has divine authority. There is no suggestion anywhere that the narratives which describe the history of events that furnish the occasion for God's word to speak to the prophets were themselves part of the word of God. In fact, in historical books like Judges and 1 Kings, the authority for the facts given is usually some other book that is referred to under the formula "are not these things written in such-and-such chronicles of the kings of Israel and Judah." It is a confusion of biblical categories to label the whole collection of volumes as the word of God when the Bible itself

²Except for references to the law as the "book of the Law" in Deuteronomy and to a book the contents of which are communicated by a vision as in the book of Daniel.

carefully refrains from doing so.

God is regarded in the book of Hebrews, *passim*, as speaking by David, and various prophets. The Psalms, being poetry, were written *seriatim* under the divine *afflatus*, and verses taken from them could be attributed to God.³

The term "prophetic writings" is found in Romans 16:25f, "According to the revelation of the mystery which had been kept silent for eternal ages but has now been made manifest and has been made known by means of prophetic writings, according to the commandment of the eternal God for obedience of faith to all the Gentiles." Here an ambiguity confronts us concerning the relationship of the phrase "of prophetic writings" to the rest of the sentence. The connective *τε* seems to separate the phrase from the clause "which has now been made manifest," and connects it with the clause "has been made known according to the commandment of the eternal God." This recent information has been disclosed to all the Gentiles. Therefore the prophetic writings may mean contemporary writings of Christian prophets, or it may refer to Christian understanding of the Hebrew prophetic writings. In either case the prophetic writings enable the Gentiles to understand a mystery which had been concealed throughout

eternal ages. In case they are the OT prophets, what has now been revealed is that to which the prophets bear witness, namely, Jesus Christ and the Gospel to the Gentiles. In case they were contemporary writings of Christian prophets, we don't know what books are referred to.

The other instance of the term "prophetic word" is found in 2 Peter 1:19f, "And we hold the prophetic word to be more firm, and you will do well if you give heed to it as to a lamp shining in a dark place until the day shines forth and the morning star rises in your hearts. We know this that every prophecy of Scripture does not come into being from a private interpretation, for the prophecy then was not carried (*or borne*) by the will of a man, but men who were supported by the Holy Spirit spoke from God." In this passage the readers are enjoined to give attention to the prophetic word as to a bright and shining light that will illuminate us until the great day of light at the rising of the morning star in our hearts. Now the term "prophetic word" appears to refer back to the previous paragraph that describes the transfiguration of Jesus in which the word came from the majestic glory: "This is my beloved Son in whom I have been well pleased." The first point to notice is that the prophetic

³I owe this reference to the book of Hebrews to the kind suggestion of Dr. Douglas Hare.

word here is one which witnesses to Jesus Christ and was spoken to the disciples. The writer of the epistle affirms that this word is to be our light until we get more illumination at the dawning of the final light. Then he proceeds to affirm that every prophetic writing does not come into being from a private interpretation but from the fact that men spoke as they were supported by the Holy Spirit. Here too is a doctrine that the prophets spoke the word of God and that they did not receive this word as a result of their own private interpretation of God's nature and purpose, or by accepting the purpose or will of any man. The support of God is hereby assigned to what the prophets "said," not to what was written. It affirms that the writing down was made possible because God had previously supplied the prophets with his word which they should speak. It affirms nothing about the writing itself. Undoubtedly the presupposition is that the writing is a faithful reproduction of the message of the prophets. Incidentally this passage has been used by Roman Catholics to justify the necessity of ecclesiastical interpretation of the Scripture over against private interpretation. However, if our understanding of the passage is correct, the Roman Catholics are just as mistaken in their understanding of it as the old ortho-

dox Protestants have been. The Protestants have affirmed that this passage asserts the divine support by the Spirit of the *writing* of the prophecy, which is in no way indicated in the text, while the Roman Catholics refer the phrase "private interpretation" to the *present understanding* of the prophetic writing while the text refers it to the original occurrence of this writing. Dr. Gerstner's broadside assertions that the Bible supports its own inspiration in over 3000 places and his further claim that this biblical inspiration is to be equated with inerrancy has precisely no support in the Scripture and even such texts as this in 2 Peter which have always been used to support such arguments turn out to mean something entirely different.* The New Confession follows this NT procedure by affirming that the OT is received as Holy Scriptures, bears witness to God's faithfulness to Israel, and points the way for the fulfillment of his purpose in the Jew, Jesus of Nazareth.

IN THE NT various references are made to the tradition of the apostles. For example, St. Paul states in 1 Cor. 15 that he is delivering to the people what he himself received from the Lord. This tradition that he received evidently came by way of the original Apostles. The Gospel of Luke refers to the "things that have been handed

*Cf. footnote 5 *infra*, p. 25.

down among us by those who from the beginning had become eyewitnesses and servants of the Word." Here the term "the Word" obviously refers to the life of Jesus Christ. Likewise in the First Epistle of John, the introduction states: "What we have seen and heard, we announce also to you." The object of these verbs is specified more in detail in the first two verses which say: "What was from the beginning, what we heard, what we have seen with our eyes, what we have beheld and what our hands have touched concerning the Word of Life, when the Life was made public and we have seen and now testify and announce to you, eternal life which was with the Father and which has been made manifest to us." This indicates that the original witnesses observed the Word of Life with their eyes and with their ears and felt it with their hands. The Word of Life, therefore, is Jesus Christ, whose life and Gospel are announced by the original witnesses. The New Confession follows this strain of the NT by saying that "the New Testament is the recorded testimony of Apostles to the coming of Jesus Christ."

The various writers of the NT also refer in different ways to the sending of the Spirit. The Spirit in the Gospel of John is to bring the believers into all Truth. In 2 Cor. 3 the Spirit is the instrument by which the letter of Christ is written on the heart, and the

Spirit is the agent of the New Covenant definitely contrasted with the Letter of the Old Covenant, so that the ministry of the Spirit possesses a glory far above that of the ancient Law. When the Law is read apart from the Spirit, it is covered by a veil which prevents the readers from understanding that it has been abolished by Christ (2 Cor. 3:14). This means that the written word is not to be taken as the ultimate revelation but it is to be seen as a witness to the new life guided by the Spirit of the Lord. Thus the New Confession follows the guide of the NT when it affirms that "God's Word is spoken in his church today where the Scriptures are faithfully preached and attentively read in dependence on the guidance of the Holy Spirit and with readiness to receive their truth and direction."

Furthermore in the NT wherever the various books of the OT are referred to, they are mentioned as the writings of Moses, the Prophets, David, Isaiah, Jeremiah, or other men. When prophecies are referred to, these are often described as spoken by the agency of such-and-such men. The Scriptures are not directly the Words of God but rather the words of various men that convey the message of God to believers. The New Confession follows this NT procedure by stating that the "Words of the Scriptures are the words of men, conditioned by the language,

thought-forms, literary fashions of the places and times at which they were written." This statement acknowledges what all biblical scholars have recognized since the time of Luther: that in order to understand the Scriptures we have to learn the Hebrew and Aramaic languages and we have to study the types of prose and poetry which were current in the times of the books. It is necessary for us to employ various kinds of word studies and to examine the methods of drawing conclusions from facts which were fashionable in the days of Israel; and it is likewise imperative that we compare the various types of literature in the Bible with the literature of the Babylonians, Egyptians, and ancient Phoenicians whose works have been dug up in modern times. The necessity of acknowledging these facts has become more imperative as discoveries in these various literatures have been greatly extended in recent times.

Furthermore the NT regards the contents of the OT as time-conditioned in many respects. For example, Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount contrasts the way of life in the Kingdom of God with that specified by the Law in six different items, of which, in at least two cases, he cancels out express statements of the Law (the *Lex Talionis* and the Law of Divorce). According to the Gospel of Mark, second chapter, Jesus by one word cancelled out all the ancient

specifications concerning clean and unclean food. According to the vision granted to Peter, God has cleansed all men; and Peter is therefore to regard nothing as unclean that God has cleansed. This involves an annulment of all the laws referring to ceremonial uncleanness in the OT. The Book of Hebrews indicates that the entire sacrificial system of the OT was merely a shadow and not even a likeness of the reality revealed in Christ (Heb. 10:1). It was temporary and pedagogical. Now all these statements indicate that various instructions of the OT, which in their original form are given as eternal ordinances, are in fact subject to annulment or radical revision in light of the revelation of God in Christ. This certainly justifies the statement of the New Confession that "the Scriptures reflect views of life, history and the cosmos that were then current." While the NT does not specifically affirm that the OT views of the cosmos are subject to revision, our knowledge of the universe and space which has developed since Copernicus requires the recognition that the biblical cosmology reflects ideas which were accepted throughout the ancient Near East.

Nevertheless, in all of these respects, the NT affirms or implies that the Scriptures acquaint us with the true God, his own personal being, his will, and the certain coming of his Kingdom. Temporary forms and time-conditioned ethical principles in

the Bible do not diminish the value of the Bible as the means by which God deals with men. The New Confession accordingly affirms that the variety of such views found in the Bible shows that God has communicated with men in diverse cultural conditions. By honestly recognizing the diversity of the views in the Bible and the interlocking relationship of these views on a human level with the various cultural patterns and forms of the ancient world the New Confession can affirm all the more confidently that God may continue to speak through the Bible to men in the modern world which has a culture entirely different from that of the ancient world. If the thought-forms and cultural patterns taken for granted in the Bible be identified directly with the Word of God, then as these thought-forms are antiquated, the Word of God is likewise antiquated. But by seeing that God uses varieties of thought-forms to communicate himself with men, we can also receive his communication to us in the twentieth century.

So far as I can see, those critics of the Confession who are attacking it as heretical or inadequate have read it with eyes prejudiced by the form of words prevalent in the seventeenth century rather than with eyes illuminated by the actual witness of the NT

and by the facts forced upon our attention by modern sciences and history.

ALL OF US are concerned with having a biblical confession. I am personally convinced that the New Confession summarizes in a remarkably comprehensive manner all of the basic teachings of the Bible concerning itself, better than any previous statement has done. As is so often the case, people who profess to speak for the Bible do so without taking the trouble to find out what the Bible actually says. One of the critics whose words are sharper and more belligerent than any others I have seen is a member of our own faculty, Dr. John Gerstner. In an article in *Christianity Today*,⁵ Dr. Gerstner concludes by stating, "This Creed is anything but sound. We appeal to them no less than all others when we urge them in the name of Christ whom we all profess to love to rescind this Confession before it becomes an indelible blemish on the eschutcheon of the Church." Such an employment of purple rhetoric is more of an evidence of the eloquence of the author than of the prudence with which he condemns the New Confession. The entire article is written in a spirit that assumes that the author is more capable of decreeing what is sound and what is un-

⁵Volume X, No. 5 (Dec. 3, 1965), p. 11. This article has appeared as an appendix to Dr. Gerstner's *A Bible Inerrancy Primer* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1965), pp. 54-62.

sound than the committee who had been authorized by the General Assembly to do what they did. Furthermore, he insinuates that the committee, while being more honest than previous theologians whom Dr. Gerstner disapproves of, is still guilty of lack of candor. He states that an ambiguity in the Confession permits "adherents to the Westminster Confession of Faith to remain in the church in good conscience." This, if it means anything, must mean that the opponents of the Creed can really find nothing in its actual statements that would prevent them from accepting it if it is adopted. If this is true, then the only thing the critic can attack is what he regards as the probable intention of the Committee.

Whenever a Creed is adopted by a Church, no one is committed to any intention or lack of intention in the minds of committees but is committed to the meaning of the words adopted. Consequently, Dr. Gerstner is battling straw men when he attacks probable intentions. But he still implies that "heresies may lurk in the shadows of vague language but all of them have not yet dared to come to the light." Though his actual sentence does not affirm that heresies lurk in the shadows, it appears to imply that they do; and he seems to be affirming that the only reason they were not more openly avowed is the cowardice of the framers of the Confession. In my opinion it is not Christian charity

nor even ordinary justice to insinuate the existence of heresies that have not been publicly proclaimed and to imply that the concealed heresies are being kept under wraps because of fear.

Another method employed in this article is to attack the Confession as a Creed which implies no idea of inspiration. The fact of the matter is that the Confession is based on accepting the fact that the doctrine of inerrancy is now being discarded, but it does not affirm that the Scriptures are not inspired. Dr. Gerstner affirms that the Scripture in 3000 places supports its own inspiration and also that the doctrine of inspiration can only mean the inerrancy of the Scriptures. Now I have taken the trouble to check through the Old and New Testaments and have looked up all of the passages in the Bible which use the terms Word of God, Holy Scripture, Prophetic Writing, It Has Been Written, The Law, The Prophets, The Prophetic Writings, etc. I don't know how many such passages there are but I think there would be well over 800. I have found in no one of them any statement about the collection of books as a whole with the exception of the 51 references in the NT to "the Scripture," which obviously means the OT. In none of these is it affirmed that the Scripture contains no errors. In practically all of them, the authority of God is assigned to The Law and the messages of the prophets, the

words of Jesus Christ, the Gospel concerning Christ, and the Good News that the Gentiles may freely receive the Gospel by faith, which is proclaimed by authorized Apostles. (It should be noted that Paul differentiates between his own opinion on the matters concerning marriage in 1 Cor. 7 and the Word of the Lord, which was spoken by Jesus. Also his apostolicity which gives authority to the Gospel revealed to him does not preserve him from forgetting how many people he has baptized, nor does it prevent him from stating as a fact what he recognizes a minute later was a mistake [1 Cor. 1].)

When our New Confession affirms that the Scripture witnesses to Christ and the Holy Spirit, to the faithfulness of God to Israel and to the fulfillment of his purpose in the Jew, Jesus of Nazareth, it is simply stating in a few sentences the real drift of all the statements about the Scripture in the NT. Therefore when Dr. Gerstner affirms that the New Confession denies the inspiration of the Bible because, as I claim, it confines itself to summarizing what the Bible itself teaches about itself, then he, it seems to me, must affirm that the Bible itself denies its own inspiration. For if the Confession must use phrases and words that are stronger than those the Scripture itself uses in order to profess the doctrine of inspiration, then the Scripture is like-

wise defective.

He then castigates the writers of the Confession for mishandling the Scripture when they affirm that the Scripture witnesses God's faithfulness to Israel. To display the incompleteness of this statement, he quotes from Hosea that God will "no more have pity on the house of Israel to forgive them at all." Dr. Gerstner neglects to give the sequel in the prophets Isaiah and Jeremiah who say over and over again, in effect, "God will bring Judah and Israel back and will restore them." If anybody has taken a verse out of context and has ignored the rest of the prophetic teaching about Israel, it would seem to be our learned colleague. Worse than this is his quotation from Romans 11:22, "Note then the kindness and severity of God, severity to those who have fallen but God's kindness to you, provided you continue in his kindness; otherwise you, too, will be cut off." The employment of this verse has in mind a proof that the committee has overlooked the fact that Israel had fallen and thus God has rejected it. But again, the critic commits the crime which he charges against the committee, for he overlooks what follows in Chapter 11:25ff: (1) that a hardness of a partial kind has happened to Israel until the fulness of the Gentiles comes in; (2) that "all Israel will be saved," (3) that they of Israel are now enemies according to the Gospel for your sake but they

are beloved for the sake of the Fathers according to election; and (4) "God has shut up all to disobedience in order that he may have mercy on all." It seems to me that no more blatant instance could be provided of a non-biblical doctrine than the doctrine of God's rejection of Israel in the face of the statements in Romans 11:26-32, and that the verse quoted by Dr. Gerstner to refute the Confessional assertion of God's faithfulness to Israel leads precisely into the Pauline assertion of the same doctrine.

Dr. Gerstner expresses dissatisfaction with the following statement in the Confession: "God's Word is spoken to his church today where the Scriptures are faithfully preached and attentively read in dependence on the guidance of the Holy Spirit and with readiness to receive their truth and direction." By a kind of legerdemain which dazzles and baffles the reader, Dr. Gerstner discovers in these words evidence that the Church is hereby made dependent upon the inspiration of a Committee. "Having dispensed with inspiration of the Bible, we must now look to the inspiration of a Committee. We are sure that this Committee does not think it is the only inspired Committee. There must be other Committees also, alas. If anything is likely to awaken the Church to its real danger, it will be the realization that once we have done away with Holy Scripture-Holy Spirit, in

the vacuum thereby created we must have an infinite series of Holy Committees!" It is impossible to imagine a more complete *non sequitur* than these sentences. One feels that our learned colleague is engaging in some sort of theological mockery whereby he is trying to see if anyone read the paper closely enough to detect this total irrelevance and whether he can get by with an accusation against the Committee which has no connection whatever with anything the Committee has said. He evidently justifies these conclusions by the following devious line of argument: Whatever the committee says in this Confession, it does not mean. This is especially true when the Committee says anything which is true and Christian (as it does in these words which have "the form of sound doctrine"). Therefore when the Committee affirms that "God's Word is spoken today where the Scriptures are faithfully preached—in dependence on the guidance of the Holy Spirit"—it really means that there is no Holy Spirit or his guidance must be singled out by the action of a Committee. How the affirmation that preaching and listening to the Scriptures may occur under the guidance of the Holy Spirit requires a conclusion that we must have an infinite series of Holy Committees to tell us when this occurs is beyond me.

The entire paragraph consists of nothing but logical pyrotechnics

which send off sparks and colored lights but have no shells, or it is nothing but shadowboxing against phantoms of his own imagination. If this sentence in the Confession involves the sinister consequences that Dr. Gerstner infers, then every reference to the guidance of the Holy Spirit who leads us into all truth likewise requires some Committee or Committee-series to inform us when the guidance is real. As a matter of fact, any Confession adopted by any Church which makes any statements about God, God's action, or God's Word, is subject to the same kind of alarmed complaint.

We will conclude by affirming that Dr. Gerstner himself has revised the Confession of Faith while failing to acknowledge that he has done so. It happens to be a fact that this particular revision has never been accepted by any Committee or by any General Assembly of any church. And the bad thing about it is that he either intentionally or unintentionally conceals the fact that it is a revision. He states that the "Westminster Confession identified the Word of God with the original text of the Canonical Books." I presume this means the text as it was first written down by the writers. Then, of course, the text as we now have it, having been copied by generations of scribes, is known to contain various errors. And Dr. Gerstner, believes, as I understand it, in the inerrancy and full inspiration only of

the original text. This is a position which several Protestant Orthodox theologians have adopted after they had to face the results of textual criticism, and is consequently a nineteenth-century doctrine rather than a doctrine of the Confession of Faith. The Confession of Faith makes no statement about "an original text." What it refers to is the OT in Hebrew and the NT in Greek, which are immediately inspired by God and by his singular care and providence kept pure in all the ages. Now this affirms that the Hebrew text of the OT and the Greek of the New which was known to the Westminster divines was immediately inspired by God because it was identical with the first text that God had kept pure in all the ages. The idea that there are mistakes in the Hebrew Massoretic texts or in the *textus receptus* of the NT was unknown to the authors of the Confession of Faith since none of the manuscripts of ancient times which reveal these mistakes had been discovered. Dr. Gerstner would have improved his own reputation for fidelity to the Confession of Faith or to his clamant insistence upon complete honesty in presentation of one's theological convictions if he had been candid enough to affirm that he, too, accepts a revision of Westminster doctrine. But the same logic which compels the recognition of transmissional errors, likewise compels the recognition of such features of the

Scripture as are acknowledged in the fourth paragraph of the New Confession's statement on the Bible. This time the recognition should be made openly and honestly by the Church as a revision of the Confession of Faith rather than surreptitiously introduced by some theologians without acknowledging that the revision has taken place. I feel that the opponents of the Confession would do themselves and the Church more good if they would take time really to read this Confession and to read the Bible and try to absorb its basic spirit

rather than to spend their time attempting to create a new division in the Church and to cast aspersions on those whom the Church officially appointed to carry out this task. These are none the less aspersions, despite his gracious testimony to the fact that "One member of the Committee . . . appears to be one of the most sincere Christians we have ever had the privilege of knowing." For the benefit of our readers we add that this committeeman must be our own Dr. Markus Barth.

The Concept of Reconciliation in the Proposed Confession of 1967

by GEORGE H. KEHM*

UNQUESTIONABLY the central, unifying theme of C67¹ is its doctrine of reconciliation. "God's reconciling work in Jesus Christ and the mission of reconciliation to which he has called his church are the heart of the Gospel in any age. . . . Accordingly this Confession of 1967 is built upon that theme" (lines 34-38). The structure of the confession clearly reflects this intention. It begins (on line 39) with a paraphrase of 2 Corinthians 5:18f, which summarizes what C67 wants to confess. "In Jesus Christ God was reconciling the world to himself. Jesus Christ is God with man. He is present in the church by his Holy Spirit to continue and complete the work of reconciliation" (ll. 40-43). Consistent with this affirmation, the three main parts of the confession are entitled "God's Work of Reconciliation," "The Ministry of Reconciliation," and "The Fulfillment of Reconciliation."

The confession does not define the term "reconciliation." This deficiency makes it difficult for an interpreter to grasp what is meant by this word. A



general picture of all that it includes can be constructed by outlining the contents of the sections and subsections of the three main parts. The first deals with the act of *God's grace in Jesus Christ* whereby His love proved victorious over sin and death, and opened the way for *new life* in which men participate when, by the

* Mr. Kehm is Assistant Professor in Theology.

¹This symbol will be used to designate the proposed "Confession of 1967" throughout this article.

inner operation of the *Holy Spirit*, they are moved to put their *trust* (faith) in the forgiveness of sins given them in Jesus Christ. The second part deals with the *mission of the church*. The church's essential task is viewed as that of being a community which witnesses in the world to God's act in Jesus Christ, to the end that the world may become reconciled to God. The internal or gathered life of the church (its order, worship, and activities for the nurture of its members) is understood as a means by which it is equipped and prepared for its work in the world. This work, broadly speaking, has two aspects: (1) the *verbal proclamation* of the Gospel to all men, and (2) *action by the church* and its members to remove enmity-creating barriers between men, such as race prejudice, nationalism, and economic injustices, which stand in the way of their being reconciled to each other. The third part speaks of the ultimate accomplishment of the reconciliation of the world through a *final act of God* in which all things are brought under the rule of Christ and all evil banished from the creation.

From this outline we draw the provisional conclusion that C67 thinks of reconciliation as a work of God begun in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus (hence different

from his works of creation and providence), continuing through the church, and not reaching its completion until the last day. It is a work which involves the elimination of all dimensions of evil, and thus requires radical transformation not only of individual persons, but also of social relations and the condition of the universe itself. The whole scheme reminds one very much of the outline of the "history of salvation" contained in Oscar Cullmann's *Christ and Time*.

C67 does not say and apparently did not want to say that "reconciliation has already been accomplished," or that "the whole human race is reconciled," as some of its critics allege.² It does speak of "God's reconciling act in Jesus Christ" (1. 61 and *passim*) and implies that this is something already completed in the past. But this act obviously does not accomplish everything involved in the reconciliation of the world to God as C67 views that. It explicitly states that God is continuing and completing "the work of reconciliation" in the church. Thus, C67 appears to teach that the work of reconciliation has been decisively set in progress and given a perfect and unshakeable foundation by God's act in Jesus Christ. This aspect of the work needs no completion: it is already fully ac-

²A Conversation about the Proposed Confession of 1967, p. 4; Edmund P. Clowney, Another Foundation, p. 10

complished. But there is yet much more to be done by God, the risen Christ, and the Holy Spirit before the full scope of reconciliation is accomplished. This implies that in a real sense "the world" is not yet reconciled to God.

Precisely because C67 speaks about reconciliation as a continuing work of God, another misunderstanding has arisen. Apparently the term "reconciling community" (ll. 71 and 207) has given offense to some because it suggests that the work of Christ requires the supplementary activity of the church in order to achieve its goal. Taken by itself, "reconciling community" might suggest that the church is the agent that reconciles man to God, God's work in Jesus Christ having merely provided the means for doing this. If that were the teaching of C67 it would indeed contain a crypto-Romanist view of reconciliation, no matter how "functionalist" its view of church order might be. But C67 does not contain such a view. This will be seen more clearly, it is hoped, as our analysis progresses. As initial clues that this crypto-Romanist interpretation is on the wrong track, we note, first, that the term "agent of reconciliation" is not used in the document, despite the fact that one of the prominent theologians on the

Committee used this term to describe the church.³ Perhaps the term "agent" smacked too much of the idea of "plenipotentiary representative" of an absentee Christ and was therefore deliberately withheld by the Committee for the same kinds of reasons that have provoked criticisms of "reconciling community." Secondly, it is important to note that other expressions, e.g., "community of reconciliation" (l. 300), "he is present in the church to continue and complete the work of reconciliation," and "called the church to be his servant for the reconciliation of the world" (l. 137f), suggest that the church is the community *through* which or *by means of which* (in an instrumental sense) God acts to bring to bear upon the world with reconciling effect the power of His grace in Jesus Christ. Read in this way, there does not seem to be any reason to reject the term "reconciling community," although it is ambiguous.

SO MUCH for initial stumbling blocks. Now we come to some of the deep and inadequately discussed issues. What did God do in Jesus Christ, and how is that deed related to reconciliation? The sub-section on Jesus Christ speaks first of the *realization of true humanity* in Jesus (l. 49). Thus, although the subject of the acts

³Arnold Come, *Agents of Reconciliation*. Cf. also George S. Hendry, *The Gospel of the Incarnation*, Ch. VIII, "The Extension of the Incarnation."

in which true humanity was realized is "Jesus, a Palestinian Jew" (i.e., Jesus, considered as a concrete human being), C67 nevertheless implies that this unique human accomplishment was somehow "*God's reconciling act*" in Jesus.

The Christology of the document is too abbreviated to provide any adequate explanation of the relation of God's reconciling act in Jesus and the realization of true humanity in him. Is the realization of true humanity in Jesus equivalent to God's reconciling act? C67 is not clear on this point. Traditional Calvinism would have answered this question in the negative. Regardless of the merits or demerits of its theory of atonement, its instincts on this question were sound. Jesus' perfect obedience to God (= realization of true humanity) makes him only *primus inter pares*, the first among many who are to be regenerated and perfected through him. Classical Calvinism would have viewed Jesus' obedience as an essential part of his reconciling work, but located the decisively reconciling element in his having substituted himself for the sinful race as the object of God's wrath upon sin. His perfect obedience would count not so much as a model for human obedience as a means of satisfying the divine justice, appeasing God's wrath

and clearing the way for him to exercise forgiveness.

C67 refers to this and other traditional ways of speaking about God's reconciling act in Jesus (ll. 61-68). It agrees that the depths of God's love for man lie beyond the reach of reason, however, and interprets these images of God's reconciling act as attempts to express "the gravity, cost, and sure achievement" of God's reconciling work (l. 67f). In view of the nature of reconciliation implied in these images, however, we should expect to hear something more at this point. We should expect to hear something about the death and resurrection of Jesus as the execution of the divine judgment upon sin, which nullified it as an obstacle to full fellowship between God and man.

We are also puzzled that the idea that Jesus took upon himself the judgment under which all men stand convicted (l. 56f) is placed under the category of the realization of *true humanity*. In that case, it can mean little more than his voluntary submission to and acknowledgment of the judgment of God which he inevitably became susceptible to in identifying himself with sinful men. That is, his acceptance of the divine judgment is little more than an act of perfect repentance.⁴ Thus, the strongest assertions of C67 fail to say that

⁴This was the view of McLeod Campbell, later taken up by R. C. Moberley. It is criticized appreciatively but tellingly by James Denney, *The Christian Doctrine of Reconciliation*, pp. 258-60; and George Hendry, *op. cit.*, pp. 81ff and 142.

anything more was accomplished in Jesus Christ than the realization of true humanity. On this basis it is easy to see why Jesus is the exemplar of the new life (ll. 159-163) and of the mission of the church (l. 213ff). But it is not easy to see how this can amount to "*God's* reconciling act" in him.

The basic reason why C67 remains indecisive on this matter is that it refuses, along with a great many contemporary biblical scholars and theologians, to speak as if God needed to be reconciled, or, to put it another way, as if there was some change in God's way of relating himself to sinners that had to be brought about by Christ's sacrifice. Older Calvinism, with its view of the necessity of a sacrifice to satisfy the divine justice, thereby made God's mercy toward sinners contingent upon the satisfaction of his justice.⁵ God's attitude toward sinners had to be changed from wrath to propitiousness before anything further could be done to transform them in such a way as to reconcile them to God. C67 seems to want to deny that the work of Christ

is aimed at any alteration in God's attitude toward sinners. Line 96 stresses the changelessness of God's love. It was that very love that led God to take upon himself the judgment due men, not in order to satisfy his justice but to bring to repentance and new life. His reconciling act in Jesus Christ, therefore, was directed exclusively toward the transformation of man.

In such a view, the most one can say about what God's reconciling act in Jesus actually accomplished is that the transformation and perfection of the creation was achieved *intensively* in his person: he is the *first fully reconciled creature*. He is thereby the *source* from which the powers that transform men so as to reconcile them to God emanate. "Reconciliation with God" became in him a historical reality, not merely an object of hope. And it continues to be accomplished in history as men are brought into contact with the reality of Jesus Christ through the Scriptures and the community which lives from them. C67 seems to be trying to historicize the concept of reconciliation,

⁵Calvin, for example, though he admits "we were loved before the creation of the world," nevertheless also affirmed "the commencement of this love has its foundation in the sacrifice of Christ." He sums up his attempt to harmonize these two assertions as follows: "Where sin is, there the anger of God is, and therefore God is not propitious to us without, or before, his blotting out our sins, by not imputing them. As our consciences cannot apprehend this benefit otherwise than through the intervention of Christ's sacrifice, it is not without good reason that Paul makes that the commencement and cause of reconciliation, with regard to us" (*Comm. on the Epistles of Paul the Apostle to the Corinthians*, Vol. II [Edinburgh, 1859], p. 238). See also *Institutes*, II. XVI. 3,4. For a pungent criticism of satisfaction theories of atonement, including Calvin's, see George Hendry, *op. cit.*, pp. 117-121.

seeing it as a description of a certain kind of historical process. It counts on the "oneness," and the actuality of reconciliation in the man, Jesus, as the unrepeatable and unshakeable anchor of this process, to rule out any mere "exemplarist" or "moral influence" view of reconciliation to God. It may be doubted that it has achieved any clear and consistent results along these lines, however.

BEYOND FAITH AND REPENTANCE further changes in the relations between man and man are required in order for reconciliation to be fully achieved, according to C67. We discover here another major innovation in C67, in contrast to the Westminster Confession, at any rate. Just this innovation enables C67 to place as much emphasis as it does upon "reconciliation in society," which is the heart of its claim to contemporaneity.

The Westminster Confession spoke of reconciliation as something that had been purchased by Christ (VIII, 8) and which believers receive through saving faith in him (XI, 2). The social consequences essentially related to this act are the works of love which genuine faith is always producing (I, 2), and the new kind of society Christ establishes among those united to him by faith ("the communion of saints"; XXVI). In its present, amended form, the Westminster Confession also speaks about

the obligation of the church to declare the Gospel of God's love to all men (XXXV). Thus, in its own way, even the Westminster Confession contains the idea of an essential social and missionary thrust stemming directly from the reconciling work of Christ. But it does not interpret these aspects of the Christian faith as essential parts of the accomplishment of God's work of *reconciliation*. They are consequences of that work; but that work is already fully accomplished in Jesus' atoning death. Moreover, the social consequences flowing directly and essentially from Christ's work are chiefly the works of love among the fellow-believers by which the communion of saints is sustained. (Cf. XV, 6; XVI, 2; XVIII, 4; XXVI, 2.) Believers are expected, of course, to show love for their neighbors and a concern to bring them to saving faith and thereby into "the Kingdom of Christ" (= the church?). Of these two last mentioned requirements, the first is not essentially a fruit of reconciliation in Christ but a requirement of humanity; and the second, which does stem directly from the reconciling work of Christ, does not aim at the removal of social, economic, and political barriers between men. The references to the Civil Magistrate (W.C., XXIII), which do bear directly on the shape of the political order, are not related to the work of Christ but to the Law and God's providential ordering of

human affairs to preserve a modicum of justice and peace. Thus, while the Westminster Confession does have something to say about the political order which makes Christians responsible for active participation in public affairs for the sake of preserving justice and peace among men, it nevertheless fails to relate this responsibility directly to the reconciling work of Christ. Since C67 does establish a direct relationship between these matters, it has given the concept of reconciliation a new twist in its statement of "reconciliation in society."

Has this departure from the Westminster Confession any foundation in Scripture? 2 Corinthians 5:18f mentions under the heading of "the ministry of reconciliation" only the proclamation of the message of reconciliation and speaks of reconciliation only as reconciliation with God. Ephesians 2:14-19, however, shows that reconciliation with God includes reconciliation or the making of peace between man and fellowman. The hostility between men which was expressed in class barriers like those which divided Jew and Greek, rich and poor, master and slave, etc., were transcended by God's grace, which made them all members with equal status (fellow-citizens, heirs, brothers) in the people of God.

Thus, there would seem to be good reason for regarding participation in "God's labor to heal the enmities of

mankind" (l. 208f) as an essential aspect of the ministry of reconciliation. But the locus of this healing, according to Ephesians, is the church. Men are reconciled to God through faith in the forgiveness of sins given them in Jesus Christ. But they are reconciled to each other through love, namely, that love which is the overflow into their existence of that same love of God which was in Jesus Christ. (Cf. Romans 5:1; 2 Corinthians 5:14.) Only relationships between man and man grounded in that kind of love can properly be said to be part of God's reconciling work in Jesus Christ. Other forms of love between man and man must be regarded as expressions of residual humanity, providentially conserved by God despite sin. Whenever men are reconciled to each other by the love that comes from Christ, and express this in actual deeds, they do attest his reconciling power and thus do create a form of witness to him. Thus, while the New Testament as a whole places primary emphasis upon the preaching of the Gospel, it also lays great stress upon the acts which "build up" the church, namely, a community exhibiting a new order of social relations in which the old enmity-creating barriers of class and caste were broken through by a new kind of love. So great is the emphasis upon the latter that it sometimes seems that the presence of this new sociality is a necessary context with-

out which the preaching is threatened with unreality and ineffectuality.

The creation and building up of the church, then, is the one direct and essential social effect of Christ's work. It is the community of those reconciled in Christ and being reconciled thereby to each other, seeking to bring all men into the "social region" in which the reconciling work of God is a present actuality, even if only in an imperfect and transitory form. This still leaves us a long way from activity by the church or its members in political and economic organizations outside the church.

C67 wants to see the church and its members work toward certain goals in these areas which comprise what it calls "reconciliation in society." It names as some of these goals such things as bringing all men to accept one another as persons and to share life on every level (l. 301f); getting nations to accept the wisdom of co-operating for peace, and of being open for fresh starts in international relations despite existing conflict (l. 312f); and the use of men's abilities and economic resources for the common welfare, especially seeking to improve the living conditions and economic opportunities and security of the poor (ll. 327-331). These goals seem to this writer to be moral ends demanded by mere humanity. They do not stem directly from God's reconciling work in Jesus Christ, as C67 sometimes labors to show, but

from his works of creation and providence. To be sure, they are not in conflict with or unrelated to the purpose of God's work of reconciliation in Christ. They indeed serve that purpose since anything that contributes to the enhancement of man's humanity contributes, indirectly, to the perfection of his humanity through Jesus Christ. But such "penultimate" ethical goals apply to all men (Christians included) simply because they are human beings, and do not express the higher obligations of life in Christ.

C67 itself seems to recognize this, for in the same paragraphs in which it states what the church is to call all men to work for in society, it first states something the church is demanded to exhibit in its interior life. And that something is not identical with what the church is supposed to work for in society. It is more. The church is called to be "one universal family" (l. 298). This seems to be an allusion to Ephesians 2:19, a passage which refers to the church as the "household of God." The church is called to be that in itself, and to work outside itself for the elimination of racial and ethnic bars which stifle the ordinary forms of human interaction to which all men are entitled as human beings. The elimination of such barriers is still a long way off from the positive relations implied in being a family, however; and it is just these positive relations that are supposed to exist in the church and pro-

wide impetus for attacking the barriers outside. Similarly, the church is called to practice forgiveness of its enemies. But that is more than it is called to ask or work for among the nations. They are to be urged to cooperate peacefully and be ready for fresh relations. That is not the same as forgiving one another, however, though it bears some analogy to forgiveness.

TO SUM UP, the church is called to work in society not for any moral goal immediately derived from the reconciling work of God in Jesus Christ, but for moral goals analogous to those which do derive from reconciliation. It is called upon to work for social, economic, and political conditions which respect man's humanity, conditions which may be subsumed under the category of justice. But the order of justice is not the order of love. Justice requires the removal of barriers between men, which love, too, is concerned to break down in order to achieve its own more perfect order of human co-existence. But justice merely makes room for love. The actualization of the order of love requires more than can be achieved by man as man or by

the instruments of power which are needed to preserve justice.

Thus, while C67 seems justified in extending the concept of reconciliation beyond the Westminster Confession's confinement of that term to the atonement wrought by Christ's death, it does not seem justified in using that term to designate the goals it sets up for society outside the communion of saints. The things C67 calls "reconciliation in society" belong under the categories of the will of God as Creator and God's providential rule over history, and not to "the reconciling work of God in Jesus Christ." They are not for this reason unimportant or unrelated to reconciliation in Christ. Nor is there any reason in what we have said for dropping them from the confession, although one might well want to reformulate them. In fact, it might well add to their authority and persuasiveness if it were made clear that without action by the church and its members for such more humane social conditions its message will suffer because the concern for the ultimate redemption of man's humanity which the message proclaims will be betrayed by an actual unconcern with the present threats to his humanity.

The Proposed Confession and Social Ethics

by WALTER E. WIEST*

IN COMPARISON to the Westminster Confession, and to other classical Protestant Confessions, the proposed Confession of 1967 is remarkable for the relative importance it gives to social issues. An urgent sense of involvement in and responsibility for what is going on in the common life of men is expressed not only in the section on "Reconciliation in Society" but also in the basic conception and orientation of the document as a whole.

At the very start, the Preface informs us that the Church has "confessed" its faith at various times in the past "as the need of the time required." It is legitimate and obligatory for the Church to "reform itself in life and doctrine as new occasions, in God's Providence, may demand." Now while "the need of the time" and "new occasions" might be taken to refer only to things that happen within the life of the Church itself (such as the perversion of the faith of the Church through false teaching and corrupt practices against which the sixteenth-century reformers reacted), in this case it seems clear that the terms are meant to include reference to broader human, historical-



cultural situations in the midst of which the Church is called to speak and act. Not only is the central theme of "reconciliation" applied to certain contemporary social issues; it would seem to have been chosen partly because of its pertinence to such issues. It is "our generation" which is judged to have "peculiar need" of the message of reconciliation in Christ, and "generation" indicates a situation which includes those outside as well

* Dr. Wiest is Professor of Philosophy of Religion.

as inside the Church.

As I read the Confession, these statements in the Preface seem to be connected with the later statement that in our "time and place" we are confronted with "particular problems and crises" in relation to which the Church, "guided by the Spirit," is to "learn how to obey" in concrete and specific ways (Part II, Section D). In turn, the "peculiar needs" of men in our time evoke in us an awareness of an aspect of the Gospel which is especially pertinent to those needs. Thus, while it is said that "reconciliation" is "the heart of the Gospel in any age," the term is also used, I think, as one of a number of thematic forms or variations in which the biblical message is expressed, the one which seems to "speak to our condition" most helpfully and tellingly. We are called to proclaim the Gospel of reconciliation to a world under tension and stress, groping for solutions to the divisions and hostilities between East and West, between different races, between the "haves" and the "have-nots," between different religious and cultural traditions.

In adopting this approach, the writers have taken a view of the nature and function of a Church Confession which in some respects is reminiscent of the Barmen Declaration of 1934. This statement of the

"Confessing Church" in Germany, in its resistance to the incursions and pressures from the Nazi "German Christians" and state-appointed church officials, was occasioned by a particular political and ecclesiastical crisis.¹ Consequently, it did not attempt to cover all important points of doctrine, but only certain items (together with items of church law) which were important for that situation. It has nevertheless been called a Confession since it was an instance in which the Church witnessed to or confessed its faith before the world. As Arthur C. Cochrane has argued, such a body of declarations can rightly be called a Confession insofar as it is a public witness to genuine Christian faith, faith in Jesus Christ as Lord based upon the testimony of Holy Scripture. Since by virtue of this witness it speaks for the "one, holy, catholic and apostolic" Church and stands in continuity with the "Church of the fathers," it can justifiably allow other and earlier confessional statements to speak on issues with which it is not immediately concerned. At the same time, it is urged, "Barmen is a genuine Confession in that it clarified the meaning of the Reformation Confessions in a new situation, confessed the old faith in a new way, and gave a more precise definition of the old . . . especially in regard to

¹Cf. Arthur C. Cochrane, *The Church's Confession Under Hitler* (Westminster Press, 1962), especially Ch. VIII.

revelation and the Word of God."²

It is characteristic of a Confession thus conceived, as again Cochrane observes, that it has "definite implications for concrete social and political issues," such as race prejudice, nationalism, communism or fascism, economic injustice.³ We can understand why questions of social and political ethics had to be taken into account in the kind of situation which was being faced by Barmen. But should that be the case with any Confession which the Church produces? Does such a procedure "slant" the Confession too much in the interests of certain temporary, secular issues and situations? Should a Con-

fession be confined to statements of those beliefs which are basic and unchanging, to "doctrine" rather than judgments about social issues?

AS A PRELIMINARY STEP in replying to such questions, it might be pointed out that Confessions regularly bear the marks of the historical periods in which they were composed. Need we be reminded that the Westminster Confession is a case in point? Written to provide a basis for a union of the English and Scottish Churches which was to follow upon the union of Scotland and England, it reflects that circumstance in its noticeably legalistic language.⁴

²Ibid., p. 189. Cochrane points out that the authors of Reformation Confessions accepted the authority of earlier creeds (e.g., Apostles', Nicene) and understood their own standards as "explanations" of such creeds designed to combat new forms of heresy. The idea that doctrinal standards should have the characteristics of "sufficiency" and "completeness," he says, was proposed only in the nineteenth century by Wilhelm Lohe.

In an article that has just appeared ("Barmen and the Confession of 1967," *McCormick Quarterly*, January, 1966), Cochrane reminds us that both Barmen and other Confessions have been called forth by crisis situations in which the "very life of the Church was at stake" (p. 138), and questions whether the situation in the Church today, and some of the reasons which have been given for producing the proposed Confession, really reflect an awareness of such a crisis. He then goes on to affirm that there does seem to be an appropriate need—the need for reconciliation between various groups in our world—and that the Church *should* have a sense of crisis about it. It is all the more critical because the Church has allowed the divisions of the world to intrude upon its own life. I should second this observation, and also ask whether it would not have been better for the Church in Germany to have "confessed" before the crisis reached the point which it did in 1934.

³Ibid., p. 206. Cochrane admits that the Barmen documents themselves do not deal specifically with the then rampant political and social evils of the Nazi regime, and confine themselves too much to the apparently selfish interests of the Church over against the state. But he calls attention to the "Memorandum" which the Barmen leaders presented to Hitler in June, 1936, in which explicit and courageous criticisms were made of these abuses. The Memorandum, he maintains, was an "actual exposition" of certain articles in the Barmen Declaration.

⁴George Hendry includes this as one of four characteristics of this Confession which mark it as a typically seventeenth-century document; cf. *The Westminster Confession for Today* (John Knox Press, 1960), pp. 14-16.

This Confession also includes some social ethics in the form of statements on political issues which were of concern at the time: on church-state relations, liberty of conscience, "lawful oaths and vows," and the responsibilities of "civil magistrates." If it was proper to include them, it is also clear that they are largely out of date and call for a contemporary restatement. If "oaths and vows" were important enough to Christian consciences to be considered in a seventeenth-century Confession, surely race relations and world peace can be given consideration in a Confession today.

There is a more fundamental point involved, however. Christian faith is such that it cannot be separated or considered in isolation from the conditions under which men live in this world, and any Confession which did not express that aspect of the faith would be deficient. I propose to elaborate upon that assertion before going on to describe some problems I see in the statements which the proposed Confession contains on social issues.

There are a number of ways in which what I am asserting might be shown to be the case. One is suggested by certain statements in the proposed Confession, to which I shall admittedly add some interpretation of my own. At the beginning, we are reminded that "In Jesus Christ, God was reconciling the *world* to himself,"

and "In Jesus of Nazareth, true *humanity* was realized once for all." Then, in the section on "The Love of God," we are told that in knowing Christ as Redeemer we also know God as Creator and Lord; and the implication is that we understand redemption as the fulfillment of God's intentions for his creation. Men are created for personal relations with God and each other; they are to use their "creative powers" to promote the common welfare and in the interests of "justice and peace." Life in a reconciled and reconciling community is the beginning of the fulfillment of these intentions. Finally, some instances are given of what such reconciliation means for contemporary human problems, and what responsibilities Christians have in our world. In other words, the Gospel has to do not only with the Church but with the "world," with human existence as such.

We should be careful about how our concern with "world" and "creation" and "human life" is expressed confessionally or formulated theologically. The norm of Christian belief and action is Christ; and the movement of thought in the Confession is from Christ to the world, not vice versa. In describing the "Ministry of Reconciliation," the Confession takes Jesus' manner of life, his service to others, his suffering and death and resurrection as the "pattern for the Church's mission." Nevertheless,

we are to be "ambassadors for Christ" and "ministers of reconciliation" not only among ourselves, but in and to the world. We are to be "neighbors" to all men, not just to those within the Christian community; for the love of God is extended to all his creatures. While the Church is God's chosen instrument for the work of reconciliation, it is not the exclusive aim or end of that work. And it is really not too much to say that God is at work in the "secular" world itself, in the interests of the reconstruction and restoration of human life. As Paul Lehmann would have it, God is working "to make and keep human life *human* in the world."⁵ At any rate, God is present and makes Himself known to us in the midst of our responses to other men and their needs, a fact most graphically expressed in Jesus' words, "Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me."

It follows that we cannot understand our faith, or know what we as Christians are called to be and do, unless we are able to see what the Gospel means for common human life and relationships. We are called to be ministers of reconciliation to other human beings. But human beings are not abstractions. Men live in history, in particular times and places, under specific social and poli-

tical and economic conditions. The lives which God seeks to reconcile or "to make and keep human," are always first-century or twelfth-century or twentieth-century lives, European or Asian or African lives. Now, what does reconciliation mean for twentieth-century men in twentieth-century situations? To what tasks of reconstruction or reconciliation is God calling us with *these* men, under *these* conditions? What does it mean to be "neighbor," not literally to a man lying beaten on the road to Jericho, but to an unemployed man caught in a "pocket of poverty" in West Virginia, or to the parents of a child burned by napalm in Viet Nam? What does reconciliation mean, not between Jew and Greek, barbarian and Scythian, but between Negro and white, or between "alienated" youth and the more conventional members of society? What does "community" mean in a modern, technological, urban society? What does it mean to be "ambassadors for Christ" and "ministers of reconciliation" in *this* world?

These are questions which affect not only our ministry and mission to "the world," but also our own faith and life within the Church. We Christians also are twentieth-century men, living under the same conditions as others. In St. Paul's words, the Christian community has been

⁵Ethics in a Christian Context (SCM Press, 1963), p. 99

given a "foretaste" or "downpayment" of the fulfilled, reconciled life God intends for all mankind. As Karl Barth puts it, the Church is a "provisional representation of the sanctification of all humanity."⁶ But such a "provisional representation" takes place within a visible community composed of historical human beings, with attitudes and ideas, interests and tasks, which are typical of their time and place. Thus the first step for us is to understand what reconciling love means for our "generation" as its typical needs and problems are represented in us, within the Church itself. It is only in this way that we can be "salt" and "leaven" in the world. From this perspective we can quickly see, as did the German "Confessing Christians," that a Church which does not address itself to social and political developments will very likely be dominated by those developments and be rendered impotent. To take a familiar illustration from our own situation, local congregations in segregated neighborhoods become segregated congregations, and nothing really effective can be done about this unless Christians become responsibly involved in efforts to change the social pattern.

Therefore, the "needs of the time" and "new occasions" which call for the Church to "confess" are not such needs and occasions as are confined

to the Church's own internal life, but are such as also pervade the lives of all our fellowmen. Therefore, a Confession can and must address itself to social questions, for we cannot understand or express what Gospel and reconciliation, Church and ministry and mission, *mean*—at least, not concretely—unless these questions are taken into account. Without this element, we are left with a set of abstract principles, or a recital of past events (those recorded in Scripture) with no clear meaning for our own faith and life.

ALL THAT HAS BEEN SAID SO FAR clearly indicates a fundamental sympathy with the ethical emphasis of the proposed Confession. That sympathy extends to the specific things which are said about race relations, international cooperation and peace, and the problem of poverty. However there are some things in the "logic" of this section which I think are not entirely clear. Probably they are as clear as they can be or need to be for the purpose which the Confession is meant to serve, but it will do no harm to subject them to some further analysis here.

First, it is not clear that the one theme of reconciliation is really the basis of all the judgments made, or that it can be an adequate basis by itself. On the whole, it serves pretty

⁶*Church Dogmatics* (T. & T. Clark, 1958), Vol. IV, Part 2, p. 620.

well for the issue of race. In the discussion of the other two problems, however, there is mention of "justice," "peace," "forgiveness," the "constructive use" of "human and material resources," the danger of idolatrous national sovereignty, the "violation of God's good creation," the use of "abilities and possession as gifts" entrusted to us by God, "responsibility in economic affairs," etc. It is not immediately obvious from the wording of the section just how justice, forgiveness, responsibility in the use of resources, respect for God's good creation, and the rejection of idolatry are all the same as, or somehow aspects or implications of, "reconciliation." This all the more is the case since none of the terms, including reconciliation, is defined.

Even if we could surmise from the general "drift" of the document and from the biblical background how these are all related parts of an overarching concept of reconciliation, it is not clear that this one concept can be used in some single and straightforward way as the norm for judgments about diverse and complex social problems. The difficulties are due partly to the fact that the document is not a systematic theological treatise and could not be expected to supply us with formal definitions and tech-

nical analyses. They are also due, I think, to an underlying confusion between what ethical terms or statements mean in a specifically Christian context and what they might mean or how they are applicable in a broader human or secular context. For instance, are the "justice" and "peace" which "governments exist to serve" the same as the justice and peace of Christian faith and in the life of Christian community? Can we make such an abrupt transition from the "forgiveness of enemies" which the Church is called upon to practice "in its own life" to the call to "commend to the nation *as practical politics* the search for cooperation and peace"? Doesn't "*as practical politics*" imply a very different sort of motivation? Does the repairing of relations between formerly hostile nations really depend on "forgiveness"? Forgiveness is ordinarily a rather personal affair; how does it apply to the more impersonal relations between nations? (Among other things, what nation is going to be morally presumptuous enough to "forgive" another?) If the Christian's motivation in such matters is forgiveness, how does this relate to other elements in the actual, "worldly" situation?⁷ Can we use the Christian community's call to service and self-

⁷Lehmann has suggested a sequence of forgiveness, justice, and reconciliation, a suggestion applied interestingly to economics by Bruce M. Morgan, *Christians, the Church and Property* (Westminster Press, 1963), pp. 54-60. In order to apply forgiveness

sacrifice as a ground for urging policies that run "the risk of national security," and can a statesman's unwillingness to risk national security necessarily be equated with an idolatrous devotion to "some one national sovereignty or some one 'way of life' "?

QUESTIONS LIKE THESE reflect a difference in ethical thinking which has existed in Protestant theology during the past thirty years or so. A brief account of this difference will necessarily over-simplify the thought of the theologians mentioned, but let us take Reinhold Niebuhr as typifying one trend and Karl Barth the other. I shall try to characterize these two types of Christian ethic briefly in order to explain further the significance of the difficulties which I see in the Confessional statements.

In his ethical thinking, Niebuhr constantly grapples with the difference and the consequent tensions between the Christian norm of the love of God revealed in Christ (*agapē*) and the actual conditions prevailing in a sinful world which make a direct application of that norm impossible. The love of Christ is self-sacrificial love which recognizes that one must lose his life in order to find it. In human relations, it calls for being en-

tirely concerned about others and not for oneself. This is too much for sinful men to attain in actual practice. Sin is expressed primarily as one form or another of self-interest, and self-interest always enters into the actions and calculations of individuals and, especially, social groups. The highest norm which is operable in this world is justice, a norm which was given classical expression in the saying, "To each his due." Justice always concedes something to self-interest.⁸ In actual practice, in the intricacies of human relationships, justice becomes a guideline by which we adjudicate or moderate the competition between opposing individual and group interests. Selfish demands can be brought within bounds but not eliminated, and even perfect justice is not fully achievable. The best we might achieve would be some sort of "equal justice," but often we must settle for a merely "tolerable justice." Especially in social relations, the fact that some are set in power and authority over others presents an insuperable temptation to injustice and corruption. Such a world cannot tolerate pure love. The teachings of Jesus concerning *agapē*, and the absolute character of our commitment to God, are "eschatological" in character; we could follow them literally

to economic relationships, Morgan revises it to mean the "openness" of one "community" to the existence of another. Some such translation would seem to be needed.

⁸Niebuhr also speaks sometimes of "mutuality" of "mutual love" as a possible norm, but "mutual" also implies a concession to self-interest.

only if God's Kingdom or rule were already established on earth. They are not immediately applicable to history as we know it. (Turning the other cheek and going the extra mile are not injunctions which can be followed by statesmen in the conduct of a nation's affairs, nor by a business man in a competitive economy; the saying, "If any one comes to me and does not hate his own father and mother and wife and children . . . he cannot be my disciple" [Lk. 14:26] does not provide a basis for family life.) All that we can accomplish in history are "proximate fulfillments" of love. If we assume that we can or have accomplished anything more perfect than that, the results are always tragic. The wheat and the tares will grow together to the end of history.

All this is not to say that *agapē* is irrelevant to Christian ethical decisions. Love and justice are in some ways positively related; eschatologically, they would coalesce, or become two aspects of one thing. In actual practice, they correct and assist each other: love reminds us of the imperfection of our actual achievements and helps us to apply general justice to individual differences and needs; justice helps us to apply love ("prox-

imately") to the realities and complexities of social processes and institutional structures.⁹ But because of their differences, love and justice can only be related "dialectically." The eschatological and the historical can never be brought into a single, unified focus. For Niebuhr, therefore, there can never be a purely biblical or Christocentric norm nor the unqualified motivation of God's love and grace (*sola gratia*) in Christian ethical judgment and action.¹⁰ In addition to the love of God in Christ, we must also be guided by the hard facts of life and by standards which are not too high for imperfect men.

By contrast, Barth is intent upon surveying the world and the problems of men fundamentally (and almost exclusively) from the standpoint of the revelation of God in Christ. His approach to ethical questions can be understood by reference to the Bar-men experience. (Not that Bar-men alone accounts for Barth's point of view; rather, his ethical thinking is a consistent part of his whole theology in its mature form.) The Nazi "German Christians" and others who opposed the position of the Confessing Church did so by reaffirming the traditional Lutheran distinction between the "two realms" of Church

⁹For a brief analysis of the distinctions and relations between love and justice in Niebuhr's thought, cf. Gordon Harland, *The Thought of Reinhold Niebuhr* (Oxford University Press, 1960), Ch. II.

¹⁰On this point, cf. Thomas C. Oden, *Radical Obedience* (Westminster Press 1964), Introduction.

and state, arguing that the state was a "natural order" having its own laws and principles which were not the same as those of the Church. Thus notions like those of the sanctity of the German family and *Volk*, "blood and soil," of Aryan superiority, and of the authority of the state to command obedience were defended as elements in God's created order of things. In the face of such arguments, Barth and the Barmen Christians denied "natural law" morality completely and insisted that Christians could judge and act only by appeal to Christ and the Scriptures. It is characteristic of Barth that he will not accept two norms—Gospel and natural law, or love and worldly justice—even in a dialectical relationship like Niebuhr's. Rather, he wants to understand the world from the standpoint of the Gospel, man from the standpoint of Christ, history from the standpoint of eschatology. According to his doctrine of election, e.g., forgiveness and reconciliation have been extended to all men in Christ.¹¹ Members of the Christian community know of their reconciliation; others are not yet aware of it. But Christians see the world only as reconciled. In Christ we see for the

first time who and what we really are, as men. Consequently, Barth does not attempt to understand man by drawing upon psychology, anthropology, sociology, or history and combining human knowledge of these sorts with insights drawn from Scripture. Neither does he attempt to discuss the condition of "natural" man apart from Christ, but bases his anthropology upon Christology. He is not basically interested to try to relate the love or grace of Christ to political or economic analyses of social problems, or to other moral principles or norms. In ethics as in his whole theology, his thought moves strictly from Christ and the Gospel to the world, and not the reverse.

This is not to say that Barth ignores all differences between belief and unbelief, between "Christian community" and "civil community," or that he is not concerned about the relation of Gospel and Law, or suggests that we cannot learn at all from "the wisdom of the world." But he has been criticized for not taking the hard facts and complexities of the actual human condition seriously enough, and for making questionable ethical judgments about situations which would have been better under-

¹¹As is well known, Barth says that all men are "elect" in Christ, but that he does not mean to affirm universalism. I shall not attempt to resolve the enigma here, but cf. his further statement on this in *Church Dogmatics*, Vol. IV, Part 3, First Half, pp. 472-478.

stood in the light of more astute political or social analysis.¹² Whether or not the criticisms are completely justified, there is some truth in them, and they point accurately to the chief difficulty in an approach like Barth's. If Niebuhr cannot bring Gospel and world, eschatology and history into a single focus, and tends to leave us entangled in dialectic and moral ambiguity, Barth seems too single-mindedly biblical and Christocentric, and not enough concerned with the worldly wisdom and concepts of "justice" which help us to make practical ethical judgments of "nicely

calculated less or more."¹³

IT WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN IN ORDER for the writers of the Confession to commit themselves to a particular "party line," and they did not attempt to do so. Their statement is more general than that. My own judgment — prejudice, perhaps — is that what is lacking is a "Niebuhrian" sense of difficulties involved in the movement from biblical faith to the realities and complexities of our social existence. The justice, peace, and reconciliation which we have in Christian community, in our life in

¹²Niebuhr has charged, for instance, that Barth's judgments on political matters have been inconsistent and unpredictable because he has attempted to make them from an "ultimate" theological perspective and not from specific political knowledge. He has complained that in the 1930's, in some statements, Barth put God too unqualifiedly behind the struggle against Hitler, then after World War II found no basis at all for criticizing the comparable evils (insofar as they are comparable) of communist regimes. On this, cf. Harland's summary, *op. cit.*, pp. 37-42. Another example of the problem in Barth's thinking is to be seen in the essay on "Christian Community and Civil Community" (reprinted in *Community, State and Church* (Anchor Books, Doubleday, 1960), in which he tries to show how Christians might approach civil or political issues by drawing some questionable analogies from Scripture and applying them to the civil community. Niebuhr's respect for the "wisdom of the world" can be seen in his account of the interplay between biblical faith and "critical reason" in western culture; cf. *The Self and the Dramas of History* (Scribner's, 1955), Part III, especially Ch. 19.

¹³Most contemporary Protestant ethicists can be roughly classified as "Barthian" or "Niebuhrian" with respect to the issue just discussed, but most have also made efforts to overcome the split. Bonhoeffer, e.g., belongs primarily to Barth's side (cf. his objections to "thinking in two spheres" and his Christocentrism), but tried to do greater justice to Niebuhr's kind of concern by means of his notions of the "penultimate" and the "natural," and his efforts to take the secular world with profound seriousness. Paul Ramsey sees the relation between love and justice as the central problem in Christian ethical thinking today (cf. *Nine Modern Moralists* [Prentice-Hall, Spectrum Books, 1962], pp. 181f) but stresses more than Niebuhr their positive connections, and the capacity of love to transform justice (or natural moral concepts and laws). Paul Lehmann attempts to put Gospel and world together by linking "koinonia" and "the politics of God" or what God is doing in the world, but he is even more extreme than Barth in rejecting all "laws" or "principles" whatever. T. C. Oden has recently suggested that Bultmann may offer a solution, although he only points the way to a new beginning, cf. *op. cit.*, Introduction and p. 152, fn. 26.

Christ, do not seem to be identical, at least on the face of it, with the justice, peace, and reconciliation which we might define as goals in areas like international relations. By what process of thought or reflection do we relate the one to the other? Are we drawing analogies between Scripture and politics? If so, how definitely or precisely can this be done? In the name of Christ, the Church can be called upon to be ready to forgive enemies, turn the other cheek, and even to lay down its life for others (whether we think it likely that it would actually be willing to do so or not). As a matter of "practical politics," could we really expect those responsible for the policies and welfare of a nation to be ready to go that far in the interests of international peace and cooperation? If not, then what are the requirements of the responsible exercise of political power which limit the application of the analogy (or whatever)? How can we translate self-sacrificial love into guidelines for political policy? The biblical concern for the poor does suggest that we must be concerned about poverty, and we should try to use our resources to advance the common welfare. But such concern might lead to the support of anything from individual philanthropy, through privately sponsored group efforts, to government programs of one sort or another. What are the further condi-

tions which should be taken into account in deciding whether we should support a particular "anti-poverty program"?

Once again, I do not mean to say that all these considerations should have been included in a Confessional statement. If that statement were to be taken as a guide, however, we should then have to go on to raise such further questions. At that point, it would make a difference whether we followed a "Niebuhrian" or "Barthian" line, or some other; and the latent ambiguities in the Confession would arise to perplex us. That is fair enough. Facing perplexities of this and other kinds is part of the continuing theological and practical work of the Church.

There are other passages in the Confession which have to do with Christian ethics. What is said about the "New Life" in Christ is clearly ethical, affecting the quality and character of Christian motivation and behavior. The statement that the Church "disperses to serve God wherever its members are . . . in the life of society" certainly has important ethical implications. In this essay, however, I have chosen to concentrate upon statements about specific social issues and the connection I think they have with the basic theme and orientation of the Confession as a whole.


Subscriptional Authority

by WILLIAM A. NICHOLSON*

THE EYE OF THE STORM raging over the Proposed Confession, as it moves over the Church, is relatively quiet. The bibliographical, ecclesiological, and ethical issues are of hurricane force, but few people are asking the central question, "Is it necessary to insist upon a subscription?" and "What does a man subscribe to when he makes a subscription?" All other questions are peripheral to these.

Subscription controversies are not the vogue today. However, old styles have a way of coming in again, and one feels that the past zeal for rigid attestation formulae and formal assents to separate Confessions could easily burst into flame. Where there is a little smoke there is fire. After all, we are not too far removed in either years or temperament from the 1640's, when religious covenants, oaths, agreements, leagues, plagued the churches of England, Scotland, and Wales. Compulsion to establish rigid agreements, especially in religious activities, is deeply ingrained within human personality.

We may have learned some lessons from the past in the matter of religious oaths which ought to restrain



us and dictate a moderate policy. The Westminster Divines, extremely ambitious in the making of leagues and covenants, had an unhappy experience in these matters. The very agreements and oaths they took proved their downfall. For example, the Westminster Divines signed an agreement to the effect that Scripture contained one, absolute, infallible form of church government, and found themselves immediately bound

* Mr. Nicholson is Associate Professor of Homiletics.

in a Gordian knot; they fell apart as a consequence, trying to solve an insoluble problem. In the case of the Solemn League and Covenant, the items bound the parties to extirpate Episcopacy and yet to preserve the King's person. However, Charles could not be preached into Presbyterianism, even by Scotland's most eloquent Henderson, and so emerged as Episcopacy's leading champion. According to the oath he ought to be liquidated, claimed the Independents—but, said the Presbyterians, we have agreed to protect the King. In the end, the Independents cut off Charles' head while the Presbyterians prayed for his life to be spared, and both parties claimed they acted according to the covenant. The old sermons of the 1640's ring with charges and counter-charges of covenant-breaking and covenant-keeping. The Solemn League and Covenant, in addition to being a religious agreement, bound Scotland to a major war with the King's forces in England, and therefore was a clever device used by those interested in political matters to force a war upon a nation. One always suspects attestations that

are made out of seemingly religious motives—they ought always to be examined for ulterior political, economic, and social motives. It is now a matter of history how the Westminster Assembly dwindled down to a small Committee of Triers, whose task was to sift out candidates for the ministry. The Committee was a packed one—all voices of dissent were excluded, and one party controlled the appointments to the Committee and therefore controlled the process of selection of ministers for the Church. The actual proceedings of the work of the Committee of Triers reflect no glory upon the members and radiate no reassurance to us.¹

The eye of the confessional wind-storm may be quiet, not only because we have learned some lessons from the past, the better wisdom to let sleeping eyes sleep, but also because a semantic revolution has shaken the whole of contemporary life. This revolution reaches into every corner of life, and one may watch words change color and meaning as quickly and subtly as the evening sky changes color values at sunset. Semantic practices in advertising, law, politics, and

¹Richard Baxter said that the triers harassed the candidates with innumerable complicated questions about predestination and the work of the Holy Spirit. He wrote:

Fuller had a friend on the bench (trier's bench) in the excellent John Howe. "You see, sir," said the quaint church historian, "I am a fat man, and have to pass through a very narrow passage; I pray you, give me a push." When asked the usual question, whether he had experienced a work of grace in his heart, Fuller replied, "I can appeal to the Searcher of Hearts, that I make conscience of my very thoughts." With this answer the extremes were satisfied.

In that day, as always, it has been good for the candidate to have a friend at court!

in ecclesiastical circles have stripped words of their rigid, exact meanings and interpretations. The modern semantic strip tease reveals neither too much nor hides too little. It is a known fact that there is no possible way of finding out exactly what a man means when he uses a word or what he believes; and anyway, what he means and believes today he may not reaffirm tomorrow morning. A new divine right has appeared to supplant the old divine right of king and church: it is the divine right to change one's mind and hold one's private opinion even when the majority call for conformity. Complex currents of individual and social attitudes, influences, and assumptions, conscious and unconscious, lie beneath the surface of a man's word and how he intends it to be understood and how others actually understand him. Religious assent, leagues and covenants, even the secular court oath and national pledge, are affected by the semantic revolution. Philosophers, philologists, and the phonetic scientists constantly seek to clear the muddy waters; but communication remains a major problem.

The present word battle over the Proposed Confession is an example of this confusion. A recent report of the meeting of Pittsburgh Presbytery to discuss the Proposed Confession is replete with suggested word alterations. This sort of business could go on forever! After all, "normative" is

no more easily interpreted than "rule," and "rule" is no more easily interpreted than "normative." Men who mean business must sooner or later give up shadow-boxing.

SINCE THERE IS LITTLE FERVOR for subscriptional controversy, and the impact of the semantic revolution has altered the basic point of view about the use of words, why does the Church retain a subscriptional policy and insist upon it? If there is no real excitement about it, and since there is no way of discovering exactly what a man believes, why still retain a pledge of any kind? We do not, as a Church, demand a subscription from members. Here is a dual standard—why carry it on? There is no doubt that large numbers of elders, deacons, and even ministers have been ordained without ever reading the whole Confession of Faith, the Form of Government, and the Book of Discipline. In the same vein, countless people have united with the Church by profession of faith, and have withheld their private opinions and interpretations. The most scrupulously written subscription, together with the most efficient enforcement and punitive machinery, could never solve this situation. Why carry on, then, with a form, when it actually breaks down in practice?

There are two answers, and both are arguments from human necessity. One is that the subscription act, like

the courtroom oath, binds a pledgee legally to the institution, and protects him and it from abuses; the other necessity arises out of the form and the life of the Church in the world; for the witness of the Church is largely caught up and unified in its leadership, which is held responsible by the Church and regarded as responsible by the world. The first argument for a subscriptional act is legalistic; the second, communistic.

When an ordinand makes a subscription, he becomes liable under the law of the Church to perjury, with disciplinary action, within the framework of the Form of Government—much the same as one who swears to tell the truth before a court of law. The ordinand accepts this liability voluntarily and necessarily. The disciplinary flurries of past years may have blown themselves out; but the fact still stands that an ordained officer may be accused, tried, convicted of heresy, contumacy, and be punished. The Damocles sword still hangs, and necessarily so, over the ordained man's head. An ordinee ought to be aware of this threat; he could be, under the proper circumstances, cited, found guilty, censured, excommunicated, even deposed. For this reason every pledge, religious or secular, contains a phrase similar to this: "insofar as you know your own mind." Although this escape clause is written in, the relative liability of the pledgee remains.

Yet the man who accepts the liability also accepts the broad freedom in which the Church permits him to speak and work. With the threat there is a great amount of protection, even for those with radical views; and there is the promise—the equity of the government of the church which assures the pledgee that he is never, even after deposition, without the promise of restoration. The subscription binds an ordinee to a discipline with legal powers of prosecution and enforcement, and it also binds him to a system of equity and mercy. His call, ordination, and continued appraisal by his brethren are within a Form of Government which operates under the authority of Scriptures and the enlightenment of the Holy Spirit within a community of believers. He is afforded a maximum of protection and a maximum of freedom. I believe it would be extremely difficult in our church polity to convict a man of any crime other than contumacy. For this reason, heresy trials urged now by a few extreme voices are urged for the wrong reason!

The only justification for this very legalistic situation is that it affords both the individual and the ordered church a protection against lawlessness and disorderliness. It is a humanly necessary legalism. In the case of the ordained officer, the subscriptional act raises him to the role of jurist and judge, a legalistic relation-

ship with his fellow church members and prospective members who are under the same discipline. The ordained elder and minister may sit on the higher courts of the Church, and serve on commissions which have extreme legal powers delegated to them. The legal nature of the subscription act has its *ex officio* implications—but the Church has wisely, by years of experience, insisted upon the *ex dono* nature of the election and ordination to office. If this were not so, we would become a purely legalistic and pharisaic Church, wholly self-regulated and contained.

Presbyterianism stands, by its very nature, on the brink of aristocratic government, and in part is the historical enemy of secular ecclesiastical democratic action. For this reason the "best people" among us must always be defined in terms of witnesses to the life of the Spirit and not in terms of making and keeping covenants, and making formal attestation to creeds, confessions, or catechisms. Both freedom and bondage must of necessity go hand in hand, freedom and bondage *ex officio* and *ex dono*.

THE ACT OF SUBSCRIPTION is not an insular one. In the case of both Congregational and Presbyterial ordination, the candidate has had a history within the life of the whole Church. Ordination, then, is not an abrupt translation from one state to

another, like a sudden promotion from laborer to boss. The life of the ordinand has been observed and approved by the congregation and his election has been made by their will, and this means that they have known him and have approved of his witness, habits, and service to the Church. This continuous history of membership and experience within the Church is the moderating factor in ordination. The student for the ministry has come up for subscription after sessional endorsement, the presbytery's approval and supervision, and the seminary's edification. The ordination is part and parcel of a living, continuous, organic relationship within the whole life of the Church. For this reason a subscription to a separate grocery list of beliefs could never fully express the candidate's qualifications and motivations for office. Subscription is, therefore, necessarily sequential, not insulated.

The first words addressed to the ordinand assume his former experience and profit to the Church: "knowing these things. . . ." This prefatory remark of the presiding officer assumes that the ordinand has had a wider range of experience and knowledge, far beyond that of the recitation of a creed, a confession, a series of articles, or a declaration. This postulate implies that the pledgee has a personal grasp of the basic historical and theological tenets of the faith and an awareness of the

Reformed theology and polity. He is also presumed to know how the United Presbyterian Church orders its life according to the Directory of Worship, the Form of Government, and the Book of Discipline under the authority of the Scriptures and the enlightenment of the Holy Spirit. In his basic assumption expressed by the presiding minister in the name of the whole Church, and to the particular congregation before whom the ordinand stands, there is common and mutual consent, agreement, and formal attestation on the part of all the people, together with the ordinand, to the specific questions put. This is then a community confession; and the ordinand, supported by the congregation, is one with them and they are one with him. This formal attestation of the individual is not insulated and solitary; it is individual but at the same time corporate, ecclesiological—certainly not a personal examination in English Bible and theology.

The apodosis follows: "and coming of your own accord to be ordained. . ." The response to God's call through the people of God is a personal one and yet within the life of the community of believers. The ordinee does not come to his office out of the cold; he is part of the family. As such, he is both free man and servant. In accepting the subscription threat and promise, the ordinee lays aside the private affairs

of his everyday life to the extent that he is now willing to have them subjected to the community welfare and judgment; matters of private judgment in theology and ethics he is now bringing into obedience to the whole life of the Church. Freedom is not surrendered; bondage is accepted willingly. This does not rob the pledgee of the right to private opinion and judgment but rather places him under peculiar obligation to the conscience of the community. He does not surrender his rights to private judgment, only his private judgment's sovereignty over all things. The new sovereignty becomes the guiding force in this newly disciplined life, under the direction of the Holy Spirit in the life of the Church.

The act of subscription is, as was stated in the Preliminary Principles published by the Synod of New York and Philadelphia in 1788, ministerial and declarative. The words of the new subscription clauses bring it more into line with the thought and intention of the 1788 principles. The former word "believe" in relation to the Bible is replaced by the word "accept," and the older words "receive and adopt" have been replaced by the word "perform." The changes simply bind the ordinand to a ministerial office and do not demand of him a subscription to secondary standards. The ordinee pledges to "perform" his duties, under the

"guidance" of the Confessions of the Church. The Confessions are, then, not separate ones, but secondary standards; and the ordinee accepts them as a guide in the performance of his duties, not as an itemized list of his beliefs. The Confessions become something like the "outline" Paul suggested to Timothy, a broad *model*² and undergirding structure of thought for his preaching and pastoral work. It is interesting to note that Paul did not supply Timothy with an itemized list of things he was to believe but an outline, a general guide to the performance of his duties, leaving Timothy free to interpret in his own words. The pledge, then, on the part of the ordinee is to perform his duties under the guidance of the Confessions and is not a pledge to conform in very itemized detail of theological dogma to the exclusion of one's own opinion.

IN CONCLUSION, whatever disturbance there may be over the new subscription, there yet seems to be an

overall awareness of the fact that we are all caught in a hopelessly involved semantic problem. But there is little to be gained by stirring up subscriptional controversies in the Church. Although we cannot find sound biblical and theological bases for religious oaths, leagues, and covenants, there is a very human necessity which, in turn, must be continually placed under the instruction and correction of history and the Holy Spirit. However, the human necessities remain: the mutual protection of the individual officer and the congregation, and the need for a declarative outline to give shape and expression to the community witness of the whole Church. Without these the Church would disintegrate and become a lawless, orderless, shapeless mob. Although these human necessities cannot be explicitly supported by Scripture, yet there is an argument, validated by all of human experience that supports a sort of divine necessity to insure the earthly welfare and survival of the Church.

²*vποτυπωσις*—cf. 1 Timothy 1:16. The word means "model," denoting an outline sketch or ground plan used by an artist or, in literature, a rough draft forming the basis of fuller exposition. Timothy was enjoined to follow Paul's outline of doctrine, not word for word as if he were reciting a creedal formula allowing for no deviation, but as a man free to interpret and expound Paul's doctrines in his own way.

Book Reviews and Notes

Neufeld, Vernon H. *The Earliest Christian Confessions*. Vol. V: New Testament Tools and Studies, ed. by B. M. Metzger. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1963. Pp. XIII + 166. \$4.00.

On the heels of form-critical research in the documents of the New Testament came the investigation of credal elements which would commend themselves as primitive parts and developmental bases in the origins of those documents. The tendency was to concentrate on portions which manifested confessional form or appeared to be the stuff out of which early church creeds grew (e.g., Stauffer's *Theology*, Part Three and Appendix III).

Neufeld has made a more basic investigation. Examining all passages which show *homologia* in any form or relationship and working from this base, he has produced a detailed study of the faith the earliest Christians confessed even before there was a tendency to formal confession. The book was developed from a doctoral dissertation presented at Princeton Seminary; so there is an understandable attention to meticulous detail.

After scouting certain features of the nature of the *homologia*, the author examines Judaism and the pagan world; for it is against this double backdrop that Christian confession was made. He then gives his most careful consideration to the letters of

Paul and the gospel and letters of John (the material, be it noted, to which Bultmann directs the bulk of his attention in his *Theology*). He adds shorter sections on the Synoptic Gospels and Acts, the Pastoral Letters, Hebrews, and First Peter.

The earliest form of confession he finds in the declaration, "Jesus is the Messiah" (and he notes that the emphasis is on Jesus). In the Johannine writings this is often developed to "Jesus is the Son of God." In Paul the form is "Jesus is Lord." Other expressions of the earliest confessions are for the most part modification of these basic forms.

Considerable attention is given to the "life situation" and function of the *homologia*. It related "to the inner life of the community as well as the world outside." Whereas some have related confession exclusively to baptism or liturgy, Neufeld insists that the importance was broader, including, e.g., *didache*, apology, and confession in persecution.

One might criticize the book in a number of details, but the overall contribution of the work is substantial. There is some redundancy, and occasionally a tentative conclusion is

subsequently treated as final. On the other hand, one has the feeling that after Paul and John the other New Testament books receive somewhat shorter treatment than they merit.

There is a Bibliography which includes unpublished dissertations and

articles. The index of passages includes not only biblical references, but also apocrypha, pseudepigrapha, patristic literature, non-Christian literature, and papyri.

—J. A. Walther

Cochrane, Arthur C., ed. *Reformed Confessions of the 16th Century*. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1966.

Check it in Cochrane!

An important source book we have long waited for will be issued by Westminster Press on May 9, 1966: a collection of twelve Reformed Confession Books in modern English dress. Professor Arthur C. Cochrane of Dubuque has rendered a significant service to all who belong to English-speaking denominations of the Reformed family by collecting, translating, and carefully editing those twelve Confessions which indeed occupy a superior place among the sixty or more confessional documents which the Reformed churches had produced in the decades following the Reformation. The volume *Reformed Confessions of the 16th Century* opens with an instructive Introduction in which earlier translations and editions are reviewed and in which a justification is given for the selection contained in the present collection. Few ministers own Schaff's well-known edition, and those who

do have long regretted the omission of some documents as well as the antiquated form of language. Before long, Cochrane's book will be a treasured volume in many private libraries, and seminary students—not only in Presbyterian seminaries—will often have their professors say: "Make sure you check it in Cochrane," when preparing papers in theology. At last students, ministers, and interested laymen will have access to more than the Westminster Confession alone. The full breadth of the Reformed tradition is now available to the English-speaking Church, a fact which will be appreciated not only by Reformed Christians, but also by the whole ecumenical community.

The volume contains translations of the following Confessions to which Dr. Cochrane has added valuable introductions and footnotes:

1. Zwingli's Sixty-seven Articles of 1523

2. The Ten Theses of Bern, 1528	10. The Scottish Confession of Faith, 1560
3. The Tetrapolitan Confession, 1530	11. The Belgic Confession of Faith, 1561
4. The First Confession of Basel, 1534	12. The Second Helvetic Confession, 1566
5. The First Helvetic Confession, 1536	
6. The Lausanne Articles, 1536	
7. The Geneva Confession, 1536	
8. The Confession of Faith of the English Congregation at Geneva, 1556	
9. The French Confession of Faith, 1559	

The Appendix contains: The Nicene Creed, the Apostles' Creed, the Heidelberg Catechism, 1563, and the Barmen Theological Declaration, 1934. These are merely reprinted without introductions.

—Dietrich Ritschl.

Berton, Pierre. *The Comfortable Pew*. (U.S. Edition; paperback.) Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1965. \$1.95.

Mr. Berton makes it clear that the target of his criticism is "the official majority voice and leadership," and not the rank and file membership, of the major Protestant denominations. He then proceeds remorselessly to spell out the familiar indictment of our irrelevance, obscurantism, incompetence, hypocrisy, pretentiousness, etc. etc. Apparently the public appetite for this kind of book is far from satisfied, for although no startling new data are produced—Mr. Berton freely concedes that "I would not pretend that there is much in this book that is new. Most of what I have to say has been said by others . . . many of these have been practicing Christians and clergymen"—sales

of *The Comfortable Pew* have far surpassed those of any other book in the entire history of Canadian publishing.

What can one say, when one is a member of the establishment so severely chastised and when one recognizes the presence of truth and force in Mr. Berton's strictures? Precious little, it seems. A partial "defense" of the clergy is possible, and perhaps overdue—but would it impress anybody? Having publicly identified ourselves with a faith and an institution, we cannot complain when we are taken to task; and even if we feel that Mr. Berton's attack is at some points unfair, and at other points simply uncomprehending, the

part of wisdom seems to be that of candidly accepting what must be taken seriously and trying to amend our ways. The best "reply" to a book

of this kind is not another book but more attention to our day-to-day calling.

—*Iain Wilson.*

Bainton, R. H., with Davidson, M. B., and the editors of *Horizon Magazine*. *The Horizon History of Christianity*. New York: American Heritage Publishing Co., 1964. Pp. 432. \$18.95.

This is a magnificent volume which will richly repay lingering study and even cursory perusal. The text is authored by a reliable church historian, and the illustrations are outstanding.

In a text which attempts to span in concise compass some two millennia of history there are bound to be details which are unacceptable to specialists in the several areas. Professor Bainton has chosen to decide boldly where there are choices to be made; and in such a volume the text is thereby rendered smoother and more readable—perhaps particularly where the expert would prefer to leave matters open (e.g., a connection between John's *logos* and Stoic immanent reason).

There is a profusion of illustration, a generous amount of it in color. Since the volume is printed on coated paper, even the incidental pictures are attractive. There are many full-page plates, and twelve "portfolios" are inserted among the chapters of text. These constitute ample material for a course in Christian art. Doubtless the art expert would have some differences of opinion on the editors' choices, but in such lavish wealth there is certainly much for everyone.

It is probably inappropriate to quibble at the price, for such a book is extremely expensive to produce. Many persons will not be able to afford the volume, but it would be appropriate for church libraries.

Hillerbrand, H. J., ed. *The Reformation. A Narrative History Related by Contemporary Observers and Participants* (with plates and illustrations). New York: Harper & Row, 1964. Pp. 495. \$7.50.

This is a source book for the period, made up of documents from a diverse roster of sixteenth-century people. There are "personal letters, governmental decrees, polemic pamphlets, diary excerpts, and other important documents," some from the famous, others from less known sources. One expects to find material from the pens of Luther, Calvin, and Knox; but here are also excerpts from papal encyclicals or "bulls," from the papers of Henry VIII, Geneva police ordinances, a report from the Venetian Ambassador to Queen

Mary, and other fascinating literary pieces.

The plates and illustrations are beautifully done and add materially to the usefulness of the volume. The book should be helpful to all but the specialist, and even the casual reader will find page after page to intrigue his interest. The book would also be of substantial value in a church library.

The author is associate professor of Modern European Christianity at The Divinity School, Duke University.

" . . . he who does not have time to read does not have time to preach."

—Editorial, *Christianity Today*.





P I T T S B U R G H
P E R S P E C T I V E

Volume VII

JUNE, 1966

Number 2

PITTSBURGH THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

P I T T S B U R G H P E R S P E C T I V E

Volume VII

JUNE, 1966

Number 2

Published four times yearly in March, June, September and December, by the Pittsburgh Theological Seminary, 616 North Highland Avenue, Pittsburgh, Pa. 15206, one of the seven seminaries of the United Presbyterian Church in the U. S. A. Second-class postage paid at Pittsburgh, Pa. Changes of address should be sent to the Seminary, care of the Director of the Mailing Department.

Editor: James Arthur Walther, Th.D.

Publications Committees

Faculty

Malcolm S. Alexander
Lynn B. Hinds, *Chmn.*
J. A. Walther

Student

Robert H. McClure, Jr.

J. Rowe Hinsey, *ex. off.*
William R. Atkins, *ex. off.*
William R. Phillippe, *ex. off.*

Circulation: William Hill

Secretarial Assistant: Mrs. Elizabeth Eakin

Contents

<i>Ad Hoc</i>	2
From the President's Desk	3
In Memoriam	4
by Frank Dixon McCloy	
Plowing for Sowing	7
by Andrew T. Roy	
The Pious Paganism of the Fundamentalist Temper	11
by Edward Farley	
The Prodigal Way	17
by Marion Fairman	
Book Reviews and Notes	
<i>Chamberlin, Freedom and Faith—New Approaches to Christian Education</i>	26
D. H. Prytherch	
<i>Myers, The Anchor Bible</i> , Vols. 12, 13, 14	28
Donald M. Gowan	
<i>Dahood, The Anchor Bible</i> , Vol. 16	30
Jared J. Jackson	
<i>Davies, The Setting of the Sermon on the Mount</i>	34
Dale Russell Bowne	
<i>Trever, The Untold Story of Qumran</i>	39
J. A. Walther	
<i>Haroutunian, God With Us</i>	40
<i>Schilling, Contemporary Continental Theologians</i>	42
George H. Kehm	
<i>Proudfoot, Suffering: a Christian Understanding</i>	43
Gordon E. Jackson	
<i>Raines, Creative Brooding</i>	44
William R. Phillippe	
<i>Deissmann, Light from the Ancient East</i>	45
<i>Schwantes, The Ancient Near East</i>	45
Howard M. Jamieson	
<i>Gingrich, Shorter Lexicon of the Greek N.T.</i>	46
<i>Westminster Study Bible</i>	46
<i>Hunter, A Pattern for Life</i>	46
Editor	
Books Received	47

Ad Hoc

THE MARCH ISSUE, dealing with aspects of the so-called "New Confession," is history; but its echoes are still audible. Because of an unsolicited editorial "plug" in *Presbyterian Outlook*, we found it necessary to reprint; and copies are now widely spread around the country. We appreciate the many comments we have received, most of them complimentary.

OUR SEPTEMBER ISSUE will be another "special," this one dealing with the so-called "new morality." There will be two extramural articles and five specialized responses by members of this faculty.

THIS PRESENT ISSUE is somewhat of a potpourri. The memorial minute on Dr. Culley was prepared by Professor McCloy at the behest of the Faculty. The articles by Drs. Farley and Roy were first presented as chapel messages in the Seminary last Fall. Dr. Farley is Associate Professor of Systematic Theology. Dr. Roy has been visiting professor of Mission during this academic year. On furlough from Hongkong, he and Mrs. Roy have been living on campus and have contributed much to the seminary community. Mrs. Fairman is Professor of English at Westminster College, New Wilmington. We carried an earlier article from her pen just a year ago.

PLEASE NOTICE the Book Reviews and Notes. We have an unusually broad selection this time. We hope they will be useful to our readers. The Editor is grateful to the reviewers who have shared in this exacting but unpretentious work.

AVE ATQUE VALE. We welcome a new Director of the Mailing Department, Mr. William Hill. We record our best wishes to Rev. E. D. McKune in his retirement. Mr. McKune has rendered many services to *Perspective* in the past six years, and we are grateful.

—J. A. W.

From the President's Desk—

THE WORD "NEW" is characteristic of our time. In most instances it seems to be used as a synonym for "novel," that is, something "not formerly known," hence, "unusual" or "strange."

There is, however, another meaning to the word "new." It may mean, according to Webster, "the recurrence, resumption, or repetition of some previous act or thing; as a *new* year; also, renovated or recreated; as, rest had made him a *new* man." In this sense, "newness" does not mean "novelty," the appearance of something which had never before been heard of, but rather the recurrence in new form of a former phenomenon or the renewal of something which has long been in existence but has wasted its powers or lost its vitality. A man made *new* by rest is not a totally new entity which has just come into being. He is one in continuity with a long past who has recaptured the energies and the freshness of vision which were his before.

This latter use of the word "new" is found frequently in the Bible. The "new covenant" of Jeremiah, for example, repeats the formula of the Old Covenant: "I will be their God, and they shall be my people" (Jer. 31:33; Exodus 6:7), a formula which, says John Skinner, "is capable of no enlargement, but only of a fuller realisation"—not something novel, but the deepening of what has been there all the time.

The same is true of our Lord's words in Mark 14:25: "I shall not drink again of the fruit of the vine until that day when I drink it new in the Kingdom of God." The "new" here means "afresh," a heightened and perfected recurrence of an earlier fellowship, "a reassembling round another board," a reconstituting at a higher level of an earlier reality.

Would not our talk of "newness" be more instructive and more charged with a hopeful dynamic if it had less of the note of novelty in it and more of the note of reconstituted past reality? It has been pointed out that the One who said, "Behold, I make all things new" (Rev. 21:5), did not say, "I make all new things." The reconstituting of the old speaks more of continuity than of novelty.

We need to recover a sense of history. Extremism, whether of the right or the left, either in politics or theology, is immaturity. The right often mistakes the "new" for the old; the left often equates the "new" with the "novel." The members of the Laymen's Movement equate their views with the "old" faith, in many cases not being sufficiently theologically mature to know the

Continued on page 10.

In Memoriam

DAVID ERNEST CULLEY (1877-1966)

DAVID ERNEST CULLEY was born near Hookstown, Washington County, Pennsylvania, on November 11, 1877. Much of his boyhood was spent in the company of his grandfather, a carpenter, from whom he acquired a love of and respect for good materials and careful workmanship. The community of Hookstown maintained a genuine culture of letters which had been planted in the earlier part of the nineteenth century by Scotch-Irish Presbyterians, and through it, David Culley was deeply touched with the power of the world's great literature. As an adolescent boy he resolved to master the various ancient and modern languages in order to explore the treasures of Hebrew, Greek, Roman and European thought.

He attended Grove City College (1897-1898) for one year and later Washington and Jefferson from which he received a baccalaureate of arts in 1901. In the autumn of that year he entered Western Theological Seminary where he came under the stimulating and rich tutelage of Matthew Brown Riddle, professor of New Testament, who gave to the young man, as to all his students, a probing, yet reverent way of handling the Scriptures and of distinguishing between the essential and the non-essential therein. At the conclusion of his theological studies in 1904 he went to Germany for graduate work, matriculating at the University of Leipzig. Here, David Culley commenced his studies in the history of the Mediaeval Church and presented some years later a dissertation on Konrad von Gelhausen and his place in the development of the Conciliar theory. The degree of Doctor of Philosophy was awarded in 1912.

In the meantime, David Culley was appointed instructor in Greek and tutor for foreign students at Western Theological Seminary in 1906, and, in 1908, instructor in Hebrew. During the long summer vacations he regularly returned to Europe studying at Paris, Florence (where he read Dante at the University, 1910), and in Germany where he pursued his Semitic studies under Gerhard Kittel and Hermann Gunkel. At Western Seminary David Culley was closely associated with Professor David Schley Schaff in the preparation of two volumes on the Mediaeval Church which had been uncompleted in his father's *opus magnum*, *The History of the Christian Church*. It was in this labor that Dr. Culley's extensive studies in the high Middle Ages were most fruitfully used.

In 1912 Dr. Culley was appointed assistant professor of Hebrew. At the time of the erection of the library of Western Seminary, he took charge of the collection and introduced the cataloguing system of the Union Theological Seminary (New York). In 1921 Dr. Culley was elevated to the rank of professor on which occasion he delivered an address, *The Hebrew Language in the Light of Recent Research*. For two years, 1922-1924, he was professor of Bible at The Pennsylvania College for Women (now Chatham College) and was invited to become a permanent member of the faculty. However, he felt his vocation to be that of training young men for the Christian ministry, and chose to remain at the seminary. Dr. Culley was closely associated with Dr. James Anderson Kelso in the teaching of the Old Testament and the two collaborated in the publication of a *Hebrew-English Vocabulary to the Book of Genesis* (New York: Scribner's, 1917). During his long professorship at Western Theological Seminary, which terminated by retirement at the age of seventy (in 1948), Dr. Culley emphasized two major aspects of Old Testamental revelation: the Book of Deuteronomy and the Psalter. These were the two embodiments of the prophetic insights of Amos, Micah, Hosea, Isaiah, the one in the daily life of the community and the other in the inward life of the human soul. Dr. Culley would reveal to his students the moral grandeur of the Deuteronomic jurists and the Josianic reform with the same fervor and compulsion with which he disclosed the lyrical beauty of the nineteenth Psalm, or the drama of the twenty-second Psalm. The focus of his teaching, the centre around which his rich erudition was laid as an offering, was the "character" of the theological student (to use his word). Dr. Culley, with the artisan's and the artist's love for molding and shaping matter into durable, functional, and beautiful form, was ever at his task of molding character. He saw the minister in the community and in the congregation as one who embodies a design of moral grandeur, not conventional moralism or legal rigidity, but of the moral grandeur that always carries the overtones of tragedy and glory. By outright precept, by gentle humor, by sharp irony, by delicate understatement, Dr. Culley left his stamp on many hundred young men across the forty-two years of his teaching at Western Theological Seminary, and latterly as an honored mentor in the Presbytery of Wabash River, Indiana.

Dr. Culley, together with Drs. James A. Kelso, William R. Farmer, James Snowden, colleagues on the Seminary faculty, were stabilizing forces in the Presbyterian Church of Western Pennsylvania during the strife of the 'twenties and early 'thirties over conservative and liberal interpretations of Scripture and dogma. The broad background of education and interests of these men was a corrective for the narrow and sharp polemics of local con-

troversy. There was no serious, permanent division of the Presbyterian Church in this area.

In 1943 Dr. Culley became the first dean of the Western Theological Seminary under the presidency of Dr. Henry A. Riddle, and continued to hold this office as well as his professorship until his retirement. Thereafter with his family he transferred his residence to Syracuse, Indiana, and for fifteen years maintained an active life of tutoring, preaching and pastoral care of the younger ministers of the Presbytery of Wabash River.

Dr. Culley married Miss Helen Craig, who had come to the Seminary as librarian, and they had one daughter, Mary Katherine (now Mrs. James Butcher of East Lansing, Michigan). The Culley home in Crafton was always open to Seminary students, and his annual spring dinner for the Senior class is fondly remembered by many alumni.

Dr. Culley's contribution to the Church of Christ was neither in the field of ecclesiastical statesmanship nor in the field of research and publication, but rather in that of Christian culture and expressing it in the lines and cast of personality. The accent of voice, the gesture, the very profile of his face testified to an inner universe of beauty which he had explored and, in a way, commanded. And he was a kind of door to this universe ever ready to be opened for the student.

"Here—here's his place, where meteors shoot, clouds form,
Lightnings are loosed,
Stars come and go! Let joy break with the storm,
Peace let the dew send!
Lofty designs must close in like effects:
Loftily lying,
Leave him—still loftier than the world suspects
Living and dying."

[Robert Browning, *A Grammarian's Funeral*]

—Frank Dixon McCloy, '39.

Plowing for Sowing

by ANDREW T. ROY

*I will make justice the line, and righteousness the plummet; and the
hail shall sweep away the refuge of lies, and the waters shall over-
flow the hiding place . . . and it shall be nought but terror to under-
stand the message. For the bed is shorter than that a man can stretch
himself on it; and the covering narrower than that he can wrap
himself in it . . . Give ye ear, and hear my voice; hearken, and hear
my speech. Doth he that ploweth to sow plow continually? Doth he
continually open and harrow his ground?* —Isaiah 28:17-23.

THE WESTERN WORLD has been plowing—in Asia and Africa—with industrialism, Western science, rapid communications, and military power. We have been plowing, and often it has been a harrowing experience as well. The Church must see that the plowing is for sowing; that the harrowing is for planting. The land quickly returns to jungle. Seeds blow in the air, and weeds spring up. There is no fence high enough to keep them out. Are we to plow forever?

We have recently plowed up *colonialism*, and in the resultant nationalisms the same weeds have grown. It was right to plow, but we could have done more sowing. We have plowed with massive American *economic aid*, and often produced the same resentments that colonialism did. We must *think* how to aid development without sowing antagonism. Herman

Hagedorn, after the First World War, wrote a poem from the dead to the living, in which he said, "Dead eyes keep watch. You who live shall do a harder thing than dying is, for you shall *think*, and ghosts will drive you on."

Much of the plowing in our time has been done by forces outside the Church, but the Church must see that the sowing of good seed takes place.

The Church is not an organization, or a set of buildings, but a community in movement, a worshipping, witnessing, expectant community—which is also a revolutionary movement, a missionary movement. It seeks to change and make new this broken, misled world which was intended for the close, interdependent family life of the children of God, in glad obedient contact with the Father. It therefore disturbs men,

judges them, puts thorns in their nests, preventing them from sleep and peace and retirement from the struggle; calling upon them to watch and pray, to arise and work, to take up their crosses and follow, to actively reconcile and witness and extend the kingdom which is God's gift.

But in a time of change and the shaking of foundations, men may become fearful and turn to religious faith for security. Security is a basic need of life; and it is good to sing of the "rock of ages" and of "a mighty fortress," as long as we realize that that is *one* aspect of the life of faith, but not the whole of it. The security of the knowledge of the presence and forgiving love of God is essential, but God is at work. Faith involves mission. Comfort cannot be separated from call.

You may say, "I've put everything into God's hands, as into a bank, because I trust Him," and not realize that you may have done so thinking of the security of the investment, and of the interest. But, giving everything to God is not like investing in a bank, but rather in an *undertaking* or a *cause* where you are thinking not of the assured return, but of the worth of that undertaking: the accomplishment of God's will.

The word "Christian" and the word "Missionary" have always been synonymous. Christians have been those of "the way"; and the way is a highway, not a suburban dead-end.

Men try to escape from the problems of the inner city into suburbs, but there are no world suburbs left. Cuba, Vietnam, Algeria, the Congo are all in your backyard; and the people there watch everything you do. We live in a glass fish-bowl.

No matter how Christian a public statement in Washington, D. C., may be, if a theological student is murdered in Alabama, the printer's ink of the world's newspapers washes out immediately the effect of the good statement.

After the Reformation there was a time when the Protestant churches were not very conscious of their world mission. Then gradually, independent missionary societies arose (outside of the official church organizations). The churches, in most cases, absorbed these and developed unilateral national missions. Then we moved into an identification of Church and Mission in a worldwide ecumenical effort. We are now in a period of the interpenetration of whole peoples. Each year now some 250,000 Americans pour through Hong Kong. Hundreds of thousands of American service men are in Vietnam, Korea, and Japan, as well as scholars, diplomats, and business men. The evil in our common life, our average life, is not only harmful now to us, but to the Japanese, the Vietnamese, the Latin Americans; for it may prevent them from seeing Jesus Christ. Our civilization is not only

pressing on all the doors of the world but effectively closing some of them.

Mission is, therefore, not an option, an addition, a benevolence. It's a *sine qua non*, a necessity; and upon all of us is laid a sense of eschatological urgency. The time is short. "Now is the day of salvation."

Though the time is short, the way may be long.

Let no man think that sudden, in a minute
 All is accomplished and the work is done;
 Though with thine earliest dawn thou shouldst begin it
 Scarce were it ended in thy setting sun.
 O the regret, the struggle and the failing!
 Oh the days desolate and useless years!
 Vows in the night, so fierce and unavailing!
 Stings of my shame and passion of my tears!
 How have I knelt with arms of my aspiring
 Lifted all night in irresponsive air,
 Dazed and amazed with overmuch desiring,
 Blank with the utter agony of prayer!

Christians are called to be a peculiar people who in times of crisis and danger react not with fear and panic and impulse, but with increase of faith and outpouring of love. We are so taught by Christ who in his hour of great danger knelt and washed the disciples' feet and, even on the cross, in intense suffering, thought not of his own condition but of the thieves, his mother, and the angry crowd.

There is a church in England with an inscription on its walls saying,

"In the year 1653, when throughout the nation all things sacred were being profaned or destroyed, this church was built to the glory of God by Sir Robert Shirley, Baronet, Whose singular virtue it was to have done the best things in the worst times and to have hoped for them in the most calamitous." Some of the best things are happening in the worst times in Asia. Formosa, for instance, has serious problems; yet the number of churches has doubled in the last ten years. Hong Kong has too many people for the available housing, for the available water, for the available food, for the available jobs. The people should be bitter. They're not. The people should be committing suicide. The rate is low. The people should be dying like flies. The death rate is lower than it is in the United States. The people should be overwhelmed by Communism; yet I know a former professional agent for the Party who is now giving her life to work for the Christian Church, and a former Party secretary who is now working as a Christian with released prisoners. I receive letters from a former Chinese student, a heroin addict, who is cured and working to save other addicts through the Society for the Aid and Rehabilitation of Drug Addicts. One Yale graduate who came out to teach for two years in Hong Kong has remained to do group work with drug addicts. The only explanation I can make for this

strange alchemy . . . is that Christ is at work.

If you are tempted in these days to be prudent, safe, calculating, and cannot understand why St. Francis threw his arms around the leper, or why Father Zossima threw himself on the ground (in *The Brothers Karamazov*) to hug the good earth and be glad . . . then begin to reread the Book of Acts—and learn again the meaning of the second mile, and the cloak also, and the Bishop's candlesticks, and the cup flowing over, and why it was that in the churches of Macedonia, "in a severe test of affliction, abundance of joy and extreme poverty overflowed in a

wealth of liberality" (or, "a magnificent concern for other people").

Let us pray:

Father, forgive us, that after many years we are still so far from understanding Thy son, or truly accepting him, or fully obeying him. Grant us the grace of pardon, the healing of forgiveness, and the gift of vision to see, behind the proud inns that shut their doors in the face of love, the stable manger where truth was born and Thy Word became flesh and dwelt among us. And may that vision remain clear even in those days when the dust falls and the smoke blinds our eyes. Amen.

From the President's Desk—Continued

history of the course of thought through which the church has come during the last 2,000 years, thus mistaking rather novel views of the late 19th or early 20th century with the historic faith. Counter views, such as the "Death of God" movement, are open to the charge of "novelty," proceeding on the assumption that there is now a radical break with the past, or that the faith is *ours* to be reformulated by us in the light of the novel aspects of current human experience, as though Christianity were something new that has grown up out of the traumatic experiences of modern man.

The future would seem to belong to neither type of immaturity. The hope of true "newness" lies in the recovery of a dynamic faith which reconstitutes the realities of the past. God is the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob,

Concluded on page 16.

The Pious Paganism of The Fundamentalist Temper

by EDWARD FARLEY

For freedom Christ has set us free; stand fast therefore, and do not submit again to a yoke of slavery.

Galatians 5:1

I

THE GALATIANS were, for the most part, Gentile Christians, which means that before they were Christians, they were adherents of some hellenistic religion and cultus. Hence, Paul observes that before they knew God, before Christ came, they were slaves to the "elemental spirits," the *stoikeia* of the cosmos. People debate about what these *stoikeia* are, exactly. Whatever they are, it seems clear they are the ruling powers of hellenistic religions. In both Galatians and Colossians, all three places where the phrase is found, Paul mentions ritualistic and ceremonial observances in connection with them—dietary taboos, a complex religious calendar of days, months, and seasons, perhaps as complex as that which is mailed out each year from denominational headquarters.

Then, the Galatians were converted. They received the Spirit. Their righteousness was obtained through faith. The time of their slavery to the *stoikeia* ended. How-

ever, at the time of Paul's letter, someone is telling the Galatians they had better get right with the Jewish Torah if they *really* want to be Christians. And apparently the Galatians are listening to these "spies," as Paul calls them. So Paul writes his letter.

He observes that they began in the Spirit; but if they do *this*, they shall end up in the flesh. And therefore instead of manifesting the fruits of the Spirit, they will do the works of the flesh. They were righteous through faith, but now they are trying to be righteous through the works of Torah. As Christians they were free, but they are exchanging their freedom for slavery. Accordingly, the letter of Galatians is structured and progresses along two parallel lines:

Righteousness through faith (being in the Spirit) which produces freedom, manifesting *fruits of the Spirit*,

Righteousness through Torah (apart from the Spirit) which means trust in flesh and its powers, hence *slavery*, hence, *works of the flesh*.

And at what could be seen as the high point of the letter, Paul in 5:1 says, "For freedom Christ has set you free . . . do not submit *again* to a yoke of slavery." Now here and elsewhere Paul makes the point that submitting to the Torah, to circumcision, to the claims of the Judaizers, is a return to their former slavery of *pagan* religion. Previously, you were slaves to the elemental spirits, and if you take up Torah, you will again be slaves. Why? What is there in common between hellenistic religion and idol worship and being a pious Jew?

In both cases one attempts to relate himself to God or gods through human powers. Both represent human beings trying to please God . . . either in the days, months, seasons, propitiations, sacrifices of pagan religion, or the observances of the Jewish religious year, its torah, customs and traditions. So we have to make up our minds. Either Jesus Christ makes us free, or he does not. If he does, then the religious paraphernalia of both hellenistic and Judaistic religion are superfluous. If he does not, there is no good news; and we still stand condemned, slaves to the elemental spirits, and their fruits, the works of the flesh.

But why is life under law and under religion a bondage? Why would it put forth "works of the flesh?" Life under the law and religion makes our relation to God, our

righteousness, our destiny before God, all subject to a *condition*, and a very shaky, contingent condition at that . . . namely, the condition of human insight and effort. We are justified before God *if* we keep the cultic rules, and *if* the priests and rabbis are right about the rules, and *if* we interpret them correctly, and *if* our motivation is pure. Life under law is successful *to the degree* that our knowledge of law and our power to fulfill it are perfect. This has a corollary. Life under the law and under religion has tremendous need for certainty. For if any of these *ifs* are uncertain or in error, all of it collapses; and we are condemned. This means that the religious life is one continual state of fear and turmoil, a state of perpetual and anxious activity to maintain all the *ifs* and all the conditions. Furthermore, since it is the cultus and its traditions that make righteous, that cultus and those traditions have to be exactly right. But according to whom? A. says we ought to be circumcized, and B. pushes sabbatarian laws, and so does C., but interprets them differently. And D. says if we don't believe D, E, and F, we will go to hell. So what has happened is that human destiny and righteousness before God is turned over to the relativities and strivings of human knowledge and human power. And since each one has to be right, bitter competition occurs along with its consequences of

debating, quarreling, and jealousy. And these are the "works of the flesh" Paul is talking about.

Most of these works are not examples of victorian fears of sensuality. These are works which human fear puts forth: enmity, party strife, striving, dissension, jealousy, envy. And behind it all is the need for certainty about the details of religious belief and practice. For if any of this is uncertain, all is lost. So we must do anything and everything to protect that certainty. Any disagreement, therefore, must be seen as produced by an absolute opponent, an enemy. For our salvation does not depend on religion and law in general, but on our interpretations, and on detailed customs like circumcision. If *one* goes, *everything* goes, and *we* go, into the abyss. No wonder this results in "works of the flesh"—dissension, enmity, party strife. For no one is going to agree exactly about the pluralities and relativities of doctrines, ceremonies, and moral decisions. So the brotherhood gets broken into many pieces, and each part claims to have the one true certainty, without which there is no salvation.

II

ALL OF A SUDDEN Galatia seems very far behind, and the issue becomes almost terrifyingly contemporary.

Like most words, "fundamental-

ism" has several meanings. Sometimes it means simply historical protestant orthodoxy. A fundamentalist thus is simply a person who stands in that theological tradition. I should like to make it clear that I am not speaking about fundamentalism in that sense at all. The word can also refer to a mood, a temper, an attitude, and, I think, a religion. And it is this I would attempt to portray. The fundamentalist temper does not stand simply for adherence to certain doctrines or moral principles, but for an *attitude about adherence*. It is a temper or religion which regards as conditions of salvation certain specified doctrines, or moral absolutes which are held as absolutely certain in a person's mind.

The one unifying feature of the fundamentalist temper is the need for *certainty* in the sense of a human work. Now there may be types of certainty which arise out of, or which accompany faith. But the fundamentalist temper manufactures its certainties . . . insofar as it says, "Unless this doctrine is true, I lose my faith." "If there are no moral absolutes, I could not be a Christian," This sort of certainty is a human work *partly* because its content is a human work and is selected among many possible contents as what we are certain about: *partly* because the criteria of certainty are manufactured—namely, the clarity of rational analyses and principles—; *partly* because such cer-

tainty must be maintained by the power of human will. When any evidence arises against any formulation or interpretation, the fundamentalist can only close his eyes and exert his will.

This need for certainty manifests itself especially in the two provinces of doctrine and morals. The fundamentalist temper wants certainty about essential doctrines . . . and to get that tends toward the demonstrations for God in natural theology to get the doctrines off to a sound start, and relies on the infallible book to keep the arguments going. At this point it becomes apparent that the fundamentalist temper is more widespread than sectarian traditions such as Protestant or Catholic Christianity. It also has its political manifestation in Birchism and similar movements, where allegiance is demanded to an infallible Constitution, infallible documentation, and infallible national security.

In the area of *morals* the fundamentalist temper needs certainty about right and wrong; and because he needs certainty, he sees the right and good as located in eternal, unchanging absolutes which are clearly available in each situation in life. Anything which qualifies such, criticizes such, makes exceptions to such, is accordingly on the side of the immoral. And in each ethical situation the fundamentalist temper wants to know, and often claims to know,

exactly what the absolutely pure action is.

For this reason the fundamentalist and God are on very close terms, so close in fact that it is difficult to distinguish them. For the fundamentalist knows what God's doctrines are, what God's interpretations of God's book are, what God's moral absolutes are, which is God's political party, which are God's colleges, God's seminaries, God's professors, God's theological movements, God's ministers in the Presbytery, and God's publishing houses.

Because fundamentalist certainty is a human work, the fundamentalist tends to live from himself. He tells us of course that he lives only from God . . . but then so did the Pharisees, the Galatia Judaizers, and so does the Ku Klux Klan. For while the fundamentalist wants to live from God, he also is careful to insist that God obey the rules. Furthermore, the fundamentalist is careful to manufacture the rules God must obey . . . namely the kinds and criteria of certainty which is the criterion for *everything*!

It should be clear by now that fundamentalism is not a heresy . . . that is, it is not primarily an intellectual or theological option which is just naive or in error. It is not one among many theological schools, it is not one of several interpretations of the Christian faith. It is not merely a certain slant on the Gospel.

If it were these things, we could treat it as such, review it, evaluate it, adopt it, reject it, revise it; in short, we could handle it as one of the interpretations of the faith. Instead, fundamentalism in the sense of the fundamentalist temper is a religion, and as a religion, a pagan religion. Even as the Judaizing movement in Galatia was not a live theological option, but a competing faith, a faith which would set aside Jesus Christ for something else, so is the fundamentalist temper.

When the Judaizing movement wanted the Galatians to see religion as a human effort to obtain righteousness by returning to Torah and its ceremonial demands such as circumcision, relation to God, righteousness before God, righteousness from God, all became *conditioned* upon the religious cultus. The fundamentalist temper makes relations to God, righteousness before God, conditioned upon certain human formulations being true, infallible, and certain. If the Nicene formulation of Christ's divinity goes, I shall lose my faith. If the Bible contains a single error, if traditional Protestant piety passes away, if I can't be certain about the Westminster Confession . . . if . . . if . . . if all of these things, or any of them . . . I shall lose my faith. Which means: my faith depends on the contingencies of human and historical efforts, and my will power in clinging to them.

If the thesis is correct, that the fundamentalist temper is an example of religion according to the flesh and therefore produces bondage, then it will result in what Paul calls the "works of the flesh." Is this the case? How is it that the lust for certainty ends us in works of the flesh? If I myself am the basis of my faith by my willful clinging to certainties, I live in perpetual fear lest one of these be taken away. So the whole tenor and tone of my life is one of defense, protection, suspicion, explaining away difficulties, isolating my certainties from possible criticism. And while many share the fundamentalist temper, very few agree about exactly what is certain. Yet, no disagreement about certainties can be admitted; for every disagreement simply amounts to damnation, i.e., since salvation depends on these certainties. This being the case, the fear aspect of the fundamentalist temper easily and quickly puts forth dissension, enmity, party strife, jealousy, envy, selfishness—in short the works of the flesh and the situation of slavery.

Will I sound too pessimistic if I say that I notice this pagan faith to be very widespread in the churches? It is not the only pagan faith there, but it is a formidable one. The churches often serve to create and foster this faith. Children are nourished in it. Teachers, leaders, churches, and colleges reinforce it

. . . so that this temper becomes formed, developed, solidified into a life-destroying, reality-denying, humanity-devouring thing. How many come to seminary each year, not simply in the spirit of being staunch defenders of orthodoxy, but as *God's* representatives in the school, who have the inside dope on God's doctrines, God's system of morals and all the rest? Fearful, lest they be corrupted, lest some *certainty* meets its demise. And the churches may be in more danger now than in previous decades; for we are in a period of far-reaching change, change which directly confronts many of the so-called "certainties" of the fundamentalist temper. And contemporary ministers face the decision simply to

tolerantly ignore this pious-sounding pagan religion in our midst, or to confront it as Paul did with the Good News of Jesus Christ. And surely we cannot be indifferent to it or tolerant before it. We must rather confront it compassionately and fearlessly as we would confront any pagan faith, and preach the Gospel to it. Fundamentalists are prisoners and slaves, and need the Good News of Jesus Christ to call them to freedom, and away from the works and certainties of the flesh.

For freedom Christ has set us free; stand fast therefore, and do not submit again to a yoke of slavery.

From the President's Desk—Concluded

not a God of our own making. John Gensel, the minister to the Jazz musicians in New York City, recently recalled the unexpected blackout there some months ago. He remarked that they had to trace the source of the trouble and reestablish the broken paths over which the vital energies flowed; but this did not mean a discontinuity with the past, a scrapping of the entire system and a rebuilding from scratch. Most of the old structures are still intact, still valid channels for conveying the old energies. Renewal was restoration, not recency; it was recovery of former vitalities, not untried innovation.

Does this contain a parable for the church?

—D. G. M.

The Prodigal Way

by MARION FAIRMAN

MODERN novels, dramas, short stories, and poems spell out an experience of alienation, an exploration into despair, a journey that T. S. Eliot suggests he would be able to

. . . describe in familiar terms
Because you have seen it, as we all have
seen it,
Illustrated, more or less, in lives of
those about us.¹

Although most modern writers agree that man reaches a point of terrible isolation, they are in no way agreed in a solution for man's dilemma. One group of writers abandon man in the abyss where he has fallen, allowing him to wander not knowing whether he is alive or dead, not able to communicate with other half-alive men, vainly calling out to a God "grown silent." In such diverse forms as Eliot's "Hollow Men," Beckett's *Waiting for Godot* and his *Krapp's Last Tape*, and Jean-Paul Sartre's *No Exit*, modern life is portrayed as a waste land, peopled with the dry bones of men, unfleshed men living with no faith, no hope, no love, a terrible picture of a world without meaning, a world that ends "not with a bang but a whimper."

Another group of writers picture man flying into illusions of relief because he cannot endure the direct look into the darkness of the abyss. In these writings, man variously tries to escape into "nature," into the "unconscious," into the "primitive," into violence, into piety, into sex. But in such differing forms as Galsworthy's *Escape*, James Farrel's *Studs Lonigan Trilogy*, Peter De Vries' *The Mackeral Plaza*, man's attempts to escape end in futility. Like Ethan and Mattie in *Ethan Frome* who try to escape an intolerable situation by crashing their bobsled into a tree, the protagonists of many works of art are denied even the relief of death but are forced to live their tortured existences maimed, worse off in the abyss than they were before.

Still another group of modern writers envisions man's life as dark, narrow, but honest, a life in which man asks for and gives no quarter. In *Time*, March 9, 1962, Tennessee Williams explains his views of existence:

There is a horror in things, a horror at heart of the meaninglessness of existence. Some people cling to a certain philosophy that is handed down to them

¹T. S. Eliot, "The Cocktail Party," *The Complete Poems and Plays 1909-1950* (New York: 1952), p. 365.

and which they accept. Life has a meaning if you're bucking for heaven. But if heaven is a fantasy, we are in this jungle with whatever we can work out for ourselves. It seems to me that the cards are stacked against us. The only victory is how we take it.²

A large number of modern authors picture man "taking it," living with a kind of controlled self-pity which enables him to face the world without faith. Humanism, which has been described as "the attempt to keep oneself up in the deep, deep sea by the exertion of one's hands," can scarcely fail to appeal. Any one of the varieties of humanism, the stoicism in Hemingways' *Old Man and the Sea*, the human compassion in Albert Camus' *The Stranger*, or the sacramental human love in Ignazio Silone's *Bread and Wine*, allows the relating of a tale of courage, of hardihood, of man standing up to life. Who doesn't appreciate this classical heroic ideal? Men respond to the modern note of heroism as they stir in feeling with Renaissance humanism, with a Macbeth who, faced with all the consequences of unrepented crimes, seizes his sword and cries out against Macduff:

Ring the alarum bell! Blow wind! Come
wrack!
At least we'll die with harness on our
back!
Lay on, Macduff

And damn'd be him that first cries
Hold! Enough!³

Humanism, of whatever era, is a song of praise for man's unconquerable will in a life "told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing."

But there is a group of modern writers for whom humanism can never be satisfactory. For them, humanism, though appealing, appears in its Renaissance form to depend upon man's reason. The existential humanist has, however, gone to great lengths to prove that reason undependable. Perhaps there is some significance in the timing of Albert Camus' story of man's fall from illusion, a novel which appeared after his comparatively optimistic themes of existential sympathy for man's plight in *The Plague* and *The Stranger*. Perhaps man's confidence in having reached the outer strands of understanding is the final web of his illusion! Humanism, in any of its forms, leads again to the void of despair, man backed against the wall, clinging to his sanity with a kind of admirable but hopeless courage.

This last group of modern writers, then, will not consent to stop with a narrative of man's alienation; they write further toward what Charles Williams calls "the way of affirmation." Isolation, that point at which

²Time, March 9, 1962, p. 53.

³Act V, Scenes V and VIII.

most serious authors arrive, becomes for this group of writers a place at which hope is a potential, an apex of experience in which conversion is a possibility, a journey, which because of its Biblical archetype may be called the "Prodigal Way."

Still, they insist with other serious writers, that the way to the possibility of regeneration must be through the depths of man's despair; they recognize that hope is not a potential until man's self-sufficiency has been stripped from him; they predict that man cannot become the "prodigal" until, like his Biblical prototype, he has eaten the leavings of pigs. They emphasize the Biblical doctrine that man can initiate nothing for his own salvation. The theologian Paul Tillich, in *The Shaking of the Foundations*, suggests that regeneration will not come about "if we try to force it upon ourselves, just as it shall not happen so long as we think, in our self-complacency, that we have no need of it."⁴ Eliot echoes man's inability to help himself when he writes, "to be restored, our sickness must grow worse." W. H. Auden suggests the obstacle to man's salvation this way:

As long as the self can say "I," it is
impossible not to rebel;
As long as there is an accidental virtue,
there is a necessary vice;

And the garden cannot exist, the miracle cannot occur.⁵

The process of regeneration, then, apparently begins only when man recognizes that he is lost. Karl Barth, the Swiss theologian, even goes so far as to suggest that when a man knows he is lost, he is saved. Auden implies the same possibility in a light-hearted vein:

Anthropos apteros for days
Walked whistling round and round the
maze,
Relying happily upon
His temperament for getting on.

The hundredth time he sighted, though,
A bush he left an hour ago,
He halted where four alleys crossed,
And recognized that he was lost.⁶

This group of writers allows man, after he knows he is lost, some understanding of his dilemma. Man comprehends the complexity of his sin, seen partially as man's deliberate choice. Reinhold Niebuhr, in *The Christian View of Man*, suggests that the essence of man is "freedom," and that "sin is committed in that freedom." Writers of all ages have understood man's deliberate choice as sin. Shakespeare's Macbeth takes conscious steps toward the acquisition of the throne of Scotland through murder; Othello chooses to believe that the innocent Desdemona is guilty; Lear gives away his throne and army

⁴Paul Tillich, *The Shaking of the Foundations*, p. 163.

⁵W. H. Auden, "For the Time Being," *Collected Poetry* (New York: 1957), p. 412.

⁶"The Labyrinth," *ibid.*, p. 9.

in a foolish, grandstanding gesture.

But writers in this modern Christian tradition comprehend sin as more than deliberate action; evil is understood as a condition of human life, something innate in man's being, not simply as something committed. In the dramatic adaptation of Herman Melville's *Billy Budd*, Captain Vere explains to Billy, "When a man is born, he takes a guilt upon him, I can't say how or why."⁷ In Eliot's "The Cocktail Party," Celia expresses the same idea:

It's not the feeling of anything I've
ever done,
Which I might get away from or any-
thing in me
I could get rid of—but of emptiness,
of failure
Towards someone, or something, out-
side of myself;⁸

By this group of writers, then, the tragic situation of man is expressed as primary and uncaused, as condition more than as action. As the prodigal son at the apex of his experience "comes to himself," so "prodigal" man, at his nadir of isolation "comes to himself"; he knows that he is lost; he understands *why* he is lost. He understands that he has sinned and so he is guilty, but he also understands that insofar as he has been sinned against he is innocent. He longs for justice, but for whom shall it be? He

cannot cry out for justice because he is guilty. His innocence and his guilt are of a piece; this is the dilemma of which Dorothy L. Sayers writes:

Though you slay innocence and outlaw
guilt

Ye cannot undo the brotherhood of the
blood.

Every man and every woman of you
Is the whole seed of Adam, not divided
But fearfully joined in the darkness of
the double self.⁹

No "magic" solution to man's dilemma is offered by modern writers in the Christian tradition; the force which they see brought to bear upon man in his hellish isolation is the revelation of love through the divine being who put himself in jeopardy by the appearance of Christ in human affairs, an appearance described in the Biblical accounts of the incarnation, the crucifixion, and the resurrection. Love, not justice, is the Biblically based answer which modern Christian writers offer for the suffering, the loneliness, and the despair of man, not a love of man for man, but a sacramental love of God for man; not *philia*, a love based on justice and equality, but *agapē*, a love which pours out everything expecting nothing in return.

It is this action of God in an earthly existence which makes possible regeneration for man. This modern

⁷Louis O. Coxe and Robert Chapman, "Billy Budd," *Religious Drama* 3 (New York: 1959), p. 204.

⁸Op. cit., p. 363.

⁹Dorothy L. Sayers, "The Just Vengeance," *Four Sacred Plays* (London: 1959), p. 313.

emphasis upon the divine initiative marks the great change in Christian literature from the medieval period. At the end of the medieval *Everyman*, the doctor admonishes the audience:

Ye hearers, take it of worth, old and young,
 And forsake pride, for he deceiveth
 you in the end;
 And remember Beauty, Five Wits,
 Strength, and Discretion,
 They all at last do Everyman forsake,
 Save his Good Deeds there doth he
 take.
 But beware and they be small,
 Before God he hath no help at all.¹⁰

The medieval *Everyman* rests on the implication that man is the master of his fate; the action of the play is based upon the belief that man justifies himself before God by his good deeds. In modern Christian writing, the concept is quite different. In Graham Greene's *The Power and the Glory*, the moral situation of the priest worsens as he sinks further and further into sin, but he is still able to receive grace and to give it in the form of communion, indicating Greene's separation of the hero's spiritual situation from his moral behavior. It is the same distinction which Christ seems to make at the other end of the scale of moral values as he pours out his anger at the Pharisee. One way of stating the differ-

ence between medieval writing and modern Christian writing is to say that medieval writing is Catholic with a doctrine of works; modern writing is Protestant with a doctrine of grace.

Through man's knowledge of his lostness, the understanding of his dilemma, and his comprehension of the love which is offered, the reality of God in Christ in these various writings ceases to be an historical or philosophical or academic or aesthetic matter; instead, it becomes for despairing man a contemporary, immediate, imperative, experiential moment. In deceptively simple terms, Tillich states that nothing that man can do is demanded of this experience, "no religious or moral or intellectual presupposition, nothing but acceptance."¹¹ By the acceptance of the love of God, man understands that he also is accepted, a process which Charles Williams calls the "coincidence" of God and man. Auden expresses the union of God and man in words often used to describe sexual love: "... because of his visitation, we may no longer desire God as if he were lacking; our redemption is no longer a question of pursuit but of surrender to Him who is always and everywhere present."¹²

Lest anyone should think that the

¹⁰"*Everyman*," sel. E. Martin Browne, *Religious Drama 2*, (New York: 1958), pp. 303-304.

¹¹*Op. cit.*, p. 161.

¹²"For the Time Being," *op. cit.*, p. 430.

offer and the acceptance of this kind of love is easy, Auden warns in the same poem that grace is made possible only by Christ consenting to his own death; that to accept this love, man must give the same consent for his own death:

For the garden is the only place there
is, but you will not find it
Until you have looked for it every-
where and found nowhere that is
not a desert;
The miracle is the only thing that hap-
pens, but to you it will not be ap-
parent,
Until all events have been studied and
nothing happens that you cannot
explain;
And life is the destiny you are bound
to refuse until you have consented to
die.¹³

Not only must man consent to die, but he must experience a new birth. Like natural birth, this spiritual birth is a happening which is painful to man, an experience of "hard and bitter agony" which strips him naked of his illusion, an event which leaves him with an awesome awareness of his frailty. In Eliot's "Journey of the Magi," one of the wise men speaks of his journey to Bethlehem:

All this was a long time ago, I re-
member,
And I would do it again, but set down
This set down
This: were we led all that way for
Birth or Death? There was a Birth,
certainly

We had evidence and no doubt; I had
seen birth and death,
But had thought they were different;
this Birth was
Hard and bitter agony for us, like
Death, our death.¹⁴

By using the story of the prodigal son as the thematic structure for their work, modern Christian authors write of the end of one journey and the beginning of another, the abandonment of the quest into darkness and the taking up of the journey into light. Although the theme of the quest is a familiar one in literature, modern Christian writing has not so far dealt with the second journey itself; i.e., in terms of the Biblical story, not the completed journey home to the father. Rather, the writings have concentrated upon the necessity for the second journey, with that existential moment at the apex of man's experience, and with his first tremulous steps upon that way described by Eliot as

. . . unknown, and so requires
faith—
The kind of faith that issues from
despair.
The destination cannot be described;
You will know very little until you get
there . . .¹⁵

Although this "second" journey is described as one taken up, in Kierkegaard's term, by a "wanderer," as one which must be started without proof

¹³*Ibid.*, p. 402.

¹⁴*Op. cit.*, p. 69.

¹⁵"The Cocktail Party," *op. cit.*, pp. 364-365.

of destination, and as one which will be walked with unavoidable loneliness, even the first few steps on this new way are significantly different than the first journey into despair. As accepted man walks this "second" way, his path is illuminated by an awareness of life in the midst of death, a theme which is distinctively and uniquely Christian. In Graham Greene's *The Man Within*, Andrews turns on Elizabeth for not yielding to him before marriage. Elizabeth replies, "You can't understand. It's not what you call respectability. It's a belief in God. I can't alter that for you. I'd leave you first." Andrews scoffs at her and asks, "What has He done for you?" Elizabeth does not answer for a long while. At last with a faint note of apology, she brings out the brief but significant reply, "I am alive."

This concept of life in death allows no sentimental wiping away of man's responsibility for his own behavior nor does it ignore evil. Dorothy L. Sayers, in her dramatization of the life of Christ, *The Man Born to Be King*, makes abundantly clear that the evil of Judas and the suffering and death of Christ remain realities; Christ did not escape the cross; he rose from the grave, the eternal symbol of the victory of life over death. The salvation of man in modern Christian literature is not an escape from the abyss into which he

has fallen, nor is it a desperate clinging to the remnants of his human glory, but it is redemption in the midst of hell, life in the presence of death, meaning in the center of chaos.

Man's moment of vision at the apex of despair begins his long, hard journey out of hell to "perfect joy." He continues to live in today, in the "time being," that Auden suggests is the "most trying time of all." But man's reason, his imagination, and his capacity to love are redeemed in what Eliot calls the daring of "the awful moment of surrender." On that long, lonely way, man's daily life recovers meaning. The person who knows he is accepted is no longer "victim" no matter what his non-important role in life. As beloved creature, he is broken loose from Melville's "deadly forms" and Camus' "little-ease"; the accepted, the forgiven, the beloved can stand up and stretch like a man.

Man's right choice restores not only significance to his individual life but meaning to his endeavors. Joyce Cary asserts, "I believe that there is such a thing as unselfish love and beauty . . . I believe in God and His grace with an absolute confidence. It is by His grace that we know beauty and love, that we have all that makes life worth living in a tough, dangerous, and just world. Without that belief I could not make sense of the world and I could not write."¹⁶

Most of all, the man who under-

¹⁶Writers at Work (New York: 1962), p. 57.

stands grace and accepts it experiences a miraculous reunion of life with life, the ability to look frankly into the eyes of another. Tillich suggests: "We experience the grace of understanding each other's words. We understand not merely the literal meaning of the words, but also that which lies behind them, even when they are harsh or angry. For even then there is a longing to break through the walls of separation. We experience the grace of being able to accept the life of another, even if it be hostile and harmful to us."¹⁷ In the midst of all our spitting and being spit upon, Auden suggests we have been given in the "time being," our "choice of How to love and why."

The actual homecoming of the prodigal suggests a fruitful paradox. Clearly, man's moment of vision at the nadir of his despair, the "coming to himself" in the Biblical story, indicates that the father has been present not only in the journey away from home but in the "abyss" itself. Yet, the father runs out to meet the prodigal. Evidently, the father has been immanent; that which has appeared to be a journey away from the father is truly the journey to the father. The prodigal, the wanderer, the spiritually alienated, returns to where he had been. The journey itself, then, must be symbolic, the gap between what the prodigal *was* and

what he now *is*. For our understanding, then, the journey from the father to the father is a perpetual arriving at where we are, an endless becoming what we are capable of becoming, a constant receiving from the hands of the father running to meet us, a Godly gift transforming our lives into their true calling.

Christian literature of today constitutes a rebuke to the apparent willingness of many writers to leave man in his despair. Christian authors suggest that there can be no self-fulfillment for man without a direct confrontation with God in the lonely debate of the human soul, no overcoming of the hell of isolation without a willingness to suffer the death necessary to the penetration of self, no meaning to life without taking on, in faith, the lonely journey of the way of affirmation.

Writing, in the Christian tradition today, is turned toward the rehabilitation of modern man who is conceived by most writers as turned in upon the isolated hell of himself and so is cut off from the transforming purposes of his life. Some Christian authors are bold enough in this age of disbelief to ask man to live through faith in God in a spirit of sonship; to discover through the acceptance of love, life in the midst of death; to experience through understanding, compassion for the pain of another.

¹⁷*Op. cit.*, p. 161.

No one would be foolish enough to suggest that Christian voices are in the majority among modern writers. But as significant minority voices, they strike an eternal note of health in the midst of sickness, of strength in the center of weakness, of hope in the heart of despair. They proclaim that at the pit of man's refusal, his evasions, his guilt, stands no ladder by which he may mount, but a cross which draws upon itself all the contradictions of life and reveals them in their absolute implications, offering to man his only option, the acceptance or refusal of love. Modern writings in the Christian tradition contain the sap and savour of Christianity; they suggest that an understanding of the contemporary significance of the events of the incarnation, the crucifixion, and the resurrection offers twentieth-century man an ample opportunity to add a deeper meaning to his life, and

they sturdily insist that the rediscovery of modern man will also be the rediscovery of God in Christ.

The Biblical story of the prodigal, then, is not simply a tale of the geographical return of a wayward son from exile, but is, essentially, a structural metaphor. It recognizes that in time of spiritual dearth, man wanders from his "home"; but the story suggests that the journey, though dangerous and difficult, is nevertheless big with promise of a fresh awareness of the true; indeed, the journey may be a mysterious "call," drawing man through "aloneness" into a new covenant with the father; moreover, it suggests that man's willingness to risk descent into the uttermost limits of death may be part of the imperative to return again and again, like the prodigal, to the Source of his being, to engage, through the acceptance of love, in the divine movement of victory over nothingness and death.

Book Reviews and Notes

Chamberlin, J. Gordon, *Freedom and Faith—New Approaches to Christian Education*. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1965. \$3.95.

In our current concern for the renewal and relevance of the Church in a rapidly changing world, we are standing on a significant threshhold in "church education." Moving from the religious education movement of the earlier years of this century, a twenty-year point and certain problems have become apparent in the development of effective Christian education in the church. The United Presbyterian Church, U.S.A., and several other denominations are in the throes of deep reappraisal and further curriculum development, and there is a new measure of concern for the responsibility and adequacy of the teacher. What do we mean by "Christian education" as we proceed on our way to "church education."

Dr. Chamberlin of the seminary faculty has given us an evaluative book which presses on beyond criticism to suggest some new approaches and emphases. I find it to be most helpful of those I have read this year in attempting to clarify where we have been, where we are, and where we need to go in the church's teaching ministry. Observing the tacit and continuing marginality of education in the church, the author notes the lack of a discrete discipline or philos-

ophy of Christian education because the major writers in the field have not written in conversation or debate with each other. "No effort has been made to work out common principles of formulation, methodology of study, or scope of content" (p. 20).

In Part I, he proceeds with an examination of the contemporary philosophies of Christian education as expressed by men whom he feels are the three most influential writers of the last two decades—James D. Smart, Randolph Crump Miller, and Lewis J. Sherrill. The definitions and emphases of each of these men is presented and then developed into a comparative dialogue, with Dr. Chamberlin entering into the dialogue at many points and raising questions from his own perspective. The framework of this appraisal is brought forth in four steps or questions which examine: (1) the context in which church education is carried on, (2) the relation between the fields of education and theology, (3) the objectives or ends of the educational enterprise, and (4) the processes or forms of education and their implication for its ends.

In Part II, the author utilizes this same framework to present his own

concepts and proposals. He sees the context of church education as the total experience of man in the whole world with its cultural and religious pluralism promoted by powerful social, political, economic, and institutional forces. Therefore, church education must deal with man's need to discern and formulate the meaning of his existence. The direction or end is seen in the educated Christian—to enable him to understand and exercise his responsible freedom. There is recognition here that in terms of understanding, the question of life commitment in Christian faith is raised over and over; and the contribution of the educated Christian (in contrast to the inducted or indoctrinated Christian) is seen in the Church and in the world:

Only the person who has been enabled to reflect upon the meaning of his own existence in the context of the total world of his experience, including confrontation by the whole stream of Christian life and witness, by God in Christ, only such a person can responsibly exercise a critical judgment about the visible church. The educated person becomes the church's own instrument of self-evaluation and renewal (p. 133).

In the midst of searching out the relationships between theology and education, one very useful section isolates and defines many of the different activities which are often de-

scribed as education: learning, growth, nurture, induction, educating, indoctrination, imparting, instruction, training, and conditioning. The author sets forth parallel theological and educational functions for the Christian teacher, and three parallel responsibilities for both the teacher and the student.

In terms of the forms or processes appropriate for Christian education, Dr. Chamberlin points out that these must be designed to develop the capacity of the individuals in the group and take into account a sense of timing for the openness or sensitivity of the student. He is particularly concerned that more responsibility for Christian education be located with the local church, instead of so much dependence on denominational boards of education and independent curriculum publishers. In what he calls the "creative congregational approach," the focus of attention is upon the teacher and his theological training, the teaching role or responsibility of the pastor is recovered, and an openness exists for fresh experimentation and new patterns of church education.

This book is an important and timely contribution to the whole Church and deserves our attention.

—D. H. Prytherch.

Myers, Jacob M. *I Chronicles*. (Pp. XCIV + 241.) *II Chronicles*. (Pp. XXXVI + 269.) *Ezra, Nehemiah*. (Pp. LXXXIII + 269.) *The Anchor Bible*, Vols. 12, 13, 14. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1965. \$6.00 each.

The author of these volumes is Professor of Old Testament at Lutheran Theological Seminary in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, and was Guest Professor of Old Testament at Pittsburgh Seminary during the Fall Semester, 1965. Reviewers of previous volumes in this series have not been of unanimous opinion as to what, exactly, the Anchor Bible is. It claims to be, not a commentary, but a new translation with notes; and if this were an exact description of every one of the proposed thirty-eight volumes, one might question whether this massive project would be worth its expense. There can be no question, however, about calling Professor Myers' work a commentary, and one of the most thorough and scholarly commentaries now available on these books in any language. This is not a work for the non-specialist; it speaks to readers who do *not* want to skip over the genealogies or the duties of the Levites in order to get to more interesting things; and it assumes that those who read it do not have to have words such as "ashlar" defined for them. But for the specialist it is an impressive accomplishment. Myers' mastery of the literature on this period of history and of the complexities of the books themselves is evident throughout. The documenta-

tion is thorough, especially for archeological works; and these will become very useful bibliographic aids because of that. The translation is in simple English, a bit more idiomatic than the RSV, though not what one could call paraphrastic.

These commentaries might be called the culmination of the recent trend toward a greater respect for the Chronicler as a writer of history. Whereas R. H. Pfeiffer, in 1941, suggested the author had invented most of his unique "sources," W. A. L. Elmslie in *The Interpreter's Bible* (1954) was willing to admit the Chronicler's sources might contain some information of historical value, but little. In these volumes, however, Myers attempts to find a historical nucleus in nearly every passage (e.g., those ascribing extensive cultic legislation to David). Even the story of the routing of the Ammonites and Moabites by the singing of the temple choir (II Chron. 20), which has been treated with scorn by other authors, is handled gently by Professor Myers. And in Ezra 4, which clearly contains a passage which is chronologically out of place, Myers finds the editor inserting a later Aramaic document because it illustrates the same kind of situation that the Judeans faced in the time of Zerub-

babel, thus giving even to an anachronism some historical value. His willingness to consider seriously the authenticity of the Chronicler's sources is a welcome corrective to the tendency to dismiss them without a hearing, although it remains to be seen how many scholars will go as far as he does in this direction.

Myers stresses that the Chronicler did not intend to write political history, but a cultic history, using events of the past to provide explicit guidance for the religious affairs of the post-exilic period. He says the Chronicler presents historical data in homiletical fashion. This accounts for the omissions of much from the Deuteronomic history, which was his major source; the addition of much new material (almost all of it pertaining to the cult); and the disruptions of chronological order which are apparent in Ezra-Nehemiah. He concludes that Ezra is to be dated later than Nehemiah, and leans toward the thirty-seventh year of Artaxerxes I for his date, but stresses that we can have no certainty in this. He believes Josephus provides a more accurate picture of some of Nehemiah's activities than the Chronicler; viz., that he did not arrive in Jerusalem until five years after 445; and that the wall took two years and four months to rebuild. Ezra may have been responsible for the editing and introduction to Jerusalem of the Pentateuch in its present form, and he may also have

written I and II Chronicles plus the Ezra memoirs. This also represents a change, from the agnosticism common in recent evaluations of Ezra's work, toward an understanding of him near that held by ancient Judaism.

A few questions occur to the reader of these volumes. In a work where the documentation is so thorough and up to date, one is surprised to find anything missing, and wonders why the Megiddo stables are attributed to Solomon without reference to Yadin's opinion to the contrary (*Biblical Archeologist*, XXIII, 1960, pp. 62-68). The author's style occasionally leads one astray, and a careful re-reading is necessary to grasp what he intends to say. The format of the series is attractive but perhaps wasteful. Each section has four parts: translation, footnotes to the translation, "Notes," and "Comment." The intention may be to keep textual, philological, and historical material separate, but in practice this does not always work, and the same kind of material often appears in two parts of the same section. Sometimes the chapter-and-verse divisions of the English versions are followed (as in I Chron. 6), and sometimes those of the Hebrew Bible (as in Neh. 3 and 4). But these minor problems do not decrease the value of these volumes for the serious student who attempts to understand the work of the Chronicler.

—Donald E. Gowan.

Dahood, Mitchell, S. J. *Psalms I.* 1-50. *The Anchor Bible.* Vol. 16. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1966. Pp. XLVI + 329. \$6.00.

This latest contribution to the Anchor Bible should lay to rest once and for all the myth of "conservative" Catholic exegesis. The author's imagination and ingenuity combine to present a work which is by far the most original in the series. The advance notices are justified in terming the results "provocative" and "controversial." Fr. Dahood, who is Professor of Ugaritic Language and Literature at Rome's Pontifical Biblical Institute, has used his up-to-the-minute knowledge of literary discoveries since 1929 at Ras Shamra (ancient Ugarit on the north Syrian coast, opposite Cyprus) to produce "not a commentary on the Psalms in the traditional sense of the word; a better term would perhaps be a prolegomenon to a commentary" (p. XVII).

Dahood's book, unlike any of its predecessors, is addressed to his fellow scholars—often against them!—and not to laymen or average clergymen, whom it will confuse more than edify. The author has given us a position paper which is designed to "set forth the relevance of the Ugaritic texts for Psalms' research" (p. XX), in as favorable a light as possible. Consequently he has omitted most of the topics usually treated in commentaries, such as literary classification, *Sitz im Leben*, form and struc-

ture, etc. Moreover, his book is intended to be a direct challenge to the present canons of interpretation in at least three fields: (1) the increasing reverence even among liberal scholars for the Masoretic text, including the vowel points (pp. XXII ff); (2) the usefulness of the oldest translations as helpful guides for the recovery of the original text of the O. T. ("In the present study the ancient versions are cited infrequently, not because they have not been consulted, but because they have relatively little to offer toward a better understanding of the difficult texts. . . . A significant corollary of Ugaritic studies will be the devaluation of the ancient versions" [p. XXIV]); and (3) the importance of the biblical and extra-biblical literature recovered since 1947 from the caves by the shores of the Dead Sea.

For all of these interests Dahood has only scorn. All such approaches have been hopelessly outdated by "the Ras Shamra-Ugarit texts and other epigraphic discoveries made along the Phoenician littoral" (p. XV) which have necessitated a complete revision of lexicography (pp. XLI f; cf. Dahood's *Proverbs and Northwest Semitic Philology*, Rome, 1963) and of grammar (pp. XXXVII-XLI).

In all of this there is a danger, and

not just the "considerable risk" of pressing the claims of a new discipline too far, which is acknowledged by Dahood on p. XX. At the counter-risk of being labelled antiquated and dismissed as irrelevant, one must ask whether Dahood is guilty of *petitio principii* in opening Hebraic locks with Ugaritic keys. It is necessary to remember that the Ugaritic material has been explained largely on the basis of our knowledge of biblical Hebrew, and hence it is not surprising that Ugaritic words can suddenly be found to parallel O. T. phrases! Moreover, ancient Ugarit was destroyed in the 13th century B.C., and the epic texts which Dahood uses were probably composed at least by the 15th century. No direct dependence is thinkable; at most the Hebrew psalmists can have been "aware" of pan-semitic terminology and ideas inherited from a culture distant in time and space, as Morton Smith pointed out long ago ("The Common Theology of the Ancient Near East," *JBL*, vol. 71 (1952) pp. 135-147, esp. pp. 135f.).

A typical example of Dahood's circular reasoning is his long note (p.10) on Ps.2:6a, which he translates, "But I have been anointed his king" (RSV: "I have set my king"). First he revocalizes the verb to *n^sūkōti* from MT *nāsakti*. Then he proposes that this new verb, *sūk*, can mean "to anoint (as king)," while admitting that its normal biblical

usage is only in connection with cosmetics. By this time we expect his proof from Ugaritic, yet the passage which serves as his example, Anat II: 40-44, must first be re-interpreted in the light of the theory just proposed, i.e., that biblical *sūk* must mean to anoint (as king)! If this were not sufficiently self-condemnatory, Dahood helpfully quotes the rival and traditional translations of the Ugaritic text given by H. L. Ginsberg in *ANET* p. 136c and by G. R. Driver in his *Canaanite Myths and Legends*, p. 89b, both of which are of course in conflict with his proposal.

Perhaps even more frightening is his nonchalant identification of the pronominal suffix -y as third person (!) singular masculine or feminine, as in Ps. 2:6b (see the list of eighty such examples he has "recognized" in the Hebrew Bible, p. 11, and his discussion, pp. XXI, XXIV). His supporting comment, "This suffix is also found in Ugaritic, though specialists have not recognized it," hardly awakens confidence in his conjecture. One is forced to the conclusion that "evidence" will be "found" and accepted as "proof" for free conjectural emendations, precisely the sort of textual irresponsibility of the turn of the century which Dahood so deplores.

Another problematic suggestion is his redivision of words to suit new ideas, a hermeneutical technique employed by the rabbis hundreds of years before the discovery of the

texts at Ras Shamra! A good example is his proposal for the difficult phrase at the beginning of Ps.2:12, MT *nashsh^q qāber*, which he reads *n^{sh}ē qāber*, "men of the grave" = "mortal men." Aside from the facts that the ancient versions give no support for this reading (he discounts them to start with) and that the biblical examples offered are not really parallels, he is forced to propose that *n^{sh}ē* really can mean "men of," whereas it clearly means "women, wives of" throughout the Bible (e.g. Gen. 4:23)! His support is only his proposed reading of Prov. 14:1 as "the wisest of men," a drastic suggestion which creates more problems than it solves (contrast RSV and R. B. Y. Scott's translation in his *Anchor Bible*, Vol. 18, "Wisdom builds her house. . . . [omitting *nashim* 'women']]"). We are given no other biblical parallels, and not even a Ugaritic text!

A final caveat will concern Dahood's loose rendering of Hebrew pronouns. Traditionally, we are taught that *b* means "in" and *min* means "from," but on the basis of the Ugaritic texts from the fourteenth century B.C. Dahood tells us that "*b* very often denotes 'from' . . ." (p. 9, on Ps. 2:4). Maybe so; but as Msgr. Patrick Skehan has pointed out, Ugaritic has a history too; and the recently discovered tablets from the thirteenth century make use of the preposition *min*, as does biblical He-

brew to which they are of course closer in time, and exhibit more of the grammatical features we are used to in the Bible. Therefore one must be cautious about treating the biblical pronouns as "wild cards" which can be translated in any fashion.

It would be both unjust and ungracious to close without at least a brief review of some of the attractive features of this pioneering work, and we may begin with two grammatical suggestions which will probably commend themselves to future scholars. Dahood draws our attention to the "double-duty suffix," in which one pronominal suffix is made to serve two nouns in parallel (p. XXII), and to the "vocative *lamedh*" as distinct from the prepositional use of that letter. Again, we must thank Dahood for his frequently extended notes on lexical problems, such as those on the distinction between *māgēn*, "shield," and *māgān*, "suzerain" (pp. 16ff, on Ps. 4:3), on *tōb* as "rain" (pp. 25f, on Ps. 4:7), on *dāmim* as "idols" (pp. 31f, on Ps. 5:7), and many others (see the "Index of Hebrew Words" pp. 319-323 for a number of surprising renderings). Perhaps most influential of all will be his attempted recovery of Canaanite allusions, especially to the realm of the dead (see pp. XXV, XXXVff, 106 on Ps. 18:8, and 111 on 18:20), and of divine appellatives such as '*ôlām* (pp. 152f. on Ps. 24:6) and '*am* as "the Strong One" (pp.

112f, on Ps. 18:28). The theological importance of such suggestions for the biblical doctrines of God (monotheism or what Union's J. A. Sanders calls "polemic syncretism"?") and of life after death makes it especially regrettable that the exegetical COMMENTS which matched the translation and the philological NOTES on each section in Speiser's *Genesis* (see *Perspective* June, 1965, pp. 28f.), Bright's *Jeremiah* (Dec., 1965, pp. 53ff), and Myers' *I Chr., II Chr., Ezra-Neh.* (see this issue) have been abandoned in the *Anchor Bible's* Psalms and Wisdom literature—Pope's *Job* (see June, 1965, pp. 29f) and Scott's *Prov-Ecc.* (see Sep., 1965, pp. 46f)—since these Books are harder for the student to understand. Finally, of the many stimulating translations I choose one as representative of the new look in Psalms study:

As a hind cries aloud for running streams,
so my soul cries aloud for you, O God.
My soul thirsts for God,
for the living God.
Where shall I begin
to drink in deeply the presence of God?
My tears have been my food
day and night,
When it was being said to me
all day long,
"Where is your God?"
These things I shall remember,
and shall pour out my soul before him

When I cross the barrier,
and prostrate myself near the temple
of God,
Amid loud shouts of thanksgiving,
amid a festal throng.
Why are you so sad, O my soul?
And why do you sigh before me?
Wait for God, for I shall still praise
him,
my Savior, my Presence, and my God.
(Ps. 42:2-6.)

So much has been promised for vol. II (how will he fit double the number of Psalms, their NOTES, and all the introductory matters postponed here [p. XLIII] into just one more volume?!) that a properly balanced judgment must await the completion of Dahood's venture. Meanwhile, it can be said flatly that this book will stimulate Psalms research as nothing has since the flowering of form-criticism. Not a few students will polish their Ugaritic, neglected since graduate school, in hopes of catching the crest of this new wave. The goal will not easily be attained, since Fr. Dahood's mastery of Ugaritic is matched by the ease with which he moves through the literature of contemporary biblical studies and is topped off by a skillful imagination. There is not a dull page in his book, but only time and further study will reveal whether he has indeed spoken what is true or merely sought to phrase something new.

—Jared J. Jackson.

Davies, W. D. *The Setting of the Sermon on the Mount*. Cambridge: University Press, 1964. Pp. XVI + 547. \$12.50.

Here is a quiet, scholarly revolt. It is a revolt easily overlooked, however, cloaked as it is by the breadth of learning and depth of insight which Professor Davies presents.

Professor W. D. Davies is a New Testament scholar whose historical researches have distinguished him in the world of Biblical studies. In this book, his primary aim is again historical: to investigate and illumine the circumstances of the emergence and formulation of the Sermon on the Mount. At the same time, although his primary purpose is historical, the author recognizes that what he uncovers must necessarily bear theological significance for Christian ethics. Here, where historical research meets modern theology, the quiet, scholarly revolt becomes clear. This book is Professor Davies' attempt to apply an historical corrective to what he sees as an excessive swing of the theological pendulum concerning the role of Law and laws for love.

The chief value of the book is, as the author indicates, historical. Principally, Professor Davies asks, and answers, the question: "What are the religious-historical circumstances which produced the Sermon on the Mount?" We begin our review here with this question and turn, at the end, with the author, to assess the

theological significance of this historical investigation.

Chapter I, "Introductory," opens with the question of the unity and integrity of Matthew 5-7. Source criticism, form criticism, and liturgical studies of the Gospel "cast doubt on the propriety of seeking to understand this section, Matt. v-vii, as an interrelated totality derived from the actual teaching of Jesus" (p. 5). Nonetheless, Professor Davies insists that the author of this Gospel, as an author and not a scissors-and-paste editor, utilized the traditions of sayings which he had received in order to construct for himself a passage that he considered an essential unity.

Chapter II, "The Setting in Matthew," asks the question, "What is the place of the Sermon on the Mount in the over-all structure of Matthew?" To answer this question, Davies investigates the Pentateuchal motifs, the New Moses theme, and the New Exodus theme, often held to dominate the Matthean Gosp'l. He concludes, however, that although such themes are implicit in the Sermon on the Mount, as elsewhere in Matthew, they "have been taken up into a deeper and higher context" (p. 93). The Sermon on the Mount "is the 'law' of Jesus, the Messiah and Lord" (p. 108) for Matthew, but the author avoids the

explicit identification of this Messianic Law as the New Torah, the New Sinai. In substance it is, but the Gospel author hesitates to express it as such. These chapters, 5-7, include the highest expression of the Christian life, which is a *New Torah*, and yet they include something more.

In Chapter III, "The Setting in Jewish Messianic Expectation," Professor Davies continues the subject of Chapter II and seeks now to clarify Matthew's caution in avoiding explicit mention of a New Torah. To do this, he turns to Judaism. Was a New Torah expected in Judaism in the Messianic Age? Jewish literary sources offer a varied, complex, and ambiguous picture. In some quarters it was held that the old Torah would continue even in the Messianic Age. Some hoped for a more satisfactory interpretation of the Old Torah then. Further, Jeremiah did not make clear whether his New Covenant involved a New Torah or merely the internalizing of the Old. Generally the sources, including Rabbinic materials (in which area Davies is undoubtedly a leading authority among New Testament scholars), "revealed the expectation that the Torah in its existing form would persist into the Messianic Age, when its obscurities would be made plain, and when there would be certain natural adaptations and changes" (p. 184). Yet, for all of this, some recognition for the need to change does appear, especially in the

Dead Sea Scrolls. In sum, the Jewish idea of the role of Torah in the Messianic Age is ambiguous.

As for Matthew, then, Davies concludes that this Gospel writer was conscious of already living in the Messianic Age. And, *in substance*, the Sermon on the Mount is a New Torah for Matthew. *But*, just as Judaism at this period is ambiguous about the role of Torah in the Messianic Age, so is Matthew. The *explicit* identification of Jesus' teaching as a New Torah has not yet been made because Judaism has not yet made clear that it expected a New Torah in the Messianic Age. "The ambiguity of Jewish expectation has invaded the Evangelist's presentation of the Messianic era" (p. 190).

Chapter IV, "The Setting in the Contemporary Judaism," presses further the investigation of Matthew's hesitancy in calling the Sermon on the Mount a New Torah. At the same time it delves more deeply into the circumstances underlying the formulation of the Sermon by posing the question: "Were there forces at work which would demand the elevation of the moral teaching of Jesus to its dominating position in the SM . . . ? What occasioned or necessitated this concentrated and architectonic presentation of the sayings of Jesus?" (p. 191). The question is the *Sitz im Leben* of the passage for Matthew and for Jesus. Davies concludes (and here our summary, as elsewhere, is

perhaps too simple to do Davies' work justice) that "the original *Sitz im Leben* of much of the SM involved the Essenes" (p. 255). His study of the Dead Sea Scrolls in relation to Matthew 5-7 indicates for him that originally the utterances included here reflect Jesus' confrontation and disagreement with the Essene sect.

But, on the contrary, "when Matthew constructed his 'Sermon' he utilized the tradition of the teaching for his own purposes—to set the Christian ethic not over against Qumran but over against Pharisaic Judaism" (p. 255). When Matthew wrote his Gospel, the influence of Pharisaic Judaism on Palestinian-Jewish life, as it began to emerge at Jamnia after A.D. 70, necessitated a Christian counter. As Davies puts it, "It is our suggestion that one fruitful way of dealing with the SM is to regard it as the Christian answer to Jamnia" (p. 315). Thus Matthew used materials originally involved in Jesus' confrontation with the radical sectarianism of the Essenes, and molded them to suit the Church's confrontation with Pharisaic Judaism.

Chapter V, "The Setting in the Early Church," looks beyond the material surveyed to this point. What now is the setting in the early Church out of which this ethical formulation, the Sermon on the Mount, emerged? Is Matthew's emphasis on the law of the Messiah an innovation in the Church? Has Matthew put his

own Christian "legalism" upon Jesus? Or has he merely made "more explicit than did others what the Church in general accepted" (p. 316), because it had become necessary in the face of rising Jewish-rabbinic pressures?

A common view holds Matthew to stand in opposition to Paul. But this, for Davies, ignores the profundity of Paul's ethic. Paul shares with the early Church a concern for Christian conduct, but a concern which finds limited expression in his letters because of the problems which Paul confronted through his correspondence. Paul and Matthew are fundamentally at one. Both, in this expression of faith and ethic, root in an understanding of Jesus and his teaching shared with the early Church. Both could see Christian life built upon some legal structures as a concomitant of grace. "To this extent Paul is at one with Matthew who also places the law of Christ in a context of the grace of Christ" (p. 365). Paul "would probably not have found the Matthean emphasis on the 'law of Christ' either strange or uncongenial" (p. 366).

In turning to see Matthew in the light of the rest of the New Testament (specifically Q, M, James, and the Johannine sources—Gospel and Epistles), Davies observes an historical development in Christian ethics. What begins in Q as a radical and absolute ethic born of the proclamation of the crisis of the coming

of the Kingdom gives way to a less radical and more regulatory ethic in M. "The ethic of crisis had to be adapted to the humdrum affairs of life" (p. 387) when the crisis did not issue immediately in a new heaven and a new earth. The radicalism is softened to regulatory directions for life—some probably from Jesus.

With James and the Johannine sources, early Church ethics takes a new direction: the "subsuming of [the] ethical teaching of Jesus under one all-embracing norm or principle" (p. 401)—the great love *commandment*. Here the laws are subsumed under one law. This movement is not wholly unknown in the earlier Matthean Gospel.

In sum, Davies concludes that Matthew's presentation of the teaching of Jesus as the Law of the Messiah more naturally emerged from the confrontation of the Church with Judaism than from some other cause. And yet, the Gospel was always presented with its ethical demand, so that even among Gentile Churches, Jesus' teaching presented as a New Law would be understandable. Above all, it must be clear, in this investigation of the Sermon in the light of the whole New Testament, that no rigid separation of Grace and Law is possible.

Chapter VI, "The Setting in the Ministry of Jesus," opens with the statement, "As we have seen in the preceding pages, Matthew drew

around the figure of Jesus the mantle of a lawgiver" (p. 415). And this view of Jesus was not unique in the early Church. But, in the next stage of his argument, Davies asks whether this view accurately represents the "Jesus of history." He here assumes the possibility of contact with the historical Jesus; the sayings attributed to Jesus should not be counted as wholesale creations of the primitive communities, but rather the genuine tradition which has, however, been modified by the Church for its own purposes. The root of the tradition rests with Jesus although the original form may now be obscure.

But shall we see Jesus as a lawgiver then? Yes. Because the Jewish eschatological hope always included the ethical: the Law. Thus Jesus, "as the eschatological figure . . . was necessarily a teacher of morality" (p. 425). But in a new way: "Whereas for Judaism the Law expressed the will of God, for Jesus his immediate awareness of the will of God became 'Law'" (p. 432). Matthew has, in one sense, then, accurately represented the mind of Jesus. In another sense, however, it must be clear that his gathering together the words of Jesus and concentrating and unifying them in one section make it all too possible "to separate the moral demand of Jesus from its total setting" (p. 433). Jesus was a lawgiver simply because his eschatological message required it—and a lawgiver on perhaps two

levels: (1) a radical demand for the uncommitted and (2) regulatory rulings for the committed. But Jesus never issued laws apart from his eschatological message of grace. The Sermon on the Mount must be viewed in this light. Here is the kerygma in concrete form.

Chapter VII, "Conclusion," spells out briefly the theological implications of the author's historical research. Davies' intent here is at least to raise "the question whether history can sometimes be called in to redress the balance of theology" (p. 437).

Theologically, this discussion of the Sermon on the Mount could not but raise the ghost of the old problem of the relation of Gospel and Law. Modern trends in theology refuse any "laws" within the framework of Christian ethics. But Davies deliberately challenges Tillich and Bultmann and E. Schweizer for their separation of Jesus-the-Word from Jesus' words, and for their attempt to absorb the words in the Word and thus deprive the words of positive significance. Their rejection of any legalism within Christian ethics hardly does full justice to Jesus and the New Testament. Let it be clear, Davies intends no rigid legalism or casuistry as a result of his historical study; but he does intend to raise anew the question for modern Christian ethics of the role of Law to Gospel. His historical research suggests that the

pendulum of modern theology has swung too far from its New Testament origin.

Here is a scholar's revolt, a scholar's attempt to apply an historical corrective to a modern theological trend (a trend which, we might add, can be seen also in Brunner and in John A. T. Robinson's recent work). For Davies, the Christian life expressed in the New Testament has some concrete footing in the regulatory rulings of Jesus and in the pattern of Jesus' life. Modern theological attempts to see this legal tradition as relative to its day or as an example or as a type, but not absolute rules for conduct, fail to see the original significance of the ethical teaching of the New Testament in its original setting.

Professor Davies' work will long be a resource for study of the Sermon on the Mount. It contains a wealth of material, especially from Jewish sources, which is pertinent to the understanding of this important Matthean passage. Inevitably, various parts of Davies' argument will not convince all. But none will fail to recognize here a great scholarly work whose explicit aim as an historical contribution to New Testament research has been amply fulfilled.

Whether Davies also raises the theological debate at which his book implicitly aims will depend upon the acceptance of his underlying assumptions: (1) What authority has the Bible for practical Christian ethics in

our modern world, especially if Davies' interpretation of the relation of Law and Gospel in the New Testament be accepted? (2) Is the distinction in Biblical theology between "what it meant" and "what it means" possible? Can we have a "descriptive Biblical theology" apart from our modern "subjective" interpretation? (3) How shall we approach the quest of the historical Jesus? Is contact with the historical figure through the tradition preserved by the ancient Church possible? Davies clearly assumes that contact with the histor-

ical Jesus is possible, although he does not easily dismiss the dangers here. Clearly, he also assumes the possibility of a descriptive Biblical theology. And clearly, he views the Bible in such a position of authority within Christendom that therefore an accurate description of its theology should and does speak to the present Christian community. Thus a single question remains: "Will modern theologians take seriously the implications of historical research?"

—Dale Russell Bowne,
Grove City College.

Trever, John C. *The Untold Story of Qumran*. (Illustrated.) Westwood, N. J.: Revell, 1965. Pp. 214 + color plates. \$8.95.

The dust jacket proclaims that this book relates "the adventure and intrigue which followed the discovery of the most valuable archaeological documents of our time, by the first American to see, examine, and photograph the Dead Sea Scrolls." Hereby one is alerted to the forensic character of parts of this book. The author is at pains to try to establish the record implicit in various aspects of the jacket statement.

Dr. Trever explains in meticulous detail how he happened to be "the first American, etc." He supplements his own notes and records with as

much documentation as he can collect; and this thus becomes—probably—the nearest thing to a definitive chronicle that we shall have for the events connected with the famous scrolls. Though there are surely persons who would dispute some details of this book, it seems unlikely that anyone else will take such pains to recount the story in such a synoptic fashion.

But this frank appraisal should not deter anyone from reading the volume. There have been more than enough romantic, ill-informed reports of the almost legendary story.

Dr. Trever has a remarkably clear memory of the events in which he figured so centrally; and if he, too, occasionally waxes dramatic or histrionic, he must be forgiven. Certainly in this case the old saw applies, that truth is stranger than fiction.

The story, for the most part, moves well. Not everyone will care to follow the notes, nor is it necessary for following the narrative itself. Those who have visited Jerusalem and the American School of Oriental Research there will delight in the vivid word-pictures the author produces; and the events portrayed—not only in connection with the scrolls but also in the partition struggles—were exciting in the extreme.

Dr. Trever is an able photographer, and he will be readily pardoned for

dwelling on the copying of the scrolls. He is an expert on the flora of Palestine—a fact which precipitated him into these adventures—and this doubtless made him extra sensitive to the pictorial fascination of the events among which he moved. The black-and-white illustrations and particularly the color plates are a valuable asset to the book.

Two faults are perhaps not so readily forgiven. One is the occasional lapse into the melodramatic under the guise of pious meditation. The other is an unnecessarily large number of typographical mistakes (e.g., on page 101, an entire line must be missing). But the book is nevertheless well worth-while for information and for reading enjoyment.

—J. A. Walther.

Haroutunian, Joseph. *God With Us. A Theology of Transpersonal Life*. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1965. Pp. 318. \$6.00.

A book by Professor Haroutunian is always an event worth noting. He always deals with big issues, important issues, timely issues. Yet he deals with them in a way that is distinctively his own. This makes him somewhat difficult to follow, but never dull. His freedom from doctrinaire cant and his passionate, humane intelligence, come as a welcome relief from the obscurantism of popular

theological literature as well as the abstract analyses of more technical theological works.

In this book he introduces his readers to the world of what he calls "transpersonal life." This is his way of talking about the world that is composed of happenings between man and fellowman. It is a world in which absolutely nothing exists "by itself," and interactions between

beings are not non-essential. Haroutunian's world, then, stands in sharpest contrast to that world of thought which deals in "human nature" and self-subsistent individuals, whose basic capacities do not derive from nor are oriented to "transaction" or "communion" with a fellowman. He succeeds in shocking us into an awareness of how much of our thinking is governed by individualistic premises even when we admit that man is a social animal and is dependent upon society in many ways. At the same time, Haroutunian makes us aware of dimensions of our humanity that are often ignored or pushed aside by the predominating functional identities we give ourselves in our super-organized society.

Other books have made similar points, of course. But Haroutunian has done something I have not found in other books that stress these themes. He has carefully thought out and reconstructed in his "trans-personal" language, the meaning of grace, freedom, love, forgiveness, the communion of saints, preaching and hearing the Gospel, the Holy Spirit, the knowledge of God, and many other theological themes. The whole *ordo salutis* of traditional theology, the process whereby sin was supposed to decrease and righteousness increase in individual believers, is set aside. In its place, we get a conception of God bringing men into communion with himself through the forgiveness he

offers in Jesus Christ, and who is present in the world in the forgiveness which sinners are able to give each other through the forgiveness they mutually receive from God through Jesus.

Ministers will have some anxious thoughts about the unreality of a forgiveness that is pronounced to a gathering of individuals on Sunday morning, in contrast to the forgiveness which produces the communion of saints. They will have many second and third thoughts about the thing called "love" which informs their counseling, group work, and ethical positions. They will learn something about what it takes to get men to be free to love, and to take notice of, respect, do justice to, and even be grateful for their amazingly different fellowmen. They will learn that grace is not a miraculous entity operating inside individuals (Where? How?), but the reality of God's forgiveness of sinners in Jesus Christ which communicates itself as forgiven sinners dare to forgive each other. If they are especially perceptive, they will find that while others have been decrying the death of God "out there," Haroutunian has been thinking through the nature of the presence of the God of the Gospel (who is not to be understood as the Absolute or First Cause of theistic metaphysics) in the mode of the unique *social process* designated by the term "communion of saints."

Those who have been wondering "Where do we go from here?" now that initial sensation of the *Honest to God* debate has worn off, should certainly give careful consideration to this volume.

These summary remarks cannot come close to presenting the richness of Professor Haroutunian's thought. They are meant only to indicate that

this is a book of great relevance and helpfulness in understanding what the Gospel, the Church, and the Christian life are all about. I can think of no book I would rather see pastors take with them on their vacations to ponder at length before plunging into the whirlpool of Fall programs once again.

Schilling, S. P. *Contemporary Continental Theologians*. Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1966. Pp. 288. \$5.00.

There seems to be no end to books of this kind although by now it ought to be evident that what we need are more good monographs. Professor Schilling has done us some useful service, however, by providing a more comprehensive introduction to important continental theologians than has previously appeared in English. He has attempted to select theologians from various countries in Western Europe who represent important schools of thought and/or one of the major divisions of Christianity. Accordingly, he discusses the thought of Karl Barth, Hermann Diem, and Joseph L. Hromádka ("Theologies of the Word of God"); Rudolph Bultmann, Friedrich Gogarten, and Gerhard Ebeling ("Theologies of Existence"); Edmund Schlink and Gustaf Wingren ("Neo-Lutheran

Theologies"); Yves M.-J. Congar and Karl Rahner ("Roman Catholic Theology"); and Nikos Nissiotis ("Eastern Orthodox Theology"). Considering the difficulties of obtaining a representative selection from among the many possible alternatives to some of the lesser figures chosen, Professor Schilling has done well. We would like to have seen something like "Neo-Reformed Theologies" included, however. It is extremely misleading to suggest, as the author does in the preface, that continental Reformed theologians are either "Barthians" or conservative Calvinists like Berkouwer.

Professor Schilling based his study almost entirely on first-hand research in the writings of these men, supplemented by personal conversations with them during his sabbatical leave

from Boston University (1959-60). While he has admirably mastered what he calls the "major doctrinal emphases" of these men, he does not probe deeply into any of the very complex issues that crop out on every page. Nor does he take account of the critical discussions that have gone on and are going on between these theologians and the schools of thought they represent. This is especially true of his treatment of the controversies on Law and Gospel, Church and Society, Scripture and Tradition, and, to a lesser extent, the "new quest" for the historical Jesus. His evaluative comments on these matters, which are of very limited usefulness anyhow because of their simplistic plus ("values") and minus ("difficulties") form, do little more than confirm the

prejudices of a rather conservative, Protestant moralist who wants to have the personality and ethics of Jesus to fall back on. In fairness to the author, however, it must be said that he has made a very serious effort to *understand* these Europeans, and in his expositions of their thought succeeds very well in maintaining objectivity.

Readers who want a good "first" book on the subject will certainly benefit from this one. The many for whom names like Schlink or Rahner are little more than names will also profit from this book. Those who are struggling with the issues these men are grappling with and are looking for some penetrating insight into them will have to look elsewhere.

—George H. Kehm.

Proudfoot, Merrill. *Suffering: a Christian Understanding*. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1964. \$5.00.

In at least two ways Merrill Proudfoot has written a *different* book on suffering. It is a biblical perspective, or more especially, a Pauline viewpoint; and, having focused on Paul's thought, the author moves to a comparison of several other perspectives with that of Paul.

Proudfoot finds a correlation between suffering and comfort and the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ.

Comfort is traced biblically to mean not a bare feeling but a fact of salvation, salvation by the act of God. The sufferings of Paul were his in the body of Christ, "a way by which Christ's death was working in him" (p. 21). The sufferings represent the death of Jesus, as the comfort is the sharing in his resurrection. Every Christian is involved in suffering and comfort so correlated with Christ's

death and resurrection because such is the nature of the one body we are of which Christ is the head. Paul's own suffering—and that of every Christian—is illustrative of the gospel: death but salvation (comfort). The author is not so convincing when he suggests that the sufferer receives encouragement in the "sympathy" of creation, though the help of the Spirit needs no argument.

The larger part of the book is a series of comparisons: Paul and Positive Thinking, Paul and the Punishment Theory, Paul and Asceticism, among others. These comparisons are not once-over-lightly. For example, in the

comparison between Paul and Existentialism Jean-Paul Sartre has fifteen pages dealt to him in his understanding of suffering in his plays, novels, and *Being and Nothingness*, suffering that is utterly lonely and yet the necessary path to authentic selfhood in freedom. Proudfoot writes sympathetically from within the viewpoint he is evaluating although his own stance is obviously beside Paul.

This book would be an excellent study series for any church. An elective on suffering during the church school hour might bring comfort to some painful situations!

—Gordon E. Jackson.

Raines, Robert. *Creative Brooding*. New York: Macmillan, 1966. \$2.95.

This book says nothing about raising chickens—it says a great deal about relating devotional life to the "Secular City." Let me hasten to say that this is not a typical "devotional book" of pious prayers and archaic moralisms. It is sub-titled: "Readings for 34 days to sharpen thought and provoke reflection," and this it accomplishes with ease. Each day's reading begins with a pungent quote from a wide selection of individuals: playwrights like Herb Gardner, au-

thors and journalists ranging from James Baldwin and Albert Camus to Petru Dumitriu and Moss Hart, anthropologist Loren Eiseley, theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer, and housewife Myrlie Evers. Carefully selected scripture and a brief contemporary prayer make up the balance of the daily fare. The little book is too rich to just read through, although this is very tempting. It is a marvelous antidote for the "spiritually jaded."

—William R. Phillippe.

Deissmann, A. *Light from the Ancient East*. Limited Editions Library. Grand Rapids: Baker, 1965. Pp. XXXII + 535. \$7.95.

Light from the Ancient East first appeared in 1908. Following the first edition several German revisions were made by the author. An English translation was prepared in 1927. Much of the material which had been uncovered in the discovery of monuments, papyri, and ostraca in the Middle East was thus made available to the public. The Greek of the New Testament and the thinking, customs, and life of New Testament times were illuminated.

Baker Book House has now presented a reprint edition of *Light from the Ancient East* which makes available, once again, the wealth of documentary material contained in the volume. While Deissmann was concerned with destroying the myth of "Biblical Greek" by presenting the fact that the Greek of the New Testament was really the Greek of the common people, the material in this volume will provide the reader with graphic word studies which can become valuable aids to interpretation.

Schwantes, S. J. *The Ancient Near East*. Grand Rapids: Baker, 1965. Pp. 191. \$4.95.

This book received the award in the Baker Book House 25th Anniversary Manuscript Contest. It presents a short history of the Ancient Near East, supported by the rapidly increasing body of archeological information available in this decade.

Beginning with early Mesopotamia, consideration is given to the rising and falling empires down to the appearance of the Israelites. In addition to the familiar Egyptian,

Babylonian, Assyrian, and Persian empires, the volume introduces the reader to the Akkadian empire, the Amarites, the Hittites, the Aramaeans, and others whose history has been intertwined with that of more familiar peoples in the Fertile Crescent.

The author is a Brazilian citizen who, as a graduate of Johns Hopkins in the field of Semitics, is qualified to handle the material presented.

—Howard M. Jamieson.

Gingrich, F. W. *Shorter Lexicon of the Greek New Testament*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965. Pp. 241. \$4.50.

This is an abridgement of the Arndt and Gingrich *A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature*, which was translated and edited from Bauer's standard German *Wörterbuch*. The extra-biblical entries have been dropped as well as the literature

references, but an adequate listing of meanings is given along with many NT references. While this book is no substitute for the larger work, it will probably prove to be the best available aid for the purposes to which a volume of this scope is directed.

Westminster Study Bible. Revised Standard Version. New York: Collins, 1965. Pp. XXVI + 1283; X + 434; Plates XVI; Index. \$8.95 & \$12.50.

When the *Westminster Study Bible* appeared in 1948, it was accepted promptly as a useful tool, particularly for lay students and teachers in the church. Its publication antedated the OT portion of the RSV, and the KJV was used as the text.

Now we are fortunate that a new edition of this volume has been issued with the RSV text. The necessary

changes have been made in the notes, and the edition includes the latest corrections and changes in the RSV itself.

The articles and notes were largely the work of Presbyterians; and Dr. Paul Leo, formerly a teacher at this seminary, made a substantial contribution.

Hunter, A. M. *A Pattern for Life*. (Revised Edition, paperback.) Philadelphia: Westminster, 1965. Pp. 127. \$1.65.

"An exposition of the Sermon on the Mount, its making, its exegesis and its meaning." This small book first appeared in Britain in 1953 under the title *Design for Life*. With remarkable candor, Professor Hunter admits that he has revised his work

in the light of writings of Jeremias, Davies, and Bonhoeffer. And the proliferation of his authorship seems not to dilute the substance of his scholarship nor to diminish the appeal of his contributions.

—Ed.

Books Received

Buswell, J. O., III. *Slavery, Segregation, and Scripture*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964. Pp. 101. \$2.50.

The *Chime Paperbacks* are an excellent series of important monographs and essays attractively published at \$1.00 each by the John Knox Press, Richmond, Va. We note the following:

Barth, K. *Selected Prayers*. 1965.. Pp. 72.

Bonhoeffer, D. *I Loved This People*. 1965. Pp. 62.

Mehl, R. *Images of Man*. Translated by James H. Farley (Pittsburgh Theological Seminary, '62). 1965. Pp. 64.

Schweizer, E. *The Church as the Body of Christ*. 1964. Pp. 78.

Scott, N. A. Jr., ed. *Forms of Extremity in the Modern Novel*. Franz Kafka, Ernest Hemingway, Albert Camus, Graham Greene. 1965. Pp. 96.

Scott, N. A., Jr., ed. *Four Ways of Modern Poetry*. Wallace Stevens, Robert Frost, Dylan Thomas, W. H. Auden. 1966. Pp. 95.

Scott, N. A., Jr., ed. *Man in the Modern Theater*. T. S. Eliot, Eugene O'Neill, Bertolt Brecht, Samuel Beckett. 1965. Pp. 100.

Tournier, P., ed. *Fatigue in Modern Society. Psychological, Medical, Biblical Insights*. Translated by James H. Farley. 1965. Pp. 79.

Daane, J. *The Anatomy of Anti-Semitism and Other Essays on Religion and Race*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1965. Pp. 84. \$1.45 (paper).

Davies, J. G. *A Select Liturgical Lexicon*. Ecumenical Studies in Worship, No. 14. Richmond: John Knox, 1965. Pp. 146. \$2.45 (paperback).

DeHaan, M. R., and Bosch, H. C. *Bread for Each Day*. 365 Devotional Meditations. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1962. \$3.00.

Edman, V. R. *But God! . . .*, with Poems by Annie Johnson Flint. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1962. Pp. 152, illustrated. \$2.50.

Enlow, D. R. *Men Aflame*. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1962. Pp. 120. \$2.50.

Forsyth, P. T. *The Cruciality of the Cross and The Soul of Prayer*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1965. Pp. 104 and 92. \$1.45 each (paperback). Reprints of the 1909 and 1916 editions respectively.

Foster, J. *Five Minutes a Saint*. Richmond: John Knox, 1963. Pp. 112. \$1.25 (paper).

Froom, L. E. *The Conditionalist Faith of Our Fathers*. The Conflict of the Ages Over the Nature and Destiny of Man. Volume II. Washington, D. C.: Review and Herald, 1965. Pp. 1344, illustrated.

Hamilton, F. E. *The Basis of Christian Faith. A Modern Defense of the Christian Religion*. Revised and Enlarged edition. New York: Harper & Row, 1964. Pp. xv + 364. \$2.50.

Haskin, D. C. *In Spite of Dungeon*. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1962. Pp. 150. \$2.50.

Hodgson, L. *Christian Faith and Practice*. American edition. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1965. Pp. xii + 113. \$2.50.

Isherwood, M. *Faith Without Dogma: In Quest of Meaning*. New York Harper & Row, 1964. Pp. 126. \$3.00.

Laubach, Frank C. *War of Amazing Love*. Westwood, N. J.: Revell, 1965. Pp. 150. \$2.95.

Lewis C. S., ed. *Essays Presented to Charles Williams*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans: 1966. Pp. xv + 145. \$2.45. Paperback reprint of a worthy 1947 volume.

Lewis, C. S., *The Weight of Glory and Other Addresses*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1965. Pp. 66. \$1.00. Paperback edition of 1949 Macmillan title.

Limbert, Paul M. *New Perspectives for the YMCA*. New York: Association Press, 1964. Pp. 255. \$3.50 (paper).

MacLennan, David A. *Revell's Minister Annual* 1966. Westwood, N. J.: Revell, 1965. Pp. 363. \$3.95. Cf. VI.1 (March, 1963), 39, where the 1965 *Annual* was reviewed. Children's talks and various dedicatory materials have been added.

MacLeod, E. H. *Prayers for Everyone to Meet Every Need*. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1962. Pp. 84. \$1.95.

Marshall, C. *A Man Called Peter*. Greenwich, Conn.: Crest Book, 1964. Pp. 351. 75¢. Paperback reprint of 1951 McGraw-Hill edition.

Overduin, J. *Adventures of a Deserter. The Story of Jonah*. Translated from Dutch edition by H. Van Dyke. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1965. Pp. 153. \$3.50.

Perry, L. M. *A Manual for Biblical Preaching*. Grand Rapids: Baker, 1965. Pp. 215+. \$4.95.

Powell, Ivor. *John's Wonderful Gospel. A Comprehensive Exposition*. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1962. Pp. 446. \$6.95.

Price, Eugenia. *A Woman's Choice. Living Through Your Problems*. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1962. Pp. 182. \$2.50.

Samartha, S. J. *Introduction to Radhakrishnan. The Man and His Thought*. (A Seminary Paperback.) New York: Association Press, 1964. Pp. 128. \$2.25.

The Scripture Sourcebook. . . ., with an Introduction on "How to Study the Bible" by D. L. Moody. (Republication of *The Bible Text-Book*.) Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1962. Pp. 221. \$2.50.

Shideler, M. M. *The Theology of Romantic Love: A Study in the Writings of Charles Williams*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1966. Pp. xii + 243. \$2.45 (paperback ed.; original, 1962).

Stalker, J. M. *The Trial and Death of Jesus Christ. A Devotional History of Our Lord's Passion*. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1961. Pp. 185. \$2.50. Originally published in 1894.

Stott, John R. W. *Basic Introduction to the New Testament*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964. Pp. 179. \$1.25 (paperback). Reprint of *Men With a Message*; London: 1954.

Stringfellow, W. *My People Is the Enemy: An Autobiographical Polemic*. (Anchor Books edition of 1964 Holt, Rinehart and Winston edition; New York: 1964. Pp. ix + 150. \$3.95.) Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1966. Pp. 151. 95¢ (paper).

Thiessen, J. C. *Pastoring the Smaller Church. A Complete and Comprehensive Guide-book for Pastors*. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1962. Pp. 168. \$2.95.

Turnbull, Ralph G. *A Minister's Obstacles*. (Revision of 1946 edition.) Westwood, N. J.: Revell, 1964. Pp. 192. \$2.95. By the pastor of the First Presbyterian Church, Seattle, Washington; formerly a teacher at this Seminary.

Von Campenhausen, H. *Men Who Shaped the Western Church*. New York: Harper & Row, 1964. Pp. 328. \$5.95. Cf. *Perspective*, VI.4 (December, 1965), p. 37, for Professor Ritschl's comment.

Vos, Nelvin. *The Drama of Comedy: Victim and Victor*. Richmond: John Knox, 1966. Pp. 125. \$1.95 (paperback).

Wallace, R. S. *The Ten Commandments. A Study of Ethical Freedom*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1965. Pp. xiv + 181. \$3.95.

Ward, R. A. *The Epistles of John and Jude. A study Manual*. Shield Bible Study Series. Grand Rapids: Baker, 1965. Pp. 102. \$1.50 (paperback).

Warfield, B. B. *Miracles: Yesterday and Today*. A reissue of *Counterfeit Miracles* (1918). Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1965. Pp. 327. \$2.25 (paper). By a famous defender of the Faith, once a teacher at this Seminary.

Wells, A. N. *Pascal's Recovery of Man's Wholeness*. Richmond: John Knox, 1965. Pp. 174. \$4.25.

White, R. E. O. *Open Letter to Evangelicals*. A Devotional and Homiletical Commentary on The First Epistle of John. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964. Pp. 276. \$4.95.

World Christian Books, a paperback series. New York: Association Press. \$1.25 each.

- 49. Hanson, R. P. C. *Justin Martyr's Dialogue with Trypho*. 1964. Pp. 88.
- 50. Neill, S. *Paul to the Colossians*. 1964. Pp. 76.
- 51. Carleton, A. P. *Pastoral Epistles*. 1964. Pp. 77.
- 52. Kraft, H. *Early Christian Thinkers*. 1964.
- 53. Estborn, S. *Gripped by Christ*. 1964. Pp. 80.
- 54. Soggin, A. *When the Judges Ruled*. 1965. Pp. 80.


CORRECTIONS, PLEASE.....

In the last issue (March, 1966) of *Perspective* there were several errors in the text of two articles. In Dr. Ritschl's article, on page 14, second column, second line of the new paragraph, the first printing contained the typographical error *technological* for the proper reading *theological*.

In Mr. Kehm's article the following require correction: p. 34, col. 1, next-to-last line, read "obedience *but rather* as a means . . ."; p. 35, col. 2, line 7, read "to bring *them* to repentance"; and p. 36, col. 1, six lines from bottom, read "(XI,2)" instead of "(I,2)."

The Editor regrets these errors and appreciates the generosity of the authors in this regard.





P I T T S B U R G H
PER SPECTIVE

Volume VII

SEPTEMBER, 1966

Number 3

PITTSBURGH THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

P I T T S B U R G H P E R S P E C T I V E

Volume VII

SEPTEMBER, 1966

Number 3

Published four times yearly in March, June, September and December, by the Pittsburgh Theological Seminary, 616 North Highland Avenue, Pittsburgh, Pa. 15206, one of the seven seminaries of the United Presbyterian Church in the U. S. A. Second-class postage paid at Pittsburgh, Pa. Changes of address should be sent to the Seminary, care of the Director of the Mailing Department.

Editor: James Arthur Walther, Th.D.

Publications Committees

Faculty

Lynn B. Hinds, *Chmn.*
J. A. Walther

Student

Robert H. McClure, Jr.

J. Rowe Hinsey, *ex. off.*
William R. Atkins, *ex. off.*
William R. Phillippe, *ex. off.*

Circulation: William Hill

Secretarial Assistant: Mrs. Elizabeth Eakin

Contents

<i>Ad Hoc</i>	2
From the President's Desk	3
The History and Literature of "the New Morality"	4
by Edward LeRoy Long, Jr.	
Human Values and Social Change	18
by Joseph Haroutunian	
Book Reviews and Notes	
Piety: Found and Lost	25
Farley, <i>Requiem for a Lost Piety</i>	
Dennis E. Shoemaker	
Second Schaff Lecturer	30
Ricoeur, <i>History and Truth</i>	
Gordon E. Jackson	
Leitch, <i>Winds of Doctrine</i>	36
John M. Bald	
Longenecker, <i>Paul: Apostle of Liberty</i>	37
Howard Eshbaugh	
Baker, <i>What is the World Coming To?</i>	38
Motyer, <i>After Death—A Sure and Certain Hope?</i>	40
J. A. Walther	
Nicholls, <i>Conflicting Images of Man</i>	41
Ogletree, <i>Christian Faith and History</i>	42
George H. Kehm	
Barth, <i>The German Church Conflict</i>	43
Iain Wilson	
Stegenga, <i>Greek-English Analytical Concordance of the Greek-English N. T.</i>	46
Rolston, <i>The Bible in Christian Teaching</i>	46
Van Buren, <i>The Secular Meaning of the Gospel</i>	46
Special List	47

Ad Hoc

THE SPECIAL ISSUE on "the new morality" which we announced in the last issue must be delayed due to circumstances beyond the Editor's control. We are presenting in this issue, however, a background article on the subject: Edward LeRoy Long, Jr., Professor in the Department of Religion at Oberlin College in Ohio, has prepared for us a survey of the history and literature relating to "the new morality." We are planning to have the other projected articles ready for the December issue.

IT IS ALWAYS A DELIGHT for the Editor to have something from the pen of Joseph Haroutunian, who is now on the faculty of the University of Chicago. The paper we are presenting was prepared for an Ethics Consultation held in Chicago about a year ago, and Dean Gordon Jackson secured the manuscript for us.

FACULTY AUTHORS continue to be busy. A new book from Edward Farley, Professor of Systematic Theology, is the subject of a review article by Dennis E. Shoemaker. Mr. Shoemaker has been until recently the Associate Editor of *Crossroads* (for which much of Dr. Farley's material was prepared); he is presently editor of *The Journal*, a periodical of resources for adult study, to be published by the Board of Christian Education of our Church beginning in 1968.

Two other books from the labors of faculty members have just been published. From James L. Kelso, Emeritus Professor of Old Testament History and Archaeology, comes *Archaeology and our Old Testament Contemporaries* (Zondervan; \$4.95). This is a "popular" book, with a foreword by W. F. Albright and a liberal supply of illustrations. The University of Chicago Press has issued the *New Testament Greek Workbook*, edited by James Arthur Walther (\$4.50; spiral-bound). This textbook embodies the teaching method pioneered and refined at Pittsburgh Seminary. Reviews of these books will appear in a later issue of *Perspective*.

—Concluded inside back cover.

From the President's Desk—

ONE OF THE DISTINGUISHING MARKS OF OUR TIME is the all but absolute power of communication media. Events taking place in the remotest corners of the earth are heralded by radio and television to "every Middlesex village and farm" in almost every nation of the world. Styles created in the centers of fashion are to be seen—albeit in cheap imitation—in the most isolated areas of human habitation. The masses of humanity hear the same things, see the same things, and respond to the same persuasions, so that the proper manipulation of the media of communication can create—if need be, out of little or nothing—mass responses devoid of any profound thought or personal critical appraisal. Discuss a new book on the "Today" show, or review it in *Time*, or spread its author's face on *Life*; and several million people immediately buy it, many will even read it, and most seemingly accept it without question as the last word on the subject. Greatness seems to be measured by quantitative rather than qualitative norms and the growth of any movement tends to be measured "by the strength of its appeal to the fickle taste of contemporary opinion."

The field of theology has not escaped. Theology in the last decade has been produced more by headlines than by theologians. The clever phrase, the novel or even the bizarre opinion, the religious tincture given to some of the current psychological or sociological views or even to some of the more depraved aspects of a jaded society, when put out to the public in attractive form, mould the religious views of many moderns and traffic under the guise of theology. Slogans are often substituted for thought, and the latest trends of a confused and chaotic generation are offered in place of responsible wrestling with the biblical revelation or of disciplined grappling with the history of theological thought.

The times are serious and fraught with decisive consequence. The marks of frivolity of our age may be a sort of reverse testimony to a deep consciousness of issues too great to be faced. A frivolous theology, which speaks only

—Concluded on page 17.

The History and Literature of "The New Morality"

by EDWARD LEROY LONG, JR.

THE TERM "the new morality" has come into popular use in recent theological journalism to refer to a variety of trends in ethical analysis, some of which are very old. It is a phrase which attracts much attention at the dinner table, tea party, and bull session and which has become recently discussed in the columns of popular news magazines, but which lacks precision as a theological category. It seems to be of greater interest when advocated by round-collared bishops than when discussed by non-collared campus beats, but neither seems overly precise in defining what is meant by the term. It is sometimes identified with a similar catchy phrase, "the death of God," which has become an object of popular attention in about the same era; but such an identification can only compound the confusion. Many expressions of the new morality presuppose a theocentric world-view quite at variance with the outlook of religious atheism.

It is the purpose of this article to look at the appearance of the phrase in recent theological discourse and the literature in which it has been

used, hoping thereby to ascertain the main ideas which it incorporates. We may not succeed in fully defining what is talked about when the phrase is employed, for too often each person who uses the term keeps in his own thinking a constellation of ideas which may be different from the ideas of the next person who uses it. The result is much talk and attention-getting journalism but little precision in thought; much infatuation with a slogan but little informed commitment. Back of the term, however, there is a very profound and extensive theological movement which is shared to varying degrees by those who use the term. The serious character of this movement is not to be lightly dismissed merely because the phrase "the new morality" is seldom employed in ways which do it full justice.

I

THE CONFUSION which surrounds the use of the term "the new morality" stems in part from the fact that it has been applied to three or four distinctively separate kinds of move-

ment in the last forty years. Some of these movements have been antithetical to each other. In 1928 Durant Drake of Vassar College published a book entitled *The New Morality*,¹ which was a thorough-going attack upon authoritarian and supernaturalistic ethics in the name of pragmatic naturalism. A few years later, G. E. Newsome of Selwyn College, Cambridge, and Chaplain to the English king, published a book² by the same title protesting the libertarian sexual ethics then advocated by Bertrand Russell. In this epoch the term "the new morality" was a product of naturalistic pragmatism and seems clearly to have been at odds with professed Christian thinking.

With the rise of existentialism as a "new" form of philosophy the meaning of the term "the new morality" changed. Existentialism engendered a non-prescriptive approach to ethical questions. It stressed the importance of the specific conditions of each ethical choice rather than the claim of rules and principles. The theological world was influenced in part by this new philosophical outlook. Indeed, it found much of it congenial and made common cause in many respects with its basic in-

tentions. In 1950 the Roman Catholic world was explicitly warned against this alliance in the papal encyclical *Humani Generis* which called existentialism a "new philosophy of error" and declared it equally dangerous to a true theology because like idealism, immanentism, and pragmatism "it tends to leave the unchanging essences of things out of sight, and to concentrate all its attention on particular existences."

In 1952 a papal allocution, *Acta Apostolicae Sedis*, again warned against moral judgments based upon considerations of situations alone; and on February 2, 1952, the Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office used the phrase "the new morality" in an allocution which condemned this approach to moral thinking and sought to arrest its influence in the academies and seminaries of the church. Bishop John A. T. Robinson therefore attributes the phrase to Pope Pius XII, at whose behest and authority the allocution was issued.³

The term as such seems not to have caused insurmountable difficulty for subsequent Catholic writers. Father Ignace Lepp, a French Roman Catholic priest, used it to entitle a book written in 1963,⁴ some eleven

¹New York: The Macmillan Company, 1928.

²New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1933.

³*Christian Morals Today* (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, c1964), p. 8.

⁴*La Morale Nouvelle* (Paris: Editions Bernard Grasset, 1963). This work has been translated into English by Fr. Bernard Murchland, C.S.C., and published in 1965 by the Macmillan Company under the title *The Authentic Morality*. Within the text, however, the phrase "the new morality" is used.

years after the condemnation was issued. Lepp's book belongs on the left margin of acceptable Roman Catholic thinking and builds in part upon the categories of Teilhard de Chardin. Many of its arguments call for a flexible kind of moral thinking and would find approval among the advocates of the new morality in its more recent and more radical expressions, but the book does not partake of the hostility to principles as such that has been characteristic of the more radical formulations. Lepp considers conditions under which the application of prescriptive moralism creates serious violations of good sense and humane values, but he does not plead the case for an ethic based solely upon considerations of circumstances in the particularity of individual cases.

The allocution of 1952 condemned both "existentialist" and "situational" approaches to ethical thinking. From the standpoint of a traditional moral theology of essences and principles these two approaches undoubtedly seem much the same. But thinkers like Karl Rahner have managed to plead for much that they consider valuable in the existential insights while taking into account the stric-

tures contained in the Pope's discourse.⁵ Care and caution is abundantly evidenced in Roman Catholic discussions of what may be valuable considerations to be garnered from existential and situational approaches, which the condemnation of 1952 does not seem to have totally erased from the pages of books with the *nihil obstat*. It also has brought forth some newly reinforced defenses of traditional morality.⁶

Protestant discussions of these matters has proceeded without the restrictions implicit in a papal allocution and its dampening effect upon the use of existentialist categories for setting forth ethics of the situation. However, until recently, at least, Protestant theologians have set forth their views without use of a slogan. Many of the most widely read treatments of Christian ethics from the Protestant perspective have incorporated insights which are now dubbed "the new morality," but which at the time of their writing were set forth as careful, deliberate, extensive, and scholarly efforts to spell out the ethical implications of the Reformation principle of justification by faith alone. In fact, the Protestant discussion of Christian ethics has for

⁵Cf. "On the Question of a Formal Existential Ethics," in *Theological Investigations: Volume II, Man in the Church*, Kruger, Karl H., translator (Baltimore, Md., Helicon Press, c1963), pp. 217-234.

⁶Cf. Ford, John C., S. J., and Kelly, Gerald, S. J., *Contemporary Moral Theology: Volume I, Questions in Fundamental Moral Theology* (Westminster, Md.: The Newman Press, 1962), especially chapters 4-8.

years been dominated by treatments in which elements of the new morality have been carefully explicated. Emil Brunner's *The Divine Imperative*,⁷ Karl Barth's *Church Dogmatics* (especially Volumes II/2 and III/4),⁸ and Dietrich Bonhoeffer's *Ethics*,⁹ are among the continental statements which soon found their way into the American discussions.¹⁰

That there are very significant differences of structure and emphasis among these books must surely be kept in mind by any careful student of these trends, yet each of them in its own way has taken issue with the ethics of philosophical rationalism and of religiously inspired legalism.

In America the discussion of issues related to these matters did not take place with any fullness until the middle of the nineteen-fifties. It was heralded by an article by Paul Lehmann entitled "The Foundation and Pattern of Christian Behavior" in 1953.¹¹ Nels F. S. Ferré protested

against the thrust for rational autonomy in Christian ethics in 1951.¹² George W. Forell brought Luther's ethical thinking to American attention in a new way in 1954.¹³ But despite these several efforts the real impact of contextual and situational ethics did not strike the American theological consciousness until just before the 1960's.

At first, the main ingredients of such an approach were well expounded in books which made no mention of the phrase, "the new morality." In 1958 Joseph Sittler published his provocative essay, *The Structure of Christian Ethics*, in which the principle-transcending nature of Jesus' teaching was portrayed with the image of "gull-like swoops."¹⁴ H. Richard Niebuhr's posthumous work *The Responsible Self*¹⁵ appeared in 1963 and presented the most careful statement of relational ethics as a generalized category yet made. Paul Lehmann's

⁷Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1947.

⁸Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1957 and 1961.

⁹New York: The Macmillan Company, 1955.

¹⁰In recent years the thought of Rudolf Bultmann has become better recognized in America as part of the European contribution. It seems difficult to explain why some continental theologians become known this side of the Atlantic while others remain relatively unnoticed. Why, for example, have the works of N. H. Soe (*Christliche Ethik*, Munchen: Chr. Kaiser, 1942) and Hendrick van Oyen (*Evangelische Ethik*, Basel: Friedrich Reinhardt) attracted such little interest?

¹¹In Hutchison, John A., editor, *Christian Faith and Social Action* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953), pp. 93-116.

¹²"Theology and Ethics," in *Minutes of the Presbyterian Educational Association of the South*, 1951, pp. 47-77.

¹³Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, c1954.

¹⁴Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, p. 50.

¹⁵New York: Harper and Row.

*Ethics in a Christian Context*¹⁶ appeared the same year elaborating and defending a situational approach to decision-making as the single legitimate manner of doing Christian ethics. Almost all of these books claim to call the theological world back to a biblical and Reformation type of ethic rather than forward to something "new."

The Protestant use of the term "the new morality" is even more recent. In October of 1959, Joseph Fletcher wrote about "the new look" in Christian ethics.¹⁷ In 1963 Bishop Robinson entitled his chapter on morals in *Honest to God*¹⁸ with the phrase "the New Morality," and like many of the other catchy aspects of that book this term stuck in the public consciousness. In 1963 Fletcher again set forth his view, this time speaking about ethics in "a new key."¹⁹ Finally in February 1966 he broke forth with the phrase itself in *Commonweal*,²⁰ and later this same year gathered all the previous dis-

cussions into a paperback entitled *Situation Ethics: The New Morality*.²¹ The phenomenal interest in this book shows with what alacrity the public will flock to a theological catch-word which arrives at a particular *kairos*.

Still another aspect of the new morality which must be mentioned is an emphasis upon the validity, authenticity, and importance of man's common social life. This point has been most vividly made, perhaps, by Harvey Cox in *The Secular City*²² which welcomes both urbanization and the collapse of traditional religiosity as twin developments in the twentieth century. Bonhoeffer, who contributed to an existentially formulated statement of neo-Reformation ethics, began a prolonged discussion of religionless Christianity, a Christianity suitable for men who live in a "world come of age." Other writers have propelled the same theme along its snowballing path, including Ronald Gregor Smith²³ and Gayraud

¹⁶New York: Harper and Row.

¹⁷"The New Look in Christian Ethics," *Harvard Divinity Bulletin*, Volume 24, Number 1, pp. 7-18.

¹⁸London: S.C.M. Press, Ltd., 1963.

¹⁹"Contemporary Conscience: A Christian Method," *Kenyon Alumni Bulletin*, Volume XXI, Number 3, July-September 1963, pp. 4-10.

²⁰Volume LXXXIII, Number 14, January 14, 1966, pp. 427-432. This issue also carries a commentary by Father Herbert McCabe, (pp. 432-437), and a second exchange between the two men. (pp. 437-440).

²¹Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1966.

²²New York: The Macmillan Company, c1965.

²³*The New Man: Christianity and Man's Coming of Age* (London: S.C.M. Press, Ltd., 1965).

S. Wilmore.²⁴ John A. T. Robinson coupled these two themes together in *Honest to God*, devoting a chapter to each. Strictly speaking these are related but not necessarily inseparable trends, since several versions of contextual ethics presuppose the church (or divinely-formed *koinonia*) to be the very locus of Christian decision-making. However, even such a strong advocate of a *koinonia* ethic as Paul Lehmann has responded with evident enthusiasm to the outlook advanced by Cox.²⁵

The extensive popular usage of the phrase "the new morality" has created something of a reaction among even its own innovators and defenders. Robinson has given vent to the feeling of frustration which rightly ought to perturb any careful theologian whose categories have become bandied about more in the market place than in the academy:

... the phrase "the new morality" has overnight become a slogan—relieving those who use it of any need to distinguish between widely different views, or even to know what they are. Nothing, I judge, could be more injurious to the Church than this kind of blanket thinking. For if the response

of churchmen is simply undifferentiating reaction, then it will merely confirm the image which we are constantly told is a caricature. And this would be tragic in an age in which Christian *discernment* was never more necessary.²⁶

Canon Douglas A. Rhymes, himself a spokesman for the main tenets of the new morality, apparently would like to disclaim the name. Moreover, he is convinced that its approach to ethics is really not new at all but can be traced back to the mind of Christ himself.²⁷ Even the enthusiasts for the secular world have manifested second thoughts. In noting the warning cries sent up by critics of the position, Cox has confessed that ". . . we should not dismiss conservative voices with a mere wave of the hand. They will turn out to be right unless we are able to manifest a degree of maturity, accountability, and adulthood which has not yet emerged, at least in the American mentality and probably not in the mentality of most nations today."²⁸

II

GIVEN the variety and complexity of ideas combined in the new moral-

²⁴"The Secular Relevance of the Church" (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1962).

²⁵"Chalcedon in Technopolis," in *Christianity and Crisis*, Volume XXV, Number 12, July 12, 1965, pp. 149-151.

²⁶*Christian Morals Today*, p. 10.

²⁷*No New Morality* (London: Constable, 1964); published in America by Bobbs Merrill in 1965.

²⁸"Maturity and Secularity," in *Religion in Life*, Volume XXXV, Number 2 (Spring, 1966), p. 216.

ity—a variety and complexity often obscured by the quick and journalistic coverage it receives, dare any interpreter define what is meant by the term? It is both risky and difficult to attempt this, but without such an effort any future discussions of this matter will find it almost impossible to focus on the relevant issues. With some trepidation, therefore, the following generalizations about this approach to ethics are offered in the hope that they could receive reasonably wide-spread concurrence among most advocates of this position. They ought, at least, to carry the image beyond the oversimplified view that "the old morality" is for rules and principles and "the new morality" against them!

This approach to ethical decision seems, in the first place, to acknowledge that the claim of the person who stands in the concrete situation, either as recipient or dispenser of neighbor-love, is greater than the claim of any abstract conception of the right. The literature says this in many different ways: often this point is made negatively through a polemical attack upon rules and principles. But the positive implications of this declaration also deserve attention. Rhymes puts it this way: "The goodness of an action will be determined

not by reference to some absolute codes based upon a law system of morality . . . but by what is the relevant action for that individual in order that he may live his life in its wholeness and secure the maximum welfare of all concerned in the situation."²⁹ Robinson complains that the traditional supernaturalist ethic which is concerned about some metaphysical or moral universal thereby subordinates the importance of the individual, who should be dealt with in the context of his personal needs.³⁰ Fletcher makes the same point when he says: "There are no 'values' in the sense of inherent goods—value is what *happens to* something when it happens to be useful to love working for the sake of persons."³¹ These quotations all presuppose a dichotomy between the claim of rules and the needs of neighbor, a dichotomy which once it is posed quite naturally elicits the judgment that neighbor-claims are prior.

The emphasis of the new moralist upon what happens to persons has much in common with the professional stance of the healing arts. It is naturally suspicious of the judgmental stance of revivalist preaching. Terms like "authentic," "mature," and "therapeutic" convey the mood of this approach better than terms like

²⁹"The New Morality: What, Why—and Why Not," *Religion in Life*, op. cit., p. 173.

³⁰*Honest to God*, p. 112.

³¹*Situation Ethics: The New Morality*, p. 50.

"judgment," "law," and "guilt." Future statements of the new morality may make more of this contrast than most of the present statements have made, for up to this moment a preoccupation with the contrast between legalistic or principled ethics and ethics of response to particular situations has overshadowed many other potentially fruitful ways of setting forth the distinctive features of this "new" approach. If one examines the ways in which and the extent to which Paul Lehmann uses the term "maturity" in connection with his ethic, the portent of this development can be perceived.

Back of this is a distrust of the authoritarian temper, a distrust which finds frequent open and even more frequent veiled expression in the writings of these thinkers. Rules and principles are considered to be bad, not only because they do not take the needs of individual cases into account but because they are indigenous to closed and rigid moralities. Judgments tendered in the name of natural law as well as scriptural legalism come in for severe criticism. Distrust of authoritarian legalism is certainly not a totally new thing in Christian ethics. It has an honorable history. What may be new in the new morality is the claim that such legalism can be overcome by revamping the basic structure of

ethical thinking.

A second important aspect of the new morality is its willingness to make common cause with the moral practices of its culture. *It regards the moral changes that are taking place in our time as more to be welcomed and transformed than to be resisted or reversed.* It relaxes the tension between Christian faith and culture by moving toward a congenial acceptance of modern mores. Indeed, at times, it even hails modern culture as a more adequate channel for true morality than specifically religious cultures of the past. Kierkegaard may be the inspiration for the metaphysical assumptions of the new morality, but it hardly shares the motivations which prompted his *Attack on Christendom*.

Bishop Robinson begins his discussion of the new morality by suggesting that Christian thinking about morals calls for the same recasting of traditional outlooks in light of the revolutionary changes in cultural behavior which are necessary with respect to Christian formulations about God's nature. He declares

. . . there is no need to prove that a revolution is required in morals. It has long since broken out; and it is no "reluctant revolution." The wind of change here is a gale. Our only task is to relate it correctly to the previous revolution we have described and to try to discern what should be the Christian attitude toward it.³²

³²*Op. cit.*, p. 105.

Robinson goes on to declare that we cannot meet with dismay the changes in moral attitude occurring all around us. We must accept the fact that standards are changing and that religion no longer has the power effectively to control public mores.

The new moralists have frequently said that Christianity is revolutionary, that it must turn its back upon the rural ethos and town culture with which it is presently identified. The more cautious and conservative spokesmen for the new morality have generally stated this conviction in general terms, as does Ignace Lepp, who declares, ". . . all authentic morality is necessarily *revolutionary*, on the condition, evidently, that the word *revolution* is understood dialectically, the emphasis being put not upon the upsetting and destruction of what is but upon the creation of what must be."³³ In more radical statements of this theme, however, the critical dialectic implied by Lepp tends to relax in favor of an enthusiastic embrace of the revolutionary changes of our era. These are accepted, hailed as the work of God, and looked upon as the channels through which the Christian not only can, but is told he must, work if he is to be relevant in today's world. The culturally *avant garde* become the heros. Everything

from the thrust of colonial nations for self-destiny to campus mores about sex and personal behavior is looked upon as a potentially fruitful development.

It is wrong to think of the new morality merely as a more open attitude toward sex, though many defenders of the position have felt it necessary to counteract a popular tendency to make this identification. To be sure, the new moralists have addressed themselves to questions of sexual behavior, but they have just as often criticized the commercial exploitations of sex in modern culture as they have complained about the unfortunate consequences of religiously inspired prudery. The twofold emphasis which is characteristic of most analysis of this issue by the new moralists is nicely packaged by Joseph Fletcher in this sentence: "We do not praise a technical virgin whose petting practices are sexually unrestrained, nor do we condemn a loving transgressor of the law who is emotionally honest although technically unchaste."³⁴

Yet a third feature of "the new morality" is its preoccupation with method. This may not be a self-conscious preoccupation nor a matter of deliberate attention, but who can read the literature of the movement without being struck with this

³³*The Authentic Morality*, p. 54.

³⁴"Love is the Only Measure," in *Commonweal*, January 14, 1966, *op. cit.*, p. 431.

characteristic locus of concern? As Paul Lehmann puts it, "The present analysis of Christian ethics as *koinonia* ethics is an attempt to take with full seriousness the methodological revolution in ethical thinking inaugurated by the Reformation."³⁵

We have fallen so naturally into this preoccupation that its subtle effects upon the nature of ethical discourse may escape our notice. The new morality is essentially convinced that the central ethical issue concerns the ways in which decisions are approached and ethical judgments rendered. It blames the difficulties of the past upon faultiness of method and promises a new procedure for dealing with the problems of choice. The new procedure is set forth programmatically but always in terms of the description of the method rather than the specificity of its consequences. This inevitably subordinates questions about the content of moral behavior to questions about the process of moral decision.

There is, of course, no little discussion of the significance of love for Christian ethics in the literature of the new morality. Robinson puts it: "Nothing prescribed—except love";³⁶ Fletcher: "Love is the Only Norm."³⁷ This curious willingness to speak of

love in terms which are rigorously eschewed for all other value concepts might send linguistic analysts into a quandary. But this seemingly valuational espousal of love is consistent with the contextualist outlook because love alone always makes judgments intrinsically related to the situation. The Christian can be unreservedly committed to love since love commits him unreservedly to the needs of the person in the situation. It alone can be used to speak of the Christian obligation to meet the situation in terms of the situational demands.

Love, alone, because, at it were, it has a built-in moral compass, enabling it to "home" intuitively upon the deepest need of the other, can allow itself to be directed completely by the situation. It alone can afford to be utterly open to the situation, or rather to the person in the situation, uniquely and for his own sake, without losing its direction or unconditionality.³⁸

Apart from this seemingly valuational discussion of love, which is in reality a paradoxical affirmation of methodological maturity rather than the portrayal of a given quality of behavior, the situationalists concentrate upon a quite different locus of concern. It is a concern for the ways of ethical analysis and the proper

³⁵*Ethics in a Christian Context*, p. 347.

³⁶*Op. cit.*, p. 116.

³⁷*Op. cit.*, Chapter four.

³⁸*Honest to God*, p. 115.

way of describing how it should be undertaken.

III

THE LITERATURE in which the themes of the new morality are set forth is not yet sufficiently extensive for contrasting schools of thought to have appeared. To be sure, different spokesmen for this kind of thinking make different emphases, and they stress different aspects of the commonly articulated insight. On some issues different conclusions have been reached, but the main thrust for the moment is upon the features that are held in common. It is therefore impossible to identify schools of thought within the movement that consider themselves to hold distinctive ideas of their own.

There is, however, another way of characterizing variations within these materials. The spokesmen for the new morality can be grouped into those who present an excited, aggressive defense and those who look upon the new morality as a corrective and supplement to traditional ways of thinking about ethics. Likewise, the critics of the movement seem to divide into those who set forth a defensive rejection and those who would subject the claims of the new morality to a careful scrutiny and thorough exploration, raising issues in the process about its ade-

quacy.

Consider first, representative examples of the aggressive advocacy. The front page of the issue of *Commonweal* which presented an interchange between Joseph Fletcher and Herbert McCabe carries the headline "Ethics at the Crossroads." Presumably we are at the junction where we must choose to go one way or the other, with no moderating interchange possible. Fletcher himself once said it this way:

. . . after forty years, I have learned the vital importance of the contextual or situational—i.e. the *circumstantial*—approach to the search for what is right and good. I have seen the light; I know now that abstract and conceptual morality is a mare's-nest.³⁹

Joseph Sittler's *The Structure of Christian Ethics* is, if my reading is not faulty, likewise a rigorous defense of a single way of dealing with ethical choices, as is Paul Lehmann's *Ethics in a Christian Context*. The zeal of new enthusiasm is coupled in these materials with the profound conviction that situational ethics has correctly understood the way in which Christians are to approach the making of ethical choices. This is it; the alternatives are wrong and must be replaced.

A different note is sounded by John A. T. Robinson in his *Christian Morals Today*.

³⁹*Kenyon Alumni Bulletin, op. cit.*, p. 4.

. . . I believe that the "old" and the "new morality" (in any sense in which I am interested in defending the latter) correspond with two starting-points, two approaches to certain perennial polarities in Christian ethics, which are not antithetical but complementary. Each begins from one point without denying the other, but each tends to suspect the other of abandoning what it holds most vital because it reaches it from the other end.⁴⁰

In expanding on this observation Robinson finds values and functions in the old morality which seem hardly to be acknowledged by many of his fellow thinkers. Taken seriously this would make for a very different kind of discussion than that which results from setting these two kinds of morality into mutually exclusive camps.

James Gustafson has termed the dichotomy between context and principles a "misplaced debate," and has pleaded for a broader and more empirical way of identifying all the different theological-ethical stances which can enter into various kinds of decision making.⁴¹ Max Stackhouse has made the same point as follows:

A truly "historical" theology of history for the new social gospel would not be

caught designating one "system," or level of experience, as crucial and call that "the essential one." But, as we have pointed out previously, neither is it sufficient to say they are all important all of the time, for the question of accents is crucial.⁴²

In reading Roman Catholic thinkers about these issues one is always aware of the restrictions under which they supposedly work. Yet, it cannot be presumed that men like Karl Rahner or Bernard Haring seek to combine the insights of the principled approach with those of situationalism simply because they are not free to embrace an unreserved kind of contextualism.⁴³

Among the critical responses to the new morality two kinds of objection can be noted. On the one hand there are reiterated ethics of principles, insistent that there is a place for rules and guidelines. Paul Ramsey expresses this sort of sentiment when he declares,

Theologians today are simply deceiving themselves and playing tricks with their readers when they pit the freedom and ultimacy of *agape* (or covenant-obedience, or *koinonia*, or community, or any other primary theological or ethical concept) against rules, without asking whether *agape*

⁴⁰*Op. cit.*, p. 10.

⁴¹"Context Versus Principle: A Misplaced Debate in Christian Ethics," *Harvard Theological Review*, Volume 58, Number 2, April 1965, pp. 171-202.

⁴²"Toward a Theology for the New Social Gospel," *The Andover Newton Quarterly*, New Series, Volume 6, Number 4, March 1966, p. 16.

⁴³Consider, e.g., Haring's treatment of these matters in *The Law of Christ: Moral Theology for Priests and Laity, Volume One: General Moral Theology* (Westminster, Md.: The Newman Press, 1961), pp. 294-300.

can and may or must work through rules and embody itself in certain principles which are regulative for the guidance of practice.⁴⁴

John C. Bennett has given expression to much the same line of reasoning, while Robert E. Fitch⁴⁵ has blasted the new morality for substituting the tyranny of the contemporary for the authority of the traditional. These largely polemical responses might very well lead, as they have in the case of Herbert Wad-dams,⁴⁶ to a reaffirmation of the place of moral theology in Christian thinking.

On the other hand, there is a small growing body of literature which questions the adequacy of the new morality in quite different ways. It worries, for example, lest the new morality abandon the sense of judgment and tension with culture in its effort to avoid authoritarian errors. Bernard Meland has given expression to this concern as follows:

One thought that has troubled me in pondering the course of the present concern to secularize Christianity, and now the church's response to the moral life, is that its advocates seem to reflect the same romanticist attitude toward people outside the churches that

motivated many earlier liberals and modernists. In their view they are people with whom alert churchmen and theologians must identify themselves. Their ways must be our ways. What is not meaningful to them or usable by them must be discarded. Christian faith must be streamlined to accord with the energetic and practical bent of mind that characterizes the modern person absorbed in the restrictive routines of the technological era, or in the swift-moving, sophisticated life of public figures and the professional intellectuals. Is this not trading one mode of conformity for another, being acquiescent to the demands and conditions of a relativistic ethos instead of being puppets in the hands of an absolutistic and authoritarian church?⁴⁷

John Fry has also raised the question whether contextual ethics really get down to the actualities of ethical decisions as commonly carried out by the ordinary individual.⁴⁸

The future direction of this discussion is certainly not clear. Perhaps the issues have been canvassed so thoroughly that there is not much left to be said. On the other hand we have, perhaps, only opened for exploration very complex considerations about the nature of Christian decision. The months and years immediately ahead of us will alone tell whether the new morality is a pass-

⁴⁴*Deeds and Rules in Christian Ethics*, Scottish Journal of Theology Occasional Papers, Number 11 (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1965), p. 4.

⁴⁵"A View from Another Bridge," *Religion in Life*, op. cit. pp. 182-186. See especially the concluding section of this article.

⁴⁶*A New Introduction to Moral Theology* (London: S.C.M. Press, Ltd., 1964).

⁴⁷"A New Morality—But to What End?" In *Religion in Life*, op. cit. p. 195.

⁴⁸*The Immobilized Christian: A Study of His Pre-ethical Situation* (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1963), see p. 10.

ing enthusiasm, a truly liberating way of thinking about Christian ethics, or just another partially suc-cessful effort to state the truth of the Gospel.

From the President's Desk—Concluded

to the superficial aspects of contemporary life, may get a ready following for a time. But into what oblivion will it fall when history speaks its verdict on our time? The way ahead lies in the direction of taking theology out of the hands of the headline writers and giving it back to the theologians. The future belongs to thinkers of the stature of such as Augustine, who can see the City of God beyond the decaying cities of this world and help other men to catch the glimmer of its light in the midst of our darkness.

—D. G. M.

Human Values and Social Change

by JOSEPH HAROUTUNIAN

THIS TITLE given me by the planners of a conference implies that there are certain human values which are in jeopardy at this time of rapid and radical social change. Among these are integrity, freedom, justice, order, beauty. It appears that such things are being set aside in favor of opulence, status, and security; production, possession, and power.

There is a conviction among us that truth, freedom, justice are authentic human values, whereas profit, consumption of goods, quest for power, are sub- or non-human. Hence we are said to be in peril of dehumanization or the loss of human dignity.

There is a certain ambiguity in this matter which I believe needs to be cleared up. There are no values, but valuable things. The value of a thing is what it will bring in the market. It is an exchange value. Things are more or less valuable, and their values change under given conditions.

Now, "human values" are not values in the above sense. There is nothing for which one can exchange integrity, freedom, justice, dignity. These values are not among the things we exchange. They are qualities which make us human. There

are no substitutes for them, and without them man as an "intelligent creation" is denatured or destroyed. They have to do with the will of man as illumined by the mind, and the will of man is his being. These "human values" are of a different order from the values of things. It is better that we should call them not values but *modes of being, modes of humanity*.

When a man gives up his freedom for security, or truth for profit, or justice for power, he gives up his humanity. Profit, security, power are instrumental values, instrumental and relative. Truth and integrity are absolute and final. As modes of being they are what they are, as man is what he is: an "intelligent creation."

Truth, freedom, justice, are modes of being-with. Truth is a matter of fidelity, and one man is faithful to another man. Freedom is exercised in one's behavior toward others, and in response to men and institutions. Justice is giving another man his due. Human values have their validity in our life together; they are ways in which we exist as human beings in our transactions one with another.

If fidelity and freedom are modes of being-with, being-with itself is the first value or good.

It is first as the setting of human action and as the realization of humanity. The human mode of being is being-with, so that there is no being that is not being-with. The biblical statement that God created man male and female means that there is no man who is not male or female, parent or child, and neighbor. There is no humanity of which the male partakes without being male as against female, or of which the female partakes without being female as against male. The man who is not male or female does not exist: which means that the man who is not a fellowman does not exist. When the mode of fellowmanhood is removed, the human being is destroyed.

Being-with is being itself. In the human mode of being there is no being beyond being-with. If the individual man were a being before he is a being-with or a fellowman, we might conceive a being above or beyond being-with. Then we might conceive being itself as beyond the individual being, or the Good as that in which every good participates. We might then conceive of values prior to human values which adhere to being-with. But since the individual does not exist except as a fellowman, or since being is being-with, there are no values which are above those which inhere in being-with. As being-with is absolute, so are fidelity and freedom, and under those justice

itself is absolute.

II

THERE ARE MANY VALUES which change with the economic changes in a given society. The goods available in a society, and the ways goods are produced and become available to consumers, determine the values of actions and things in that society. Brain may become worth more than brawn, competence more than diligence. Even the brains and competence of people may be to a large extent worth less than those of computers and automated machinery. Precision, organization, standardization may be worth more than craftsmanship and even "creativity."

The value of human beings in the economy may change. They may not be needed to do certain things, and they may not be needed to do the things that need to be done. They may hardly be needed at all.

As goods change, tastes will change. Machines of various sorts, such as TV sets and cars, may and do lead people to new values; and things in food, drug, or hardware stores may revolutionize their enjoyments.

In the course of economic change, people's views of truth, freedom, justice may and will also change. Men come to see truth as a matter of fact; freedom as equal opportunity; justice as their rights in the economic establishment. They come to prefer security of work in an industry or

store to private enterprise; the success of an organization to distributive justice among its personnel; fidelity to the institution to fidelity to this official or that official. In short, institutions replace individuals as objects of loyalty, and being-with is replaced by being-in.

I think in the last resort the problem of human values in our time of social change is the peril of the subordination of being-with to being-in. This is the ontological peril of our time; and unless faced with what Tillich called "ultimate concern," it will lead to disaster or the self-destruction of man. The desperate thing is that the subordination of being-with to being-in is not only practiced by the vulgar, but also methodically justified by our "technical reason." As every trained observer of our society knows, being-in is among us prior to being-with. We live and move and have our being in organizations. Our powers are integrated to the powers of our machines. Our ways are the ways of our institutions. We arrive at truth by way of statistics. We understand ourselves by way of the behavioral sciences. We produce results by way of calculation and control. We move mountains and fill up valleys not in the mode of being-with but in the mode of being-in, and we know ourselves methodically not as beings-with but as beings-in.

There are those who believe that

man is formed by his environment, and for these there is nothing to do but to work with the premise that in our society being-with is subordinate to being-in. After all, human values are relative to and produced by a given society and its institutions. In our technological society, being-in is prior to being-with. Organized behavior counts for everything. The communion of fellowman counts for less. Our values are the values of our organized life, and they are what they are, and they are our values. They are different from traditional values called "human." But they are not therefore any less human, since we are clearly human beings, and they are our values. Values as goods acknowledged by a given society are what they are. They could hardly be other than they are. The thing to do is to produce them and enjoy them, and we both produce and enjoy them in our institutions and as beings-in.

There are others who on the contrary see the environment—that is, our technology—as instrumental to our values. They see values as the products of the human mind and will, and the machines as servants of man with his values. They say, "We produce our foods and clothing, our comforts and pleasures, our power and security, because we value them. We use our machines for producing these things and enjoying them. We have made the machines, and we can do with them what we will. We have

no problem but to increase the quality and quantity of our machines for the realization of our values. In short, it is up to us, by the use of our intelligence, to make human use of our machines. Man forms his environment and not the environment man. The problem is to control our machines in the service of man." But this is no problem because man makes the machine and runs it.

There is a third and perhaps better view that men and machines belong in a "field" of forces: that neither man nor machine is cause or effect; that they are to be understood as interacting entities, each as a unit of energy in a field of energy. In this view, man forms the machine, the machine forms man, and both are formed in a field of transaction which is prior to their interacting. Thus the deterministic model of "man and machines" is replaced by a model of symbiosis according to which both man and his institutions are seen as exercising power and as being formed by their interactions in a field of action.

Perhaps this third view, derived from recent biology and physics, is more helpful in understanding the human situation today than are the other two. It certainly is helpful in getting us away from mechanical, cause-effect models in our attempt to understand the relationship between man and environment. It is hardly true that the machine produces hu-

man values or that man uses machines to realize predetermined values.

Nevertheless, the issue is the subordination of being-with to being-in in our technological society. This issue is obscured by the issue of "men and machines," and attention given to the latter issue is a telling evidence that the social scientist today subordinates being-with to being-in. There is today no "ultimate concern" with being-with as a mode of human being. The "organizational man," both practically and theoretically, is losing knowledge of himself as being-with and of the qualities of fidelity and freedom as the modes of his existence as a human being. This is our peril as fellowmen which corresponds to the well-known perils of our common life in the world today.

III

WHAT THEN shall we do? We have an awesome problem here; therefore we ought to think. I offer the following not as a solution but as a direction our thinking may take.

All power and competence, whether of the mind or of the body, whether of dynamos or of computers, are occasions of trial and temptation, and finally of tribulation. Power is a primary good and source of all good things. But we never have or use power except as under trial and never apart from temptation. We are tried as to whether we shall use

power as fellowmen; and we are tempted to use it as if we were not.

Every encounter of fellowmen is a trial as to whether they shall be and act as fellowmen. Fellowmanhood, being-with, is a matter not of nature but of decision between being-with or not being-with; of turning toward or turning away from, of being open or being closed to one's neighbor, whose presence is the logical condition of one's being-with. There is no human existence without this trial. God tried Adam in the beginning, and He tries every man. And this of necessity, for there is no humanity or freedom except by trial. The creations of man are also the trials of man.

Where there is trial, there is freedom; and where there is freedom, there is power. Freedom and power, though gifts to man as a being-with, that is by virtue of the presence of his neighbor, are exercised by the individual who is given them as his possessions and the signs of his being. By freedom and power the individual exists as this being, and without these he does not exist as a human being. He wants to be secure as this being, with his freedom and power; and by a subtle suggestion made to his mind he wants to be secure by an autonomy which is the repudiation of his being-with. His neighbor, by whose presence he receives his being-with, or being, in freedom and power, becomes to him

a source and sign of his existence as a limited being. In his mode of being-with, his neighbor is both his benefactor and malefactor, both his friend and his enemy. He is both a promise and a threat. Hence his imagination gives his mind the absurd notion that he ought to turn his back to his neighbor; that he ought to repudiate his neighbor, or annihilate him. In this way he seeks being, and denies being-with. He seeks security, and makes himself insecure and anxious and desperate. *Thus trial is turned into temptation, and temptation leads to tribulation.*

The tribulation of man begins by way of trial and progresses by way of temptation. The first principle of wisdom today is to see the age of power, the age of cybernetics, as the trial, and temptation, and tribulation of man who is a being-with.

We have to go beyond the question of man's freedom in the use of his machines. If we insist upon our freedom, we shall end as slaves. We shall be able to maintain our humanity or human values in the midst of a social change in this and the coming age of cybernetics, if we see our problem as one of intelligence, if our intelligence does not reveal our situation to us as one of trial, temptation, and tribulation—all three at once. If we see ourselves only as on trial with regard to loyalty to certain values, so even as tempted more or less strongly by the goods we produce, we do

not see clearly and well. We should know better. We are under tribulation, under the kind of temptation which Jesus spoke of in the Lord's Prayer, when he taught us to pray saying, "Lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil": temptation which is a deadly conflict, in which we are no match for the adversary; temptation which is an assault upon humanity, and the tribulation of man under this assault.

Indeed our life with our machines is a trial of our humanity—our situation in which we *may* live in the human presence. In this respect, in this responsibility, we are "intelligent creation" and free to choose between good and evil, life and death. This our life is also a temptation which we *may* resist. There is no coercion which makes our fall from being-with or humanity necessary or predetermined. The very fact that the tempter reasons with us as he did with Adam or Jesus shows that in our action the mind and will are in operation. Still, the tribulation and the defeat, or the fall and the tribulation, are there also. We are assaulted and vanquished. We find ourselves without the power to resist temptation. We find ourselves perplexed, and confused, and driven, and up against it. We are stupefied and weakened, and neither our knowledge nor our power is sufficient for our peace. We seek good, and behold evil; and life, and behold death.

This is why we were taught to pray, "Lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil (*or* the evil one)."

It would be deadly ignorance for us to see our awesomely clever machines as mere machines, or as the works of our hands and our slaves. Of course they are these things. But in a way passing comprehension they function in our lives as occasions for trial, temptation, and tribulation. The temptations and tribulations which man suffered in his physical environment have not disappeared. They have taken on a new force in our technological age. The tempter has become more subtle and more persuasive and more deadly than he was in the garden of Eden. He has infinitely more to offer, and the things he offers have in them the promise of paradise. Through our machines we are up against the spirit of lies, and bondage, and death itself. In sheer actuality, our machines belong in a spiritual world and function as spirits before whom we live in confounding anxiety, compounded of guilt and insecurity, by and in our turning away from the human presence and the presence of God in the human community.

The logical thing to do is to turn back, and this we are to do with prayer and hope, as Christ's people and in the Church. We are not sufficient, but we know one who was and is among his people. We are not sufficient in ourselves, one by one;

but we may draw intelligence and strength one from another as those who are in the company of Christ, knowing that God who produced the miracle of Christ, and his people, is able to produce the miracle of our becoming one to another help in our trial, encouragement in our temptation, and victory in our warfare and tribulation.

I SAY THESE THINGS as it were in cold blood. People used to say, the ultimate value or good is Being. I say, and not I first or alone, the ultimate value or good is Being-with, God, who is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; and by God and in God and through God, it is being-with, our life as fellowmen, our presence one to another. Our being-in, our life in our world, in our "technological society" is subordinate to our being-with. Such is the order of being created by God and redeemed in Christ Jesus. This order is permanent in social change. It is the absolute because it is the order of being in which alone we may exist as human beings. This order is maintained by trial, in temptation, and under tribulation. Therefore it is maintained by prayer for which the Church exists, and by intelligence which is from prayer and exhibits the power of God in our common life.

God alone in the being-with of his people is able to maintain freedom and justice in the midst of social change. But God maintains "human

values" by our being-with, by the freedom of man as under trial. There is no competition here between God and ourselves. We exist under the law or the command of God, of which it is the sign that our neighbors claim our fidelity in justice. As we live by the presence of our fellows, we are called to live a common life formed by the power and the goods of a "technological society." As thus called we are to care for the well-being of our fellowman. We are to do what we must do to establish justice in the sense of equal opportunity in our midst. Here we must make use of technical and political reason. There is no substitute for competence and power in the making of freedom at this level, and there is no ascertainable limit to the common good that may be realized. We have every reason to have faith in reason.

But the exercise of reason itself is a trial of man, a decision for or against being-with. This trial is also a temptation in which reason itself is threatened and a tribulation in which reason as a mode of being-with is overthrown, and the knowledge of good and evil issues in evil. The last word must therefore be that God alone, in the community of men who live and work under his grace and command, being themselves one to another the signs of his presence, is the hope of the preservation of values in the midst of social change.

Book Reviews and Notes

PIETY: FOUND AND LOST

Farley, Edward. *Requiem for a Lost Piety. The Contemporary Search for the Christian Life.* Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1966. Pp. 139. \$2.25 (paper).

SOME TIME AGO I was pondering the merits of an obscurely written manuscript I hoped to use in *Crossroads* when my eyes caught the following sentence: "If you, dear reader, think you aren't getting anywhere, well you aren't." I laughed out loud. The writer had seemed to anticipate my predicament and graciously relieved me of further anxiety. Or at least that's what I thought until I looked again. As it turned out, what the writer was saying was something like this: "I have worked myself right into a corner—and if you stick with me, you'll be in that corner, too." Bravo! We need more people who are willing to be trapped uncomfortably in logical corners.

Edward Farley appears to be one such man; and if his readers take him seriously, they will join him in the corner. Or maybe "corner" is not the right metaphor. Reading *Requiem for a Lost Piety* suggests whole houses falling down, some new houses going up on quaking foundation, and—to switch images in mid-sentence—that the Christian life is,

a la Kirkegaard, an experience similar to swimming in water 70,000 fathoms deep. If this, however, suggests that Farley is a talented smasher of idols who gets his kicks that way, I want hastily to protest in his behalf. The book is the handiwork of a man who sees with 20/20 vision what most of us work hard at not seeing at all: that the American Protestant no longer can discern specifically and concretely what the Christian life is. What Farley sees is pretenses of piety, make-believe piety, remembered piety, but nothing true-blue. But let us add immediately, he is not happy about what he sees. Not that he is worried much about not being able to point to this or that person and say, "By golly, there goes a Christian!" More to the point is the fact that the Christian life must inevitably take some form, pattern, style, shape. Indeed, the Christian must ask two questions: What am I to believe? and, What am I to do? Farley claims that Protestants deal with the latter question either by shrugging the shoulders or by anx-

iously inventing new pieties. Both ways give the show away: the question isn't being answered.

Part of the problem with this book is that the author is a theologian with a steel trap mind. This is not the product of a social psychologist who diagnoses a problem arising out of culture, and then gleefully waits around for a theologian to squirm out an answer. There is such a maneuver, a kind of game designed to put nervous theologians on the spot. But it isn't played here. Farley takes matters in hand all by himself and says, *theologically speaking*, that Protestant piety has gone with the wind. But before we say something about how he comes to such a conclusion, we should first understand more precisely what he means by "piety," and secondly, what type of theological analysis is going on here.

"Piety" is defined broadly in this book as a pattern that gives a whole set of actions (everything a person does) its foundation and justification. As such it is not particularly a Protestant word or even a Christian word. Moreover, it has neutral value when taken by itself—being simply the name for the way in which a person organizes a whole set of actions into a pattern that justifies what a person does. Probing this a bit, a person expresses his piety whenever he is not for sale. From this definition of "piety" in its more or less neutral state, we are now pre-

pared to add adjectives—we can speak, for example, of religious pieties and secular pieties. And we may speak of particular religious pieties, of Protestant Christian piety, for instance, which has its beginning in the Reformation, and which picked up various emphases and themes along the way to the present time. It is this conglomeration of themes about the way in which the Christian life ought to be interpreted, some of which come from Luther and Calvin, some from the "pietism" of Spener and Wesley, and some from frontier revivalism, which interests Farley. "All these together produced a 'Protestant piety,' an expression of faith in concrete attitudes and acts, duties, and disciplines." These, seen separately and as a conglomerate whole, are now lost to the contemporary Protestant Christian. With this definition and explanation, two things become clear: First, the author has rescued a word. It is now safe to use the word "piety" again. But secondly, we are faced with the argument that the word's essence, in contrast to its usable definition, has been lost.

It has been suggested already that Farley is a theologian and not a sociologist commenting on the contemporary cultural scene. So now we must ask our second question: What type of theological analysis is going on here? Closely related is another question: What is the con-

nection Farley sees between faith and piety? Consider: If faith must express itself (Farley's claim), and there is no longer a discernible pattern by which it may be expressed (also Farley's claim), does it follow that faith itself has passed away? Indeed not! Faith, he claims, must and does express itself in one way or another; but the particular patterns of expression that once seemed valid and viable in Protestant history are no longer operable. Further, new patterns now coming to the fore are not operable either. Thus the type of theological analysis done here is really a kind of historical criticism from a theological perspective. That is, what can no longer be regarded as valid and viable is in such a poor state not alone because multitudes of Protestants have shunted these patterns aside, but also because through theological analysis they can be shown to be invalid in the first place.

It is time now to give some attention to these themes that are conglomerately held together within Protestant piety in order to give focus to what we have been saying in a general way, and also to give attention to the structure of the book. The first two themes, taken together, are *Bible piety* and *Jesus piety*. The first appeals to the Bible as an infallible book in which are found the rules for the Christian life; the second points to Jesus as the one whom the Christian must follow step by

step. Both have an enduring place in Protestant piety, and, in a pinch, still function. So "proof-texting" the Bible, whether in general or in specific reference to Jesus, is still the all-time favorite hermeneutical method for determining an ethical decision. In such piety patterns the Bible and Jesus become whips to use on those who fail to agree with us; or, at best, they demonstrate a magical use of Scripture and of Jesus. In any case, the patterns are idolatrous. So down with "The Bible says" pronouncements and "What would Jesus do?" questions. There's real loss in putting them down, but then idolatry is no real gain either.

Following the analysis of *Bible piety* and *Jesus piety*, Farley takes up seven additional themes: *Pure principles*, *religious duties*, *religious experiences*, *guiltless acts*, *guiltless motives*, *Christian virtues*, and *unselfishness*. These appear to be in direct contact with the first two and dependent upon them. When these themes are individually subjected to the author's analysis, what happens is something like this: *Principles* become mixed, confused, and impure in such a way that we live attuned to what is in vogue anyway. Moreover, Farley says, "If God's Word is identified with past principles to which we resort when perplexed, then God is silent in the present—unable to speak a *present* Word in a novel situation." *Religious duties*, like fast-

ing, giving alms, private prayer, Bible reading, and church attendance have a historically parochial status and cannot determine what the Christian specifically ought to do at all times. *Religious experiences*, when they are allowed to form the pattern of the Christian life, turn guilt and forgiveness into mere feelings, with the result that if I do not feel forgiven, then I am not forgiven. Similarly, if emotions of a certain type become the final goal of the Christian life, then God is dead or silent if I do not experience the proper emotions significantly. Again, if *guiltless acts* sum up the Christian life, then I cut myself off from partaking in the social order where in the corporate nature of things I am not guiltless as a matter of course. But if I reach behind specific acts and resort to pure *intentions and motives*, I must learn that theologically and psychologically what I really intend and what really motivates me is so clouded with ambiguity that I cannot know whether my motives are really pure or whether they are rationalized to overcome my sense of guilt. Likewise, concentration on *my virtues* means that the world is tolerated as long as it doesn't get in the way—of my virtues. Such world-denial is, at the very least, contrary to God who created the world and sent his son to die for it—not just me and my tired virtues. Finally, concentration on the art of

unselfishness as the goal of the Christian life is also a form of world-denial—of myself, a creature in and of the world whom God is said to love.

Such is a thumbnail sketch of the piety themes which the Protestant piety tradition has worked out, and which, in times past, were, in part, workable. But now, in spite of the analysis as much as because of it, these themes have suffered a decline and fall. Why? Perhaps the decline is God's judgment upon Protestant life. But who can say for sure? There are, however, more apparent reasons. One rises out of theology itself which in the Protestant mode criticizes more aptly than it constructs. It is easy, for example, for the theologian to show that the words of the Bible are *not* the Word of God; but Protestant theologians are lacking who will dare to say as clearly and definitively what the Word of God is. Another reason has a cultural orientation. Times have really changed. Scientists and others work at solving problems for which it was once thought Protestant piety offered real solutions. Such piety, whatever it really ought to be, cannot now play a "medicine man" role in the contemporary world.

Now if things are in such a state, some reconstruction is obviously necessary. This takes the form, initially, of an analysis of what Protestant piety is for in the first place.

Why does the pattern we have been talking about exist? Because it is the means to an end—the vision of God, ultimately, and what has been called “a righteous, godly, and sober life,” temporally. The goal entails a pilgrimage that is characterized in Protestant piety as being individualistic, perfectionistic, and inflexible. Recognizing the sad end to which the old themes have come, and perhaps believing that the temporal goal and the whole pilgrimage as such is itself inappropriate, many contemporary Protestants have sought to invent new patterns of piety. The new patterns he calls *pseudo* pieties, in contrast to *genuine* pieties, which the themes examined earlier might have been once but are not now, because they have fallen. The *pseudo* pieties are of two kinds: secular and religious. The first include the “happiness cult” typified by Norman Vincent Peale, and “superpatriotism,” whether in the form of Nazism or the John Birch Society. The second, which he calls “the religious pieties of official Christendom” include the angry prophet whose devastating attack on all plans, claims, and movements seems to be an end in itself, the “Christian existentialist” who bemoans the lack of “authentic experiences,” and those who are dedicated to reforming the church by ambitious schemes of church renewal. These fail like all the previous themes because they are *pseudo*, invented, and

not genuine. And hence the reconstruction fails.

Farley makes no attempt himself to state a contemporary Christian piety. He does, however, add a final chapter in which he suggests some of the enduring marks of Christian piety, those that must be included if a genuine piety is to emerge. These marks include: revelation as the ultimate source of piety, specific and concrete directions for being and doing, the condition of radical transformation, the conjunction of a contemporaneous Word and present decision, the context of a social and historical environment, and the demand for a rigorous discipline. These, he says, are “so integral to the Christian life that if any one is eliminated, a significant distortion is effected.” No one, of course, can now fashion such a piety, but such a lack is not all loss. Indeed not, for the contemporary Christian is yet able to possess certain attitudes which are derivative of these marks. We may expect him, claims Farley, to possess a measure of gratitude because his world has been given him by God, to share in the responsibility of the tasks of the world, and to have a sense of compassionate militance. And if those attitudes should themselves fail as pointers toward the Christian life, as all piety formations are seen to do, there is yet the good news of Jesus Christ in which we live.

Such is the structure of the argument. As a reader I have given much thought to this work, and I am impressed. But at least one critical question does come to mind. It arises out of the whole treatment as it comes to a focus in the conclusion. We will continue, Farley says, to live "by the waters of Babylon." And we live there by grace. Well then, since all piety patterns have failed and do fail, and faith must yet express itself, should not the subject of the shape of the Christian life be left alone? Let faith express itself in whatever form of distortion it must take, recognizing the terrible blend of experiences and past history that nevertheless give some sense of unity to a

person's life. Perhaps we should not attempt to call this pattern of expression of faith "Christian," if we mean that word in some ideal sense. And yet, should we not call it "Christian" freely? For if it really is faith that is being expressed, does the pattern matter overmuch? Perhaps not, and if so, then the message of the book is clear: it calls us away from anxious quests for the authentic Christian life. And if that is really so, Farley has sent some of us back to our theological drawing boards. In light of the contemporary chaotic state of theology, that might not be a bad idea.

—Dennis E. Shoemaker.

SECOND SCHAFF LECTURER

Ricoeur, Paul. *History and Truth*. Translated by Chas. A. Kelbley. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1965. Pp. XXIV + 333. \$10.00.

At the outset it should be said that the importance of this review to the readers of *Perspective* is more than the importance of a significant book. Paul Ricoeur, the author of *History and Truth*, will be the Schaff lecturer at Pittsburgh Seminary this

Fall, in October, 1966. This major lectureship which eventuates in publication had for its first lecturer C. F. D. Moule, well-known British New Testament scholar. The Frenchman, Paul Ricoeur, is equally eminent in his field of philosophy. To introduce

him as well as to set the personal dimension of *History and Truth* I digress from a traditional review.

Paul Ricoeur was born in 1913. He occupies a chair of philosophy at the Sorbonne in the University of Paris and also teaches at the Free Protestant Faculty of Theology in Paris. Prior to his professorship at the Sorbonne he held the chair of History and Philosophy at the University of Strasbourg. Ricoeur is a Reformed lay theologian, a brilliant representative of French Protestant thought, and a zealous supporter of the ecumenical movement. In his own preface to the first edition (1955) of *History and Truth* (*Histoire et Vérité*) he lists his own major roles: university professor teaching history of philosophy, a member of the team of *Esprit*, a left-wing Christian monthly founded in 1932 by the French Personalist, Emmanuel Mounier, to whose memory one of the essays in the book is dedicated, and "as listener to the Christian message."

As a philosopher Ricoeur uses phenomenological method¹ and existential categories. But Ricoeur goes

far beyond Husserl's phenomenology. He is intent, as Husserl was, to describe the appearances of things within man's consciousness, but he insists on going beyond to transcendence, mystery, the thing-in-itself, to metaphysics. Consequently, both Kant and Hegel are his guides as well as Husserl. Phenomenological method has its limitations. Certain aspects of life are not accessible to phenomenological description: i.e., the mystery of another personality, the reality over and above the appearances, the thing-in-itself which is a limiting concept for Ricoeur. Spiegelberg maintains that Ricoeur is the best informed French historian of phenomenology, has made the largest and most original contribution to phenomenology among the younger philosophers, and is the French philosopher best qualified to bridge the gap between German and French phenomenology.²

In his existentialism Ricoeur is favoring affirmation in protest to Sartre's philosophical existentialism as primarily negation. He questions Sartre's nihilism while respecting his brilliant exposition of nothingness as

¹Paul Ricoeur has tried to delimit if not fully define phenomenology: "Fundamentally, phenomenology is born as soon as we treat the manner of appearing of things [or ideas, values and persons] as a separate problem by 'bracketing' the question of existence, either temporarily or permanently." (Quoted by Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement*, I, 7). Two fine illustrations of phenomenological method are the last two chapters in *History and Truth*.

²Herbert Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), II, pp. 563, 578.

the "ontological character" of the human reality.³ One of the essays in *History and Truth*, "Negativity and Primary Affirmation," is *contra Sartre*. Ricoeur argues that Sartre has gotten off the track with a "flimsy conception of being" (p. 324). Sartre has confined being to the "factual," the mundane, to thingness. Therefore to be free, man must be no-thing. Freedom is essentially negation for Sartre, the "secreting [of] his own nothingness" (p. 320, quoted from *Being and Nothingness*). Sartre sees authentic human acts as withdrawal, uprooting, disconnection, cleavage. Sartre opts for each act of mine to nihilate that which has preceded. In the act I exist, for I break away from that which ensnares me. Being is a trap.

Ricoeur also embraces negation; for example, we all perceive from a limited point of view or perspective; but this very limitation points beyond itself ("transgresses") and the situation of finitude to transcendence (at least human). Likewise the imminence of death (negation) implies the will to live (affirmation). We *think*, we *perceive*, we *intend* something beyond the negation. There is a primary affirmation presupposed in every negation. But Ricoeur's notion of being is not within the philosophy of form, as in Plato and other classic

philosophies, where the transcendental Ideas are being itself; rather, his notion of being is act: "living affirmation, the power of existing and of making exist" (328). So Ricoeur's existentialism is essentially affirmation which is inclusive of, and basic to, all negations of doubt, anguish, death, etc.

In some ways Ricoeur owes discipleship to Gabriel Marcel, the French Roman Catholic existentialist philosopher. His major systematic work, *Philosophie de la volonté*, is dedicated to Marcel and he acknowledges that "meditation on the work of Gabriel Marcel is in fact at the root of the analyses in this work."⁴ The mystery of the body has been a major topic of Ricoeur, and in this he shows indebtedness to Marcel. Likewise, Ricoeur has been also confronted significantly by another Christian existentialist, Karl Jaspers, an extensive study of whom resulted in his first book-size publication.

The main concern of Ricoeur is that he sees man broken (alienated) and in need of reconciliation with himself, his body, and the world. Man's tornness is manifest between objectivity and subjectivity, between the abstract and the concrete, between universality and particularity, between society and the neighbor, between the involuntary and the

³Charles A. Kelbley, "Introduction," *History and Truth*, p. XVII.

⁴Quoted by Spiegelberg, *op. cit.*, p. 569.

voluntary, between love and coercion, between guilt and greatness. It is in the dimension of Transcendence that reconciliation is hoped for. In the chapter, "Christianity and the Meaning of History," Ricoeur isolates three levels of history: progress, ambiguity, and hope. Progress relates to tools, instruments (knowledge as well as hammers) for man's achieving. But it is on the level of ambiguity, lived history where decisions are made and events take place, that man's alienation is experienced. Guilt attaches to this level but so does greatness. But whence reconciliation for this level of ambiguity? Ricoeur locates it on the level of hope which is eschatological. Because God is the Lord of all history, there is meaning within the ambiguities but a meaning hidden in mystery, that is, not disclosed within the history itself. There is revelation from sacred history which illuminates all history. The level of hope is the faith-level: faith that the Lord of history is moving history, through guilt and redemption, toward himself.

If one keeps his eyes focused solely on lived history, the power of reconciliation is hidden in mystery, and life is absurd. This is the existentialist vision. But Christianity, while also participating fully in the absurd, in ambiguity, has confidence in a hidden meaning and is encouraged to embrace courage "to believe in a profound significance of the most tragic

history" and to maintain a "sense of the open" (pp. 95, 96).

As we turn our attention specifically to *History and Truth*, we should note that it is a collection of some of Ricoeur's essays appearing from 1949-61. The French edition came out in 1955, to which were added several essays for the 1964 edition, translated for Northwestern University Press in 1965 by Charles Kelbley. Part I is methodological dealing with the significance of historical work, objectivity and subjectivity in history, and theological perspectives on history. Part II is ethical in its broadest meaning dealing with what Ricoeur calls a "critique of civilization." Politics and power are the central orientation of this part.

A summary of the first two essays, the second of which is the central essay of the book in the opinion of the author, will provide methodological clues. In "Objectivity and Subjectivity in History," Ricoeur brushes aside a narrow positivistic critique of documents as a too-limiting concept of historical objectivity. Rather, he insists upon the crucial function of the historian's subjectivity. The historian makes a judgment of what is important so that the insignificant can be sorted out and a continuity created. This judgment lacks a "sure criterion," but is essential to history. Then the historian must "feel" his way through many explanations of

the historical epoch: motivations, fields of influence, conditions, etc. Because of historical *distance* the historian by a kind of imagination must re-present past times, bringing the past *closer* while giving full significance to the epoch's own time and place. Finally, the historian must try to understand *men* from other times and other places. The historian's work is stamped with subjectivity because it is the labors of an "investigative ego." But there is good and bad subjectivity. There is objectivity, then, in the order of subjectivity as good subjectivity prevails over bad. Objectivity in this sense is of the nature of the ethical.

We may pause here, though there is much more in the chapter, to reflect on the significance of this understanding of the historian's craft for the biblical exegete or the church historian, or pastorally speaking, for the weekly task of the preacher and educator. If we are not hypocritical about the role of subjectivity, the theological task ought to help educate our subjectivity so that "openness," "availability," and "submission," help to overcome bad subjectivity (cf. p. 31).

In chapter two, "Philosophy and the Unity of Truth," Ricoeur's concern is to take seriously philosophy's singularities (e.g., Plato, Kant) which is history, and to deny a single truth, an immutable truth, which makes null the singularity. Con-

cerned as Ricoeur is with the concrete over against the abstract, the particular over against the universal, men as centers of existence and thought over against a universal logic, he is concerned to do the history of philosophy rather than the philosophy of history. The latter, as in Hegel, imposes a single interpretation and an imperialism. To do the history of philosophy is to grasp the singularity of the various philosophies. This is not to "reduce them to the subjectivity of the philosophers themselves." Rather, it is to enter into their work to find their meaning, to locate their intention, through their "project" to find the expression of their consciousness (cf. p. 47). This calls for communication wherein each one is in *dialogue* with others: ". . . each one 'explains himself' and unfolds his perception of the world in 'combat' with another. . . ." (p. 51). The philosophers of the past thus are saved from "oblivion and death" because they change their meanings since there emerge new intentions and "possibilities of response" which their contemporaries had not seen. Truth, then, is intersubjective, the dialogue between present research and the past, and avoids the narrowness of singularity deposited in the museum of the past and the universality of the timeless idea. For Ricoeur the unity of this truth is eschatological: "I hope I am within the bounds of Truth" (p. 54).

The preposition "within" suggests that truth is a milieu. It is a concept in keeping with man's lived history as ambiguous!

Part II, the ethical orientation, deals superbly with the problem of power. In "The Political Paradox" is a fine critique of power as well as a probing analysis of Marxism. In "State and Violence" Ricoeur is once again dealing with the level of ambiguity when "love and coercion walk side by side" (p. 246). The citizen's role in supporting the State or "betraying" it is equally an "ethics of distress." The one is to assure the State's survival; the other "affirms treason in order to bear witness" (p. 246). In "Non-violent Man and His Presence to History" Ricoeur affirms that the efficacy of non-violence is to be in a dialectical relationship to history: the critic of history, the symbolizing of certain values and ends as a reminder to history, and even a force within history. These and the other chapters in Part II are testimony that Ricoeur has inserted himself in the "trajectories of civilization" and so has the right to speak of the nature of truth.

Paul Ricoeur is a first-rate thinker. One of the values of this book is to see what a first-class historical and philosophical mind, not writing the-

ology, can do with theological themes. He is also a splendid writer. This is not bed-time reading; but time spent wrestling with the momentous topics of *History and Truth* might well foment intellectual revolutions among us. In his preface to the first edition Ricoeur writes, "In a sense, all of these essays are in praise of the word which reflects efficaciously and acts thoughtfully" (p. 5). His word is incisive and brilliant; reflection upon it can be efficacious.

History and Truth is a translation. I would like to have checked some sections in the French but had no copy before me. However, I assume a good job by Charles Kelbley for in most places the translation is lucid. It ought to be noted that Mr. Kelbley has also translated Paul Ricoeur's *Fallible Man*, available in paper back. (Northwestern University Press is soon to bring out an English translation of Ricoeur's *Le Volontaire et l'involontaire*.) Some questionable punctuation (pp. 67, 238, 310), a misspelling (repentence, p. 301), and two grammatical errors (of he" [p. 7] "for he" p. [233]) are surprising but understandably a part of our ambiguous existence.

—Gordon E. Jackson.

Leitch, Addison H. *Winds of Doctrine*. Westwood, N. J.: Revell, 1966. Pp. 62. \$2.50.

Dr. Leitch, Professor of Philosophy and Religion and Assistant to the President at Tarkio College, is an alumnus and former President of Pittsburgh-Xenia Theological Seminary and served as a Professor of Theology in Pittsburgh Theological Seminary. His host of friends will be delighted to have available to them in this work his five G. Campbell Morgan Lectures. Written with the clarity, insight, and good humor that have always characterized his teaching, the book presents a very brief survey of what he regards as being the major emphases in the thought of several of the most widely known and influential theologians of the present day. Following the initial chapter which sketches the 19th-century philosophical and theological background of contemporary theology, Dr. Leitch introduces the thought of Karl Barth in a second lecture. A third chapter reviews some characteristic contributions of Emil Brunner, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, and Reinhold Niebuhr. The work of Rudolf Bultmann and Paul Tillich is examined in Chapter 4; and the final lecture, entitled "Counter-Thrust," is concerned with an evaluation and criticism of modern theological work in general from Dr. Leitch's own position within the conservative theological tradition.

The author is, of course, well aware of the dangers of oversimplification that accompany attempts to interpret the thought of such first-rank scholars and thinkers as he has chosen to examine when little time and space are available for the task. Accordingly the risks are taken responsibly and the attempt is made in the summary treatment of what he believes are central thrusts in the theologies under review to keep his judgments true to the total context of each man's thought, which the limitation of space prevents him from providing in detail. The result is a useful introduction even though other interpretations may differ with the judgments that are made. In view of the author's restricted aim it would have been helpful to his readers had he appended bibliographies to the expository chapters.

Dr. Leitch's approach is sympathetic and positive. He welcomes the contributions that these men have made and at the same time clearly states the points at which he cannot fully accept those contributions or at which he feels constrained to reject them altogether. This is particularly true of the final chapter where he appeals for a theology which recognizes that truth is by nature definitive and which, so far as may be found possible, seeks to resist what

he is convinced are the vitiating pressures of the relativism that he finds in contemporary theological endeavors. It is to be hoped that Dr. Leitch will someday do in depth what he

has done so well in a work that of necessity has the scope of an extended and useful outline.

—John M. Bald.

Longenecker, Richard N. *Paul: Apostle of Liberty*. New York: Harper and Row, 1964. Pp. x + 310. \$4.50.

"The proper way to a theological understanding of the Apostle's teaching about law" is a perplexing problem in Pauline studies. Longenecker approaches this problem from what he calls the "legality-liberty dialectic" of the Apostle. These concepts are not balanced against one another but measured in Christ. Longenecker is to be commended for his distinction between "legalism" and "nomism." Legalism is obedience to the external aspects of law in order to gain righteousness. "Nomism" is the control of life in conformity to a rule or standard. This is a useful distinction and an aid to a more accurate appraisal of Judaism. The reviewer believes that this might be further strengthened by using the term "torahism" for the latter concept.

Longenecker begins by evaluating the source material—talmudic literature, the apocryphal and pseudepi-

graphic writings, the historical accounts, the Pauline corpus. Longenecker establishes four categories of talmudic literature that can be used for Pauline studies. While these will undoubtedly be debated, the establishment of some standards to show what Judaic material is contemporary with Paul is a must.

The book is divided into three areas: (1) Paul's pre-Christian days under the legal system of Judaism; (2) his Christian teaching concerning legality and liberty; (3) his personal practice of liberty as an apostle of Christ. An appendix on Jerusalem Christianity concludes the book.

Pre-destruction Judaism is described as a complex within a unity. The role of Hellenism in Paul's life is minimized. Paul is a Hebrew of the Hebrews, a nomistic Pharisee. It was the person and work of Jesus Christ as the fulfillment of Israel's

hopes and not dissatisfaction with the law that transformed Paul. The law was an essential but secondary part of the Old Covenant. The law, especially Jewish nomism, has come to its full completion and terminus in Christ. Now in its place stands liberty in Christ. This indicative of liberty carries with it the imperative that is based upon the fact of a new nature. Paul himself illustrates this in his actions to others—the Judaizers, the "pillar" Apostles, the Libertines, the Ascetics, the "Strong", the Ecstatics.

There is little newness or freshness in Longenecker's presentation. Its brilliance lies in its thoroughness. He gives fair and substantial arguments for alternatives. Longenecker knows and has utilized the material

of Pauline studies. This can be seen in the richness of the footnotes. They run the gamut from Baur to Munck and Reitzenstein to Davies. While the reviewer can find many point of both major and minor disagreements, Longenecker is to be commended for the comprehensive nature of this study.

The book includes several indices and is generally well printed. A transposition occurs on p. 165, lines 1 and 2. The transliteration on p. 140 "kayyem" should be "kallem."

The results of a comparative study of Pauline books (a look on the bookshelf) show that the publisher has excelled. The book is a real bargain. The price is right. Let other publishers copy right.

—Howard Eshbaugh.

Baker, Nelson B. *What Is the World Coming To?* A Study for Laymen of the Last Things. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1965. (Paper.) Pp. 157. \$2.25.

There is a steady interest in eschatology, and certainly laymen need help in understanding its intricacies and mysteries. This book by the Professor of English Bible at the Eastern Baptist Theological Seminary is designed to meet the need for a non-technical discussion of the questions in this area, but I must register overall disappointment.

Responsible students of New Testament eschatology are convinced that there is a tension between the *already* and the *not yet*, and Professor Baker has indicated this. But his methodology leaves me uneasy. Side by side with critical observations helpful for understanding New Testament problems there are uncritical uses of scriptural quotations. The

writer jumps about upon occasion and juxtaposes references without careful regard for their context. He seems to have some compulsion to quote as many Bible verses as possible.

He has an uneven view of what is important for discussion under his principal theme. Millenarian views are relegated to an appendix as "a minor and disputed matter"; but since it "ought not to be ignored," he gives his own view—which is a combination of good thinking and proof-texting. He raises questions that are commonly asked—perhaps by sectarians more often than by Reformed laymen—but he devotes pages to curious and unnecessary matters ("reunion before resurrection?"; "recent expressions of Antichrist") while giving only scant mention of the very substantial problem of Johannine eschatology outside the Apocalypse.

Another problem that I find in this book is the author's bibliography. I am always suspicious of studies that quote a series of references without serious attention to them—a sort of extracanonical proof-texting method. Thus the Notes quote ten different authors before one is "*op. cited*"; and only three in the first twenty-four are repeated. The choice of cited litera-

ture is also unsatisfactory. Thus George E. Ladd's article in *The New Bible Dictionary* is referenced, but no indication is given that the author is familiar with Ladd's two major books on eschatology. A book by Shedd, published in 1885, is quoted; but J. A. T. Robinson's *Jesus and His Coming* is never mentioned. And this is not to be excused because the book is for the long-suffering layman; for Reinhold Niebuhr, Emil Brunner, and G. H. Beasley-Murray are among the references. Then there is the prize quotation that comes from the author's wife's uncle who heard it from the pastor of the one quoted!

The perceptive reader will not be satisfied with the treatment of several of the topics. For example, there is discussion of the dominical saying about the gospel being proclaimed to all the nations before the end; but in this context there is no indication of the implied problem about the nations and generations that rise and pass away without the gospel—what point is there in pushing the "all nations" limit when in fact only the nations of the end time are meant?

Westminster's editorial board, I should suggest, could have done better by this arresting subject.

Motyer, J. A. *After Death—A Sure and Certain Hope?* Philadelphia: Westminster, 1965. (Paper.) Pp. 94. \$1.25.

This is one of a paperback series, *Christian Foundations*, prepared under auspices of the Evangelical Fellowship in the Anglican Communion and edited by the redoubtable conservative scholar Philip E. Hughes. One wonders why Westminster Press chose to sponsor such a series if this volume is typical; for besides being somewhat quaint in general approach, there are a number of "inside" remarks, especially regarding the Thirty-Nine Articles of Religion of the Church of England. One would have expected Seabury Press to be the American sponsor; and again there rises the question of why treatment of the eschatological theme by those outside the Reformed tradition is published by the United Presbyterian publishing house.

The author warns that he will give "as many references as possible to Scripture"; and this is perhaps the principal weakness of the book (from the reviewer's standpoint) for two reasons. First, references are cited and in some cases developed without due regard to their particular

place in the biblical witness. Second, one misses discussion of biblical details which seem to be precisely relevant, e.g., the raising of Lazarus, Jesus' empty tomb, 1 Cor. 15. Although he is usually careful to avoid blatant misuse of Scripture, the author heaps up references where some attention to New Testament doctrine "across the board" would have been more helpful.

Two viewpoints are given particular attention from a negative critical stance: universalism and "conditional immortality" (the latter espoused in this country by Seventh-Day Adventists). Neither set of arguments seems very well articulated.

Some readers will appreciate the citation of theological books a century old; others will find this somewhat tedious, perhaps irrelevant. And there are several typographical errors in the text. One hopes to be spared any sermons or lectures that may grow from this book.

—J. A. Walther.

Nicholls, William, ed. *Conflicting Images of Man*. New York: Seabury Press, 1966. Pp. 231. \$4.95.

This is an interesting book, though one of very limited usefulness. It consists of eight essays, some by rather well-known theological writers, on the problem of reconstructing a Christian theological view of man which will be both pertinent to and defensible against modern secular views of man. The authors had no intention of forming a "school." Rather, they did what so rarely happens among contemporary theologians: they collaborated to contribute what they could to the clarification of an important issue. Indeed, Nathan A. Scott, Jr., who wrote the lead essay on "The Christian Understanding of Man," was courageous enough to allow his essay to be read by the others before they wrote their pieces, knowing full well that at least one of these men, Professor D. G. Brown, a philosopher who regards theological assertions as either false or vacuous, was waiting to take pot shots at what he had to say. Fortunately, for the Christians, the editor has the last word with a long essay that takes up about a quarter of the book. His attempt to explain the logic of theological assertions and thereby nullify Professor Brown's criticisms is one of the most interesting and original parts of the book. He takes up the issue where Paul Van Buren left it and carries it toward a much more

satisfactory solution.

Some of the major questions discussed, aside from that of theological language are: the role of Christology in determining the Christian view of man; whether a theological view of man should be regarded as a special contribution to be combined with the contributions of other sciences by philosophical anthropology, or whether it was the office of theological anthropology to synthesize the contributions of the special sciences studying one or another aspect of man's existence; whether man is "free" in some sense that would set an absolute limit against efforts to "research" him and explain him in causal terms; the extent to which "autonomy" can be affirmed as good and proper for man. The book has some intelligent and well-informed comment to make on all these matters.

Its chief limitations are three. Despite their interest, the contributions of Scott, Gustafson, Brown, and to a lesser extent Nicholls are too sketchy to provide much more than clues about the direction further work in this area might proceed. The contributions of Ronald Gregor Smith and Keith Bridston are, for the most part, trite. Finally, the essays by Pieter de Jong on Teilhard de Chardin, and Reginald Fuller on Bon-

hoeffer's prison writings, while informative and competently done,

exhibit little connection with the other essays.

Ogletree, Thomas W. *Christian Faith and History*. Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1965. Pp. 238.

It has become increasingly evident that some of the basic problems which preoccupied liberalism fifty to a hundred years ago are still with us. The problems posed by the vast increase in historical knowledge, and by the discovery that man's involvement in history radically alters our understanding of "human nature" (and therefore our whole conception of man's relation to God, of Christ, the Church, redemption, etc.), have been the chief reasons for the theological innovations proposed by liberalism and neo-orthodoxy.

Professor Ogletree provides an excellent analysis of the different ways in which two pivotal figures, Ernst Troeltsch and Karl Barth, tried to deal with these problems. Troeltsch, sometimes called the systematic theologian of the "History of Religions School," tried to interpret Christianity along purely historicist lines. A completely non-miraculous, rational, ethical account was to be given of it. In this he succeeded, but only at the cost of undermining the claim, essential to the New Testament message, that the event designated by the name

"Jesus Christ" is not merely one event among others, but the event which is absolutely decisive for every man's relation to God regardless of his historical proximity or distance to it.

Karl Barth, precisely in order to protect that claim, attempted to deal with the problem of history by first establishing theology as a discipline fundamentally independent of historical research, though it could use historical research for achieving a preliminary understanding of Scripture. Barth realized that his theological doctrines of God, Jesus Christ, the Church, etc. all contained claims about history, e.g., that this or that happened at a certain point in time and space (Exodus, Resurrection, etc.); or that the meaning of history as a whole, and therefore the meaning of every event in history, has to be understood from the standpoint of God's self-glorification in the fulfillment of His covenant with man in Jesus Christ. The net effect of Barth's effort, in Ogletree's opinion, was to isolate the content of the Christian faith from the historical

context in which it arose and developed.

In general, one has to concur with Ogletree's conclusion. His proposal for a fresh attack upon the problem also seems worth taking up. He thinks Barth's theological framework provides more opportunities than Barth himself realized for finding positive theological significance in the continuities of history and the varieties of meaning men have created

in human history.

The book is a delight to read because of its direct, clear style. What makes it even more valuable, however, is the fact that the author gives you something of lasting usefulness, namely, some basic clarifications—free from the mystification of the "New Hermeneutics"—of the categories used in the on-going debates on "faith and history."

—George H. Kehm.

Barth, Karl. *The German Church Conflict*. (#1, Ecumenical Studies in History.) Richmond: John Knox Press, 1965. Pp. 77. \$1.75 (paper).

The explicit intention of the editors of the new series, "Ecumenical Studies in History," is "to further the unity of the Church." It has to be asked, therefore, whether this selection from Karl Barth's writings during the German Church conflict is more than important documentation (which it undoubtedly is), and whether it does, in fact, contribute to "Church unity." Not all Christians will agree that it does: those, for example, for whom an intact polity is indispensable will, in 1966 as in the thirties, regard Barth and the Confessing Church as being subversives. On the other hand, those who believe that the unity of the Church is *au fond* in God and not in man, and

who would rather see the organized Church in ruins than maintaining a specious formal unity by theological compromise and adulteration of Biblical faith, will see in these essays—as did the hard-pressed men of the Confessing Church—an unyielding prophetic summons to the Church to lose herself for the sake of the Gospel, and in that way to experience and manifest the only unity that matters.

This book is important. Western Christendom as a whole has not properly heeded or understood the issues and the lessons of the German Church struggle, in which there was a most agonizingly direct engagement between forces which are still

active throughout Christendom, in the U.S.A. as elsewhere, but which are not steadily recognized for what they are. If Barth is right when he says that "the doctrine and attitude of the German-Christians is nothing but a particularly vigorous result of the entire neo-protestant development since 1700" (p. 16), or when he concludes that "our opposition must . . . be fundamentally directed against the ecclesiastical and theological system of neo-protestantism in general, which is certainly not incorporated only in the German-Christians" (p. 25), then it is clear that the presuppositions of what developed into the German-Christian heresy are present in our own situation here and now. Six years later, Barth went further: "The worst enemy of the Confessing Church today is the army of neutrals . . . whose ecclesiastical desire is to be dangerous to no one, thus letting themselves be in no danger, who, to further this aim, are never at a loss for any possible patriotic, pious and learned argument . . . it is not impossible that there are many subjectively well-meaning persons in this army. But its watchwords . . . spell death" (p. 75). It is probably of such a passage as this that the General Editor, in his Introduction, says that it "speaks both directly and indirectly to the ecumenical situation today—not least in Great Britain and the United States of America":

for although the contextual situation varies, the Churches here and now are invaded by and must deal with racism, nationalism and practical atheism: and neutralism is still the safe way out.

It might not be out of place to draw the particular attention of theological teachers to Barth's 1935 statement that when a resolute witness to the sovereignty of God appeared, "it was not the old leaders of the Church, nor the theological faculties . . . (nor was it the German 'religious socialists!'), but it was very quietly, now here, now there, a few hundred pastors with their congregations, who formed free synods and parish conferences with the aim of giving an account to themselves and the rest of the Church, to the German-Christians and pagans, and to the National Socialist State itself, of what the Church today is and is not, what it wants and does not want" (p. 44). This suggests that the indifference, condescension, or active dislike with which some theological teachers regard the pastoral, congregational ministers betrays a faulty appreciation of where the Church's life is being most authentically, if not most noisily, lived.

The debate of those days was not distinguished by graciousness, and the harshness of some of Barth's statements, however understandable, is often unpleasant. For example, after listing "five fundamentals" of

the Confessing Church's protest against current developments, he concludes by saying: "Whoever is of 'another opinion' in any one of these five points himself belongs to the German-Christians and should not be permitted to disturb a serious opposition by the Church any longer" (p. 17). In other words, any deviation from or qualification of Barth's theses exposed a man to insult, the most damning kind of categorization, and—when possible—eviction in disgrace by the brethren from further "serious" debate, presumably until such time as he repented. One would like to know whether, now that thirty years have elapsed, there has been any real relaxation of this kind of stringency, and if so, the reasons for the relaxation. One wonders, too, whether Barth is now willing to exonerate Pastor von Bodelschwingh from the charge of being "soft" on the German-Christians (cf. pp. 35-37), or to withdraw the withering comment that had von Bodelschwingh been made State-bishop, this would have ensured "a peaceful continuance in Church life in mild harmony with the new age

and order" (p. 43): or whether he might even find a gentle word to say for the memory of that great villain, Bishop Marahrens. The very fact that the Editor says that he "has not thought it necessary or desirable to supply notes to allusions which might wound reputations," suggests that these essays still return an echo of the rancorous personal animosities which were so conspicuous a feature of German Church life in the thirties, and which have played no small part since then.

In spite of this, what comes through loud and clear as one reads this book is the great trumpet-cry, the clean and authentic warrior-note which — although Barth himself would be the first to deplore it—evokes our love and veneration for the man who, under God, recalled the Church to her own peculiar forms of honour, duty and courage: for it is not the men of the Confessing Church alone, but a whole generation, who owe their theological lives to that which the Spirit and the Word gave us through his work.

—*Iain Wilson.*

Stegenga, J., compiler. *Greek-English Analytical Concordance of the Greek-English New Testament*. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1963. Pp. xv + 832. \$14.95.

This impressive volume, which was prepared under the auspices of the "Hellenes-English Biblical Foundation" of Jackson, Mississippi, proposes to consist of "an alphabetical listing of every Greek word in its original case form and inflexions brought together with all relative, prefixed and compounded words in alphabetical arrangement under its particular root stem . . . a grammatical analysis of each word, prefixed word or compounded word . . . a systematic listing of every Greek and English word . . . given by book, chapter and verse wherever found in the writings of the New Testament

[and] English translations given in every form used and if omitted, thus noted."

The book can be very useful to researchers. Unfortunately, it has been based on the *Textus Receptus*; and a sampling of entries indicates that errors are frequent enough to suggest careful checking by the user. The English translations of the various entries indicate how important it is for the student of the Greek New Testament to be able to use such tools as Arndt & Gingrich's Bauer and the Kittel *Theological Dictionary*.

Rolston, Holmes. *The Bible in Christian Teaching*. Richmond: John Knox, 1966. Pp. 104. \$1.45 (paper).

This useful little volume, which had already appeared in 1962, is re-issued in the *Aletheia* series; and *mirabile dictu* the price is now five cents less! The author, who is well

known to Presbyterians, particularly in the South, builds to a philosophy of Christian communication which will be instructive for all who share the Church's educational task.

Van Buren, Paul M. *The Secular Meaning of the Gospel*—Based on an Analysis of Its Language. New York: Macmillan, 1966. Pp. XVII + 205. \$1.05.

This controversial but very important book (first published in 1963) is now available in paperback. The author is one of the so-called "death-of-God" theologians. One ought to

read this book to see what the writer is saying rather than to accept the stereotypes so widely and irresponsibly bandied about.

From time to time we receive from publishers books which we sincerely intend to review. The reasons are diverse why certain reviews never are written; the vicissitudes of faculty activity and editorial preoccupation are perhaps the basic problems. The following books are ones which we feel sure merit review but which are unlikely now to receive further space in this journal. We express our appreciation to the publishers for their willingness to supply these books, and we recommend these titles to our readers for their special consideration.

Althaus, Paul. *Faith and Fact in the Kerygma of Today*. Philadelphia: Muhlenberg, 1960. Pp. 89. \$1.75.

Brunner, Emil. *I Believe in the Living God. Sermons on the Apostles' Creed*. Translated and edited by John Holden. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1960. Pp. 160. \$3.00.

Carnell, E. J. *The Kingdom of Love and the Pride of Life*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1960. Pp. 164. \$3.50.

Diem, Hermann. *Dogmatics*. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1960. Pp. 375. \$6.95.

Fuhrmann, P. T. *An Introduction to the Great Creeds of the Church*. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1960. Pp. 144. \$3.00.

MacGregor, Geddes. *The Coming Reformation*. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1960. Pp. 160. \$3.50.

Piper, Otto A. *The Biblical View of Sex and Marriage*. New York: Scribner's, 1960. Pp. 239. \$3.95.

Whitehead, Alfred North. *Process and Reality*. New York: Macmillan, 1960. Pp. xxiii + 509. \$6.50. A reissue.

Wyon, Olive. *Prayer*. Philadelphia: Muhlenberg, 1960. Pp. ix + 68. \$1.00.

Berger, Peter L. *The Noise of Solemn Assemblies—Christian Commitment and the Religious Establishment*. New York: Doubleday, 1961. Pp. 189. \$1.75. (Paper.)

Boman, Thorleif. *Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek*. Translated by Jules L. Moreau. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1961. Pp. 224. \$4.50. A volume in The Library of History and Doctrine.

Bruce, F. F. *Second Thoughts on the Dead Sea Scrolls*. Revised and enlarged edition. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1961. Pp. 160. \$3.00.

Bruce, F. F. *The English Bible. A History of Translations*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1961. Pp. xiv + 234. \$3.75. From the earliest English Versions to the New English Bible; illustrated.

Clarkson, Jesse D. *A History of Russia*. New York: Random House, 1961. Pp. xix + 857. \$10.00.

Cunliffe-Jones. *Jeremiah*. New York: Macmillan, 1961. Pp. 287. \$3.50. One of the Torch Bible Commentaries.

Gustafson, James M. *Treasure in Earthen Vessels*. New York: Harper, 1961. Pp. xi + 141. \$3.50.

Kelly, A. D. *Christianity and Political Responsibility*. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1961. Pp. 239. \$5.00. One of the Westminster Studies in Christian Communication.

Luccock, Halford E. *More Preaching Values in the Epistles of Paul*. New York: Harper, 1961. Pp. 255. \$3.75.

Newbigin, Leslie. *Is Christ Divided? A Plea for Christian Unity in a Revolutionary Age*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1961. Pp. 41. \$1.25.

Ogden, Schubert M. *Christ Without Myth. A Study Based on the Theology of Rudolf Bultmann*. New York: Harper, 1961. Pp. 189. \$3.75.

Rhys, J. H. W. *The Epistle to the Romans*. New York: Macmillan, 1961. Pp. vi + 250. \$3.50.

Smart, James D. *Servants of the Word. The Prophets of Israel*. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1961. Pp. 95. \$1.50. One of the Westminster Guides to the Bible.

St. John-Stevas, Norman. *Life, Death and the Law*. Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1961. Pp. 375. \$5.95.

Winter, Gibson. *The Suburban Captivity of the Churches: and the Prospects of Their Renewal to Serve the Whole Life of the Emerging Metropolis*. New York: Doubleday, 1961. Pp. 216. \$3.50.

Bonhoeffer, Dietrich. *Act and Being*. New York: Harper, 1962. Pp. 192. \$3.00.

Clark, Henry. *The Ethical Mysticism of Albert Schweitzer*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1962. Pp. xii + 241. \$4.95.

Crim, Keith R. *The Royal Psalms*. Richmond: John Knox Press, 1962. Pp. 127. \$2.75.

Johnson, H. and Thulstrup, N. (eds.). *A. Kierkegaard Critique*. New York: Harper, 1962. Pp. 311. \$6.00.

Littell, Franklin H. *From State Church to Pluralism: A Protestant Interpretation of Religion in American History*. New York: Doubleday, 1962. Pp. xx + 174. 95¢. An Anchor Original (paper).

Pfeiffer, Charles F. *The Dead Sea Scrolls*. Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1962. Pp. 119. \$2.50. Revised, enlarged, and illustrated second edition of a 1957 publication.

Proudfoot, Merrill. *Diary of a Sit-In*. Foreword by Frank P. Graham. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1962. Pp. xiv + 204. \$5.00.

Sontag, Frederick. *Divine Perfection*. New York: Harper, 1962. Pp. 158. \$3.75.

Thielicke, H. *Christ and the Meaning of Life*. New York: Harper, 1962. Pp. 186. \$3.00.

Thompson, David. *Europe Since Napoleon*. New York: Knopf, 1962. Pp. xx + 909 + xl. \$10.00. Second edition, revised, of a Borzoi Book.

Thielicke, H. *Man in God's World*. New York: Harper & Row, 1963. Pp. 223. \$3.95.

Harrison, Everett F. *Introduction to the New Testament*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964. Pp. xiv + 481. \$5.95. Covers the background, language, textual criticism, canon, and literature.

Ad Hoc, concluded

PAUL RICOEUR will be the second Schaff Lecturer at the Seminary, in October. Professor Ricoeur's latest book has been reviewed for us by Dean Jackson, who has also included some information on the life and thought of this distinguished French Christian scholar.

CIRCULATION of the Seminary's publications is a considerable task. We appreciate the thoughtfulness of those who promptly notify the Director of the Mailing Department when any change of address is required.

—J. A. W.




Pittsburgh Perspective

DECEMBER, 1966

Volume VII

Number 4



PITTSBURGH THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

PITTSBURGH PERSPECTIVE

Volume VII

DECEMBER, 1966

Number 4

Published four times yearly in March, June, September and December, by the Pittsburgh Theological Seminary, 616 North Highland Avenue, Pittsburgh, Pa. 15206, one of the seven seminaries of the United Presbyterian Church in the U. S. A. Second-class postage paid at Pittsburgh, Pa. Changes of address should be sent to the Seminary, care of the Director of the Mailing Department.

Editor: James Arthur Walther, Th.D.

Publications Committees

Faculty

Peter Fribley
Lynn B. Hinds, *Chmn.*
J. A. Walther

Student

Robert H. McClure, Jr.

J. Rowe Hinsey, *ex. off.*
William R. Atkins, *ex. off.*
William R. Phillippe, *ex. off.*

Circulation: William W. Hill

Secretarial Assistant: Mrs. Elizabeth Eakin

Contents

<i>Ad Hoc</i>	2
From the President's Desk	3
Theology As the Mind's Worship	5
by Gordon D. Kaufman	
You are This	17
by David A. MacLennan	
Notes on the Practice of the New Morality	22
by Elwyn A. Smith	
Yahweh v. Cohen et al	28
by Jared J. Jackson	
Book Reviews and Notes	
Von Rad, <i>The Problem of the Hexateuch, etc.</i>	33
Jared J. Jackson	
Shires, <i>The Eschatology of Paul</i>	35
J. A. Walther	
Walther, <i>New Testament Greek Workbook</i>	37
Herman C. Waetjen	
Hyatt, <i>The Bible in Modern Scholarship</i>	38
Barker, <i>Everyone in the Bible</i>	39
Schaff, <i>The Creeds of Christendom</i>	40
Bruggink, <i>Guilt, Grace, and Gratitude</i>	40
<i>The Advance of Christianity</i>	41
Editor	
McCracken, <i>What Is Sin? What Is Virtue?</i>	41
Rhymes, <i>No New Morality</i>	42
Charles C. W. Idler	
Two for the Money on Sex	43
William R. Phillippe	
Muirhead, <i>Education in the New Testament</i>	47
David B. Cable	
<i>Monographs in Christian Education</i>	47
<i>Makers of Contemporary Theology</i>	48
MacLennan, <i>Revell's Minister's Annual 1967</i>	48
Manson, <i>The Way of the Cross</i>	48

Ad Hoc

OUR PROJECTED ISSUE on "the New Morality" has for the present foundered on the shoals of editorial difficulties. We make no promise, but we still plan for such a project next year. Meanwhile, we offer here an article which Professor Elwyn Smith wrote for the projected issue before he left our faculty. There are also some book reviews which were prepared for the same issue.

THE ADDRESS BY PROFESSOR KAUFMAN was delivered at our Fall Convocation last September. It was so well received here that we are anxious to share it with our readers.

DR. MACLENNAN'S SERMON was preached at our Fall Communion. He is one of our denomination's best-known preachers. Before beginning his ministry at Rochester, he was Professor of Preaching at Yale Divinity School; and he had prominent pastorates in Canada. He served as Vice-Moderator of our 177th General Assembly.

THE ARTICLE BY JARED JACKSON was first presented as a paper at one of the semi-monthly meetings of the Biblical Division. We offer it here for our readers who enjoy substantial study of difficult scripture passages.

MANY SPEAKERS in our convocations present fine material which we hope our readers enjoy when it is published here. We assume, however, that we can best serve our seminary circles—both on campus and extramural—by preferring the writing of our faculty and staff. Accordingly, we intend to emphasize "home-grown products" in Volume VIII.

—J. A. W.

From the President's Desk—

ONE OF THE ISSUES forced upon us by current discussion and by the mood of the times is the meaning of relevance. Customarily the word in our time seems to describe that which can be got across to people, that to which people will gladly listen, that which seems to them applicable to their interests or needs. This would seem to limit relevance to that which ministers to people's felt needs, which in turn implies that people can discern what their true needs are. The question poses itself, however: if that which is relevant be limited to what men think or feel that their needs are, what becomes of it should they be mistaken in their self-analysis?

One can imagine, for example, a good many so-called relevant discussions going on in the school in Wales which was recently inundated by a slag slide, killing about one hundred and fifty people. A physical hygiene discussion about the care of teeth or the necessity of vitamins to health could well have seemed relevant to those participating. In the light of the immediate situation, however, this was totally irrelevant. Death hovered so tragically near that one hundred fifty people will never again brush their teeth nor take vitamins. The only really relevant thing in that situation would have been a timely warning of the coming disaster which would have enabled them to escape it. The conscious needs of that group were not at that moment their real needs.

The history of words, like the history of ideas, sometimes brings changes which are not particularly advances. The word *relevance* has had such a history. The meaning which is listed in most dictionaries as "obsolete" or "rare" is the one which comes closest to the highest meaning of the word. Our English word *relevance* comes from the Old French, which was in turn derived from the past participle of the Latin word *relevare* meaning to "lift up again, lighten, relieve." Hence, it came to mean "help, assist." That which is really relevant, therefore, is that which really lifts up the true meaning of any situation and offers help in it, in terms not of the apparent but of the actual realities of the situation. And, just as in the case of the slag slide, the most significant aspect of the actual situation may not be present to the consciousness of those involved. Hence, true relevance can not be limited to that which men will at the moment accept as significant.

The danger in the current quest for relevance, particularly in preaching, lies right here. Either the Bible is by-passed for a quick word of our own which seems to speak immediately to "where the action is," or it is used

superficially by seizing upon certain of its features which *we* have decided beforehand are relevant. But as James Barr has pointed out in his recent work, *Old and New in Interpretation* (London: SCM Press, 1966), relevance "cannot work as a guide to interpretation before the interpretation is done. Only after we have worked on the meaning of the Bible can we tell in what way it is relevant. . . . Any attempt to judge relevance at the beginning of our study must only perpetuate the value systems we previously accepted. Where this is so, the relevance conception works like tradition in the negative sense" (pp. 192f).

If there is any unique word of God in the Bible, perhaps listening for it may help us to define what is relevant and help us to speak to needs of men which may go deeper than their felt needs and enable them to sort out the ultimate issues of life and death which often lurk hidden beneath the more dramatic and apparent crises of their everyday life.

Another danger of the current cry for relevance is that it may ultimately become self-defeating. A desire for easy and quick relevance tends to by-pass the long, slow discipline of study. This tends to foster an anti-intellectualism which in the pulpit results in easily understood homilies pointedly applied in a moralistic fashion, becoming little more than sophisticated exhortation, and in the administrative wing of the church places the highest priority on program and polity. This anti-intellectualism tends to become sterile, for people grow indifferent to repeated exhortation to behavior they do not want to indulge in without biblical and theological grounds to do so. Furthermore, this procedure does not challenge the best young minds of the church who are tempted, therefore, to by-pass the church as irrelevant. Hence the anti-intellectual effect toward immediate relevance often results in an ultimate irrelevance which is self-defeating. If the church is to be truly relevant, it must keep vigorously bound to the biblical, theological, and historical disciplines which themselves help to determine what is relevant and at the same time give a depth and solidity to the church which lifts up the true meaning of the human situation and kindles the undying hope that the God who has committed Himself to man in the history of Israel and in the incarnation of Jesus Christ will never withdraw that commitment.

—D. G. M.

Theology as the Mind's Worship

by GORDON D. KAUFMAN

The Lord our God is one Lord: and thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength. (Mark 12:29-30.)

"**T**HOU SHALT LOVE the Lord thy God with all thy mind." This is a very curious and uncommon combination of words. To love God with your whole heart: yes, that is comprehensible, for the heart is the very seat of the emotions, the center from which love flows. Love God with your whole soul: this reinforces the previous imperative by making the love of God a demand laid not only on the emotions but on the whole self, the total personality. Love God with all your strength: this would seem to make the command complete and all-inclusive; our whole being is to be given over in all its energies to the love of God; every power within us in every moment is to be exerted to its utmost capacity in his service. Nothing is left over; nothing is left out. What, then, is the meaning of that extra command which seems to be included already in the others: thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy mind?

It is not often, I suppose, that we associate love with the mind. The

mind is that capacity of the self to be cold and calculating, objective and scientific. What has it to do with warmth and self-giving and love? It is the mind which is the source of questioning and doubt and skepticism, those great destroyers of that simple child-like faith to which we aspire. Above all, it is in the activities of the mind that the self demands full autonomy in determining its own course, indeed, in judging the very nature of Truth. When the mind submits to external authority it does so grudgingly and sullenly and only under some foreign compulsion. How then can the mind bow down and worship God and yet remain itself? Is it not man's reason, man's insistence on being his own authority, that is the very mark of human arrogance and rebellion against God? Was it not, after all, desire for the fruit of the tree of knowledge that misled our first parents? Surely the proper attitude of Christian faith toward human reason must be that of fear and even of enmity. Before

GORDON KAUFMAN is Professor of Systematic Theology at Harvard Divinity School.

the faith which we have is destroyed by a doubtful intellectualism should we not, in Luther's words, "grasp reason by the throat and strangle the beast"?

I

"THOU SHALT LOVE the Lord thy God with all thy mind." I suppose part of our difficulty in immediately seeing what might be involved here lies in our understanding of the term love. Despite such biblical and theological training as many of us may have had, all of us, I suspect, continue to think of love as somehow primarily connected with the emotions, with sex, or at least with the will—and not with the mind. And because of these preconceptions lying hidden somewhere in the back of our minds, it is difficult for us to think out very clearly what it might mean to talk of the mind—the intellect, the reason—as loving. But if by love we mean a kind of all-absorbing self-giving devotion of the self to the object of love, the turning of attention and concern and interest away from the self and focusing it instead on that beyond the self to which the self is given—and this conception is not too far from the kind of self-giving known in the New Testament as *agapē*—then it begins to become apparent that love is not an inappropriate term to apply to the activity of the mind. For authentic intellec-

tual activity is always characterized by a devotion to the object, by a radical disinterest in the desires of the self, as the mind subjects itself to the true nature of the object. Consider the scientist in his laboratory, working all hours of the night, completely forgetful of his own needs for sleep or food because of the consuming excitement of the experiment he is conducting. Consider the mathematician on the verge of the solution of a problem with no conceivable practical applications, so engrossed in his search for truth that he cannot pause for rest or relaxation. Consider the scholar working long hours with dusty tomes in the library, seeking the solution to some obscure, and, to most of us, meaningless, question about the nature of family relationships in some pre-literate tribe. In each of these cases we find a man so given to the object over against him that the normal needs of the self are almost completely forgotten. Or better, in all these cases the natural needs of the self have become transmuted into something new and different by an all-consuming passion, a great love, for something other than the self: for the true nature of the object being studied.

The mind, as Augustine long ago realized, and as the Freudians and the sociologists of knowledge have lately reminded us, does not select the objects of its investigations with complete objectivity, directing its

penetrating gaze on every aspect of the universe equally and impartially. On the contrary, the mind in its choice of objects to study and to know is always guided by the interests, the passions, the loves of the self to whom it belongs. Thus one man becomes a biologist, another an historian, and a third a philosopher, not because truth is intrinsically greater or more readily available in one or the other of these fields of study, but because his particular interests direct his pursuit of truth in a particular direction. It is the love of the self for this or that object, for this or that kind of knowledge, and the consequent willingness of the self to sacrifice all in the pursuit of this pearl of great price, on which the very life of the mind depends. The work of the mind is rooted not only in the *erōs* of Plato, the self-centered desire for beauty and truth born of the union of poverty and plenty; it depends equally, even more, on the self's act of disinterested self-sacrifice and self-giving in behalf of the object loved; it is rooted in *agapē*. And any person unwilling to make this kind of sacrifice of self for the object of knowledge will never know the joy of beholding truth.

II

THE COMMANDMENT which we are considering, however, is not a

commandment simply to seek truth in general, to give ourselves in the pursuit of any kind of knowledge whatsoever. It is the very specific commandment to love *God* with our minds, to give ourselves without reservation in intellective response to Him, to make Him the object and the center of all our thinking. How is this possible? What is really required of us here?

Perhaps we can more readily see what claim is here laid on us if we first examine some of the ways in which we seek to evade it and thus are disobedient, with our minds, to the commandment. I do not care to dwell on the very obvious kinds of intellectual disobedience in which some of us engage much of the time and in which we all engage some of the time. Every catalog of sins contains the names of idols to which our minds, in the movement of our thought and contemplation, have been attracted and before which, upon occasion, they have bowed down in love and worship. But every preacher knows these ways of disobedience involving not only the mind but the whole self, and there is no need to rehearse them here.

More appropriate for our consideration are the specific kinds of disobedience to God peculiar to the intellect. It is not difficult to find a general definition of what such disobedience will consist in. Just as we refuse to obey God when we refuse

to direct our wills in service to Him, so we disobey God when we refuse to use our minds to think Him and to think about Him. For to love God with our minds is to make Him the object of our thought.

There are several ways in which this disobedience may manifest itself. One of the most common, perhaps, is an expression of what we may take to be humility. To think about God—to theologize—that after all is a task more than a match for the greatest of human intellects. Who is able to hold the almighty God, the Creator of the heavens and the earth in his mind?

Have you not known? Have you not heard?

Has it not been told you from the beginning?

Have you not understood from the foundations of the earth?

*It is he who sits above the circle of the earth,
and its inhabitants are like grasshoppers;*

*who stretches out the heavens like a curtain,
and spreads them like a tent to dwell in;*

*who brings princes to nought,
and makes the rulers of the earth as nothing.*

Who has directed the Spirit of the Lord,

or as his counselor has instructed him?

Who did he consult for his enlightenment,

and who taught him the path of justice,

and taught him knowledge,

and showed him the way of understanding?

Behold, the nations are like a drop from a bucket,

and are accounted as the dust on the scales;

behold, he takes up the isles like fine dust.

*Lebanon would not suffice for fuel,
nor are its beasts enough for a burnt offering.*

All the nations are as nothing before him,

they are accounted by him as less than nothing and emptiness.

*To whom then will you liken God,
or what likeness compare with him?**

Before this almighty God, is not the only appropriate attitude the closing of the eyes and the bowing of the head? Is it not the utmost arrogance to seek to think this God with our puny minds? Should we not simply serve Him in all humility as befits our humble station before Him rather than engage in sophisticated intellectual distinctions about his nature and attributes? Certainly the latter—if it is necessary at all, which we may sincerely doubt—can be left

* Isaiah 40:21-23, 13-18.

to other and more powerful intellects than ours, and we will engage in the humbler everyday work of the church.

"Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy mind." The command comes back to us again. It will not let us escape in our cloud of excuses that our humble station, surely, exempts us from seeking to think God with the feeble powers of our minds. This command was not directed merely to the scribes, the professional theologians, of Jesus' time. This command is directed to us all. We are all to theologize. We are all to devote our mental powers, such as they are, in love to God. Even if we have only one talent, to bury it in the earth is to be disobedient to this almighty God. Far from true humility in the face of God's glory, such disobedience is but another form of assertion of self, of pride, of sin, of self-idolatry. We have no excuses. We must seek to think God whatever be our intellectual capacity. God does not require that the man with one talent produce ten; but neither does He exempt the man with one talent from using that one in His service.

If our humility gives us no exemption from the theological task, we often find another way of escape. Surely God did not intend all men to be theologians. On the contrary, there is a diversity of gifts. "Some should be apostles, some prophets, some

evangelists, some pastors and teachers" (Eph. 4:11), and, perhaps, some theologians; but there must be a vocational division here in accordance with aptitudes and interests. If all men tried to be theologians, then, besides increasing the already-too-large store of bad theology, the other tasks of the church would not get done. As for me, we may say, I am called to be a preacher, or a church administrator, or a counselor, not a theologian. The theological task I will leave to the professionals. I do not expect the theologians to interfere with my work, and I will not interfere with theirs.

Here again is a common enough attitude, and one which seems plausible on the surface. But it is one which involves both a mistaken conception of theology (as we shall see in a moment), and, far worse, disobedience to the commandment to love God with our minds. For surely our work in church administration or pastoral counseling, in preaching or teaching, must be done for one purpose only: in the service of God's will. None of these tasks are sufficient unto themselves, containing their ends in themselves. All are for Him, in service and love to Him. We are never justified, then, in carrying out our day-to-day tasks without a continual reference, always implicit, and often explicit, to that One whom we are serving. We must always have before ourselves the question whether

in fact this work we are doing is serving the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ—or whether it is serving some other god. And this requires thinking—good, hard thinking. For, as the passage from Isaiah which we read a moment ago suggested, the God whom we are seeking to serve cannot be likened to anything in all creation. He is One who must be distinguished in all respects from anything and everything in our limited, finite existence and experience. To suppose that his nature and his will can be properly discerned without the utmost exercise of our mental powers is sheer blasphemy. We cannot serve Him in our day-to-day work without striving continuously to think Him, whom we seek to serve, with our minds, for it is our thinking after all, that guides us in our work whatever particular tasks may be ours. We must love the Lord our God with our whole mind—we must theologize—if we are going to love the Lord our God with our whole soul.

The kind of disobedience of the divine command which emerged as an expression of supposed humility was the opposite of this disobedience which emerges from the Protestant doctrine of vocation. In the former case we sought refuge from the imperative to theologize by pleading our lack of capacity in the face of the overwhelming majesty of God. In the latter we seek to avoid the

theological task by the audacious supposition that God's will and work for us can be so easily discerned that it requires no mental effort on our part. In the first case we sought our own way rather than God's under cover of the plea of humility; in the second, we seek our own way rather than God's in the blatant and open claim that the mystery of God's holy nature and will is so transparent to us that we need not think at all. In neither case are we obeying the command to love God with our whole mind.

There is a third kind of disobedience of the divine command which occurs in peculiar refraction from the two which we have just noted. It is the disobedience which is especially the sin of professional theologians. It is the disobedience into which we may fall headlong as we flee from the refusal to use our minds in thought about God directly into theological work, the explicit attempt to think Him and to think about Him. In some ways this is the most vicious kind of disobedience of all, because it arises directly out of our supposed obedience, out of our theologizing. The more, I suppose, we attempt to love God with our minds through devoting much time and effort and thought to defining carefully his nature and attributes and will, the more we are in danger of supposing that with our thinking we have indeed grasped the Divine

Being. The more profoundly and comprehensively we may be able to set forth who this God who makes himself known to us in the Bible truly is, the more easily our thinking and attitude may become informed by that especially offensive kind of theological arrogance and pride that insists I have the truth about God, and those who disagree with me are fools.

Here, again, we are disobedient to the command to love God with our minds, and instead we come to love our own ideas about God with all our minds. We become so entranced with the sense of authority which it gives us to be able to speak the truth, as we think, about the very Creator of the universe, and so intrigued with the subtle and sophisticated distinctions which we find ourselves making, that we forget that after all the objective of our thinking is not the demonstration of our own intellectual power and subtlety, but is the worship and love of God. And so through the apparent pursuit of the theological task itself we fall into a self-idolatry of the mind at least as pernicious as the self-idolatries resulting from the rebellious refusal to theologize.

III

"THOU SHALT LOVE the Lord thy God with all thy mind." We have not yet discovered the way in which

this command can be rightly fulfilled, but surely our growing awareness of the difficulties has not left us entirely without any sense of its meaning. It must be clear that whatever are the dangers of the theological enterprise, the mind's love of God must at least involve trying to think Him and to think of Him with whatever intellectual powers He has given us; no false humility or vocational specialization can exempt us from the theological task. It remains to see what is involved in this theological work that is laid upon all of us who would obey our Lord's commandment. How then do we love and worship God with our minds?

The presupposition, and therefore the first moment, of the mind's worship, as of all worship, must be thanksgiving. We must be thankful for our creation: that is, for God's having made us as we are, creatures with reason and intelligence, creatures who have the capacity to think and to know. And we must be thankful for our salvation: that is, for God's not having left us in our thinking to the devices of our own minds but for his revealing himself to us, making it possible for these minds of ours in some measure to know Him. The moment of thanksgiving, then, with which the mind's worship must begin, is the movement through which the mind gathers up its energies in the effort to devote all of its powers to thinking of God. This will

be no true thanksgiving for the mind, and for God as the true object of the mind, if we enter it half-heartedly or with hesitancy. With all the joyousness and the thrill that the mind can know in its pursuit of truth, and with all the discipline that is required to keep us working on the most difficult problems, we must seek to think—logically, creatively, freely, comprehensively, systematically—of God's holy nature and will. For it is in this act of thinking, and only in this act of thinking, that we truly give thanks to God for making us creatures who *can* think and who can come to know Him.

The second moment of this the mind's worship—and surely this is inseparable from the first—must be a moment of penitence and confession. It must be a moment of awareness of our shortcomings, our failures, to fulfill the command to love God with our whole mind. How, then, does the mind repent? Penitence here cannot consist in refusing to think, through, for example, trying to force ourselves to believe this or that doctrine taught, as we believe, by our church or by the Bible, when we have found ourselves secretly doubting its truth. No, such an act would belie the moment of thanksgiving for our creation with minds which have the ability to question and doubt and judge for themselves.

Our penitence, then, must itself be an act of affirmation in thankfulness for our reason, must itself be an act of thinking. Our penitence is that moment in our thought in which we recognize explicitly and openly that all our thinking, even—nay, especially!—our thinking about God is infected with our own self interest, our own desires, our own pride, that instead of opening ourselves to the divine revelation we find ourselves defending the traditions of our particular denomination, or the ideologies of our particular social or economic or political group, as though they were nothing less than God's own truth. Our moment of penitence is the moment in which we recognize that we are continually guilty of confusing our thought of God with God Himself, and thus that we always fall into the sin of loving ourselves with our minds rather than God.

For my thoughts are not your thoughts,

neither are your ways my ways,
says the Lord.

For as the heavens are higher than the earth,

*so are my ways higher than your ways and my thoughts than your thoughts.**

This moment of repentance and confession through which we become aware again that our thinking is after all *our* thinking, and not to be con-

* Isaiah 55:8-9.

fused with God's, that we are on earth and He is in heaven, is the moment in which we come to grasp more fully what true theologizing—loving God intellectually—is. We have already noted the sins of the mind which must be continually confessed: they are the opposite sins of either seeking to avoid the theological task entirely in a false humility or supposed necessity of specialization, or, at the other extreme, of exalting the technical-professional theological enterprise itself as though it were the very thinking and being of God. But each of these sins, after all, rests on the view that theologizing, thinking of God, the mind's love of God, is a particular kind of technical activity carried on by professionals who are called theologians. And this is a false view, fostered and perpetuated by the sinful collusion of theologians and anti-theologians, both of whom are seeking to disobey God's command.

For theologizing is nothing but, to borrow a term popularized by Paul Tillich, *theonomous* thinking. It is, certainly, thinking—hard, rigorous, logical thinking. It is not mere opining or dreaming or conjecturing. It involves the application of the mind with all its powers under the strongest discipline to which we are capable of subjecting it. But it is thinking *theonomously*, that is, thinking in the light of God's revelation of himself and his nature and his will,

thinking in awareness of the fact that God is God and that we are men, that God is the Creator and we are his creatures who have been set on this earth with specific tasks to perform. To think theonomously is not to suppose that the professional theological task is the whole, or even the most important, of the human mind's tasks. Indeed, such a supposition would involve another idolatry, the self-idolatry of theology. To think theonomously is to recognize that no particular human task is in some special way God's favorite, that indeed this whole world and all of the work in it is God's and God's alone. He gives each task its true meaning and He it is who calls man to its performance, whether the work be that of preaching or teaching, farming or making shoes. To think theonomously is to see all of creation and all the work going on therein as God's work being carried out in the fulfillment of his holy purposes. To think theonomously, then, is not to think exclusively about God; rather, it is to think about the specific tasks and problems of this life which have been given us as our special tasks and problems, and to think rigorously and logically and in disciplined fashion about just these tasks and problems and no others—but to do this thinking always with the almighty God as the ultimate referent, to do it always searching for his will, his purposes, and not simply for our own

or for those which we might suppose can be discerned as immanent in the tasks themselves.

To be sure, there is a professional theological task, too. It is the task of seeking to define and refine with as great precision as possible—utilizing all available biblical and historical aids—our understanding of this One who must be the ultimate referent in all our thinking, and the relation of this God to us men. And it must be said also that if thinking in other areas—in our political life, in our economic life, in church administration and pastoral counseling—is to be theonomous, it cannot be carried on without a continuous dialogue with those whose entire intellectual effort is devoted to technical theology. It is important therefore—and especially for anyone in the ministry—for all of us to keep reading and conversing with those whose work is directly and explicitly theological if we are going to love God with our minds in the particular areas of life, the specific work, which he has assigned each of us. But the converse must also be said. The technical theologian ceases thinking theonomously, and thus he ceases thinking theologically, the moment he forgets that his task is but one of many tasks which men are called to perform here on earth, the moment he fails to see it in its proper place as the work he has been called to do alongside the carpenter and the business man. It is

not enough for him to engage only in the intramural conversation with the various branches of theology or even the various offices of the ministry. He, too, must keep in continuous conversation with all those others of God's children doing the world's work with little or no contact with professional theology, lest his own theology become self-idolatrous and thereby non-theological.

When our mind's moment of confession that we and our thinking are not God and God's thinking becomes real penitence before God, and we are truly enabled to think of ourselves and our tasks in this life theonomously, that is, theologically, then we have been brought to the beginning of the third moment of the mind's worship of God: the re-dedication made possible by the redemption and renewal of the mind which, it is our faith, God himself grants us. Here, once again, we must not make the mistake of thinking that our act of worship, in this case our act of rededication, will be anything other than an act of thinking. For if it were to be such, our thankfulness that God has created us with minds that can think would be called into question, and our penitence for refusing to accept our creaturely status and use our minds in theologizing would be confuted. Our re-dedication, then, will be nothing but our renewed attempt to follow through with ever more consistent

logic and ever more persistent discipline the exercise of the powers of our minds. We will do so, now, of course, with greater awareness and clearer consciousness that we who are thinking are creatures of the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ; we will do so, therefore, with greater awareness of the limitations under which our thinking is carried on. But since our thinking now will be carried on in clearer consciousness of the One who loves us and redeems both us and our thought, we will have a deeper sense of its true meaning and significance as a dimension of our work in and for God's kingdom. For we will remember that our thinking is not simply the servant of ourselves and is not pursued for itself alone, but is a part of our worship of God, a gift and a sacrifice which we offer to him and which he will surely accept and will redeem through giving it a significant place in the building of his Kingdom.

IV

WE HAVE CONSIDERED three moments of the mind's worship of God, through which the mind seeks to obey the commandment to love God absolutely. It must be apparent, of course, that these three moments do not follow each other in chronological succession. Rather, these are simply the three dimensions or elements which must be present when-

ever we truly theologize, that is, whenever we truly love God in and through our thought. To be thankful in our thinking is nothing else than authentic thinking—that is, thinking as God created us to think, thinking as creatures before God. To be penitent in our thinking, is also nothing else than authentic thinking—this time through painfully turning away from that tendency to exalt ourselves rather than God in our thought, from that fatal desire of ours not to acknowledge our creatureliness. To re-dedicate our thinking is, once again, nothing else than authentic thinking—this time because of God's own renewing of our minds actually turning to the tasks in this world which God has given us, and thinking them through in the light of his holy nature and will. Each of these is but a different way of saying the same thing: God has given us, his creatures, minds, and He has called us as his creatures to exercise our minds in thinking. To love God with our minds is, then, to utilize the powers of our minds through strenuous thought, but always in this consciousness of our creatureliness; in short, it is to think theologically at all times and with all our strength.

I conclude with a prayer of Anselm of Canterbury, one who has much to teach us about thinking theologically.

O Lord . . . Be it mine to look up

to thy light, even from afar, even from the depths. Teach me to seek thee, and reveal thyself to me, when I seek thee, for I cannot seek thee, except thou teach me, nor find thee, except thou reveal thyself. Let me seek thee in longing, let me long for thee in seeking; let me find thee in love, and love thee in finding. Lord, I acknowledge and I thank thee that thou hast created me in this thine image, in order that I may be mindful of thee, may conceive of thee, and love thee; but that image has been so consumed and wasted away by vices,

and obscured by the smoke of wrong-doing, that it cannot achieve that for which it was made, except thou renew it, and create it anew. I do not endeavor, O Lord, to penetrate thy sublimity, for in no wise do I compare my understanding with that; but I long to understand in some degree thy truth, which my heart believes and loves. For I do not seek to understand that I may believe, but I believe in order to understand. For this also I believe—that unless I believed, I should not understand. Amen.

"The torture allotted to the Danaids in the classical underworld, that of attempting to fill sieves with water, is the symbol not of one vice but of all vices. It is the very mark of a perverse desire that it seeks what is not to be had."

—C. S. Lewis, *The Inner Ring*.

You are This

A COMMUNION SERMON

by DAVID A. MACLENNAN

Open Thy Word to our hearts, O God, and our hearts to Thy love, that we may know Thee better and love Thee more, in Jesus Christ our Lord.
Amen.

Now you are together the body of Christ, and individually you are members of Him. 1 Corinthians 12:27 (J. B. Phillips).

ALL OF US are aware, and some of us are excited by radical theology in our time. It is an expression of the "revolt against God" in our society. Increasing the confusion is the fact that some of the "Death-of-God" theologians retain a deep attachment for Jesus of Nazareth, even when one of them defines Him as location, a stance, a style. It is a kind of Unitarianism of the Second Person of the Trinity. But with the attachment to the person and the ethics of Jesus it is a repudiation of the Church. "Religionless Christianity," yes; any institutional expression of Christianity, no.

This would puzzle the Apostle Paul, and it disturbs many today who share Paul's high Christology. For Paul, as you well know, believed that the Church was integral to Christian faith. (President Donald Miller made us all his debtors by his clear, convincing exposition of this truth in his book of a few years ago on *The Nature and Function of the Church*.) Paul not only spoke of the Church as the *ecclesia*, the gathering of all who love and obey Christ, but called the Church by the greatest of titles, "the Body of Christ." Writing to the young Church in Corinth, in the twelfth chapter of our first letter to the Corinthians, he declares: "For by the one Spirit we have all been baptized in such a way as to become one body, whether we be Jews or Greeks, whether we be slaves or free men, and that one Spirit was poured out for all of us to drink." Then he proceeds to give his famous picture of the unity of the Church. It is the picture of the Church as a body. A body consists of many parts, but it is an essential unity. Plato pointed out that we do not say, "My finger has a pain," but rather, "I have a pain." There is an I, a personality,

DAVID A. MAC LENNAN, D.D., Litt.D., is senior minister of the Brick Presbyterian Church, Rochester, New York.

which gives unity to the many different parts of the body. As the personality controls and uses the body, so Christ controls and uses the Church.

Then Paul makes what is really an astounding statement. We may have become so familiar with it that its quality has been dulled for us. "You," he says to the very ordinary, frequently blundering and sinning men and women, "*Now you are the body of Christ.*" You are this!

Since His resurrection and exaltation, Jesus Christ is no longer operating in the world in the body which was His in the days of His human life. If He wants a task done, a cause supported, His truth embodied, He must find a man, a woman, to do it. If He wants to have a sick person cured, a child or adult taught, peace created among warring nations, He must find physicians, surgeons, teachers, statesmen, and more pedestrian souls to do these things. The old verse is not deathless poetry, but it expresses deep truth:

*He has no hands but our hands
To do His work today;
He has no feet but our feet
To lead men in His way,
He has no voice but our voice
To tell men how He died,
He has no help but our help
To lead them to His side.*

This should be something to make us catch our breath in wonder: that we—you and I and folks like us—are part of the living body of Christ upon this planet.

But anyone aware of the Secular City knows that many people who are responsive to Christ, to His ethic at least, whether they are allergic to what is called His "God-talk," find the Church irrelevant, trivial, expendable, and even a reactionary hindrance to a more Christlike world. Some of the fierce critics of institutional Christianity—"the religious establishment"—undoubtedly are persons of sincere Christian commitment. Some affirm their belief in the mystical body of Christ, the dispersed company of disciples of Christ. Nevertheless, it is when the mystical Body of Christ takes "a local habitation and a name" that they bridle and revolt. The core of their criticism is that the congregation, especially in comfortable urban and suburban communities, is self-concerned and ingrown, devoting nearly all of its resources to its own interests, ministering only "to the domestic tides of life, not concerned with the secular realm where the most important decisions are being made, not

identifying itself with the disadvantaged people who are struggling for needed changes in society, not trying to be a community of reconciliation between different social and racial strata."¹ That this is the view of a significant number may be indicated by the recent survey. This indicates that only one third of theological students want to devote themselves to what is called "the typical residential church." Of course, when such Christians choose other forms of Christian ministry, they do not repudiate or deny the Body of Christ. To paraphrase the Apostle's words, "God has appointed in the church some to be messengers, secondly, some to be preachers of power (whether in First Church, Metropolis, or Main Street Church, East Cupcake, South Dakota); then workers of spiritual power in storefront churches, then Council of Churches executive secretaries for the inner city work; some to be seminary and college professors and administrators, some board and agency staff members, some radio and television specialists, some college chaplains and presidents; some military chaplains; some to be journalists and editors; some to be physicians, surgeons, nurses, agriculturists in Christ's Peace Corp. . . ."

A recent issue of the magazine *Look* gave a profile of what the senior editor calls "The Open Generation," comprising some twenty-five million young Americans. "These . . . began life in a tumult of affluence and change—incredible family, scientific and educational change." "They're religious," writes Jack Shepherd, "but they tend to reject organized religion. Some eighty-six per cent say they believe in God or a Supreme Being. Seventy-seven per cent go to church or synagogue once a month. Some fifty-five per cent say their religious belief is getting stronger." Strangely, they cite the "God is Dead" controversy as one reason for strengthened religious belief. . . . Says Dennis Duffy, of Boston, "I believe God is a belief, not a 'Hello-Reverend Jones-baby-switchboard.' . . . But most of them would not go to church if their parents didn't push them. Faith, they argue, is personal and not tied to institutional religion. One boy says he likes church best when there are no people in it."²

All of us here today, who are reasonably literate theologically, may share a similar dim view of the Church in its institutional expression, but from a more intellectual level. We may cite Dr. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, understandably the twentieth century martyr-saint-theologian, and his emphasis on religionless Christianity. Certainly some of his writings show that he blasted the church of the 1930's and 1940's, as he knew the church in Germany, and as

¹Editorial by Samuel McCrea Cavert in *Pulpit Digest*, September 1966, pp. 9, 10.

²*Look*. September 20, 1966, pp. 29, 44.

he sampled it during his graduate year at Union Seminary, New York. In his letters he did reveal his vision of a new kind of secular Christianity, preaching the Gospel of Jesus, "the man for others," and using a "non-religious interpretation of Biblical concepts." But those who knew him personally, and who are competent to assess his thoughts, assure us that "the kind of worldly holiness that he proposed for modern Christians took for granted the necessity of the Church, the sacraments, and inner spiritual discipline." Had he lived, it is possible that he would have worked out his radical theology in firm commitment to church doctrine. The latest translation of one of his manuscripts, his 1932 lectures entitled *Christ the Center*, shows him to have held a high doctrine of the Church.³ When he faced the question, "What is Jesus Christ?" he was led to give three answers: "Word," "Sacrament," and "Church."

In another context St. Paul asked early Christians, "Do you despise the Church of God?" (1 Cor. 11:22). True, he puts the question because of the unchristlike behaviour of Christians in respect to their fellow Christians and because of their disunity and misconduct in Church meetings and at the Lord's Supper. (NEB translates: "Are you so contemptuous of the Church of God that you shame its poorer members?")

Of course in the morning years of the Christian movement there were no church buildings as such. The "church-house" was the norm. It is also true, as a New Testament scholar has said, that "In the New Testament the Church is always a company of worshipping people who have given their hearts and pledged their lives to Jesus Christ."⁴

(1) Nevertheless, ideas, as George Eliot said, even the noblest ideas, are poor ghosts. Ours is the religion of the Incarnation. *The living, unseen Lord must be embodied, first in the fellowship of those who acknowledge Him to be Supreme, their Lord, God in a human life; then using visible institutions, which ever need renewal and restructuring. The Church does not just resemble a body, it is Jesus Christ's body.*"

(2) *Again, as the body of Christ, the Church has Christ for its Head.* Without the body the Head is helpless. Without the Head the body is without a mind, without direction, without control. "He is the head of the Body, the Church," is the New Testament claim. (Col. 1:18). When we say this we are saying that the Church cannot live without Jesus Christ and Jesus

³See Preface to this work, by Edwin H. Robertson.

⁴William Barclay, *The Mind of St. Paul*, page 238, British edition published by Collins.

Christ cannot work out His plans in the world without the Church.

The implications of this picture and this reality are startling. We need each other. There is no such thing as isolation or rampant individualism in the healthy church. The Body must realize its unity in Christ and obey Christ's will. Every Christian must take a whole Christ for His Saviour and a whole Church for His community and a whole world for his field of operations. Need I remind everyone that so often we settle for so much less? For several years my office at a certain School of the Prophets in a place called New Haven was next door to Halford Luccock, now making saints much jollier in Heaven. He tried out some of his sparkling insights on me. Later, some appeared in his "Simeon Stylites" columns in the *Christian Century*. I remember one, about a lackadaisical little congregation on a summer Sunday dragging the Church-militant hymn, "Onward Christian Soldiers." They moaned the words "Onward then ye people, join this happy throng." Hal said as he looked around, "There were three things wrong. First, they were not a throng; second, they did not look happy; and thirdly, they acted as if they didn't care whether anyone loved them or not."

To be a Christian is to be a member of Christ, the body, however humble, or weak, or ineffectual, or sinful. To be in the body of Christ is to be involved in Christ's life and death and resurrection. We become even more deeply involved through baptism and the Lord's supper, through our style of life and our involvement in Christ's kind of program in today's world. This is to be "where the action is"—God's redemptive action. To be "in Christ" is to be absurdly happy, to be in a glorious throng, moving onward through all the world in obedience to Him. "Now *you*—are—the Body of Christ."

Notes on the Practice of The New Morality

by ELWYN A. SMITH

I

IN HIS WELL-INFORMED AND CLEAR ARTICLE Professor Long has expounded the new morality as it is understood by its scholars (cf. last issue of *Perspective*). I will comment on its practice.

Let us first distinguish "what's-the-harm-in-it?" morality, which is a morality of weakened rules and by no means new, from the legitimate concern for a general structure of human conduct, personal and social, that is focused on the welfare of persons (rather than institutions, for example) and therefore merciful, yet constructive and socially responsible. From the Christian point of view the new morality is dominantly responsive to the doctrine of grace, which transforms law. St. Paul's teachings on the freedom of the new life in Christ is the biblical ground of the new morality.

The shape of the new morality thus takes the shape of one's theological thinking on grace and law. This is no new problem to Christian thought. We have already known both antinomians and supernomians. As I sense the feeling of young

people, both Christian and non-Christian—not the "what's-the-harm-in-it?" school but those in search of a more sensitive ethic—they want to take more responsibility on themselves for the welfare of others than conventional custom encourages.

Take, for example, the race question. For many generations, Christian-American mores accepted it that Negroes were a separate people, with the effect that they were disbarred from a full share in either the national idealism of freedom and equality or a fair share in its material and social benefits. The founders of the country were not serious about equality when it came to Negroes. The nation is making a great effort to break with that ancient viewpoint. It is striving for a new morality of race. For this reason, many of the youth of whom I am speaking are to be found in that struggle.

Take the war question. While discontent with the Vietnam action has many sources, as with Walter Lippmann's traditional views, many young people are sick of a moral order that approves killing people wholesale as a normal means of achieving overseas policy goals. When a young man

ELWYN A. SMITH is now Professor of Religion at Temple University, Philadelphia.

who has been taught from boyhood to take responsibility is suddenly told that he is not to think about the war in Vietnam but just obey orders, he questions the entire system that is addressing him. It is not, however, the failure of logic that offends him; it is the inhumane results. Many modern young people are ready for the radical steps they believe necessary to establish a wholly new approach. Many will go to jail, risk a job, accept rejection by the status-makers of the society rather than accept an international order that seems both immoral and inane. Above all, this young person rejects the effort to brainwash him with radio spots like the J. Edgar Hoover warning against Communism which, as he hears it, tells him to reject all possibility of human reconciliation with the present national enemies. But he remembers that international relations change with blinding rapidity, and he is utterly skeptical about such urgings. What he cares about is human relations, not ideologies; least of all, nationalism and racism.

To listen to much discussion of the new morality, one would think it nothing but a philosophy of sexual libertinism. It is true that the serious effort to grasp the relations of men and women in more humane terms is gravely handicapped by morally superficial people who quote the latest book on situation ethics to prove that when they experimented

with some college girl suffering from doubt of her femininity, they did her a favor. It is not easy for people to view one another in their wholeness, for each to see the other as a person bearing fears and hopes and struggling to arrive at some sure sense of himself, one whose associations and trials in adolescence profoundly form the adult he is becoming. Indeed, mature adults who have the surest sense of themselves and who are by no means cutting their teeth on other people often cannot grasp all the issues that are at stake in relations with the young—our own children, students, our troubled counselees. Still, it is possible to distinguish the person who is seeking something for himself—a sexual victory, a demonstration of one's power to control another, sycophancy—from a person who adjusts his action toward the other entirely to the need of the other person. This is the ethic of love and it is the legitimate field of reflection and decision of the new morality. It is remote from the ancient and tragic failure of the human being to love the other. It despises slick, updated rationalizations.

A surprisingly large proportion of the youth I have met in civil rights work come from troubled family backgrounds. Their authoritative early experience of sex and family life is abhorrent to them. They are determined not to be like that. Many feel similarly about their church ex-

perience, which to them has been restrictive, rejective, unfeeling. Typically—perhaps not justifiably—they dump the whole business. Some feel that marriage is a set of legal obligations that do not provide a framework in which love can flourish. It is love they value, not just sex. In their families many have seen loveless sex, a sex of obligation rather than a sexuality of love. They know the ephemeral nature of human experience, and they are not sure they are able to sustain a love relationship throughout an entire lifetime. They do not feel sure of themselves. Let me distinguish these young people absolutely from the *Playboy* crowd, male and female, which sees sex as unconnected with enduring love, much less marriage. The latter prefer the ephemeral. To them, marriage is something everybody does, with or without love, with or without fidelity. But the searchers for a better morality take the other seriously, and therefore they are wrestling with the meaning of love.

These young people consider sexual activity both natural and human, and they want to do it in a truly human way. Many are sexually uninhibited; others are attacking their own inhibition. Young people who have outgrown or rejected their families are a lonely crowd. Between the time a young person leaves home and the time he (or she) marries and accepts a job (or bears children) life is

peculiarly unstructured. There are, perhaps, college rules, army regulations, the law itself, and "custom." Many actively resent all of these, especially if hardships in early years have alienated them from authority. Decisions must come from within. Conscience itself is poorly formed in many young people; and when well formed, it may be resented, like an oppressive parent. Many young people also want to break with themselves. Their cry for freedom is not only a protest against evil law but may also represent the longing for a fuller inward freedom.

II

IT IS AMONG SUCH young people—often highly intelligent, sensitive, sexually motivated but not yet mature, sick of the lies of the advertisers, and living in an unstructured environment—that the search for a humane morality is being pressed. Many carry special burdens: parental rejection, sexual problems, anger, self-doubt, an unendurable idealism. Some of the most honest I know are living with all of these.

An often unrecognized risk to their search for a better morality is solipsism: when nothing is truly real except the self. Participation in the social struggle can become a theater in which they are playing out a one-man drama. When this happens, one no longer acts in relation to others

but uses them to become something self-contained. This is a subtle dividing. What is the relation between being a truly loving person (a concern for one's self) and loving another? If concern for the former dominates, the quest for a better morality is already aborted; if in loving others, a person becomes trusting and trustworthy, an open person whose "aye" is "aye" and whose "nay" is "nay," a person whose identity is quickly clear to others because he is himself unconfused — then the new morality is vindicated by its results.

I construe the rejection of "everyone over thirty" by the Berkeley radicals as a kind of social solipsism: i.e., a denial of the reality of the society and the wholesale rejection of most person-to-person relationships. This is the mentality that I was taught to call "fundamentalism": a fixation which bars the way to reality and the newness of life that God makes always possible. It is the common trait of racism, Marxism, rightist extremism, and, regrettably, some forms of Christianity. To destroy real possibilities or deny what is real is a delusion. It is a delusion to suppose that everyone over thirty is corrupted; it is a delusion that people under thirty are less liable to corruption. It is a delusion that black society is inherently capable of a higher humanity than white society; it is a delusion that white society is inherently superior to an integrated

society. But delusion is not the mark of the new morality: love is.

The most visible problem of the new morality, as I see it practiced in pieces and parts, is that it demands more than any but the most mature human being is able to give. The self cannot act without some concern about itself. Why did a young friend of mine break the terms of his probation (a pacifist, he had refused to register) and climb on a helicopter to protest the Vietnamese war? Not only to stop the war but also because he has achieved a remarkably clear picture of himself by this sort of action. That is not bad, as a by-product; but how well has he loved the tortured people of Vietnam by this particular act?

Only a serious youth will pause to ask himself a question whose answer everybody knows: how do you love a girl? A nineteen-year-old girl I know, the daughter of a prostitute, has lived alone in San Francisco since she was thirteen. She is very beautiful and has consistently sought the protection of men. How many of them knew what it was she needed, as against what she expected? Which of them gave more than he took? Who is wise enough to know how to love such a girl? And who is good enough to do it?

The new morality is the most demanding ethical concept in the market place of ideas. Only the most mature persons are capable of prac-

ticing it. Where it fails, this is not because the familiar rules of morality have been broken—love may truly make demands almost incomprehensible to moralism—but because someone has failed to recognize the demand of love, or recognizing it, has fallen short.

Calvinists may see a "third use of the law" here. The law which condemns the self-righteous man and drives him to plead for mercy can also function as an aid to the faithful man. If the rules of morality are never used for judgment, if rules help a man who wants to love a girl find the way to do it, then they are an instrument of grace. For myself, I am sure they are indispensable, not because they are sufficient in themselves but because they can be aids to the practice of love. Rules are for the weak; emancipation is for the mature. For the immature, a flexible use of rules is an intrinsic part of the effort of a free person to love other persons in a responsible way. At best this is a difficult aspiration. Those who angrily reject the new morality and follow the rules they know, are often prone to condemn others and congratulate themselves. Those who reject all rules claim a strength they seldom possess; those who make use of rules for the sake of love will alienate themselves from love if they use their rules to judge others. There is no way but the way of grace. So

far as we lack grace, we remain necessarily in tutelage to law.

III

THE AMERICAN NATION is now a pluralism of moralities as it is a pluralism of religions and it is no more possible to enforce on this diverse people a single morality than it is to enforce a single religion. The public law must, therefore, be held to the minimum that is essential to the public welfare. The birth control laws of some states illustrate the problem. The moral predilections of the Puritans led them to pass laws against obscene personal practices; and the Catholic Church down to the present has regarded most birth control measures as obscene. The Supreme Court recently recognized, however, that law may not reach into certain areas of privacy, and a Connecticut statute was declared unconstitutional. This is the direction of things to come: expanding spheres of personal freedom checked by expanded concepts of the social good. The clash will occur along this line: to what extent may the freedom of individuals or groups to exert power over others be tolerated consistently with public justice? In the personal realm, greater variety of conduct will be removed from the surveillance of the law (e.g., sex practice) while activities which impinge on the general

welfare (drugs, packaging, safety, health) will be ever more closely scrutinized.

The new morality will thus enjoy enlarging freedom in America but will have to prove itself socially. This it has already achieved in a single crucial sphere through non-violent protests against oppressive laws. Devotees of the rule cannot break a bad law; but those who know that love of human beings demands law-breaking are free to do it, as Jesus violated the Sabbath code. But since law is a permanent part of human society, a liberated morality of love must reconstruct rather than demolish civil law.

Family law is headed for long-term revision, not only because of the chaos of law that still prevails (New York State has just comprehensively revised its divorce laws) but because in the family the public interest and private right must be uniquely reconciled. Offspring must have care and the state must assure it; but whether a couple will bear children and if so, how many, is not for the state to decide. The state must regulate property in connection with marriage and divorce; but it must concede extensive rights of personal

liberty in the making, ordering, and breaking of marriage. If the insistence on the "rights of love" implicit in the new morality is to be validated for the public order, the American people must make important strides toward maturity in the control and uses of sex. The general revision of family law that is now getting under way will no doubt provide considerable flexibility; but the burden of the state will always be the question of its responsibility toward the whole people. The association of love, sex, and marriage is delicate and often ephemeral. To what extent can the state turn over this eminently private yet also crucial public concern to private judgment alone?

That law can be revised to conform to the concrete demands of a morality of love has been demonstrated by the civil rights legislation. No law fulfills the possibilities of love; but neither is law inherently alien to love. The severest test of situational ethics is the achievement of a social and legal system which will offer the widest freedom to those who can achieve the maturity demanded by love and yet support and compel those whose capacity for responsibility is prone to failure.

Yahweh v. Cohen et al.

GOD'S LAWSUIT WITH PRIEST AND PEOPLE—HOSEA 4

by JARED J. JACKSON

THIS PAPER is intended to be a modest contribution to the study of the form and structure of the prophetic books as exemplified in Hosea chapter 4. A reconsideration of the structure of this passage, in the light of the literary type now commonly called the *ribb-pattern*,¹ may yield a greater respect for the integrity and coherence of the chapter than has usually been granted, provide a new perspective on the admittedly difficult textual problems, and perhaps help us to understand the meaning of Hosea's message.

I

IT IS CLEAR NOW from the study of such passages as Deut. 32; Isa. 1:2f, 10-20; Mic. 6:1-8; Jer. 2:2-37; Ps. 50; and perhaps Isa. 3:13ff, that there was a well-known *genre* or *Gattung* in ancient Israel which may be called the *ribb* or "controversy" pattern, from the technical legal term which was used to describe the lawsuit in Israel. This *Gattung* had a fairly fixed structure, which has been compared to some forms of international treaties in the ancient Near East,² and which consisted of at least the following elements: (1) Introduction: summons to attention, appeal to heaven and earth, e.g., Deut. 32:1f; Jer. 2:12; Ps. 50:1-7b. (2) Interrogation and first implicit accusation, Deut. 32:6; Jer. 2:5f.; Ps. 50:16b. (3) Indictment: declaration of the crimes which have broken the covenant, review of the saving acts of Yahweh and of the ingratitude of Israel, Deut. 32:7-18; Jer. 2:7-11, 14-25. (4) The uselessness of ritual compensations instead of the worship of Yahweh, Deut. 32:16f;

¹Cf. B. Gemser, "The Rib- or Controversy-Pattern in Hebrew Mentality," in *Wisdom in Israel and in the Ancient Near East*, eds. M. Noth and D. Winton Thomas, *Supplements to Vetus Testamentum* Vol. 3 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1955), pp. 120-137; H. B. Huffmon, "The Covenant Lawsuit in the Prophets," *Journal of Biblical Literature* Vol. 78 (1959), pp. 285-295; H. J. Boecker, *Reformen des Rechtslebens im Alten Testament*, WMANT 40 (Neukirchen, 1964), esp. pp. 54, 102, 143ff.

²J. Harvey, "Le 'Rib-Pattern', réquisitoire prophétique sur la rupture de l'alliance," *Biblica* Vol. 43 (1962), pp. 172-196.

Jer. 2:26ff. (5) Declaration of guilt and warnings of total destruction, Deut. 32:19-25; Jer. 2:31-37; Ps. 50:22f.

Evidently the prophets took over the *ribb*-pattern as a form of speech and developed it for their own needs as messengers of the divine Word to Israel. It is the thesis of this paper that Hosea 4 represents an adaptation of the lawsuit to the particular situation which the Prophet faced in North Israel about the year 735 B.C., in which the religious leaders of the nation took initiative in guiding the people into apostasy from Yahweh.

The chapter has four strophes, with an introduction and conclusion. The introduction serves to summon the defendants and to appeal to the witness of heaven and earth and their inhabitants. The first two strophes are directed against the priests, while the last two condemn the people. The conclusion, which takes up the motif of the animal kingdom again, leaves no room for hope for the criminals.

Here, then, is a structured translation, with marginal notations giving the progress of the *ribb*.

II

Introduction

Summons

1. Listen to Yahweh's charge, you 'Israelites'! Yahweh has a case against the residents of the land.

Summary of Evidence

2. Specifically: Nothing of trustworthiness, nor of fidelity, nor of knowing God is in the land. But swearing and then denying, murder, kidnapping, and adultery overflow (in the land), and bloodshed leads to bloodshed.

Description of the effects of the crimes

3. It is for these reasons that the earth continues to wither and all its inhabitants lose their fertility, together with the wild beasts and the birds of the sky—and even the fish of the sea are exterminated.

Strophe I

4. Yet let no layman prosecute, let no citizen defend himself;
Since my bill of indictment is against you, O priest.

*a. Identification of the suspects
b. Indictment of the priesthood*

- c. *Particulars*
- d. *Quotation as precedent*
- e. *Defendant warned of consequences*

- 5. For you stumble in broad daylight, the prophet beside you trips up in the dark of night, so that thy mother grieves.
- 6. "My people are destroyed for lack of the knowledge!"
So, because you have rejected the knowledge, I would eject you from my priesthood. Since you have forgotten the revelation of your God, I would also forget your sons. Indeed I would!

Strophe II

- IIa. *Bill of Particulars*
- b. *Sentence demanded*
- c. *VERDICT*
- d. *SENTENCE*
- e. *Grounds for the Opinion*

- 7. The more they multiplied, the more they infringed upon me; they traded in my honor for ignominy. 8. The crime of my people they devour; they are greedy for their guilt.
- 9. So: What happens to the people must happen to the priesthood!
Therefore: I will punish him for his ways and penalize him for his deeds.
- 10. They shall eat but never be satisfied;
They shall go whoring but be frustrated all the more
Because they have abandoned the service of Yahweh.

Strophe III

- IIIa. *Quotation*
- b. *Indictment of the people*
- c. *Particulars*
- d. *Uselessness of crime*
- e. *Consequences of crime*

- 11. "Fornication and wines take away the senses."
- 12. My people! He inquires of his wooden idol, and his staff gives answer.
Indeed, a wind of harlotry makes (them) stagger, so they go whoring under their gods!
- 13. On the tops of the mountains they sacrifice, on the hills they burn incense—under oak and storax and terebinth—thinking, 'How pleasant is its shade!'
So of course your daughters turn prostitute, and your daughters-in-law commit adultery.

Strophe IV

- IVa. Exception granted*
- b. Extenuating circumstances*
- c. Warning*
- d. Proposed settlement*
- e. Parole*

14. No, I will not punish your daughters for their harlotry nor your daughters-in-law for their adultery,
Since the men tear themselves apart with harlots and 'sacrifice' with temple prostitutes.
"Now a senseless people will be crushed!"
15. Though you are inveterately whoring, Israel, Judah must not incur guilt.
That means you must never enter Gilgal, never go up to Beth-awen, never swear "As Yahweh Lives!"

Conclusion

- Refusal of pardon*
- Criminal to be led away*
- Remorse will come too late*

16. Surely Israel is rebellious as a stubborn heifer.
How could Yahweh give them pasture like a lamb in an open field?
17. Ephraim is coupled with idols—let him go!
18. A band of drunkards, they are driven to harlotry. Her insolent ones love ignominy.
19. When a wind wraps her up in its wings, then they will be ashamed of their altars.

III

FAILURE TO OBSERVE the structural relationships within the chapter has led to a denial of its unity and has also obscured the literary form. Yet the whole passage has been very carefully constructed, both in its major parts and in detail. First of all, the Introduction is balanced by the Conclusion, in structure as well as content.³ The main body, however, is dominated by a markedly ordered design, since Strophe I (the Priesthood Accused) and Strophe III (the People Accused) stand over against Strophe II (the Sentence Passed) and Strophe IV (the Sentence Suspended). Thus the pattern is AB A'B'. Moreover, within the corresponding strophes, Ib is paralleled by IIib, Ic by IIIc, Id by IIIa, and Ie by IIIe; while IIb is matched by IVe, IIc by IVa, IID by IVc,

³3 + 2 lines balance 2 + 3 lines in Hebrew.

and IIe by IVb:⁴

I — III	II — IV
Ib — IIIb	IIb — IVe
Ic — IIIc	IIc — IVa
Id — IIIa	IId — IVc
Ie — IIIe	IIe — IVb

The correspondences in the first series of strophes are exactly reversed in the second, *both in structure and content*. In addition, verses 6b, 9b, 12a, and 13b exhibit chiastic exchanges of word order within their clauses (AB B'A'). It is no accident that structure and content work together throughout the chapter to overcome the impression of fragmentation produced by the textual uncertainties.

IV

THUS YAHWEH'S LAWSUIT builds to its climax. A Priesthood which has rejected its prime task and duty of bringing the people to the intimate knowledge of God (v.2), will be destroyed with the nation it has betrayed. Therefore the whole nation is summoned before the bar of divine justice, evidence in abundance is produced, sentence is demanded, verdict given, and punishment prescribed in swift sequence. We are shocked by the explicitness of Hosea's language; no doubt his contemporaries were grossly offended by his description of what they considered devout religious practices. Yet by reversing a familiar public scene in which the priests customarily acted as judges and interpreters of Torah, Hosea was able to convey the full meaning of God's condemnation of those to whom He had entrusted His covenant love.

⁴Even the introductory formulae correspond. Compare *ki* of Ie with '*al ken*' of III e, and *ki* of IIe with *ki* of IVb. But the pattern does not force all parts of the strophes to a logical perfection of form, since the Semites are symmetrophobes.

Book Reviews and Notes

Von Rad, Gerhard. *The Problem of the Hexateuch and Other Essays*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966. Pp. xiii + 340. \$9.50.

The famous Heidelberg *Alttestamentlicher* presents here in English form sixteen of his finest essays, originally published between 1931 and 1964. Since von Rad is widely recognized as the most exciting theologian among O.T. scholars, this collection will be gratefully received by students and teachers, and will serve as a useful introduction to his challenging two-volume *Old Testament Theology*.

The title essay on the form-critical problem of the Hexateuch sets forth the author's well-known thesis that the "little credo" in Deut. 26:5b-9 (cf. 6:20-24; Josh. 24:2b-13; I Sam. 12:8) represents the structure of the present Hexateuch *in nuce*, "a summary of the principal facts of God's redemptive activity." Later cult lyrics, such as Ps. 136; Ex. 15:1b-18; Pss. 105 and 78 and even 135, show a progressive relaxation of the traditional pattern, yet it is not until Neh. 9:6ff that the motif of the giving of Torah at Mt. Sinai is included with the other basic elements. This does not mean that the Sinai traditions were late, however, but that they were inserted into the old canonical scheme at a relatively late stage. Indeed, the legend of Sinai

preceded and was formative of the cultic celebration, although the legend was elaborated in turn in the cultus. Pss. 50 and 81 show us how the legend was related to ritual. It was originally at home in the framework of the Feast of Booths (cf. Deut. 31:10b-11, not Ex. 19:1, which points to the Feast of Weeks), celebrated annually (!) at Shechem, not Jerusalem as Mowinckel had claimed. Actually, it was the Settlement tradition in Deut. 26:5ff which was celebrated at the Feast of Weeks in Gilgal. It was the genius of the Yahwist writer, who was a creator and not merely a collector, that he co-ordinated a "great number of detached traditions of the most diverse origin" and subordinated them to the Settlement tradition. Even the exodus tradition in Ex. 1-14, which Pedersen showed was a unit derived from the Passover ceremony, was made inferior to the tradition of the Settlement. In addition, major complexes were worked in at three other points: the interpolation of the Sinai tradition, the development of the patriarchal tradition, and the introductory addition of the pramaeval history; and in each case this new fusion was an entirely literary process

which took place only after the materials had been freed from the cultus and seriously spiritualized.

Such a brief resume can convey nothing of the detailed study which has formed the basis for his influential essay. Moreover, as von Rad pleads in a brief preface, this and the other articles should be read in the light of the progress of scholarship at the time of original publication (in this case, 1938). His arguments here about the development of the Hexateuch have been carried further and partially modified by Martin Noth in the latter's *Überlieferungsgeschichte des Pentateuch* (1948), and have been challenged by A. Weiser's student W. Beyerlin, whose counterarguments may now be read in his *Origins and History of the Oldest Sinaitic Traditions* (1961, trans. 1965).

The succeeding essays evince as great a power of theological reflection and not merely of form-critical acuity. In "There Remains Still a Rest for the People of God . . ." (1933), von Rad traces the Deuteronomic concept of "rest" through to Heb. 3:7ff. "The Tent and the Ark" (1931) concludes that these ancient religious symbols were originally separate, and that the former alone originated in the Wilderness age. "Faith Reckoned as Righteousness" (1951) traces Gen. 15:6 back to the cultic declaratory formula used by the priest in accepting the worship-

per's offering, which has now been radically spiritualized by the Elohist writer (but, one is tempted to ask, did the Hebrew term *hsbb* really have a meaning which was ever restricted to the cultus?). "The Theological Problem of the Old Testament Doctrine of Creation" (1936) finds that this doctrine is always "subordinated to the interests and content of the doctrine of redemption," a treatment which is balanced by von Rad's later consideration of the secret of creation as something the wisdom writers (Ps. 19; Job 28; Prov. 8; Ben Sira 24) knew to be hidden from man precisely because of his technological brilliance—"Some Aspects of the Old Testament World-View" (1964).

Perhaps the finest of these articles is the long one dealing with "The Beginnings of Historical Writing in Ancient Israel" (1944), which examines both the heroic sagas of Israel's ancient heroes and the so-called history of the succession to David's throne for the light they shed upon the historical mode of presentation as a new dimension of theological reflection. A companion piece lays bare the later doctrine of the prophetic word which is said to be fulfilled in history—"The Deuteronomic Theology of History in I and II Kings" (1947).

Space precludes more than mention of the remaining essays, "The Royal Ritual in Judah" (1947), "The City on the Hill" (1949; cf.

Isa. 2:2-4 and 60), "‘Righteousness’ and ‘Life’ in the Cultic Language of the Psalms" (1950), "The Levitical Sermon in *I* and *II Chronicles*" (1934), "Job XXXVIII and Ancient Egyptian Wisdom" (1955), "The Joseph Narrative and Ancient Wisdom" (1953), and finally "The Early History of the Form-Category of *I Corinthians XIII. 4-7*" (1953). This bare list may give some idea of the range of Professor von Rad's interests and influence. Even where one feels compelled to differ with his conclusions, it is thanks to his stimulation that a fresh study of the Scriptures has been undertaken, which is surely the aim of all biblical students. In view of the fact that some of von Rad's critics have charged him with a neglect of the prophets in favor of

Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomistic history-work, it is perhaps a pity that his searching essays on "The False Prophets" (1933) and "The Confessions of Jeremiah" (1936) have not been included; but in the face of such treasures as appear here such a complaint would seem churlish.

The Rev. Dr. E. W. Trueman Dicken is to be thanked for a clear and faithful translation which succeeds in retaining the forcefulness of von Rad's original. Our only regret is the increasingly frequent lament that the price will raise the volume above the hands of those who most need to read responsible, theologically oriented treatments of biblical themes. Wait for the paperback!

—Jared J. Jackson.

Shires, Henry M. *The Eschatology of Paul in the Light of Modern Scholarship*. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1966. Pp. 287. \$6.95.

The subject of eschatology continues to attract readers and publishers, and this is Westminster's third recent book in the field (cf. *Perspective*, VII.3 [September, 1966], pp. 38-40). This present volume is longer and more technical than the other books, and the title indicates the author's concern with a specific

and exacting area of the field.

Dr. Shires, who teaches at the Episcopal Theological School in Cambridge, Massachusetts, is conversant with this subject and its literature. He surveys the general outlines of Pauline eschatology and then deals in particular with more specific categories in the subject (salvation, judgment,

time, life in the Spirit, etc.). His positions are moderate, and he manifests an appreciation for the rather wide spectrum of positions which are possible in this field. He permits (wisely, in the reviewer's opinion) Paul to argue his thought with what appear to be unresolved contradictions. He shows that Paul's eschatology is woven integrally into the whole cloth of his theology and is neither determinative nor unessential.

It is a pity that an author with so much to offer in the way of judgment and competence should be allowed to come to print with so many evident faults in his book. For this reviewer, the most annoying feature of this study is the manner in which the copious annotations are employed. There are scarcely two paragraphs in sequence without a quotation. Whether or not these should mostly be relegated to the notes is, perhaps, open to question; but the way in which they are introduced is bad: they remind one repeatedly of the "Tom Swifties" of recent popularity ("Davies notes carefully"—"Higgins concludes soundly"—"Davies declares unequivocally"). Besides, the quotations themselves suffer from two weaknesses: the precise relevance for Shires' context is not

always smoothly apparent, and one is not always sure that the particular quotations will bear the apodictic use made of them.

There is a certain repetitiousness in the text which probably has some value but which sometimes gives the impression of "padding." There are several infelicitous forms of expression ("The statement of Dodd is solidly supported by the writings of Paul: ''"); and there is one egregious blunder on p. 65 where the Aramaic of "Our Lord, come!" is transliterated *maran atha*.

Professor Shires' choice of material is generally good, and there is a helpful bibliography. One is surprised, however, that he has not mentioned G. Vos' *The Pauline Eschatology*. His discussion of "wrath" in Chapter IV could well have referred to Bultmann's helpful treatment of "wrath as event" in his *Theology* I. 288ff. One also would have hoped for more exegetical study of the particular passages in Thessalonians and 1 Corinthians 15.

There is need for a good, up-to-date book on this subject. Dr. Shires' volume could be the one with a revised edition.

—J. A. Walther.

Walther, James Arthur. *New Testament Greek Workbook*. An Inductive Study of the Complete Text of the Gospel of John. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1966. Pp. xxvi + 208 + 13 "Progress Checks." \$4.50 (paper; illustrated).

The appearance of two new grammars of the language of the New Testament within a year does not necessarily imply that a rejuvenation of the biblical languages is taking place. But it does indicate that scholars and grammarians are applying new and improved methods of language instruction to the teaching of Greek which promise to make the learning process both easier and more meaningful. This is evident in *The Language of the New Testament* (New York, 1965) by Eugene Van Ness Goetchius and now in James Arthur Walther's *New Testament Greek Workbook*. Both emphasize the inductive study of grammar; both attempt to minimize rote memorization as much as possible. Both set forth exercises which utilize New Testament vocabulary and constructions and place little emphasis on translation from English to Greek.

Of the two grammars, however, Walther's is the more inductive in its approach. While a workbook accompanies Goetchius' text, Walther's grammar is a workbook. Students are introduced to the alphabet and then directly to the text of the Fourth Gospel. The new vocabulary of each biblical paragraph is listed separately.

This is followed by a grammatical and syntactical analysis of the words and phrases of the text. No paradigms as such are printed; but biblical references to chapter and verse are supplied in paradigmatic arrangement for the cases, genders, number, persons, tenses, voices and moods of the declensions and conjugations which are encountered along the way. The entire Fourth Gospel, divided into 23 units, is covered and studied in this manner; and Walther promises that "an able class may complete this workbook and read the Gospel of John in fewer than seventy class hours." Nine plates are scattered throughout presenting photographic reproductions of some of the great manuscripts and texts of the New Testament. Bound with a paper cover by a sturdy plastic ring-binder, the book is an attractive manual which reduces to a minimum the psychological shock often accompanying students' introduction to a foreign language.

The disadvantages, of course, are relative depending on the instructor's own approach to the inculcation of the biblical language. The severest limitation may be the sole use of the Fourth Gospel which, as a result, con-

fines the student to a study of the vocabulary, grammar, and syntax of that book. Furthermore, since the explanation and elucidation of grammar and syntax—apart from the biblical context—is left to the instructor, there is no way for the student to delve into the structure of Greek for himself. In this respect Goetchius' book has more to offer, for in using the terminology and techniques of linguistic analysis he is able to provide the student with a greater comprehension of the structure of the language. This might not be so vital if present-day students brought a sound knowledge of their native tongue and its structure to their study. As it is, however, English grammar must usually be taught first in order to prepare the way for an understanding of Greek.* On that

account this reviewer would prefer to employ Goetchius for the introductory grounding in the biblical language. In turn that would be followed by an exhaustive use of Walther's *Workbook*. Such an interdependent usage or the employment of one in preference to the other will be determined by the instructor's own views on teaching Greek. Nevertheless, the appearance of both grammars is to be welcomed for the new possibilities which are afforded for the instruction of Greek in the years to come. Walther is to be congratulated for his excellent *Workbook* and its contribution to a rejuvenation of the learning of New Testament Greek that will hopefully follow.

—Herman C. Waetjen

San Francisco Theological Seminary
Graduate Theological Union.

* The *Workbook* has an introductory review survey of pertinent English grammar.

—Ed.

Hyatt, J. Philip, ed. *The Bible in Modern Scholarship*. Papers Read at the 100th Meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature. Nashville: Abingdon, 1965. Pp. 400. \$7.50.

In December, 1964, nearly a thousand persons met at Union Seminary and Riverside Church in New York City for the 100th meeting of the SBL. The occasion drew many of the

world's most noted biblical scholars, and a representative group of them read papers and made responses. These proceedings were collected and edited for the present volume by the

professor of Old Testament at Vanderbilt University. During the annual meeting of the SBL in 1965—at Vanderbilt—the volume was presented to the Society and dedicated to the memory of Professor Kendrick Grobel.

While the collection reflects the differences of the contributors and not all the pieces are of even quality, it is safe to assert that the material in this book represents a fair sampling of the finest achievements of biblical scholarship two-thirds of the way through our century.

There are three OT discussions on "Method in the Study of Early Hebrew History" (de Vaux, Mendenhall, and Greenberg), "The Role of the Cult in Old Israel" (Kapelrud, Vawter, and May), and "Prophecy and Apocalyptic" (Muilenburg and Frost). There are four NT discussions: "Kerygma and History in the NT" (J. M. Robinson, Stanley, and Filson), "Pauline Research Since Schweitzer" (Munck, W. D. Davies, and Koester), "The First Christian Century" (Conzelmann and M. A. Cohen), and "Gnosticism and the NT" (Quispel, R. McL. Wilson, and

Jonas). There is a discussion of "Method in the Study of Biblical Theology" (Stendahl and Dulles) and one on "Archaeology and the Future of Biblical Studies" (Freedman and Pritchard). Finally, the papers of the American Textual Criticism Seminar are included: "NT Textual Researches Since Westcott and Hort" (papyri, by Aland; ancient versions, by Metzger; scribal corruptions, by Colwell).

It would be gratuitous to single out particular essays for mention of merit. Those who attended the original presentations will remember that Hans Jonas' response to Quispel's paper on Gnosticism was the most spirited conflict of the series. And those same auditors, who packed into crowded lecture halls, will be grateful for the opportunity to pursue at leisure the wealth of learning summarized in these pieces—and to have the material in permanent form, revised for publication, one would suppose, and supported by footnotes. And best of all, many thousands who were not privileged to hear the voices may now read the words.

Barker, William P. *Everyone in the Bible*. Westwood, N. J.: Revell, 1966. Pp. 370. \$5.95 (\$6.95 after Jan. 1, 1967).

Just two years after he published his fourth book, *As Matthew Saw the*

Master (Revell, 1964), Mr. Barker has been able to come to print with

a volume that must have taken a tremendous toll of time from his busy pastorate and Christian action. This book professes "to provide Bible readers with a concise, accurate, and readable biographical account of every person named in the Bible."

The author is aware of the problems and limitations of such an undertaking. Few persons, however, are likely to be so picayunish as to challenge the effective completeness of this list; and many Bible students will find the material useful. If everyone will not find a need for it in his

personal library, certainly it has a place in church libraries and like collections.

A sampling of the material indicates a substantial and judicious presentation of essential data, and appropriate Bible references are given. Since the meaning of names was so important to the Semitic mind, inclusion of such meanings (where reasonably certain) would have been a valuable asset.

Mr. Barker is a graduate of this seminary in the class of 1950.

Schaff, Philip. *The Creeds of Christendom*. Vol. III. The Evangelical Protestant Creeds, with Translations. Grand Rapids: Baker, 1966. Pp. vii + 966. \$12.95.

Baker's *Limited Editions Library* continues to offer reissues of many excellent old standards. While the three volumes of *The Creeds of Christendom* have been generally available, this fine reprint is particularly welcome at this time. For United Presbyterians who are studying the "Book of Confessions" this year, it is timely to have such an edi-

tion readily purchasable.

The original edition was published by Harper in 1877. The present edition has been reprinted from the last edition which contains the "Part Fourth. Recent Confessional Declarations and Terms of Corporate Church Union," including data as late as 1932. The print is clear, and the format is attractive.

Bruggink, D. J., ed. *Guilt, Grace, and Gratitude*. A Commentary on the Heidelberg Catechism Commemorating Its 400th Anniversary. New York: Half Moon Press, 1963. Pp. xi + 226. \$3.50.

Using the translation of the 400th Anniversary Edition, a group of prominent scholars from the Reformed Church in America has provided essays on the topics treated by

the Catechism *seriatim*. The book has a particular interest to those who are considering the "Book of Confessions" in the current United Presbyterian confessional study.

Walker, G.S.M. *The Growing Storm*. Sketches of Church History from A.D. 600 to A.D. 1350. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1961. Pp. 252. \$3.75.

Parker, G. H. W. *The Morning Star*. Wycliffe and the Dawn of the Reformation. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1965. Pp. 248. \$3.75.

Douglas, J. D. *Light in the North*. The Story of the Scotch Covenanters. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964. Pp. 220. \$3.75.

Orr, J. E. *The Light of the Nations*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1966. Pp. 302. \$5.00.

Volumes two, three, six, and eight of *The Advance of Christianity Through the Centuries*, edited by F. F. Bruce. Note of volume seven (then volume six)—Wood, A. S. *The Inextinguishable Blaze*. Spiritual Renewal and Advance in the 18th

Century—was carried in our June, 1961, issue.

These volumes, written by known British writers, are attractively produced, and provide a fine addition to the historical literature.

—Ed.

McCracken, Robert J. *What Is Sin? What Is Virtue?* New York: Harper & Row, 1966. Pp. 94. \$2.95.

In a day when the church is concerned with preaching a social gospel whose necessary theme is reconcilia-

tion, Robert J. McCracken, pastor of the Riverside Church in New York City, reverses the trend by focusing

his latest book on the individual. He helps the reader answer the questions "What is Sin? What is Virtue?" with regard to his own life.

One chapter is devoted to each of the seven deadly sins (pride, envy, anger, sloth, avarice, gluttony, and lust) and to each of the cardinal virtues (wisdom, justice, temperance, courage, faith, hope, and love). While each sin and virtue is dealt with in a sensitive and helpful way, it appeared to this reader that neither the author nor the gospel had much that was new or unique to contribute.

In the first half of the book, the chapter on lust is exceptional. Dr. McCracken clearly sets forth a solid theological and scriptural foundation for the relationship between the sexes. The final three chapters of the second half (faith, hope, and love) are also strong.

The description of the book on the front cover is misleading ("A personal guide to spiritual balance in the confusing age of the New Morality"). The book has nothing to say in the current discussion of the "New Morality" or situational ethics.

Rhymes, Douglas. *No New Morality—Christian Personal Values and Sexual Morality*. New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965. Pp. 146. \$3.50.

Pragmatically speaking, what the church has been teaching about sex during the last few decades has been very inadequate. The old morality has been unsatisfactory, and what has been taken for "new morality" indicates capitulation rather than constructive thinking. The author contends that the morality called for is not new but the old alluded to if not specifically taught by Jesus. The law as the Pharisee saw it was a series of flat inflexible judgments applied to all people in every circumstance. The law was to be upheld even when it caused a wedge to be driven between man and man, and man and God.

Jesus' attitude toward the woman taken in adultery did not condone her actions but it did make the laws involved subservient to the person. Douglas Rhymes, Canon of Southwark Cathedral, believes that our attitude with regard to sex is dominated by an antiquated series of rigid rules that eliminates any personal understanding of the problem involved.

Standards with regard to premarital and extra-marital sex relationships have been taught by a generation of adults that, by their example, believe that no such standards exist. Today's youth show respect only for a system of morals that

seems to work. Present systems are shallow and phoney and are, hence, disregarded.

Jesus relied upon a deep understanding of the law of love, which had to be applied in an existential way. The author spells out Christ's approach as leading young people into a deeply "profound knowledge of themselves; of helping them to a responsible and creative attitude towards life and people; of encouraging the right kind of revolt against conventionality, and of seeing them in the situation in which they are placed."

While this approach seems not so revolutionary, it does call for the church to rethink its position with regard to "assumed standards." If Christ was able to forgive the woman taken in adultery, must the church be inflexible under *all* circumstances in

every case of pre-marital or post-marital sex?

Is there a better approach to the problems of the homosexual than blanket condemnation and veritable exclusion from the human race? How can the church exhibit more love and concern for the divorcee, or what is more important, the potential divorcee?

Love was the supreme law for Christ. Canon Rhymes calls for the church to begin to take it seriously.

The book has a very definite British flavor. This is reflected in both the language and the statistics. But it is, none the less, quite readable, a sane approach to a difficult problem, and recommended reading for any who have responsibility for counseling young people.

—Charles C. W. Idler.

TWO FOR THE MONEY ON SEX

I sometimes feel that potential writers of sex books ought to be fed some sort of contraceptive pill so that we could limit the literary explosion in this field. Of all the books that have come across my desk this past year only two deserve any serious attention. One I even assigned to

the wastebasket—it was a bald attempt to disguise in atomic clothing a return to the Victorian you-should-not-even-kiss-a-girl-before-you-are-engaged mentality. Just three years of counseling college students was enough to convince me that more harm is done by those within the

church who can not or will not come to see the new world and the new generation that inhabits it than by all the pills that could be dispensed to teen-agers and college students.

Richard F. Hettlinger, Chaplain and Professor of Religion at Kenyon College, Ohio, has done a masterful job of cutting away the myth approach to sexual life in his book *Living with Sex: The Student's Dilemma*, (Seabury Press, 1966, \$4.50). While this book is primarily addressed to men it should be read by women who want to try to understand what makes men so seemingly inconsistent in their sexual approach. The chapter entitled "The Girl's Point of View" is, according to my wife, the best treatment she has seen on this phase of the whole subject. Dr. Mary Calderone's quote forms the real summary here saying, "The girl plays at sex, for which she is not ready, because fundamentally what she wants is love; and the boy plays at love, for which he is not ready, because what he wants is sex."

The "Playboy Philosophy" is dealt with critically and dismissed as inadequate; "it falls into precisely the same error as the traditional religious mores, which it castigates so vigorously: it denies the contemporary psychological understanding of the depths of sexuality in the human person." The position of the church, both traditionally and in our day, is candidly discussed and found want-

ing of any compelling direction for today's youth. Misunderstanding Jesus' acceptance of the wholeness of life, the church historically has succeeded in giving the impression that sex is a regrettable necessity and the sexual sin is the worst of all. "Why is it that the word 'immoral' immediately implies sexual deviation, never unfair business practice or the exploitation of labor?" he asks. Further, the church presents a confused and conflicting view of sex to the mind of the young and the outsider. It has accepted the idea of "romantic love" (belatedly) but has not faced the fact that "you cannot welcome sexual pleasure between married adults and still condemn it wholesale between unmarried adolescents." The studies of Kinsey and his associates is respectfully evaluated and used throughout the book. Hettlinger is careful to caution its use in most all respects but states, "his initial reports will rank with Karl Marx's *Das Kapital*, Darwin's *Origin of Species*, and Adam Smith's *The Wealth of Nations* in their influence on history. But, unfortunately, the influence of the reports is largely vitiated by the wide-spread disregard of the author's warnings of the limitations inherent in this kind of study."

Particularly helpful to young men are two well done chapters on masturbation, "Sex—All Alone," and homosexuality, "Sex—All Male." In both instances the ground is cleared

of popular misconceptions and the source of confused attitudes on these subjects is traced and dealt with. The superstitious reverence for semen, the supposed physical and mental effects and the general position of the church in the matter of masturbation are sharply exposed as the grounds for present unhealthy attitudes. "If masturbation were accepted as a natural phenomenon of adolescence, no more reprehensible than wet dreams or the onset of menstruation in girls, it would never play a significant part in most men's lives. To condemn it as wicked and sinful is as stupid as to punish a baby for crying when it is hungry or a child for climbing trees. It is symptomatic of a healthy desire for sexual experience and of normal adolescent virility."

Concerning homosexuality, Professor Hettlinger believes that ignorance, superstition, and prejudice must be cleared away before there is opportunity to help those caught in this problem. In one brief paragraph he sets the tone of the chapter: "First, nobody in his senses will accept a homosexual way of life if he can avoid it. Second, a large number of men who are not fundamentally or even exceptionally homosexual in their orientation have adult homosexual experiences. Third, no one within the normal student age range has reason to conclude that his homosexual urges, however strong, are

either basic or permanent." His effort is not to get the church to abandon its position entirely, but to witness to the inadequacy and imperfection of the homosexual condition and call upon its members to abstain from the satisfaction of physical needs through the purely promiscuous use of other human persons. At the same time, there must be a welcoming of such persons to the fellowship of the church and, in light of modern knowledge, a reexamination of the traditional dismissal of all homosexual relationships as intrinsically evil.

This book is refreshing in that it does not attempt to steer clear of the language that is current to the college student. It may offend some pious ears but students know exactly what he means when he discusses in blunt, frank, and contemporary language the sexual feelings of both men and women. Situational ethics underlies the handling of the problem of pre-marital intercourse, petting, and all the other tricky, yet urgent, problems faced by youth.

Hettlinger's conclusion is worth quoting:

The Christian Church, by its very nature, has an obligation to proclaim the supremacy of love as revealed in Jesus Christ. By its teaching it must challenge the individual to preserve the final intimacy of intercourse for the final commitment of marriage. It must remind men of the complexity of sexual relationships and warn them of the consequences of selfish private indulgence. But it should affirm these stand-

ards without denying the freedom necessary for individual judgment and occasional nonconformity. Without compromising on the principle that intercourse should be the expression and seal of the commitment of marriage, the church must make it clear that not all failures to attain the ideal are equally reprehensible. It must reassure the young couple that a decision to compromise with the ideal, because of the realities of twentieth-century life, when honestly and sincerely arrived at, does not cut them off from God's love and grace. It must face the fact that occasionally love requires actions that are outwardly in conflict with what love normally seeks to do. It has to discover some way of upholding ideals without turning them into rigid law.

Teen-Agers and Sex: A Guide for Parents, by James A. Pike (Prentice-Hall, 1965, \$3.95), is the second of the acceptable books I have seen this year. As the subtitle implies, this book is designed for parents—not for the youth themselves. The author's main thesis is: "Without denigrating the role of school and church programs of sex instruction or of books about 'the facts of life' for children or teen-agers, I am convinced that there is no substitute for direct parental involvement in this important aspect of the nurture of children." Let me quarrel with Pike right at this point by saying that while I agree that the ideal way of sex instruction is by a constant conversation throughout the years between parents and children, it has been my experience, especially with church people, that there is far too much

prudishness built into our adults to allow this to be accepted as a universal. I am not sure but what a better conversation about sex can take place between a young person and some 'outsider' where fears and embarrassments do not present such formidable roadblocks. Be this as it may, the author does a good job in the opening chapters of setting up the subject, discussing succinctly the two current approaches to morality, traditional and 'new,' the conflicting currents present in today's society, and the questioning of absolutes that is a part of situation ethics.

From this point on, the book attempts to set forth a flexible schedule of when and how to talk about the various stages of sexual development. In each of the three 'Phases' (ages 4-7, 10-12, early high school) both underlying moral theories are brought to bear on specific problems. Pike feels the choice as to whether to promote one or the other should be the parents', not the author's. I am sure he will be criticized for this attempt, but it seems rather helpful in that it at least presents carefully all the dangers inherent in the traditional view and cautions parents who feel that they must hold this view in this new age to present it in such a way that their children will appreciate it as having worked for the parents and should, therefore, be seriously considered and not just dismissed as archaic.

There are some excellent case histories worked into the text and some sage advice about how to break an existing relationship that has "lost its love." The chapter entitled "Alcohol and Sex" is the only one I have seen

like it in any kind of sex book. Too often the connection between these two subjects is not considered.

A good, up-to-date bibliography is a valuable part of both these books.

—William R. Phillippe.

Muirhead, Ian A. *Education in the New Testament*. (2. Monographs in Christian Education.) New York: Association Press, 1965. Pp. 94. \$2.50 (paper).

The thesis of this monograph is that, although the New Testament was written over a number of years, the Church, from the beginning to the end of this period, held a basically uniform view of Christian education—a view which gave to teaching an indispensable position in the life of the Christian community. According to the author, there is no Biblical justification for subordinating teaching to preaching. "Whatever was the product of preaching, it was not an end-product"; rather, the end-product resulted from the *didache*, entrusted

to the Church by the Holy Spirit, which taught Christians to walk worthy of their high calling in Christ Jesus.

This book is an expanded version of a paper which Mr. Muirhead contributed to the Church of Scotland Special Committee on Religious Education. The expansion presents a good case for the theological importance of an area of ministry that can easily be (and often has been) undervalued.

—David Blaine Cable, '67.

Other *Monographs in Christian Education*, edited by C. Ellis Nelson, and published by Association Press at \$2.50 each (paper), are:

1. *Protestant Strategies in Education* by Robert W. Lynn (1964; pp. 96).
3. *Learning in Theological Perspective* by Charles R. Stinnette, Jr. (1965; pp. 96).
4. *The Shaping of Protestant Education. An Interpretation of the Sunday School and the Development of Protestant Educational Strategy in the United States, 1789-1860* by William Bean Kennedy (1966; pp. 93).

John Knox Press (Richmond, Va.) this year began to issue a series of little paperbacks on *Makers of Contemporary Theology*, edited by D. E. Nineham and E. H. Robertson (\$1.00 each; also published in a British edition). Thus far, four have appeared:

Paul Tillich by J. Heywood Thomas (pp. 48).

Rudolf Bultmann by Ian Henderson (pp. 47).

Dietrich Bonhoeffer by E. H. Robertson (pp. 54).

Teilhard de Chardin by Bernard Towers (pp. 45).

MacLennan, David A. *Revell's Minister's Annual* 1967. Westwood, N. J.: Revell, 1966. Pp. 380. \$3.95.

In *Perspective* for March, 1965 (VI.1.39) Dr. MacLennan's first *Annual* was reviewed. Since then he was a guest of the Seminary when he preached at the Fall Communion Service, September, 1966 (see this issue, pp. 17ff).

Ordinarily, one would hope that each minister would do his own

"homework." But we repeat our judgment that if one is going to use such aids or thought-starters, this book is recommended. Again we suggest that Dr. MacLennan's prayers are particularly helpful, and we add that many leaders of worship could profit from observing his careful choice of hymns.


Manson, Wm. *The Way of the Cross*. Richmond: John Knox Press, 1964. Pp. 91. \$1.00 (a Chime Paperback).

"Five studies based on Holy Week addresses on the form structure of the Christian life," with a biographical note by James Stewart. Each study relates to a text or pericope and is concluded with an apposite prayer.

Here is a meaty little book which is recommended for Lenten study. It is both theological and devotional, a combination not always easy to come by. Both reader and preacher will be edified by Dr. Manson's studies.








Pittsburgh Perspective

MARCH, 1967

Volume VIII

Number 1



PITTSBURGH THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

PITTSBURGH PERSPECTIVE

Volume VIII

MARCH, 1967

Number 1

Published four times yearly in March, June, September and December, by the Pittsburgh Theological Seminary, 616 North Highland Avenue, Pittsburgh, Pa. 15206, one of the seven seminaries of the United Presbyterian Church in the U. S. A. Second-class postage paid at Pittsburgh, Pa. Changes of address should be sent to the Seminary, care of the Director of the Mailing Department.

Editor: James Arthur Walther, Th.D.

Publications Committees

Faculty

Peter Fribley
Lynn B. Hinds, Chmn.
J. A. Walther

Student

Robert H. McClure, Jr.

J. Rowe Hinsey, *ex. off.*
William R. Atkins, *ex. off.*
William R. Phillippe, *ex. off.*

Circulation: William W. Hill

Secretarial Assistant: Mrs. Elizabeth Eakin

Contents

<i>Ad Hoc</i>	2
<i>Preaching and the Law</i>	3
by Donald G. Miller	
<i>Book Reviews and Notes</i>	
<i>Kelso, Archaeology and our O.T. Contemporaries</i>	24
William F. Albright	
<i>Pfeiffer, The Biblical World</i>	24
Howard M. Jamieson, Jr.	
<i>Porteous, Daniel: A Commentary</i>	25
Donald E. Gowan	
<i>Kraus, Worship in Israel</i>	26
H. Eberhard von Waldow	
<i>Fromm, You Shall Be As Gods</i>	29
Donald E. Gowan	
<i>Foakes Jackson, The Beginnings of Christianity</i>	33
<i>Hennecke, New Testament Apocrypha</i>	34
<i>Smith, Young People's Bible Dictionary</i>	35
<i>Stuber, The Illustrated Bible and Church Handbook</i>	35
J. A. Walther	
<i>Packer, God Speaks to Man</i>	36
Howard Eshbaugh	
<i>Thielicke, Between Heaven and Earth</i>	36
<i>Bruce, No Empty Creed</i>	37
Jay C. Rochelle	
<i>Brill, The Creative Edge of American Protestantism</i>	38
Charles C. W. Idler	
<i>Books Received</i>	39
<i>Sonnet for Spring</i>	<i>inside back cover</i>
by Rowe Hinsey	

Ad Hoc

THE PRINCIPAL ARTICLE in this issue is from the President's desk. It is his contribution to *New Testament Studies in Honor of Raymond T. Stamm*, a book being edited by Jacob Myers, Professor of Old Testament at the Lutheran Theological Seminary at Gettysburg, Pa. Professor Stamm was a long-time teacher at the Gettysburg school, and Dr. Myers was a guest professor on our campus in the fall of 1965. We hope to review the entire volume when it is published.

WE INVITE YOUR ATTENTION to the Book Reviews, among which three important contributions in Old Testament and Archaeology appear. In our review columns we try to do three things: (i) to bring you notice of books that we think merit your further study; (ii) to assess books which you are likely to see because of special publicity; and (iii) to give our reviewers an opportunity to present comments which may be prompted by current publications. Our coverage is not in any way complete, and doubtless it is sometimes too selective. We want our journal to be useful to our readers, and we welcome constructive criticism.


WE MAKE NO APOLOGY for the rather large number of book reviews which have appeared in our recent issues. The publications explosion is a situation with which we and our readers must live. Among the new books are good, bad, and indifferent works; and each of us has time for only a small percentage of the total. If we help our readers expend their efforts on the best books, we think that we are serving our theological task in one more way.

—J. A. W.

Preaching and the Law

by DONALD G. MILLER

THERE HAS DEVELOPED in our time a Christianity without command or prohibition. This is nothing new. John Wesley described a form of Christianity which he encountered in the eighteenth century as one "where nothing good is commanded, and nothing bad is forbid."¹ A century before that a similar form of faith was advocated in New England in which "no Christian must be pressed to duties of holiness," nor "exhorted to faith, love, and prayer."² Behind this lay a number of movements, mostly springing from the medieval Brethren of the Free Spirit, who advocated a view of Augustine's but without Augustine's wholeness: "have charity and do what thou pleasest."³ The roots of these may be traced clear back to the first century, where Peter had to deal with men who were using Christian freedom "to provide a screen for wrongdoing,"⁴ and Paul had to repudiate those who were



using Christian freedom as "license for [their] lower nature."⁵

If there is any difference between this outlook today and that of earlier times, it is the basis on which it rests.

¹*The Journal of John Wesley* (New York: Eaton & Mains, 1909-16), Standard Edition, Volume II, p. 498.

²*The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge* (New York and London: Funk & Wagnalls Company, 1908), p. 201.

³*Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, edited by James Hastings (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1910), Volume II, p. 842.

⁴1 Peter 2:16, New English Bible (NEB).

⁵Galatians 5:13, NEB.

The former aberrations usually rested either on gnostic dualism, the philosophical view of the unreality of the material world, or on mysticism, positing a mystical union with Christ which raised the believer above moral involvement. The present outlook rests on premises which claim the sanction of the so-called "man-sciences" and reflects certain tendencies characteristic of the mood of our time.

Modern permissiveness has been baptized by theology. A ten-minute leafing through one book on the work of the ministry yields the following adjectives to describe the ideal minister: "permissive," "genial," "non-judgmental," "nondirective," "without censure," "tolerant," "nondogmatic." So far as I am aware, these terms have not developed either out of biblical or systematic theology, but have come into the theological stream from the secular disciplines. After these concepts have been theologically baptized, their proponents then seek to give them the sanction of Jesus, although they are almost of necessity Marcionites as to the Old Testament, and they usually have difficulty in knowing what to do with Paul.

The end result has been the almost total eclipse of the law either in preaching or in pastoral work. The preacher is, therefore, confronted anew with the age-old problem of

the relationship of the law to the gospel and with the question of what place the law has in preaching. No easy answer to these issues is to be found, but the search must be made; for to ignore them is really an answer—and that answer could be wrong.

In facing this issue, three alternatives seem to present themselves. The first is to preach the law without the gospel, or what is perhaps worse, to reduce the gospel to law and preach law as though it were gospel, transforming "good news" into a demand. This is legalism. The second is to preach the gospel without the law, as though the preaching of the gospel could be separated from the preaching of the law by making them separate and distinct entities, as though the gospel has abrogated the law and made it irrelevant, thus making the gospel an offer without demand. This is libertinism. The third alternative is to hear the gospel in the law and to derive the law from the gospel, thus making God's offer a demand, and His demand an offer.

LAW WITHOUT GOSPEL

LET US LOOK FIRST at the preaching of the law apart from the gospel. One of the temptations to which the church often succumbs is to transform the gospel into a legalism. This is one aspect of the expression of the "natural man" to which we easily fall

prey. Man is a born legalist. Legalism is well defined by Webster as "Strictness . . . in conforming to . . . a code of deeds and observances *as a means of justification*."⁶ The last words in this definition should be underscored. Legalism is not, as many think, strictness of life, methodical self-discipline, adherence to rules and regulations and precise habits of behavior. It is only when these are done *as a means of justification* that they become legalism.

It is important to keep this in mind, because it is broadly assumed today that anyone who keeps the law, or plays by the rules, is a legalist. The commuter who takes the train at 7:25 every morning merely because that is when the train goes and he wants to keep his job by being at his office on time, is not thereby a legalist. He is a legalist only if he becomes sinfully proud of his achievement and credits himself with moral merit before God, thinking that by prompt regularity in commuting he has contributed to his escape from eternal death. The farmer who milks his cows regularly, without missing a single day in thirty years, because his cows would get sick otherwise, and because he needs the milk besides, is not necessarily a legalist. It is only when he "hopes for heaven thereby" that he becomes such. The driver

who obeys the speed limits because he believes them to be regulatory of traffic in a way which will preserve the life and limb of himself and fellow motorists, is not a legalist. He becomes such only as he allows his law-abiding behavior to foster unworthy pride and make him forget that he "deserves no credit" and has "only done [his] duty." Legalism is involved in behavior only when it becomes the means of self-justification, leading to the Pharisaic thankfulness that we are "not as other men," and making impossible for us the prayer: "God, be merciful to me, a sinner."

The idea, therefore, that he who keeps the law is necessarily a legalist should be discarded, along with the twin idea that the only way to avoid legalism is to sit loose to the claims of the law. One does not need to become criminal to confirm himself in the doctrine of justification by faith!

John Wesley tells in his *Journal* of one who fell into the false conception of legalism. "One whom you know," he writes, "was remarkably exact in keeping his word. He is now [after avoiding works to keep from trusting in them] as remarkable for breaking it; being infinitely more afraid of a *legal* than of a *living* spirit! more jealous of the works of the law than of the works of the devil! He was cutting off every possible expense in

⁶New International Dictionary of the English Language, Second edition, unabridged (Springfield, Mass: Merriam Company, 1935).

order to do justice to all men; he *is* now expending large sums in mere superfluities. He was merciful after his power, if not beyond his power:

*Listening attentive to the wretch's cry,
The groan low-murmured, and the whispered sigh.*

But the bowels of his compassion are now shut up; . . . to prove his *faith*, he lets the poor brother starve, for whom Christ died!"⁷ It is a false understanding of legalism which prompts men to "persist in sin, so that there may be all the more grace."⁸

Although we must question the view that an honest effort to keep the law is in itself legalism, we must yet remind ourselves that, as both the Old and the New Testaments bear witness, legalism *is* one of the mortal enemies of genuine faith. It is native to man to endeavor to keep the law in self-justification before the bar of God, to secure a righteousness of his own, to put God in his debt, to demand salvation from Him for the price of obedience.

This results in pharisaism, either of the type which our Lord branded as "hypocrisy," or the type exempli-

fied by Paul in his despair. It becomes hypocrisy in that it claims to fulfill God's demand by paring it down to the limits of our achievement. It fosters what John Bright has called "a very small righteousness" by which "we become good too easily."⁹ If we avoid robbery, rape, adultery, and murder, we content ourselves with the illusion that we have fulfilled our duty to God. Or by keeping rules and regulations and by observing stated forms of religious observance we feel that we have achieved what will please the Almighty. In fact, the regulations may even be observed to enable us to escape our duty with a clear conscious. We cry "Corban" all too easily, and by our tradition "make God's word null and void."¹⁰ By appealing literally to irrelevant ancient forms of the law, it is possible in the name of the law to justify ourselves in outrageous indifference to human need or even in heinous exploitation of our brothers.

But an even worse hypocrisy arises out of the simulation of a true relationship to God based on our good works. We were made for sonship, wherein good works would be done spontaneously as the expression of our filial relation to God. But our

⁷*Op. cit.*, Volume III, p. 506,

⁸Romans 6:1, NEB.

⁹*The Kingdom of God* (New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1953), p. 262.

¹⁰Mark 7:12f, NEB.

pride and self-will turn our efforts into self-conscious means of ingratiating ourselves with God, and thus become self-defeating. In fact, our very success in keeping regulations fosters pride of achievement and a meritorious claim on God which falsify our sonship and turn us into moral day-laborers for wages. Success in moral endeavor can actually alienate us from our Father. It can make us elder brothers who do not know what home is, nor what is our true relationship to our Father. "You know how I have slaved for you all these years," cried out the angry, self-righteous older brother; "I never once disobeyed your orders; and you never gave me so much as a kid, for a feast with my friends. But now that this son of yours turns up, after running through your money with his women, you kill the fatted calf for him."¹¹ He thought sonship was based on wages; and when the father's love was lavished on one who had not earned it, he pouted and "refused to go in." His very success in obedience had vitiated the meaning of sonship for him and distorted his true relation to his father. Such is the deceptive paradox of legalism. We dare not, therefore, preach law without gospel.

We must avoid preaching which even suggests that if one abandons

certain grosser forms of evil and indulges in certain acts of religious worship, he has thereby earned the divine favor. We dare not, when people ask what they must do to inherit eternal life, answer: "You know the commandments." "These do, and thou shalt live." For they may then rest in the easy answer, "All these I have observed from my youth," and mistakenly conclude: "I am rich, I have prospered, and I need nothing," not knowing that they are "wretched, pitiable, poor, blind, and naked."¹²

If legalism does not, however, thus rob men of their sincerity, it will, on the other hand, land them with Paul in despair. Even to hint at the hope that by keeping the law one may be set in right relation to God is to challenge a sincere man to heroic effort. But in spite of his effort, failure is bound to come. The more sincere he is, the more his failure will plague him with guilt. In order to overcome the guilt and to avoid its damaging accusations in the future, the harder he will try, the more severely he will discipline himself. This more strenuous effort will, in turn, make the next failure the more unbearable and plunge him the deeper into distress. And so the vicious cycle plays itself out—effort, failure, guilt; harder effort, further failure, deeper guilt;

¹¹Luke 15:29f, NEB.

¹²Luke 18:20f., 10:28; Revelation 3:17.

still more strenuous effort, more tragic failure, more damaging guilt. As Bishop Nygren has pointed out in his commentary on Romans, the problem is not one of a divided will, but of the inability of the will to achieve what it wills.¹³ During Paul's days under the law, his will was always united and always on God's side. But he found out what every sincere man who tries by his own efforts to keep the law finally discovers: "I can will what is right, but I cannot do it: For I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want is what I do." There is civil war within, a "schism in the soul." Struggle though one will to free himself, he is made "captive to the law of sin which dwells" within him.¹⁴ John Dow pictures the struggle thus: The Pharisee "had seen before him a long, long toiling in rowing, stroke following stroke in painful inch-by-inch progress against wind and tide; he was to reach his destination only through incessant effort. Paul had found that kind of voyage a nightmare. The human craft was leaky and fragile, and the rocks and shoals beyond his power to negotiate. He saw certain shipwreck though he

rowed with all the fury of a desperate man. No one could reach harbor by his own efforts."¹⁵ Try as he would to gain the shore, the force of the tide was too strong for him. He strove

*. . . like to the vessel in the tideway
Which lacking favouring breeze hath
not the power
To stem the powerful current. . . .¹⁶*

Despair lies at the end of the path of legalism for a sincere man. As a car stuck in the mud sinks the deeper the more the motor is gunned, so the predicament of a morally honest man becomes worse the more he tries to extricate himself. The outcome of his sternest effort is: "Wretched man that I am!"¹⁷

Surely our preaching ought not to leave men in despair. It must be something other than moralism. We must not stand on the shore shouting encouragement in a high voice to men whose very effort to which we urge them is doomed from the start. It may be that such preaching is prelude to the gospel. It may be necessary at times to drive men to despair before they can really hear the "good

¹³ Anders Nygren, *Commentary on Romans* (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1949), pp. 290f.

¹⁴ Romans 7:18f, 23.

¹⁵ "Conviction and Action," *Interpretation*, October, 1953, p. 394.

¹⁶ Quoted in David Smith, *Disciples' Commentary on the New Testament* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1928), p. 399.

¹⁷ Romans 7:24.

news." James Denny once remarked that not intellectual acumen but despair was necessary to understand Paul. So despair may be the abyss from which the gospel may be truly heard, and the preaching of the law may in some instances drive men to the depths from which they may hear God's word of grace. But despair is no virtue in itself. And preaching which drives sincere men into the abyss of moral defeat without the accompanying note of God's "good news" of victory in Christ is law without gospel and a betrayal of our calling.

GOSPEL WITHOUT LAW

AS WAS INDICATED at the beginning, however, a likely greater danger in our time is the preaching of gospel without law, as though the law were abrogated rather than fulfilled in Christ and no longer has any relevance. Such preaching not only tells men, "God loves you just as you are," but strongly implies, "God doesn't much care that you are what you are." This presents God as an indulgent rather than a *holy* Father, and sponsors a "cheap" grace with no judgment in it. As H. H. Rowley has put it: "In our age the thought of the Judgment has receded far into the background, and there is a widespread idea that what we do with our

lives is of little moment. . . . We set love and justice over against one another, and imagine that a God of love can have no use for justice, and therefore there can be no Judgment."¹⁸ This ends in a libertinism which is often amoral and sometimes positively immoral, a conscienceless Christianity with no ethical dynamic. It is natural to expect always a certain number of downright hypocrites in the church, whose lives make no effort to embody their profession and whose outward loyalty to the church is consciously intended to cloak their unrighteousness with respectability. The problem in our time, however, is rather that the law has been so silenced that men mix the faith and the world without any seeming consciousness of hypocrisy. The contiguity of religious and irreligious programs on television is a case in point. One sees and hears an eloquent plea to attend church and foster spiritual values; then a split second later, without changing the dial, he hears an equally eloquent plea to find the real meaning of life in some rather gross form of worldliness, or sees downright sordidness presented so appealingly and repetitiously that in the subconscious mind, at least, these become naturally associated as though they quite inevitably belong together. Movie stars grow rich by the exploitation of their bodies in

¹⁸The Relevance of Apocalyptic (London: Lutterworth Press, 1944), p. 165.

obscene suggestiveness, business men increase profits by systematic evasion of the law, students cheat their way through examinations, citizens lie their way out of income tax obligations through fabricated expense accounts or unreported income, civic authorities flaunt the law and avoid enforcing it for a bribe or a vote, young and old engage in drunken debauchery and sexual irregularities—and move without conscience from all this to the worship of God as though such things were in no sense incompatible with it. And one suspects that in many cases this is not the result of conscious hypocrisy, but rather that people have been fed a gospel which avoids all judgment and awakens no conscience in them. They seriously believe that Christian freedom means life without discipline and no control on indulgences. We preachers have given them the impression that, as Dr. Gossip put it, "they do not need to worry overmuch, since, happily, God is an amiable Being who does not really bother about our bits of sins, but whatever he may have said, will let us off, and pass us through."¹⁹

John Wesley gives a vivid example of this view of things in a recorded conversation with a Christian libertine of his day. "Do you believe you

have nothing to do with the law of God?" Wesley asked. "I have not," came the answer. "I am not under the law: I live by faith." "Have you, as living by faith, a right to everything in the world?" "I have; all is mine, since Christ is mine." "May you, then, take anything you will anywhere? Suppose out of a shop, without the consent or knowledge of the owner?" "I may, if I want it; for it is mine. Only I will not give offence." "Have you also a right to all the women in the world?" "Yes, if they consent." "And is not that a sin?" "Yes, to him that thinks it is a sin; but not to those whose *hearts are free*."²⁰

This, too, is as old as the first century. An accredited member of the church in Corinth engaged in "immorality such as even pagans do not tolerate: the union of a man with his father's wife."²¹ This was no secret affair which had inadvertently come to light. It was done openly with the approval, at least, of those of the "Christ" party in the church who argued: "We are free to do anything."²² This was, therefore, momentarily an approved form of Christianity in Corinth. It was a triumphant claim to freedom from tradition, custom, and law on the basis that freedom in Christ sanctifies any form of behaviour, that grace hal-

¹⁹"The Whole Counsel of God," *Interpretation*, July, 1947, p. 328.

²⁰*Op. cit.*, pp. 237f.

²¹1 Corinthians 5:1, NEB.

²²1 Corinthians 10:23, NEB.

lows any breach of moral integrity. And how contemporary it sounds! It was gospel without law. It was the old rock on which ancient Israel was broken — covenant without conditions, deliverance without demand, redemption without responsibility, sonship without obedience, faith without commitment, belief that does not influence behavior.

Both Old and New Testament pronounce this a perversion of the faith. The Old Covenant *was* a covenant of sheer grace. God acted graciously in Israel's behalf on his own initiative when they deserved it not one whit. But for this very reason, the covenant laid heavy demands on Israel. John Bright has well said: "Israel could never properly take her status as a chosen people for granted; it was morally conditioned. . . . The covenant bond . . . was . . . neither mechanical nor eternal. While it could not be called a bargain—it was not between equals—it nevertheless partook of the nature of a bargain in that it was a bilateral compact. God would give Israel a destiny as his people, would defend and establish her, but only so long as she obeyed him. The covenant . . . demanded . . . a grateful and complete loyalty to the God of the covenant to the exclusion

of all other gods. Equally, it demanded strict obedience to the laws of the covenant in all human relationships within the covenant brotherhood."²³ God's covenant demanded the response which Israel agreed to at Sinai: "All that the Lord has spoken we will do, and we will be obedient."²⁴ And when Israel refused this promised obedience, God had to say, sorrowfully but frankly: "You are not my people and I am not your God."²⁵

For the New Testament judgment on the failure of moral response to God's grace, it is sufficient to look at Paul's handling of the incestuous member of the Corinthian Church: "This man is to be consigned to Satan for the destruction of the body, so that his spirit may be saved on the Day of the Lord."²⁶ Adolf Schlatter suggests that Paul intended physical death to the man, through which judgment he hoped that he would be led to penitence and final redemption.²⁷ Lest we think Paul too severe in this, let us remember Jesus' words about the wicked servant whose Lord graciously forgave him an immense debt, but who did not respond to this in his behavior toward others. Said Jesus: "In anger his lord delivered him to the jailers;" and then He

²³Op. cit., p. 29.

²⁴Exodus 24:7.

²⁵Hosea 1:9.

²⁶1 Corinthians 5:5.

²⁷Cf. *The Church in the New Testament Period* (London: S.P.C.K., 1955), p. 184.

added this terrible judgment to those who acted likewise: "So also my heavenly father will do to every one of you."²⁸ Neither Old nor New Testament knows anything of gospel without law. Floyd Filson has reminded us: "Pagan cults never equaled the moral seriousness which emerges in the prophetic demand of the Old Testament and finds deepened echo in the New Testament. Here faith and daily living are tied together in one united witness to God; the whole life is to be an act of obedience to God."²⁹

To miss this note in the Bible is to read it with one eye shut, for every exhortation to moral behavior and ethical living—and the Bible is full of them—must be overlooked. Obviously, the libertines in first-century Corinth and in twentieth-century Protestantism could not claim Paul as their colleague. Even though Paul was the great champion of Christian freedom, when freedom was turned into license Paul had to be disowned and his ethical teaching abandoned. Nor could James or Peter be brought in as witnesses to sanction freedom from the ethical demands of the law. Since apostolic authority was taken seriously in the early church, some

semblance of apostolic sanction must surely have been sought by the Corinthian libertines. Schlatter suggests that there are "points of contact between St. John's presentation of the Gospel and the 'new theology' of the Christ party at Corinth."³⁰ John was the apostle of light and love, who contrasted the "grace and truth" which came through Jesus Christ with the law "given through Moses."³¹ From John, therefore, "it was but a small step to the Corinthian Gospel with the triumphant vitality and unrestricted freedom of the Christ party."³² But as Schlatter points out, "This step had been taken when only the positive side of the Johannine Gospel was appropriated, and the negative side, which is just as serious, was ignored. St. John taught that the light drives out the darkness, truth kills falsehood, and love destroys hatred. This antithesis, so essential to Johannine teaching, was missing in the Corinthian theology."³³ It is safe to say that no biblical witness, when taken in its wholeness, can be summoned to support gospel without law.

Law is necessary not only to regulate the disintegrating forces in secular society, to set limits to the overt

²⁸Matthew 18:24f.

²⁹*Jesus Christ the Risen Lord* (New York: Abingdon Press, 1956), p. 178.

³⁰*Op. cit.*, p. 186.

³¹John 1:17.

³²Schlatter, *op. cit.*, p. 187.

³³*Ibid.*

expression of evil in the natural order without which chaos would ensue, but is necessary for the Christian who has been set free in Christ. And that for several reasons.

For one thing, the law is necessary to sit in judgment on that part of us which is not yet Christian—to judge the "old man" whom we must reckon to be dead, but who is still very much alive and kicking. As Luther insisted, the Christian man is saint and sinner at the same time. And the law exists to take the measure of the "old Adam," who no longer reigns within us but works surreptitiously in the underground and must be ferreted out from every secret corner of our lives. As Melancthon put it, "The law indicates the sickness" from which we need the healing of the gospel at every moment.³⁴ Luther adds: "We are to fast, pray, labor, to subdue and suppress lust. . . . While flesh and blood continue, so long sin remains; wherefore it is ever to be struggled against. Whoever has not learned this by his own experience, must not boast that he is a Christian."³⁵ A modern theologian, Emil Brunner, sums it up well when he writes: "True as it is that as a be-

liever the Christian is no longer under the law, as a sinner he continually comes under it. . . . In so far . . . as sin—in the Christian—is concerned, the law remains operative; for sin must die, it must be judged and condemned, even and particularly, where one stands in faith, in the new life. For that very reason Luther insists, in his campaign against the Anti-nomians, that the law must remain, not merely for 'blockheads' but also for believers, in order that they should not fall into a false security."³⁶ Wilhelm Anderson has used the apt figure of the function of a dog's leash to express this: Insofar as a dog on leash obeys his master's order to "heel," the leash is irrelevant. But when he begins to stray, the leash tightens and calls attention to his tendency to stray.³⁷ So the law, although irrelevant to the "new man in Christ" within us is still necessary to curb the "old man" within us which struggles against the Lordship of Christ.

The law is further necessary for the Christian to interpret Christian freedom as Christian obedience. Freedom does not mean escape from duty; it means that one is *free to do*

³⁴Quoted by Norman F. Langford, "Gospel and Duty," *Interpretation*, July, 1951, from Melancthon's *Loci Communes*.

³⁵Quoted by Hugh Thomson Kerr, Jr., in *A Compend of Luther's Theology* (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1943), p. 114, from Luther's *Commentary on Peter and Jude*.

³⁶Man in Revolt (London: Lutterworth Press, 1939), p. 525.

³⁷Law and Gospel (New York: Association Press, 1961), p. 32.

his duty, and to find therein his true freedom and joy. Augustine put it: "The law is given that grace may be sought; grace is given that the law may be fulfilled."³⁸ Or as George Richards said: "The gift of grace becomes the task of life." "For the believer faith is obedience just as obedience is real only when it is faith."³⁹ But perhaps the strongest statement of this is by Paul: "You who were once slaves of sin have become obedient from the heart to the standard of teaching to which you were committed, and, having been set free from sin, have become slaves of righteousness . . . slaves of God."⁴⁰ Christian freedom, then, is nothing other than a new bondage—one exchanges his slavery to sin for slavery to righteousness. Paul's highest boast was that he was "a slave of Jesus Christ."⁴¹ He found his freedom in servitude to his redeemer. George Matheson caught this insight of Paul's when he wrote:

*Make me a captive, Lord,
And then I shall be free;
Force me to render up my sword,
And I shall conqueror be.⁴²*

But the obedience of which Paul spoke was not a forced obedience, a new legalism; it was the obedience of "the heart" in which he found his true joy. Obedience to God is the spontaneous response of faith in gratitude for redemption. The law reminds the Christian to interpret his freedom as obedience "from the heart" to God. The Gospel "frees us to do our duty," and "our duty—accepted as the light yoke of Christ—is our freedom."⁴³

The law also has as its function to relate Christian freedom to Christian love. The whole tragic situation at Corinth, says Adolf Schlatter, "originated from the one source: from the mistaken divorce of freedom from love."⁴⁴ The desire for freedom without law, even though it is often justified in the name of love, is basically love's opposite—the prideful expression of self-will and self-centeredness. To justify freedom from one's obligations to one's neighbor or to one's group in the name of grace, as is often done, is an effort to cloak self-centeredness in piosity and to give religious sanction to downright deviltry. Students sometimes try to

³⁸Quoted by F. Bertram Clogg, "Abiding Standards," *Interpretation*, October, 1950, p. 426.

³⁹Beyond Fundamentalism and Modernism, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1934), pp. 269, 184.

⁴⁰Romans 6:17-18, 22.

⁴¹Romans 1:1; cf. also 1 Corinthians 7:22.

⁴²Cf. *The Hymnbook*, (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1955), p. 308.

⁴³Norman F. Langford, *op. cit.*, p. 284.

⁴⁴*Op. cit.*, p. 178.

compensate for poor work by demanding the acceptance of love based on the gospel. Employees justify laziness and failure to fulfill their obligations to their employer because they are living under grace and not law. Men and women violate the sanctity of each other's bodies in the name of a freedom which makes all things pure to the pure. Christians flaunt their free behavior before their weaker brothers who have scruples, claiming to have both a knowledge of the faith and a wisdom superior to those of tender conscience. All of these, justified in the name of Christian freedom, are manifestations of pride and self-aggrandizement. "Knowledge" puffs up, but love builds up," said Paul.⁴⁵ True freedom is the liberating effect which brings freedom to others, and saves one from selfishly manifesting "the sense of power" by which he exalts himself "above Nature, the Law, and the Church."⁴⁶

Wesley's penetrating insight into the springs of human action singled out pride as the root of antinomianism. He writes: "The Antinomian teachers had labored hard to destroy this poor people. I talked an hour with the chief of them. . . . I was in doubt whether pride had not made

him mad."⁴⁷ He adds elsewhere: "To desire to do what God commands, but not as a command, is to affect, not freedom, but independency. Such independency as St. Paul had not; for though the Son had made him free, yet was he not without law to God, but under the law to Christ: such as the holy angels have not; for they fulfill His commandments, and hearken to the voice of His words: yea, such as Christ Himself had not; for 'as the Father' had given Him 'commandment,' so He 'spake.'"⁴⁸ Independence from God is the ultimate pride. This pride is man's curse, and love is its cure. The law exists to keep freedom tied to its moorings in love.

A further function of the law is to make love intelligent. Love needs guide lines for its expression; otherwise, with the best of intentions it may wound the very object of its love. Many a hurt in family life, for example, has come not so much from a failure of love as from stupidity. Lack of understanding, lack of sensitivity, lack of knowledge, may cause wounds by those whose love is pure and unstinted. Love needs instruction as to how its high intentions may find adequate embodiment. The *Torah* to the devout Jew was far

⁴⁵1 Corinthians 8:1.

⁴⁶Schlatter, *op. cit.*, p. 176.

⁴⁷*Op. cit.*, Volume III, p. 237.

⁴⁸*Op. cit.*, Volume II, p. 356.

more than a catalogue of "do's" and "don'ts." It literally meant "instruction." It was in the *Torah* that men were instructed in love's adequate response to God. "Thy testimonies are my delight, they are my counselors," says the writer of the 119th Psalm. "Through thy precepts I get understanding. . . . Thy word is a lamp to my feet and a light to my path."⁴⁹ The "rules of the game" in any sport are not intended to impede freedom, but to impart intelligent control to group activity in order to gain maximum freedom. The highest sportsmanship without an adequate knowledge of the rules will issue in countless fouls. God's law makes love for Him and for one's neighbor intelligent, so as to reduce the number of needless and unintentional fouls. James speaks of it as "the law that makes us free."⁵⁰ As Suzanne de Dietrich has indicated, what men perversely see as "a restriction of their freedom" is God's will through the law "to establish conditions of peace and justice that will make liberty possible."⁵¹ Law is essential to the intelligent expression of freedom in love.

The law is necessary, too, in indicating what the will of God is

in the world. As Wilhelm Anderson has said, Christian freedom "can exist only in a right relationship to the revealed and gracious will of God. . . . The church of Jesus Christ is that company of men on earth, in whom it is the purpose of God that His good will revealed in Jesus Christ should take on visible form."⁵² We affirm this when we pray in the Lord's Prayer, "Thy will be done, on earth as it is in heaven." But what is this will? It is that all men should be restored to right relations to Him and thus to each other. But what does this involve? Conceivably, sinless men might know. But we are sinners, and at our best "see only puzzling reflections in a mirror," we know only "in part."⁵³ The law, then, aids us by revealing what God's will for the world is. Calvin called this the principal function of the law, to give Christians "a better and more certain understanding of the Divine will to which they aspire, and to confirm them in the knowledge of it."⁵⁴ Zwingli concurs: "The law is nothing else but the eternal will of God . . . the doctrine of God's will through which we learn what he wills and what he does not will, what he demands and what he forbids. . . . The

⁴⁹Psalm 119:104, 105.

⁵⁰James 1:25, NEB.

⁵¹From unpublished material.

⁵²*Op. cit.*, pp. 8, 9.

⁵³1 Corinthians 13:12, NEB.

⁵⁴Quoted by Langford, *op. cit.*, p. 271.

law is the eternal and abiding will of God."⁵⁵ The law, of course, does not lay down specific precepts which direct every action and command every decision. But, as Professor Walther Eichrodt has put it, it lays out "the lines along which a life pleasing to God must move, if it is not to be overcome by the destructive urges and forces which dwell within it," and offers "guiding lines" and "basic insights . . . for our own actions."⁵⁶ God's will for His world must be sought in the law.

Other reasons could be given, but these are more than sufficient to indicate that the preaching of gospel without law has no sanction in the Scriptures or in the central stream of Christian history, and may lead to damage beyond repair. Christian "freedom" which sets loose the "old Adam" in us, which permits our unregenerate natures to express themselves without restraint, is merely a continuance in the slavery of sin. The end of the path, for the individual or the church, is destruction. The law is "fulfilled," not abrogated, by Jesus. There is little value in what Forsyth called seeking "to be modern by the way of extenuation rather than realism, by palliation rather than penetration, by moral tenderness rather than by moral probing, by poetry

rather than prophesying, by nursing where surgery is required." Forsyth goes on to remind us that there was in the Judaism of Jesus' day "a mild, humane, and attractive school of the law in contrast to those teachers who pressed it unto unsparing detail." But Jesus opposed this "kind and genial" school as vigorously as its opposite. The reason was that "His freedom in relation to the law lay not in getting rid of it, not in easing it. He preached no mere emancipation. He was not antinomian. What He brought was not a general dispensation. The imperative note was always in the front of His preaching. He always recognized the law as the will of God. . . . Law for him . . . was no piece of Judaism to be overthrown with Pharisaism, but it was the expression of God's holy will to be honoured in his Son."⁵⁷ The law, properly understood, is still binding on the Christian. True faith issues in good works, and the Bible is not averse to proper rules of conduct being held before people in preaching. God's covenant of love demands a response of love. And a true response of love to God consists not in mere sentimental feelings but in shouldering the vigorous demands of duty. John Bright has stated this well: "Repelled by all legalism, we

⁵⁵Quoted by Richards, *op. cit.*, p. 184.

⁵⁶"Revelation and Responsibility," *Interpretation*, October, 1949, p. 391.

⁵⁷P. T. Forsyth, *Positive Preaching and the Modern Mind* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1919), pp. 154f.

have come close to the point of apologizing for any duty religion seems to involve, nay, have offered a religion almost without the demand of duty at all. It is time we heeded the lesson . . . that . . . Christianity does involve duty. And that duty is to obey God, not in general and as it is convenient, but in every detail and without exceptions."⁵⁸ There is no true gospel without law.

LAW AND GOSPEL

WHAT THEN? How may the church "escape the two dangers which at all times threaten it: on the one hand the danger of transforming the Gospel of Jesus Christ into a moral law by conformity to which a man can be saved; and on the other hand the danger of reducing the message of salvation in Jesus Christ to a set of ideas which can be intellectually held without any necessary effects on life and conduct?"⁵⁹ If we cannot preach law without gospel, nor gospel without law, what is the relationship of the law to preaching? We must preach the gospel in the law and the law in the gospel. For purposes of analysis, the two may be kept separate and distinct, but actually they

contain each other. Every promise of the gospel contains an imperative. All gospel contains law. The word to Abraham was: "I will bless you," but the blessing was to come only as Abraham responded to the command, "Go." On the other hand, every imperative of the law involves a promise: Abraham could "go" because there was a "land that I will show you. And I will make of you a great nation, and I will bless you. . . ."⁶⁰ All law contains gospel. Dr. Herbert Alleman once called the Ten Commandments God's "charter of freedmen. The 'ten words' . . . are not prohibitions as law. . . . As the Hebrew negative (*lo'*, not '*al*) indicates, these so-called 'commandments' should be translated, not 'Thou shalt not,' but 'Thou wilt not.'"⁶¹ In other words, the Ten Commandments are a promise of what Israel is to become by God's grace. This is reinforced by R. W. Dale who wrote: "The very laws of God are promises. . . . That God tells us how to live, proves that he still cares for our obedience; nay, His precepts indicate, not so much the measure of the strength to obey Him that we naturally possess, as the measure of the help which he intends to afford to our obedience."⁶²

⁵⁸*Op. cit.*, p. 177.

⁵⁹Anderson, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

⁶⁰Genesis 12:1-3.

⁶¹"Personal Religion," *Interpretation*, July, 1948, p. 302.

⁶²*The Jewish Temple and the Christian Church*, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1896), p. 236.

The promise of the commandments is fulfilled in Jesus Christ. He has identified Himself with us in such fashion that the commandments have found their fulfillment. He fulfilled them for us, in our place. Therefore, when in the Sermon on the Mount Jesus gives the higher law of the New Kingdom and demands that our righteousness shall exceed the righteousness of the Scribes and Pharisees, he is not offering a new legalism, demanding a more strenuous effort on our part, injecting a higher standard of measurement by which we are to be judged. If that were the case, as Edouard Thurneysen has well said, it becomes "the law that kills us. For it becomes immediately the law that we ought to fulfill and no one can fulfill. . . . Then the Gospel is silenced. Then the word of Jesus becomes the word of pitiless demand and judgment. Then Hell opens up before us. Then there still remains only the curse of despair." But it is otherwise when we realize that "the law of the Sermon on the Mount is the form in which the Gospel here comes to us. When we see that, then the law which here speaks to us will become for us a law that does not kill us, but one that calls us to life. For in all its words it describes nothing else than a life

that has never and nowhere been attained, begotten or created by man, for we men do not fulfill the law of this life: but a life that comes to us from Jesus Christ who has fulfilled the law of this life—as the ONLY ONE who has done it. That this life comes to us from Christ is grace, allowing us to see and value it . . . as if it were our own life (and in Jesus Christ it has become our own life!), that is faith. So, in this way our life becomes righteous before God from grace through faith. That is the Gospel in the law of the Sermon on the Mount."⁶³

At this point the true humanity of Jesus becomes precious. As man, for man, He fulfilled the law. What does God demand of man? He demands from sinful man perfect penitence. But who can offer to God a penitence commensurate with the enormity of his sin? Herein lies the meaning of Jesus' baptism. In response to John's call for repentance the multitudes came to the Jordan. But says Luke, "When all the people were baptized, . . . Jesus also" was baptized.⁶⁴ Why connect Jesus' baptism with that of the people? Because therein lay its significance. The people accepted a "baptism of repentance for the forgiveness of sins,"⁶⁵ but their repentance was inadequate and their sins

⁶³*The Sermon on the Mount*, an unpublished manuscript.

⁶⁴Luke 3:21.

⁶⁵Luke 3:3.

not remitted. Jesus, the Sinless One—and only a sinless one can know the enormity of sin—also accepted a baptism of repentance for the remission of sins, not for His own sins, but for theirs. He offered an adequate penitence in place of their inadequate one.

The law also demands that we should believe. Can we believe? Yes, but not adequately. The best we can do is to cry out: "I believe; help my unbelief."⁶⁶ But in place of our inadequate belief, Jesus offered to God in our stead a perfect faith. The law demands, too, that we obey. Do we obey? Occasionally, and partially; but more often we disobey. And what is worse, our very obedience becomes a source of independence from God, which is the worst disobedience. You know the book title, *Pride and How I Overcame It!* and its companion volume, *Humility and How I Attained it!* But Jesus, in our stead, offered to God a perfect obedience. He fulfilled the law for us.

So the law now becomes a picture of what we are in Jesus Christ. It is promise. "Beloved, we are God's children now; it does not yet appear what we shall be, but we know that when he appears we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is."⁶⁷ The Sermon on the Mount is not a new demand on our own effort. It is

rather the autobiography of Jesus Christ—a picture of what He was. But it is also a picture of what we are in Him. There is, therefore, gospel in this law. It is a promise held out before us in which we hope by faith.

Does the law, then, lay any obligation on us? Yes. We have already seen that we cannot be libertines. But the law is not now so much a demand as it is an offer. This is what we are in Jesus Christ. The imperative, then, is merely this: Become what you are in Jesus Christ! In a recent article by Gerhard von Rad on the law and the gospel in Deuteronomy, he indicates that the exhortations in both Old and New Testament are "a form of theological speech, the peculiarity of which has only in our day been theologically clarified: paraclesis, a form which is developed extensively in the New Testament epistles . . . paraclesis is quite other than a moralizing sermon. It does not think of calling into question the indicative of the gospel; it is rather a speech of exhortation directed to those who have already received the word of salvation. It has occasionally been said that paraclesis could be summed up in the phrase—'become what you are' . . . 'let not your heart faint; . . . for the Lord your God is he that goes before you' (Deut. 20:3f) — this is

⁶⁶Mark 9:24.

⁶⁷John 3:2.

. . . an exhortation in view of the indicative fact of salvation."⁶⁸

This interaction of the indicative and the imperative, of the law and the gospel, is closely related in the New Testament to the work of the Holy Spirit. Eduard Schweizer has shown that living "in the Spirit" not only involves the indicative fact "that a man's life depends not on his own but on an alien strength," but also contains the imperative "that he should live his life relying upon that alien strength and not his own"—that "he should let the strength which does in fact mould his life also be the standard at which he aims."⁶⁹ Hence, the Spirit is both the creative origin of the Christian's life and the standard by which his life is patterned. To live "in the Spirit," then, or by "the Standard of the Spirit," is possible only as the gift of God's grace. Hence, continues Schweizer, "the notable pronouncement" in Romans 8:4 is that "in consequence of the saving event the requirement of the law is fulfilled *in* (not by) those who walk after the Spirit and not after the flesh." The promise in the law, through the Spirit, is that we may live in God's "saving sphere of action."⁷⁰

On the other hand, it is the covenant that, both in the Old Testament and the New, puts law in the gospel. God's covenant claim on Israel means that Israel belonged solely and completely to Him and was to manifest His will in life. Hence, the law was given to make clear what God's will was, and thus what the significance of the covenant in life was. Granted that Israel did not fulfill the law and that a new covenant was therefore needed, this did not do away with the law. "I will make a new covenant" is accompanied by: "I will put my law within them, and I will write it upon their hearts."⁷¹ The law is still there, deepened as the covenant is deepened, by going beyond mere outward conformity to commands into the motives, and purposes, and desires of the inmost heart. When Paul, therefore, speaks of freedom from the law, "he is not opening the door to human self-pleasing and self-will; he is not thinking of a freedom that declares itself to be no longer bound by the will of God. What he is offering us is freedom from the law of sin and death. . . . In liberating us from guilt, from anxiety and from the law, Christ has not set us free from the will of God; He has set us

⁶⁸"Ancient Word and Living Word," *Interpretation*, January 1961, pp. 6-7.

⁶⁹*Spirit of God*, (Bible Key Words from Gerhard Kittel's *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament*—London: A. & C. Black, 1960), p. 73.

⁷⁰*Ibid.*, p. 76.

⁷¹Jeremiah 31:31, 33.

free to do the will of God.”⁷²

Luke's story of Zacchaeus presents this in a living situation. Arthur John Gossip has pointed out that when Zacchaeus discovered the grace of God he “broke with his past, made public confession, announced that he was ready to make the most generous restitution, that he was done with the old life, and had embarked on a new and a very different one.” Here was the new covenant in action, and here was the new law in the new covenant. Zacchaeus knew that “if Jesus was to be his friend, the old life would not do.”⁷³ God's holy will and not his own would henceforth have to be the standard of his living. So Zacchaeus found gospel in the law, the “good news” that although he, as “a chief tax collector” had enriched himself dishonestly at the expense of the disinherited and defenseless poor, yet the spotless Son of Man called to him and said: I count you worthy of my friendship; “make haste and come down; for I must stay at your house today.”⁷⁴ Yet Zacchaeus also found law in the gospel. If Christ was to invade his unworthy life, that of which he had defrauded others had to be returned, and the self-centeredness of his lust for riches which had pumped a steady stream of gain into his own coffers must henceforth be-

come an outgoing love which would issue in a stream of beneficent pity for the broken and the lost. For Zacchaeus law and gospel were integrated and fused into an inseparable unity.

And so it is with any who have heard the gospel in the law and the law in the gospel. Perhaps the inter-relationship of love and law may be seen in the remark of a young man about to be married. At the wedding rehearsal all attention was focused on the bride and her wishes. Finally the minister, seeking to bring the groom into some relationship to the wedding plans said to him: “Isn't there something you would like to say about the wedding?” He merely replied: “No. Her word is law to me!” To know Christ's love is to make His word of grace our law. It is to become what we already are in His love. Is this not what Paul meant when he wrote to the Philippian Christians: “Have this mind among yourselves, *which you have in Christ Jesus.*”⁷⁵

So let our preaching be the preaching of the gospel in the law and the law in the gospel. Let us give heed to Wesley's counsel that when we preach the law we take “particular care to place every part of it in a joyful light, as not only a command

⁷²Anderson, *op. cit.*, pp. 59, 65.

⁷³*Op. cit.*, p. 335.

⁷⁴Luke 19:6.

⁷⁵Philippians 2:5, *italics mine.*

but a privilege also . . . and that all true obedience springs from love to Him grounded on His first loving us . . . labour therefore in preaching any part of the law, to keep the love of Christ continually before their eye: that thence they may draw fresh life, vigour, and strength to run the way of His commandments. . . . For the commands are food as well as the promises . . . these also duly applied not only direct but likewise nourish and strengthen the soul. . . . Not that I would advise to preach the law without the gospel, any more than the gospel without the law. Undoubtedly both should be preached in their turns; yea both at once, or both in one. All the conditional promises are instances of this. They are law and gospel mixed together. According to this model I should advise every preacher continually to

preach the law — the law grafted upon, tempered by, and animated with the spirit of the gospel. I advise him to declare, explain and enforce every command of God. But meantime to declare in every sermon . . . that Christ is all in all, our *wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption*: that all life, love, strength are from him alone; and all freely given to us through faith. And it will ever be found that the law thus preached both enlightens and strengthens the soul: that it both nourishes and teaches; that it is the guide, 'food, medicine, and stay' of the believing soul."⁷⁶

It is only as we thus combine law and gospel in our preaching that we can at one and the same time give men joyous hope and produce moral character.

⁷⁶A letter of John Wesley quoted by Clogg, *op. cit.*, p. 420.

Book Reviews and Notes

Kelso, James L. *Archaeology and Our Old Testament Contemporaries*. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1966. Pp. 191 + index. \$4.95.

This book is an unusual and much needed contribution to modern Christian understanding of our Hebrew past. It is neither "fundamentalist" nor "liberal," but is written from a staunch theologically conservative point of view. No popular book of this type has ever been so well grounded in natural science and the history of technology. With a long record of excavation in Palestine behind him, the author is a reliable guide on archaeological matters.

Having been intimately associated with the author since 1926, I have learned to appreciate his outstanding qualities as a man and as an archaeologist. Like James Henry Breasted, who attributed part of his success in interpreting Egyptian medical texts

to his early training as a pharmacist, so James L. Kelso has utilized his early preparation in the same field for the elucidation of technical problems in ancient ceramics and metallurgy.

Two strong currents run through this volume: a sustained atmosphere of reverence and a common-sense approach to human affairs, seasoned by flashes of wit. Personally, I find the book particularly instructive for its unexpected parallels between the Biblical and modern worlds. Humanity has indeed remained the same, and human culture has changed far less than commonly supposed.

—*The Foreword by
William F. Albright,
The Johns Hopkins University.*

Pfeiffer, Charles F., ed. *The Biblical World*. Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1966. Pp. 612. \$8.95.

The Biblical World bears the subtitle, *A Dictionary of Biblical Archaeology*. Edited by Charles F. Pfeiffer, the volume has been prepared with the non-specialist in mind. It presents reports on the results of modern

archaeological research in the biblical world. Pfeiffer is Associate Professor of Ancient Literature at Central Michigan University. Claude F. A. Schaeffer is one of the consulting editors. His work at Ras Shamra is

well known. George Ernest Wright has contributed the article on "Shechem" and "Beth-shemesh" to this volume. The reference to "Taanach" has been prepared by Carl Graesser, Jr., of Concordia in St. Louis. Concordia has been excavating Taanach. This use of current reports from the

field is one of the characteristics of the book. Dr. James L. Kelso, Pittsburgh's retired professor in archaeology, is the well-qualified contributor of four articles in this work: "Ceramics," "N.T. Jericho," "Metallurgy," and "Pottery."

—Howard M. Jamieson, Jr.

Porteous, Norman W. *Daniel: A Commentary*. The Old Testament Library. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1965. Pp. 173. \$4.00.

There is no shortage of useful commentaries in English on the Book of Daniel. Those by Montgomery, Jeffery, and Heaton are excellent works, each with its own strength. Hence Norman Porteous has shown considerable wisdom by not attempting, in this most recent of Daniel commentaries, to do again the work done so well by others. He offers us a different kind of volume, one which refers us to these other books for information on technical introduction and philological analysis, and which endeavors to synthesize from that information a series of essays which will convey the intent of the author and the significance for the modern reader of each of the major units of Daniel. Thus there is little in the way of detail that can be called new in this book; but in its

judicious and pertinent formulations intended to guide the reader in interpreting Daniel for our time, there is an originality which is of real value.

Porteous accepts the usual critical conclusions concerning the Macabean date of Daniel, its pseudographic character, and the dubious nature of some of its historical references (e.g., Darius the Mede). Among the great variety of interpretations of chapter seven which have been offered, Porteous chooses to adhere most closely to that which finds a strongly mythological background for the vision of the four beasts and the Son of Man. He agrees with several recent students of the book that Daniel ought not to be labeled "apocalyptic" uncritically, without consideration of how it dif-

fers from certain aspects of apocalyptic thought, and concludes that one ought to consider it a unique piece of literature, with affinities to several earlier types (e.g., Wisdom), and with a distinctive witness of its own.

A reader of this book who was unfamiliar with the other works to which Porteous refers so often would probably find that a more technical commentary would also have to be

read in order to understand fully the present volume. But the reader who is acquainted with scholarly work on Daniel will find in every section an excellent summary of the message, with occasional new insights, and will find real help for understanding what this strange, much interpreted, frequently misinterpreted book has to say to our time.

—Donald E. Gowan.

Kraus, Hans-Joachim. *Worship in Israel. A Cultic History of the Old Testament*. Translation of *Gottesdienst in Israel* (Chr. Kaiser Verlag München, 1962), by G. Buswell. Richmond: John Knox, 1966. Pp. xi + 246.

As in many other fields of Old Testament study, the form-critical way of considering the texts had a strongly stimulating effect on the investigation of the Israelite cult. From the very beginning, the father of form criticism, the German scholar Hermann Gunkel, had combined the question of the form of the texts with the question of their *Sitz im Leben*. It appeared very soon that again and again when the question was traced for the *Sitz im Leben*, the cult and worship stepped into the field of vision. So, opposite to the ideas of the old Wellhausen school, it became evident that already from the very beginning the cult played a decisive part in the Israelite religious

life.

However, the investigation of the Israelite cult now beginning with Gunkel was in the first instance burdened with strong onesidednesses and theories which tended to lump the festivals into one. So S. Mowinckel, e.g., assumed an enthronement festival of Yahweh, attempting to understand it as the center and culmination point of the cultic worship in Israel. At his side appeared Artur Weiser who assumed the festival of the renewal of the covenant to be the main festival, including in it the elements of the enthronement festival as conceived by Mowinckel. All the other cultic celebrations shrank into the background

over against their onesidedly overstressed "mammoth-festivals."

The cultic historical investigation of the Old Testament received a new impetus by the exploration of the great religions in Israel's environment. However, the results of this comparative investigation of the religions of the ancient Near Eastern world was in the first instance partly overemphasized by the fact that particularly under the influence of the British scholar, S. H. Hooke, there was postulated for the entire ancient Orient a common cultic pattern, in which also was included the Israelite religion with its cult. But in this way, the particularity of the Israelite cult was leveled and subordinated under an alien scheme.

This situation as it was here very briefly sketched is the background for the book by Kraus, *Worship in Israel*. The author is fully aware of the fact that actually it would still be very difficult to offer at the present time a comprehensive presentation of the Israelite cult. Many results are still too uncertain for such an endeavor. What he has in mind is, therefore, much more modest. In the foreword of the German edition, he writes that he understands his book as an outline and as an introduction in the cultic historical research. This goal the author attains in an excellent way.

In resistance to the above men-

tioned theories, Kraus starts considering the Old Testament texts with reference to the cult and takes them seriously in their particular individuality. That means, the texts in question are studied in their respective historical contexts and examined for their traditional historical relationships. The proper presentation begins with an analysis and confrontation of the so-called cultic calendars in the Pentateuch and with the consideration of the main festivals listed in them: the Feast of the Passover and the Unleavened Bread, the Feast of Weeks and the great Autumn Festival. Included in this part are the institutions of the Sabbatical year and the Year of Jubilee as well as New Moon and Sabbath and the later new formations, Hanukkah and the feast of Purim.

Then follows a chapter dealing with the cultic officials and the sacrificial system. Here are described the Priests and Levites. Kraus relinquishes the widespread assumption of a historical connection between the tribe of Levi and the priests. Rather, Levi was an old designation of a priest, having its origin in the semi-nomadic form of life. Their duty consisted in handling the lot casting, "Urim and Thummim," and teaching the divine law. In later times, in the realm of the temple of Jerusalem we find them confronted with the Zadokites. It is likely that

they initially were the priests belonging to the former Jebusite sanctuary, but a definite decision is hardly possible. Also, the question as to where the strong emphasis of a connection between the priests and Aaron has its origin as we find it in later sources still remains open.

Just as difficult today as the problem of the priests in the Old Testament is the problem of the prophets. What was their relationship to the cult? This is today the decisive question. Kraus avoids speaking quite generally of the so-called, "cult prophets." With this he avoids a term that is very often used today but without a clearly defined content. In opposition to this Kraus displays the individual manifestations of this entity which cannot be so easily brought under one heading. Kraus' assumption of the ministry of a prophetic mediator, occupied in a continuous succession which has to be understood as a continuation of the Mosaic ministry of mediation, is of particular interest. Probably we should have to understand here Samuel, Elijah, or Ahijah of Shiloh.

In a further chapter the outstanding sanctuaries in Israel and their particular cultic traditions are dealt with. It is important here that Kraus makes it evident that there existed already from the very beginning, in addition to the different local sanctuaries, a central sanctuary extending

in importance beyond all the others. In earlier times the location of the central sanctuary changed sometimes. At first it was Shechem; then we find it in Bethel, in Gilgal, and finally in Shiloh. In view of this fact, it is important that each of these sanctuaries was connected with a particular tradition, so that the cult celebrated there had its own individual character. Thus Shechem was combined with the covenant and the divine law as far as with the tradition of the establishment of the sacral confederacy of the twelve tribes (Josh. 24 and Deut. 27). Bethel was, before it became a central sanctuary, connected with the tradition of the fathers (Gen. 28). Later on, it was the state sanctuary of the northern kingdom. And in Gilgal, finally, the tradition of the occupation of the promised land (Josh. 3-5) was localized.

The last chapter deals with the state sanctuary in Jerusalem and its particular traditions. These traditions are new formations caused by the establishment of the state, the election of David and Jerusalem, and the Royal Festival of Mount Zion. The chapter ends with a survey of the cult in the postexilic cultic community.

It is not possible to mention in such a review more details or to enter a discussion. Many questions are raised and sometimes the reader is challenged to reply. For instance, are we allowed to assume an Israelite tent

festival in the desert as the origin of the tradition of the sacred tent? But just such questions make this book so stimulating. In completing this review, we can say that this book gives as clear a picture of the cult as is possible at the present time; in-

deed, it offers a very good insight into the problems of the Old Testament cult, its officials and its traditions, and so it must be recommended as a valuable auxiliary means for an advanced study of the Old Testament.

—H. Eberhard von Waldow.

Fromm, Erich. *You Shall Be As Gods: A Radical Interpretation of the Old Testament and Its Tradition*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966. Pp. 240. \$4.95.

Affirmations of faith based on a nontheistic, humanistic outlook are common enough these days, but to find the OT used as a source document for "radical humanism" is a bit of a surprise. Erich Fromm, the noted psychoanalyst and philosopher, reveals the influence of his Jewish background and his early training under Talmudic scholars by the serious effort which he has made in this volume to find some continuity between his view of man and the views of the OT and traditional Jewish teaching. This attempt is remarkable in that, although he does not believe in God (he describes his present religious position as "nontheistic mysticism"), he still considers the Bible a document to be taken seriously, and he is concerned to show how it can be relevant to the modern man.

This is a well-written work, clearly and carefully done; it was written by a man who knows his source material well, so does not contain the kind of blunders which often appear when men who are not biblical scholars interpret the Bible in terms of their own specialties; and it contains some excellent insights into man's predicament, based, no doubt, on Fromm's own special field of competence, yet very often in full accord with the Bible's understanding of man. However, one must question whether the Bible does at all point toward the radical humanism of Fromm, and whether he has made a proper use of the rabbinic material which he has put to the same purpose.

By radical humanism, Fromm means "the capacity of man to develop his own powers and to arrive at inner harmony and at the establish-

ment of a peaceful world" (p. 13). The term "God" means for him not an absolute reality but a historically conditioned concept. He believes he has traced the evolution of the God-concept through the OT and subsequent Jewish thought. God was first understood as an absolute ruler, as in Gen. 3, from whom man could gain the first vestige of freedom only by rebellion. What Eve did was right, for it was the only way man could aspire to the potential Godhood in himself. Fromm recognizes that in the main line of biblical thought the concept of the image of God means man is not God, and cannot become God, but can become *like* God, by imitating him; however, he finds occasional statements which he believes imply that the difference between God and man can be eliminated; and this, for him, is the ideal. Gen. 3 is thus not the story of man's "fall," but of his awakening; and the succeeding account of man's history is that of the evolution of man's freedom from his "incestuous ties to blood and soil."

The next stage in the evolution of the God concept is the covenant with Noah, in which God, by limiting himself, is transformed from an "absolute" to a "constitutional" monarch. This covenant and the one with Abraham mean that man is no longer the slave of God, but can challenge him, make demands of him which

God has no right to refuse (Gen. 18:23-32). The third step is the revelation to Moses that God has no name, which is how Fromm interprets 'ebyeh "sher 'ebyeh, thus that he cannot be represented in any way. The call to obey the nameless God offers to man the possibility of gaining freedom from all idols. The next to the last stage is to be found in Maimonides' declaration that God has no essential attributes, and hence can only be spoken of in terms of negation; the final stage is Fromm's description of the *x-experience*, i.e., the "religious" experience of the non-theist. Human freedom, then, ultimately means freedom from God. The value of all that is said about God in the OT is that obedience to these precepts brings freedom from idolatry, from all those things unworthy of man's final loyalty; but if man is to achieve everything that is in his power to do, he must finally free himself from every outside authority, including God.

Man must gain freedom for himself; there is no God to give him supernatural help. But how can a slave envisage freedom, or do anything to gain it? The answer is that the move toward freedom is motivated by suffering, which leads man to react against his oppressors. The Exodus is discussed in detail as an example of this, though it is a step toward freedom which fails. The two

aspects of history which interest Fromm most are the Exodus and the messianic time, the time in which man becomes fully human. The main point of his lengthy discussion of this subject is that the messianic time is not brought on by an act of God, but will come as man is driven by suffering to find new solutions to his problems. Nothing is said about *what* man ought to do to bring this about; the stress is on the possibility of his doing so. Man is not sinful by nature, but has a free choice of good or evil. The fact of sin does not mean that man is corrupt nor should it be any reason for contrition or self-accusation. Fromm appeals to statements about God's readiness to forgive in order to show that sin should be no cause for sorrow, and that repentance means simply to return to the right way without remorse.

The way of life in which Fromm believes has as its central values Life, Love, and Freedom. His fervent concern is to achieve unity, brotherhood, peace, harmony among men; and he believes that theists and nontheists both may contribute. On the last page of the Epilogue he alludes to his program: "fundamental changes in the socioeconomic structure of industrialized society (both of capitalist and socialist societies) and of a renaissance of humanism that focuses on the reality of experienced values rather than on the reality of concepts

and words."

The author and the reviewer represent different faiths, nontheistic and theistic; but it is scarcely profitable to criticize his book on that level, for theism and nontheism are not positions subject to review on the basis of evidence. There are two questions, however, where there is evidence which can be discussed, and where the reviewer remains unconvinced by Fromm's work. The first is a hermeneutical question, dealing with the interpretation of documents and the use of literary and historical data. All of us do some selecting of the materials that impress us in the Bible, and emphasize certain parts more than others. One problem every interpreter must try to avoid is to take from a document certain elements which *can* be interpreted in a way different from the main intent of the document, then to claim in some way the authority of the document for the new interpretation. Fromm quite readily admits that the materials he selects represent a tiny minority of the witnesses in the OT and Judaism, and that the main stream of the tradition represents a quite different view. He admits that one can find his humanistic strain only by looking back at the material from our 20th-century vantage-point; so he does not ignore the hermeneutical problem. Rather, he justifies using the material as he does by

claiming that he finds in the documents evidence for an *evolution* of the God-concept and of human freedom, from Adam's rebellion to our own time, so that although the whole idea of radical humanism is admittedly not present in the OT, its beginnings are.

But to what reality does this evolutionary scheme correspond? It is neither founded on the biblical literature as it stands, nor on a critical reconstruction of history. Perhaps it is a psychological evolution to which he refers. The impression which this work makes on an OT specialist is that we have here no interpretation of the OT, but a scheme whose origin has nothing to do with the Bible at all, into which a few Bible stories and rabbinic sayings have been fitted. The result of doing so has been in almost every case to make them say something their authors did not want to say. If there had been a real evolution, then this procedure might still be justified; for the authors would then be but imperfect stages in the development, saying things the eventual import of which they could not foresee. But this is not the case. The result to which Fromm comes is not something unknown to the biblical authors; it is clear that some of them had already considered some such position (though obviously in a much less sophisticated form), and had rejected it. This is what is meant

by Isa. 14:1-21, Ezek. 28:1-19, 31:1-18, and Dan. 4. Fromm is certainly correct in finding in the OT a real exaltation of humanity; man is, for the OT writers "almost God," but for them the "almost" is an indispensable part of the affirmation. They do not take the final step with Fromm, not because evolution has not progressed far enough, but because they *have* considered that possibility and have concluded that to take it would be to destroy their humanity. They know men who believe in no other god but themselves, and they believe those men have lost the glory of humanity. That is to say, the reviewer believes there is an irreconcilable difference between the theistic humanism of the OT, and modern (also ancient!) nontheistic humanism. Fromm has interpreted the references in the OT and rabbinic writings to God's limitation of himself as signs that he can be done without, and see progress as a gradual retirement of God from human life until only man is left. But the reviewer believes that the references which Fromm takes as hopeful signs that man can be free of God surely meant something quite different to their authors and the communities which preserved them; viz., they were intended to point to the supreme *graciousness of God*. A gracious God, from whom there would be no point in being free, has no place in this book. Surely Fromm's

stress on man's fear of freedom is good; and his exposition of our preference for slavery of one kind or another, which is idolatry, is in accord with the biblical understanding of man, and is something which modern man needs to hear. But he differs from the Bible in his view of where freedom is to be found. For him it is in man, himself, alone; for the Bible it is in loving obedience to God, and it goes on to say that man himself alone is less than human.

If there is no God, then the positive statements in the Bible about freedom as obedience to God have no meaning; and the best one can do is what Fromm does: look for some other kind of positive statement. But one must ask whether the Bible's *rejection* of nontheistic humanism does not need to be taken very seriously today, and not simply to be dismissed along with its theistic presuppositions. That is to say, while the reviewer can understand Fromm's lack of faith in God, though he does not share it, he can neither share nor

understand his faith in man. What evidence is there to lead us to believe that through rebelling against suffering man really does take a step toward freedom, so that in time real progress is made? Does he not only move from one form of slavery to another? The kind of technological messianic age which some are enthusiastic about today obviously does not appeal to Fromm; but other than this kind of progress, given man's obvious penchant for dehumanization, what real basis for man-centered hope is there? Does experience confirm anything other than the biblical statement that if man's own potential is all we have, then we are without hope?

The reviewer must conclude, then, that this very interesting book is not really an interpretation of the OT and its tradition, but a philosophical statement with illustrations from religious traditions. For if the theism of the OT and Judaism is done away with, its humanism is gone as well.

—Donald E. Gowan.

Foakes Jackson, F. J., and Lake, K., eds. *The Beginnings of Christianity*. Part I. *The Acts of the Apostles*. Vol. IV. English Translation and Commentary, by Kirsopp Lake and Henry J. Cadbury. Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1965. Pp. xi + 421 + map. \$7.95.

One of the Limited Editions Library reprints, which *Perspective* has

previously mentioned with appreciation. This present volume is recom-

mended in the Bibliographical Issue. Macmillan published the volume only thirty-four years ago, but it has been long out of print and hard to come by.

This volume contains a translation of J. H. Ropes' Greek text, established in Vol. III, and copious notes and cross references to the literature up to the early thirties. Since this is

a reprint, no attempt has been made to update bibliographic references; and this would be the principal limitation on the use of the book today. There are detailed indices, and a map of the Eastern Mediterranean.

The book is beautifully produced and a welcome addition to our list of available commentaries.

Hennecke, Edgar. *New Testament Apocrypha*. Vol. 2: *Writings Related to the Apostles; Apocalypses and Related Subjects*. Edited by Wilhelm Schneemelcher. English Translation by R. McL. Wilson. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1965. Pp. 852. \$10.00.

See *Perspective* for June, 1964 (V.2.37f) for a review of Vol. 1 and general remarks about this work. The intervening time has only underlined how important the appearance of these volumes is.

An impressive array of scholars has contributed to this book, among them the Germans W. Bauer and G. Bornkamm, and assisting the English editor, E. Best and G. Ogg. A notable contribution is the introductory material on apocalyptic by P. Vielhauer. It is a valuable feature of this work that more than the translations of documents is provided. The maze of material on the apostles dating from

the first three centuries of the church can be mastered by only a few scholars; so the summaries and assessments given here are of prime importance for the non-specialist.

Some of the material covered in this volume has been figuring prominently in recent biblical theology. The "Pseudo-Clementines," for example, are of importance in the discussion of Johannine thought; and the early apocalypses help to understand the genre and differentia of canonical apocalyptic.

Westminster Press is to be congratulated again for venturing to provide us with these excellent volumes.

Smith, Barbara. *Young People's Bible Dictionary*. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1965. Pp. 161 + xvi plates. \$4.50.

This Bible-study aid is designed for "young people," which may be paraphrased "Those who are not ready to use the 'standard,' more detailed dictionaries." Miss Smith's name is known to those who are familiar with Westminster curricular materials, and she has produced a worthy work in this book.

Included are the most important names of Bible personages and a good selection of Bible words that are not readily understood without assistance. The entries are replete with scripture references, and there is

a helpful supplement with Wright-Filson maps. A "how-to" introduction should make the book even easier to use.

It is not possible to be completely objective and non-controversial in such a project. Perhaps the "Time Line" page with its overview of history—and dates—would bring the most demurrs. For the most part, however, the text is quite up-to-date and perceptive. The RSV is presumed throughout, and there are up-to-date illustrations and photographs.

Stuber, Stanley L., ed. *The Illustrated Bible and Church Handbook*. New York: Association Press, 1966. Pp. 532. \$5.95.

This reference book should prove useful in home and church libraries. It contains a "Who's Who in the Bible" and a sort of dictionary of Bible "Facts." A section on the Church also has a "Who's Who" which extends to modern times, more facts including architectural and liturgical details, a concise treatment of symbols, and a separate chapter about Christmas. The third section deals with hymns—another "Who's Who" and stories of 180 "favorites."

The volume is nicely produced and should be serviceable at a rather elementary level of inquiry. Some of the information is certainly inadequate if not misleading (the Dead Sea Scrolls are described as "a collection of a dozen scrolls of very old manuscripts discovered in the spring of 1947 . . ."); but any book so wide-ranging runs this risk. The line drawings which occupy considerable space are also of questionable value except, of course, in the treatment of symbols.

—J. A. Walther.

Packer, J. I. *God Speaks to Man: Revelation and the Bible*. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1965. Pp. 95. \$1.25.

This volume is part of the series "Christian Foundations" appearing under the auspices of the Evangelical Fellowship in the Anglican Communion under the editorship of Philip E. Hughes.

Packer's work is a poorly written 1965 rehash of B. B. Warfield. His shotgun blasts against K. Barth, Bultmann, the liberal, the broad churchman, and the "honest to God-er" find their mark only in his own straw man. One sentence best illustrates the whole book: "The only proviso is that our study of the Bible as Christ himself, must be based in fully bibli-

cal presuppositions about which we are studying." What are these? Are Packer's presuppositions biblical or the product of orthodoxy? The reviewer wishes Packer would have written: "Throw away presuppositions, let the Bible speak."

While Packer states that he does not belittle technical biblical scholarship, much of the book does. In contrast the reviewer finds the words of Bengel a satisfactory reply to Packer and the motivation for scholarship and Bible study—*Te totum applica ad textum: rem totam applica ad te.*

—Howard Eshbaugh.

Thielicke, Helmut. *Between Heaven and Earth*. New York: Harper and Row, 1965. Pp. 189. \$3.75.

This book is a distillate of conversations carried on between Dr. Thielicke and seminarians, pastors, theologians, newsmen, and laymen during his visit to the United States in 1963. There are nine chapters. The first three deal with the Bible and its interpretation, including sections in which Thielicke confronts verbal inspiration and criticizes it as a position detrimental to faith (and nowhere has there been written a better explanation of the problem), and a long section on the historical-

critical study of the Scriptures. Chapter 4 is a long chapter given over to the theological defense of the Virgin Birth. In Chapter 5, Dr. Thielicke cites his reasons against glossolalia (chief of which is the fact that the "inspired" speaker considers himself to be gifted, rather than giving glory to the Giver of all good gifts). There is a healthy treatment of the problems and historical background of Nazi Germany, brought forth in heart-rending fashion by one who lived through those trying times, at-

tempting to minster to those caught in the trap. There are also some healthy insights into our own problem of racial integration (the chief problem is to bring this question out of the realm of "ideologizing," the second to recognize that it is dangerous for the church to take *political* sides in an issue). For those who have often heard Luther's much-maligned doctrine of the two Kingdoms chided, there is a very good understanding of this teaching to be found in the same chapter. The final

chapter is a warming insight into what Thielicke considers the major problem of American Christians: they have not learned to accept *suffering*, and see it in its theological setting. He has much good to say in this chapter, as throughout the rest of the book. Thielicke is one of the top German Lutheran theologians of this century. His books deserve to be read, and especially this one, which seems to be written just for the reader.

Bruce, Michael. *No Empty Creed*. New York: Seabury, 1966. Pp. 143. \$1.45 (paperback).

Fr. Bruce says he wrote this book for intelligent seekers outside the faith. Unfortunately it will have its basic appeal among "high-Church" Episcopalians of the Anglo-Catholic branch of the faith. The book has fifteen chapters, each treating a phrase of the Apostles' Creed in the form of a question (e.g., "Are our Sins Forgiven?"). It starts out well discussing God as Father and as Almighty. Chapter three is a noble defense of strict Chalcedonian Christology, emphasizing our experience of this doctrine through communion with the living Christ. Unfortunately, the Virgin Birth is not defended as an article of *faith*. The whole chapter on it is a defense of the biological possibility of parthenogenesis; one

wonders if Fr. Bruce himself doesn't miss the theological point of the Virgin Birth. You may also not agree when he says "The fundamental importance of Christ's triumphal Ascension is that it guarantees the sympathy of God" (p. 72). There will also be disagreements on his chapter regarding "Communion *with* the Saints." Here he rightly stresses the neglected truth of communion between the "quick and the dead" in the Eucharist. His arguments for a primitive doctrine of purgation are, however, unconvincing; they are based solely on reason and human need. Also, though the saints do "intercede before the throne of God" on behalf of the Church Militant, one still questions the possibility of ask-

ing them personally for their prayers on one's own particular behalf. Much of the book is sound, basic theology. It is marred by the almost-cynical desire of the author to "prove" the articles of faith. You will like the crisp, no-nonsense style of

writing; it is refreshingly simple (perhaps *too* simple?) in a day of so many obscure theological writers. The trouble is, one wonders if Fr. Bruce didn't fill up parts of the empty creed with the wrong baggage.

—Jay C. Rochelle.

Brill, E. H. *The Creative Edge of American Protestantism*. New York: Seabury Press, 1966. Pp. 248. \$5.95.

The author sees the creative edge of Protestantism as: carefully defining its position in a pluralistic society; helping the United States to find its "rightful place" in world leadership; re-defining its position with regard to the federal government and the public schools; accepting its increasing social responsibility; and concomitant to this last item its renewed vigor in the city with its complicated metropolitan problems.

One must admit that the author has chosen the crucial issues, but one can understand doubts about a book of only 248 pages attempting to do so much. This is both a strength and a weakness depending, of course, on what you're looking for.

Thinking churchmen must face the issues dealt with in this book. Sometimes these questions arise out of the natural situation. If so, here is a book that can help the layman deal with the problem from a larger perspective. Each problem is viewed

historically. While these histories are brief, they do present a helpful outline which, together with the bibliography, can be a good start toward a solution.

One of the most helpful items in the book is a discussion of the terms "liberal" and "conservative." Brill tries to show both sides of every issue though his sympathies are clearly with the liberals. He does show why the liberal or the conservative takes the predictable position he does. For those who are confused with labels, this is a big help.

The chapter on the church-related college and the problems faced by it is disturbing. The author freely admits that there are some "church schools" among the nation's best colleges as well as among the worst, but then he deals in generalizations that include only the worst of them. Far too many schools are doing a good job for Dr. Brill to reach the pessimistic conclusion that he comes to.

All things considered, this is a good survey of the crisis faced by the Protestant Church. The layman whose social conscience is suddenly awakened can get needed historical and theological background for his thinking. Used in adult groups at the local level and on campuses this book can bring about a personal *aggiornamento* so far as the contemporary church is concerned.

The church has been taking its

lumps recently. This book throws some pretty good punches at the church; but by and large it shows where the church has been, where it is, and where it is probably headed. And, you know, I'm not at all discouraged. This book shows reason for hope.

The author is presently the Episcopal Chaplain at the American University, Washington, D. C.

—Charles C. W. Idler.

Books Received

Calvin, John. *The Acts of the Apostles* (Vol. I [Chapters 1-13], translated by W. J. G. McDonald [1965; pp. vi + 410]; Vol. II [Chapters 14-28], translated by J. W. Frazer [1966; pp. v + 329]), and *Galatians, Ephesians, Philippians and Colossians* (translated by T. H. L. Parker [1965; pp. vi + 369]). Vols. 6, 7, and 11 of Calvin's *New Testament Commentaries*. A New Translation edited by D. W. and T. F. Torrance. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans. \$6.00 each. Three more volumes in this beautifully produced edition. For mention of other volumes in the series, see especially Wm. Anderson's review in *Perspective*, II.2 (June, 1961), p. 35; also II.4 (December, 1961), p. 31; III.2 (June, 1962), p. 40; and V.3 (September, 1964), p. 32.

Cole, Alan. *The Epistle of Paul to the Galatians: Tyndale Bible Commentaries*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1965. Pp. 188. \$3.25. An "everyman" (nobody?) commentary. Very few footnotes. (Howard Eshbaugh.)

Collyer, Bud. *With the Whole Heart*. Westwood, N.J.: Revell, 1966. Pp. 96. \$2.75. Poem-sermons by a popular entertainer, an active member of the First Presbyterian Church, Greenwich, Connecticut.

Crane, Jim. *On Edge*. Richmond: John Knox, 1965. \$1.25 (paper). A collection of "cartoon-commentaries which probe universal human dilemmas," by the Associate Professor of Art at Florida Presbyterian College.

DeHaan, M. R., M.D. *Genesis and Evolution*. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1962. Pp. 152. \$2.50.

Dooley, Thomas A., M.D. *Doctor Tom Dooley, My Story*. New York: New American Library, 1964. Pp. 128. 50¢ (paper). A Signet Book abridgement of Dooley's three books; illustrated.

Drake, Robert. *Flannery O'Conner*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1966. Pp. 48. 85¢ (paper). A critical essay in the series *Contemporary Writers in Christian Perspective*.

Fesquet, H., collector. *Wit and Wisdom of Good Pope John*. Illustrated. New York: New American Library, 1965. Signet Book. Pp. 128. 50¢. A charming little book, about "one of the greatest, and most beloved, men of our time portrayed through his own words"; a good source of anecdotes and quotes.

Flynn, L. B. *The Power of Christlike Living*. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1962. Pp. 127. \$2.50.

Foster, John. *Five Minutes a Saint*. Richmond: John Knox, 1964. Pp. 112. \$1.25 (paper). Thumbnail sketches of forty-two men and women from early Christianity, with liberal quotations from most of them; a concise source of illustration and inspiration.

Grimley, J. B., and Robinson, G. E. *Church Growth in Central and Southern Nigeria*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1966. Pp. 386. \$3.25 (paper).

Hulme, Wm. E. *Your Pastor's Problems: A Guide for Ministers and Laymen*. New York: Doubleday, 1966. Pp. 165.

Jauncey, J. H. *I Believe in the American Way*. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1962. Pp. 128. \$1.95.

Jones, W. Paul. *The Recovery of Life's Meaning: Understanding Creation and the Incarnation*. New York: Association Press, 1963. Pp. 254. \$4.50.

Kierkegaard, S. *The Gospel of Our Sufferings*. Translated from the Danish by A. S. Aldworth and W. S. Ferrie. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964. Pp. 150. \$1.45 (paper). American edition of 1955 British edition of "Christian Discourses in a Different Vein, published in 1847 at Copenhagen."

Knox, John. *Life in Christ: Reflections on Romans 5-8*. New York: Seabury Press, 1966. Pp. 128. \$1.25. Readable exegesis for the layman, (Howard Eshbaugh.)

Law, Wm. *A Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life*. Introduction by Geoffrey W. Bromiley. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1966. Pp. xx + 313. \$1.95 (paper). A fine reprint of a "spiritual classic" from Macmillan's 1898 edition.

Limited Editions Library is a series of valuable reprints from Baker Book House. Among these are:

- Greenleaf, Simon. *The Testimony of the Evangelists Examined by the Rules of Evidence Administered in Courts of Justice*. (Reprinted from the 1874 edition.) Pp. xxiii + 613. \$7.95.
- Mayor, Joseph B. *The Epistle of St. Jude and the Second Epistle of St. Peter*. Greek Text with Introduction, Notes, and Comments. (Reprinted from the original edition, 1907.) Pp. ccii + 664. \$9.95.
- Olmstead, A. T. *History of Palestine and Syria to the Macedonian Conquest*. (Reprinted from Scribner's 1931 edition.) Pp. xxxiii + 664. \$9.95.

For notice of other volumes in this series, cf. *Perspective*, VI.2 (June, 1965), p. 38, and VII.2 (June, 1966), p. 45, and p. 33f above.

Mueller, Wm. R. *The Prophetic Voice in Modern Fiction*. Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday, 1966. Pp. ix + 186. 95¢ (paper). Major writings of James Joyce, Albert Camus, Franz Kafka, Ignazio Silone, William Faulkner, and Graham Greene interpreted as introductions to basic religious doctrines. Anchor Book reprint of Association Press' valuable 1959 edition.

Peale, Norman Vincent. *The Healing of Sorrow*. Pawling, N.Y.: Inspirational Book Service (per Doubleday), 1966. Pp. 96. \$2.95.

Pickell, Charles N. *Works Count Too! Faith in Action in the Life of the Christian*. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1966. Pp. 120. By a graduate of this Seminary; now pastor of Wallace Memorial U. P. Church, West Hyattsville, Maryland.

Shideler, M. M. *Charles Williams*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1966. Pp. 48. 85¢ (paper). A critical essay in the series *Contemporary Writers in Christian Perspective*.

Verney, S. *Fire in Coventry*. Westwood, N.J.: Revell, 1964. Pp. 95. \$1.95.

Wiebe, R. *Peace Shall Destroy Many*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1962. Pp. 239. \$3.95. A Novel.

Sonnet For Spring

(*after Walden*)

The purple hyacinths arise in prayer
At garden's edge, a paschal nominee—
Now born to bear the chilling world's despair:
That here be martyred Love's Gethsemane.
The poetry of Spring forever rhymes,
For heaven's underfoot and overhead;
A patient sod awakes and saffron climbs
The willow's plume; capricious tendrils wed
To warming winds, their April walls aspire.
As if the earth had burst with inward heat,
Her grass afame like spreading emerald fire,
A sun once prodigal, prepares to greet.
In Beauty God reveals His cosmic story:
The grave of Winter leads to paths of glory.

—*Rowe Hinsey.*




Pittsburgh Perspective

JUNE, 1967

Volume VIII

Number 2



PITTSBURGH THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

PITTSBURGH PERSPECTIVE

Volume VIII

JUNE, 1967

Number 2

Published four times yearly in March, June, September and December, by the Pittsburgh Theological Seminary, 616 North Highland Avenue, Pittsburgh, Pa. 15206, one of the seven seminaries of the United Presbyterian Church in the U. S. A. Second-class postage paid at Pittsburgh, Pa. Changes of address should be sent to the Seminary, care of the Director of the Mailing Department.

Editor: James Arthur Walther, Th.D.

Publications Committees

Faculty

Peter Fribley
Lynn B. Hinds, *Chmn.*
J. A. Walther

Student

Robert V. Mathias, *Chmn.*

J. Rowe Hinsey, *ex. off.*
William R. Atkins, *ex. off.*
William R. Phillippe, *ex. off.*

Circulation: William W. Hill

Secretarial Assistant: Mrs. Elizabeth Eakin

Contents

<i>Ad Hoc</i>	2
From the President's Desk	3
The Shape of Zwingli's Theology	5
by Gottfried W. Locher	
Demythologizing	27
by Schubert M. Ogden	
Book Reviews and Notes	
<i>The Jerusalem Bible</i>	36
Jared J. Jackson and J. A. Walther	
Anderson, <i>The History and Religion of Israel</i>	40
Jared J. Jackson	
Brown, <i>The Gospel According to John</i> (i-xii). The Anchor Bible ..	40
Goetschius, <i>The Language of the New Testament</i>	43
James Arthur Walther	
Wolf, <i>Journey Through the Holy Land</i>	45
Anna Marie Walther	
Rogers, <i>Scripture in the Westminster Confession</i>	46
John H. Gerstner	
Reist, <i>Toward a Theology of Involvement</i>	51
George H. Kehm	
Richardson, <i>Religion in Contemporary Debate</i>	53
Hughes, <i>Creative Minds in Contemporary Theology</i>	54
Freemantle, <i>The Protestant Mystics</i>	55
Jay C. Rochelle	
Peerman, <i>Frontline Theology</i>	55
Valentine, <i>The Cross in the Market Place</i>	56
Charles C. W. Idler	
<i>The Action of the Church</i>	56
Walter R. Clyde	
Merton, <i>Conjectures of a Guilty Bystander</i>	57
Jay C. Rochelle	
007— <i>Jekyll or Hyde</i>	59
William R. Phillippe	
Wise, <i>The Meaning of Pastoral Care</i>	63
Jay C. Rochelle	
Wright, <i>Let the Children Paint</i>	64
B. M. Burrows	
<i>Psalm</i>	Inside Back Cover
by Howard Vogt	

Ad Hoc

THIS ISSUE contains two lectures given during this past year by guests on our campus. During the Fall, Professor Gottfried W. Locher, of the University of Bern, Switzerland, visited Professor Dietrich Ritschl here. Since our schedule did not afford a time when Dr. Locher could address the whole seminary community, he lectured to Dr. Ritschl's seminar. We are indebted to Dr. Ritschl for arranging for us to have the manuscript of that lecture. It seems to us to be a very perceptive, interesting, and instructive study from Reformation Theology; and we are pleased to be able to share it with our readers.

It is quite another phase of theological concern which was presented to us by Professor Schubert M. Ogden, of Perkins School of Theology, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas. In a convocation last February 23rd he essayed an up-to-date summary of the role of "demythologizing" in theological studies. It is six years since he published *Christ Without Myth*, and it is valuable to have an estimate of how this contemporary problem looks to the expert Dr. Ogden today. We have printed the lecture in the form in which it was brought to us. Many local alumni and friends share these convocation events with us, and we take this means of sharing this one with you.

NEXT ISSUE we are delighted and proud to give you a paper that many of us have long been hoping for. Hundreds of people have been guided and helped by Professor William F. Orr's famous lecture on marriage—which long ago became known as "Topic A" in seminary circles. This Spring Dr. Orr read a paper to the Biblical Division on "Paul's Treatment of Marriage in First Corinthians Seven"—the biblical basis for the popular lecture. The September *Perspective* will feature this article.

PAST ISSUES—many of them—are still available. In particular we mention three: (1) George Swetnam's "Star in the West," a history of the Seminary and its antecedents; (2) the Bibliographical Issue; and (3) the special issue on the "Confession of 1967." There is no charge for these—but it would help the Seminary budget if you could send about 35 cents a copy to cover our expenses.

—J. A. W.

From the President's Desk

PERHAPS A WAY OUT of at least some of the theological confusion of the moment might be to realign ourselves with the continuities of history. If we knew better the history of the past, it could well be that much that is called "new" today is but old errors dressed out in new garb. Furthermore, attention to the total pathway by which we have come would be a savory corrective to the tendency to think we had made new discoveries when we are only succumbing to the spirit of the time and reflecting the current temper. To listen to our ancestors might save us from excitedly telling people what they already know, and calling it the Christian faith.

Professor T. F. Torrance has written: "True thinking takes place within a frame of continuous historical development in which progress in understanding is being made . . . no constructive thinking that is worthwhile can be undertaken that sets at nought the intellectual labours of the centuries that are enshrined in tradition, or be undertaken on the arrogant assumption that everything must be thought through *de novo* as if nothing true had already been done or said. He who undertakes that kind of work will inevitably be determined unconsciously by the assumptions of popular piety which have already been built into his mind." (*Theology in Reconstruction* [London: SCM Press Ltd., 1965] p. 24.)

Humility before the past, respect for "the larger Christian tradition," is a mood which should characterize the theological enterprise. Away back in 1845, Philip Schaff saw the folly of a theological temper which arrogantly dismissed the past as benighted. In *The Principle of Protestantism* he showed amusement at Protestant pride which dubbed the middle ages the "Dark Ages," and laughed at enlightened nineteenth century writers who thought of such as Anselm, Aquinas, Da Vinci, and St. Francis as "poor children of darkness." He pictured these "mighty dead" as pointing "our dwarfish race to their own imperishable giant works" and exclaiming, "Be humble, and learn that nothing beseems you so well." (Quoted by James H. Smylie, "Philip Schaff: Ecumenist," in *Encounter*, Volume 28, No. 1, p. 8.) Such advice is more needed now than then.

This is not to propose that our fathers knew all that there is to be known: that there is no more "light to break upon the sacred page" than

that which they saw; that we should be "cabin'd and cribbed" by their modes of thinking or their results; or that any one of them, or group of them, should be the sole orientation point around which all theological thinking revolves. Historicism of this type has often been a handicap to theology, substituting a survey of other men's thoughts for the rigorous process of doing our own thinking.

I am suggesting, however, that we stand in a stream of continuity with past generations, and that the meaning of the span of this stream where our own generation stands will be obscure without tracing the stream to its source, and that the theological objects which come floating down the stream will be confusing and valueless unless we explore the banks of the entire stream and look at these objects in their original setting.

Our "now" needs a "then." Our "henceforth" must be guided by a "hitherto." I am not arguing for a binding "historicism" but for a liberating "historical perspective" which will break the pattern of our contemporaneity and free us from the bondage of the moment.

—D. G. M.

The Shape of Zwingli's Theology

A Comparison with Luther and Calvin

by GOTTFRIED W. LOCHER*

I. MESSAGE AND THEOLOGY IN THE REFORMATION

In the famous introduction to the second part of the Schmalkalden Articles of 1537 *Martin Luther* writes: "Here is the first and principal article: That Jesus Christ, our God and Lord, died for our sins and rose for our justification (Rom. 4), and (that) He alone is the Lamb of God, who bears the sin of the world. . . . As this has to be believed, it cannot be gained or comprehended through works, through the Law, or earned in any way, so it is quite certain that only such faith can justify us. . . . One cannot abandon anything concerning this article nor detract from it, even if Heaven and earth should fall and all things should pass away."¹

In the sixty-seven articles, which led to the acceptance of the Reformation in Zürich in January 1523, *Huldrych Zwingli* declares:

"*The second article:* The main point of the Gospel is that our Lord Jesus Christ is the true Son of God, who has revealed to us the will of the Heavenly Father, and through His sinlessness has saved us from death and given us atonement with God.

"*The third article:* Thence is Christ the only way to salvation for all who have lived, who now live and who shall live. . . .

"*The sixth article:* For Christ Jesus is the guide and leader promised and given by God to the whole of humanity."²

* A lecture given in the seminar of Professor Dietrich Ritschl at Pittsburgh Theological Seminary on October 11, 1966. The translation was kindly done by Rev. J. A. Morrison (Lauenun Kt. Bern) and revised by Mr. J. Adams (Bern). An expanded form of this paper with the addition of rich documentation will appear in *Zwingliana* 1967/1, Berichtshaus Zürich.

¹Schmalkaldische Artikel 1537. *Die Bekenntnisschriften der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche*, herausgegeben vom Deutschen Evangelischen Kirchenausschuss, Göttingen, 1930, Band I, Seite 415, 4ff.

²Huldreich Zwinglis Sämtliche Werke, herausgegeben von Emil Egli u.a. 1950ff. (*Corpus Reformatorum* Volumen LXXXVII ss.) ("Z") Band I S. 458.

In the third book of his *Institutes*, John Calvin describes faith with the following definition: "It is the unshakable knowledge of God's kindness towards us, which is founded in the truth of the free promise of grace in Christ and revealed to our minds and sealed in our hearts through the Holy Spirit."³

It is not at all easy in a few words to get at the essence of the message which the Reformation contains. Therefore we have decided to concentrate upon the understanding of justification by faith or, to put it more exactly, upon the relation of faith to Jesus Christ as the one and only Redeemer and Saviour. We could go further and begin to compare the three principal Reformers by analyzing the characteristic we have heard. To compare the Reformers and to reach a deeper understanding of them, it is necessary to distinguish one from the other. But immediately there arises the danger of over-emphasizing their differences, of laying too much stress upon contrasting attitudes instead of properly assessing their similarities. In reality there is a great common background; the differences between the various Reformers—and with such we shall deal here — are only to be understood theologically in relation to this common background. The whole Refor-

mation movement is the escape from fear and uncertainty to Jesus Christ, who was crucified and raised for us, and is the desire for the comfort and strength which we can find in Him alone. The whole Reformation rediscovered the Saviour of the sinner over against the picture of Christ in the Middle Ages as the pitiless Judge of the world. All the Reformers share the same view of *sola gratia*, which stands in contrast to the infinite cultic and moral demands of Rome and the medieval scholastics, as well as being in contrast to the different stages of a mystical approach to salvation, which cannot be enforced in any way. They also have in common an exact definition of grace and of justification *sola fide*: that is to say, to the exclusion of a natural or supernatural attribute or a natural or supernatural cooperation by man, even if one should call such an attribute or power of cooperation "grace." Only the pure gift of grace can grant us total certainty. A further common bond of the Reformers lies therefore in the personal understanding of grace as against a sacramental *gratia infusa* which is injected into man. There is also their common acknowledgment of the Church as the communion of believers as over against the saving organization considered to be infallible with its

³*Institutio III,2,7.* = *Calvini Opera Selecta* ("OS"), ed. P. Barth, W. Niesel e.a., Vol. IV, p. 16,31 ss.

various hierarchical offices and its teaching and legalistic traditions. In common work the Reformers held together in their awakening of the *viva vox* by proclaiming the Gospel and its total dependence on Holy Scripture; but even the *sola scriptura* is only a form to witness to the presence of Him whom the scriptures proclaim: the *solus Christus*. Come to Christ, put your trust in Him in life as well as in death! There is no comfort to be found in man—this is the Reformation message.

Now we have to take into consideration that the interpretation of this message is influenced from two different directions. Firstly, it is influenced by the exposition of Holy Scripture. Here the Reformers are still predominantly in accord. The second influence was the needs and experiences of the Reformers and their parishes. When we question the motives of the Reformation movement we must not be surprised at the different answers we reach nor at the consequences to be drawn: rather we should be amazed at the complete fullness of what they have in common. Still it would pay us here to be very careful. The presentation of Reformation theology, especially in the German language, has all too often been built only upon the teaching and guidance of Luther; Zwingli

and Calvin have only been considered for their agreement or disagreement with the German Reformer. On the one hand, this leads to their differences being exaggerated; whereas on the other, different tendencies in similar-sounding expositions are too easily overlooked. To reach a better understanding of the Reformers it is necessary to question their motives both historically and objectively. Here we have arrived at the heart of their theologies. We shall try succinctly to paraphrase their various positions.

1) Continuing *Martin Luther's* words in regard to justification by faith we read: "This article contains everything which we teach and live in opposition to the Pope, the Devil and the world. Therefor we must be fully certain of this and not give way to doubt. Otherwise everything is lost, and the Pope and the Devil gain the victory and all right over us."⁴ Luther's teaching fights not only against the pope (that is to say, the representative of a church principle which denies the *solus Christus* and therefore has characteristics of the antichrist) but also against doubt and despair, against the ways of the world with its reason and sin, against eternal damnation and the devil. Day and night we are surrounded by these powers and are surrendered up to

⁴Schmalk. Art. (cf. note 1) S. 416,3ff.

their temptations. Yet their most dangerous powers lie within ourselves. In my conscience the devil reminds me of God's laws and tells his own good works, who lives in me: "You are lost!" Luther's message goes out to the man who doubts fear of hell. Or to put this in a more modern terminology, Luther speaks to the man who really endeavours to lead a purposeful and full life, but for all that fails to realize the presence of God in his life and the eternal bond which binds him to God. Such an experience has also its psychological side. We Protestants must never forget the picture of Brother Martin struggling with God in his monastery cell. Here Luther was afraid; that is why he was able later to appear fearless before the State and the whole Church. He was fearful of not being elected by God; he was fearful about the acceptance of his works, and the purity of his convictions. He was afraid of being damned for his sins. There is no real evangelical faith which does not know the attack of God's anger and which is not wounded by this vexation. For only the conscience which is attacked—and this was Luther's way — can hold on to the Gospel against the Law, grasp the promise of grace in the cross of Christ, which is in itself both of these: condemnation by God's anger and acceptance in His love. As we have already said, there is no faith without this emer-

gence from the darkness of guilt into the light which is lit for us in the preaching of God's Word, in the message of the sacrament. In this sense the question "How can I find a merciful God?" truly describes the most personal and deepest of human questions as well as the central motive of Lutheran piety. Comprehension of the promise of grace takes place in personal faith. Indeed this faith, created by the Word of God, is itself the aim of God's revelation, leading us from the Law to the Gospel. Its typical antithesis is: either "despair" or "work."

2) *Huldrych Zwingli* also became a Reformer because of fear, fear in the face of God's anger. But we have to realize right away that the reason for his fear lay in another direction. It is often said that Zwingli never knew the struggles of the soul which Luther experienced throughout his whole life; this does not tally. But whereas Luther's religion was to the very end the desire of the true monk fighting for the salvation of his soul, the Reformer of Zürich was a priest of the people, responsible for the souls of his parish; besides this he was also a loyal Swiss, a keen politician and a fiery democrat. For Zwingli the Word of God revealed itself especially in his time; and the task of preaching God's Word is a prophetic one, a preaching appropriate to the times, declaring the hour

of decision. The public and private life of the present is, however, governed by two factors. These are the corruption of the times themselves and the Reformation movement. This means a general and terrible falling away of the followers of Christianity and their Church from the commandment of God, and their plunging into the self-destruction of bloody wars, which are in fact a betrayal of Christ. This bore especially heavily upon Zwingli's sense of loyalty towards his country, a country which had become proud of her position in the wars of freedom and haughty about her avaricious mercenary campaigns, with their ensuing inextinguishable guilt. The threatening punishment was unthinkable. In his publication in 1524 of *The Shepherd*, the Reformer directs his remarks to the clergy: the shepherd knows that he "should accuse and hinder the wanton waging of war by the princes and rulers." "Where do the papists, the high bishops, and the whole crowd of so-called priests stand on this matter? What position have they adopted? In the last fifteen years they have played off the greatest and strongest nations against each other and caused utter chaos, whereby innumerable people have suffered untold physical and spiritual hardships. The most recent times are the worst. Whenever these men have

started to talk of peace they have done so in order to benefit from it; generally, however, the ensuing war was more horrible than its predecessor, with the result that everyone is gripped by a feeling of utmost fear when he hears any talk of peace. This clergy seeks to bring destruction into the world. Therefore, he who wants peace, let him now accept God's Word, which is brightly revealed in this age; because if he does not, he will never enjoy peace. The axe is laid against the tree."⁵ He allows His Word to be preached. It is our last chance to return to our Heavenly Father. And if we rebel against the Gospel, shall we not find ourselves under a terrible judgment? This is bound to be God's last word. "Do you not think, O pious Christian, that God reveals himself and his Word with special zeal to this sinful age, because such a wantonness, such a destruction of real piety, justice, chastity, truth and faith, and in addition to this such a dastardly grasping, robbery, usury and inflation have arisen among the majority of the rulers? Since the beginnings of Christianity the Word of God has never been so apparent as today, so that we can realize that it is there for our salvation and to rid us of all hypocrisy in human teaching. Therefore, in an age when also children and simple folk are able to speak,

⁵Z III 34,20—35,3.

woe to the shepherd, who keeps silent and hides the candle under a bushel and does the work of the Lord with slackness, and does not help in freeing God's people.”⁶

The man who turns against the commandment of God is a sacrifice to his own selfishness; and opposition to the Gospel is rooted in man's obstinate hold on his own ideas and traditions. In both cases he makes creation his god instead of recognizing the one true God, who is spirit. Here lies the roots of the spiritual emphasis in Zwingli's theology. For the moment we can take note of the following: for Zwingli “belief in the Gospel” not only means a personal seizing upon the merciful promise of eternal salvation, but means at the same time a decision for a change in the whole social and political sphere of life. The opposite of “faith” in practical life is called “self-interest”; and in the field of religion it is called “human teaching” and “tradition.” “It is beyond doubt that if man thinks he can, by reason alone, produce something good, he refuses to recognize that right and good come from God and His Word alone; he builds up an idol within himself, namely his own reason and discretion—an idol, which is hard to

destroy, because it spreads its magic, its hypocritical light beams in the face of others and sells what it has as being true and righteous. Just as a monkey is as pleased as punch with its young, so is man with his discoveries.”⁷

As in the case of Luther, it must not be forgotten that Zwingli sees the ground and the possibility of faith in Jesus Christ alone. The book *The Shepherd* expounds how faith and love are one in the face of the revealed grace of Christ: “When man realizes that Christ is not trying to trick him with His promises, then he has found real trust and faith in God. Where this exists, then it is impossible for godly love not to follow. For who would want to accept God as the merciful, true and highest good and still not love Him, especially when He has assured us of His grace through Jesus Christ, His Son?”⁸

3) We have seen how important the Word of God was for the first Reformers—the living proclamation found in the rediscovered Bible. In the case of *John Calvin*, a man of the second generation, the real and living strength of God's Word was itself the motive for the Reformation.

⁶Z III 27,22—28,9. Cf. G. W. Locher, “Das Geschichtsbild Huldrych Zwinglis.” *Theologische Zeitschrift*, Basel, IX/4, 1953, Seite 275-302.

⁷Z III 29, 28-35.

⁸Z III 44, 9-14.

tion movement. Here fear plays no role; a real worship of God causes love and deep respect spontaneously, "even if there were no Hell."⁹ Our situation in life becomes quite clear and simple before the powerful reality of God's Word: to honor God in the life of the Church of Jesus Christ. We cannot escape the impression that Calvin criticizes even his highly-regarded Luther when he stresses that the glory of God is still more important than our salvation.¹⁰ But with him, too, Christ is the revelation of grace and is therefore for us the wonderful possibility of faith. Yet we must acknowledge that trust itself represents a part of the obedience to which we are led by the Holy Spirit. Its opposite is disbelief in all its forms, which is and always will be "disobedience."

II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF HULDRYCH ZWINGLI¹¹

1. Let us have a look at Zwingli's *life and work*. Born on the first of January, 1484, in Wildhaus, Toggenburg, which stands at a height of 3,540 feet above sea level, the son of a free mountain-farmer and village magistrate, young Zwingli, when five years old, is given into the care of

his uncle Bartholemew Zwingli, the principal priest in the parish of Wesen on the Lake of Walen. At the age of ten he is sent to the Latin School in Basel, and two years later to Bern. When he reaches the age of fourteen—he is already living in the Dominican monastery—his uncle sends him to the famous University of Vienna. In 1502 he gains his Master of Arts degree in Basel; and in 1506 is ordained in Constance as a priest of the Church by the Bishop Hugo von Hohenlandenburg. For ten years, 1506-1516, he works as a priest in the small but important town of Glarus; during this period he makes a pilgrimage to Aix-la-Chapelle and takes part in two campaigns in Italy as a field-chaplain. As a supporter of the alliance with the Pope he has to give way to the strength of the French Party, and as a result becomes a minister of the Church in Einsiedeln, a famous place of pilgrimage. Now an opponent of the use of mercenaries, he is called on New Year's Day, 1519, to fill the vacant post of parish priest in Zürich Cathedral. He breaks away from the order of service as laid down by the Catholic Church and introduces a form of evangelical preaching, based on the exposition of whole books of

⁹*Inst. I,2,2 (OS, Vol. III 37, 4ss).*

¹⁰E.g., against the Cardinal Sadoletus, *OS I 463s.*

¹¹Cf. Walther Köhler, *Huldrych Zwingli*, 1943. Oskar Farner, *Huldrych Zwingli*, 4 Volumes, Zürich, 1943-1960.

the Bible. The ever increasing enthusiasm for his teaching causes a few friends to break Lent—Zwingli defends their action. The inactivity of the Bishop leads in January, 1524, to the calling of the First Zürich Disputation by the city council to discuss Zwingli's principle of evangelical preaching according to Holy Scripture only. Zwingli's successful defense of his sixty-seven theses was the first breakthrough for the Swiss Reformation. The "exposition of and reasons for his arguments" form the first evangelical dogmatics in the German language and are Zwingli's profoundest work. A second disputation follows (concerning images and the Mass) which led to a new attitude in the Church: the clergy must base its preaching on the Word of God; decisions concerning the Church can only be carried through by a majority vote in the parish. Pictures and images must be removed without disturbance from places of worship; funds for the celebration of masses for the dead are to be used for schools and for the care of the poor; a seminary is founded which provides instruction on biblical exegesis and preaching before a congregation; from the year 1525 there is the celebration of an evangelical form of Holy Communion. In the same year Zwingli's most important work in the Latin language appears, his *Commentarius de vera et falsa religione*. Soon afterwards there

follow the publications on his struggle with Luther in regard to the Lord's Supper. The main political and theological conflicts take place in the next few years: with the farmers, the baptists, the strict papists of inner Switzerland, and with Luther. Zwingli, however, experiences his greatest triumph at the Bernese Disputation of 1528, which brings the city and the territory stretching from there to Geneva into the Reformation fold. The most important event for the inner history of Protestantism takes place in the year 1529 in Marburg, where Zwingli and Luther meet to discuss their theological viewpoints. They agree with each other in every sphere except in that concerning Holy Communion. Even here the main question is whether their differences must lead to a split in the Church: Zwingli feels strongly that this need not be necessary. The ever worsening confessional and political tension with the Cantons of Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden leads to bloody attacks by the latter. Zwingli's aim is to induce them to allow the promulgation of the Gospel. The strict and somewhat bungling measures of Zürich and Bern drive the Inner Swiss to desperate counterattacks, which find the Protestants quite unprepared. At the Battle of Kappel the army of Zürich, completely inferior in numbers, is routed; the army chaplain, fighting bravely, falls in the massacre. As a result the

Reformation movement receives a severe shock. However, the determination and bravery of Zwingli's assistant, Leo Jud, and his young successor, Heinrich Bullinger, held Zürich, Bern, Basel, and Schaffhausen along with their territories for the Reformation.

2. As far as it is possible to have an over-all impression of Zwingli's *inner development*, we could phrase it as follows. Through the influence of his home Zwingli shows a fervent love for his fatherland, his people, parish, and Church. The "trivium" schooling is customary; however, the Latin Schools of Basel and Bern offer courses in ancient history, this being the influence of the humanists. His studies in Vienna and Basel bring him into close contact with the medieval scholasticism: there is perhaps also a semester in Paris which gives him some experience in the theology of Thomas Aquinas. Although at that time the Faculty of Arts forbids humanist studies, the student receives his first impression of humanism in Vienna, in fact from the viewpoint of Eastern Europe, which concentrates more strictly on the exact sciences. His period in Glarus shows an increased awareness of loyalty to his country. During this time he also meets the highly respected Erasmus, the representative of West European humanism, which does homage to an individualist and cosmopolitan ideal

of learning. Now Zwingli goes through a pacifist period. Then with friends he forms a group which with its desire for political and Church reform and educational zeal is quite unique: this has recently been spoken of as "Swiss humanism." During his years in Einsiedeln he is busy studying Greek and Hebrew, the Church Fathers, and the Greek New Testament. Later he takes up the works of Augustine. Around 1516 the importance of Holy Scripture comes to the fore: this is to be taken as the result of his personal confrontation with the living Christ. The duty of renewing the Church is looked upon as a holy responsibility, to be understood in the light of the Parable of the Talents. Later Zwingli looks back on this as the start of his evangelical mission. Besides the essential principle of Christ as the focus of understanding for salvation, reformed theology makes slow progress. The early writings of Luther of around 1520 are still interpreted in the light of a reforming humanism. On the other hand, Luther's decisiveness at the Leipzig Disputation is regarded with admiration as being the proper example for all to follow. After the plague of 1519 Zwingli wrote a hymn which shows a deeper personal faith and his readiness to offer himself as an instrument of God. This experience must have furthered his understanding of Paul's anthropology and teaching about sin.

In 1522 there appears a lively and new interpretation of Paul's teaching on grace and freedom. From this point until his death Zwingli's theology retains its form, only small items being changed or added or made more profound, through the Christology of the Epistle to the Hebrews, through the debate with the baptists, and the debate with Luther concerning the sacraments.

3. Within the boundary of this awakening, brought about by preaching of Christ, we also have to understand the originality of the Zürich Reformer and his thinking. In this task, however, we are still at the beginning. Whether critically or as an object of praise, during the last 300 years Zwingli has always been described (both dogmatically and historically) in comparison to the professor from Wittenberg, and thus has never been properly understood. A proper understanding of Zwingli has also been obscured in the last 400 years by world-wide influence of the Reformer from Geneva. Whether modern theology has reason to consider Zwingli's contribution to the Reformation message or not, this we can only decide when we know the man himself. One thing we have to notice right away is that his teaching on Holy Communion has to be presented within the framework of his theology, and not the opposite way around.

III. PRINCIPAL CHAPTERS OF ZWINGLI'S THEOLOGY

1. Zwingli's way of thinking can be phrased in the following way:

(a) The main *elements* are: his scholastic tendency in the sense of *via antiqua*, which is largely Thomistic in outlook, but with certain Scotistic overtones; the humanism of Erasmus, which even after his change to reformed ways exercises an influence in the sense of a Platonistic understanding of spirit and soul, and which leads to the historical, critical, and linguistic exegesis of biblical texts, whereby the use of biblical terminology in secular writing is also examined. Viennese humanism drew Zwingli's attention to the historical and geographical factors of environment in the New Testament. Swiss humanism adopts a stoical and impressive form of virtue, and uses ancient as well as local history as a storehouse of examples. The Church Fathers, especially the Cappadocians and Augustine, are now being studied in the light of the Bible. The Reformer's like-minded understanding of the Old Testament prophets comes as a surprise; at mid-point in the New Testament stands the Gospel of Matthew, because of its proclamation of the Lord's words, John because of its Christology, the Epistles to the Romans and to the Galatians because of their teaching on grace, the Epistle to the Hebrews be-

cause of its understanding of the sacrifice of Christ.

(b) The motives for Zwingli's Reformation struggle lie: in his acceptance of the mildly rationalistic and reformist thought of humanism, but with the keen observation that this alone is not enough for the redemption of social and church life; in the Reformer's republican patriotism; in his passionate enthusiasm as a church minister for the Gospel of Christ and the spread of His love in the parish; in his experience that Christ is ever present and demands obedience in the rediscovered Word of God, and in its interpretation and proclamation. The Reformer himself states his motives in various but at the same time harmonious ways: "the glory of God, the common good of a Christian form of state government, the comfort of a stricken conscience."¹²

2. For Zwingli the Reformation decision lies in turning away from idolatry to the one true God. It is this same worship of creation which manifests itself religiously in the normative claims of human authority, teachings, and traditions, especially in sacramentalism and justification through works; and then socially

through avarice, war, and licentiousness. The newly proclaimed "Gospel" contains therefore a spiritual character, for it is a call away from the spirit of man to the Word of God, from the emotions to God's command: it reveals God as our highest and only true comfort and possession: *summum bonum*. It is spiritual because the living Christ is revealed in it. As a result the offer of grace and the proffered grace itself coincide. "Gospel" is often merely a term for the Reformation movement. Understood in this way it has a claim on all life, even public life. Zwingli did not "amalgamate" Church and State, religion and politics, but he never considered for a moment that there could be a sphere of life outside the influence of God's Word. Throughout he thinks theocratically in the sense of the medieval *corpus christianum*.¹³ But the decision between "God or creation" is always something entirely personal. The spiritual essence of God had already been emphasized by the humanists, but Zwingli went much further in that he realized that man could neither imagine nor provide himself with the knowledge that "spiritual comfort lies in God alone";¹⁴ and therefore to overcome sin it was necessary not merely to have a principle

¹²Z III 911,30f.

¹³Cf. G. W. Locher, *Die evangelische Stellung der Reformatoren zum öffentlichen Leben. Kirchliche Zeitfragen Heft 26*. Zwingli-Verlag, Zürich, 1950.

¹⁴Z I 346/347; 382,29s.

of spirituality, but there must be an act of salvation on the part of God.

3. The one great event which affects man most profoundly, which brings him salvation and the gift of faith, and therefore can be designated as the most important event in his life, is atonement through the death of Christ on the cross. This is to be understood strictly in the sense of a doctrine of propitiation (*satisfactio*) and in this way can be looked upon as the *Gospel*. "For He, who is blameless, suffered death for us sinners, and paid the terrible price to obtain for us the wonderful justification of God, which no human can attain to. So He has opened up the way to God for us through His free gift of grace. Whoever hears this and believes without doubt shall be saved. This is the *Gospel*."¹⁵ In contrast to Anselm, Zwingli declares that not only justice but also God's mercy requires propitiation: forgiveness through the dispensation of punishment would not be pure grace.¹⁶ Again it is emphasized that no creature, but only the eternal Son of God,

was able to turn us from the path which would have led to damnation.¹⁷

4. With sacrifice of His life, Christ has become our "Captain," that is to say, He rules over our life and can demand its sacrifice from us.¹⁸ Yet the acceptance of atonement through *faith* must prove itself in our child-like trust of God's guidance in everyday matters. Zwingli's famous stress on providence does not challenge his faith in Christ, rather it is a form of it. Matthew 6 and Romans 8:32 are his usual arguments. "Let us find our succour in God alone, who is our Father. For this reason we dare come to Him. For how will He reject us, when He has already given His Son for us (*pro nobis*) as an eternal security, and freed us from all sin?"¹⁹ Nevertheless providence cannot be separated from God's omnipotence. Yet for the faithful there remains the fact that we "are nothing but the instruments and implements through which God works," not something to be taken for granted, "because we are by nature evil."²⁰

¹⁵Z II 478, 1-6.

¹⁶Huldreich Zwinglis *Werke*, herausgegeben von Melchior Schuler und Johannes Schulthess, Zürich, 1828ff ("S"), Vol. IV, p. 47-48. Cf. G. W. Locher, *Die Theologie Huldreich Zwinglis im Lichte seiner Christologie*. Band I: *Die Gotteslehre*, 1950. Seite 147f.

¹⁷Z II 38-40. S IV 47-48.

¹⁸Cf. G. W. Locher, "Christus unser Hauptmann," Ein Stück der Verkündigung Huldreich Zwinglis in seinem kulturgeschichtlichen Zusammenhang. *Zwingliana ("Zwa")* IX/3 (1950/1) 121-138.

¹⁹Z II 221,19-23.

²⁰Z II 186,16-26.

5. Behind all this stands the concept of God. As in scholasticism, God is called *summum bonum*, but Zwingli does not lay so much stress upon the fact that the precious possession and fellowship with Him is to be reckoned as salvation, but rather that God is the fount of all good. Reformation thinking turns the scholastic concept around drastically with the dialectic that the perfection of God is in no way the result of our decision, arrived at as a judgment among other good things, but is rather the opposite—God alone is good. Everything which can be considered “good” in creation has been given the quality of being so “through participation or rather by bestowal” and must be judged over against God’s revealed goodness. (The start of Zwingli’s work, *De Providentia*, 1530.²¹) The same way of thinking is to be maintained in regard to the concept of being, the only true, non-created Being possessing the power of being within Himself. Here Zwingli means neither an embracing *essentia* of creator and created nor a form of pantheism, but more what Thomas Aquinas described as the relationship between Creator and creation in their dissimilarity. But the Reformer underlines the fact that this relationship is created by the Creator and remains dependent upon Him. As a result the traditional

aseitas (absolute independence) of God, along with His being Lord, remains one.

Both conceptions — God as the highest good and as pure being — are placed by Zwingli in the category of what he understands under the word “Father.” To this are added the traditional attributes—absolute self-sufficiency, the all-powerful, the all-knowing, etc.—wherein the Thomistic conception of determinism sometimes plays a part. Zwingli stresses the essential “simplicity” (*simplicitas*) of God: his reason for this is, I think, to counteract Luther’s Occamistic distinction between *Deus absconditus* and *Deus revelatus* (the “hidden” and the “revealed” God). In his revelation God offers Himself to us entirely. For all stoical or static-scholastic conceptions serve biblical, historical thought: God is *Deus noster*, “our God.”

6. Zwingli holds firmly to early Church Christology: *vere Deus, vere homo*; his orthodox teaching on the Trinity underlines the transition to Christology. But after what has been said it is no wonder that the main stress is laid upon the divinity of Christ. In the Reformation discussion Luther stressed the humanity of Christ, whereas Zwingli stuck firmly to the divinity of God become man. Luther took hold of the *revelation* of

²¹S IV 81.

God, Zwingli *God's* revelation. The consequence is the Nestorian coloring of the relationship between the two natures: the "person" of Christ is identical with His divinity. At the same time, however, Zwingli brings out dogmatically the importance of Jesus' life here on earth as no other Reformer has ever done. This arises from the fact that not only the miracles of healing but also Christ's teaching and the authority of His words are contained in His *divinity*. Humanity born of the Virgin Mary is the instrument of His divinity; He could only suffer physically, but only through His divinity could His suffering bring about eternal salvation, and just here lies the strength of *pro nobis*, "for us." The *communicatio idiomatum*, that is to say, the intertwining of the properties of godly and human nature may be considered as *communio naturarum*; only in regard to the person of God become man is it possible to ascertain, *per alloiosim*, the properties of a nature. (*Alloiosis*, change, is a rhetorical term from Plutarch.) Christ's presence in accordance with His divinity reaches further than His glorified humanity. The later so-called *Extra Calvinisticum* is already clearly formulated by Zwingli in accordance with the older form of scholasticism. (Contrary to this, the contemporary

polemics of Roman theology and cf Luther argue in the sense of a new-monophysitic Christology. I feel that there is a common root in late medieval mysticism and in nominalism.)

I should like to refer here to two quotations from Zwingli, which I have chosen intentionally because they do not argue against Luther. "His humanity is the sacrificial lamb, which takes away the sin of the world, not because He is man, but because He is both God and man; according to His humanity He could suffer, but in the power of His divinity He raises us to life."²² Here the dyophysitic formulation and the soteriological intention which stands behind it are clearly defined. Now Zwingli attacks John Eck with extreme acerbity, saying that his assertions are a perversion and a dimming of the Word of God and a "defamation of Christ's glory and honour, who sits at the right hand of the Father, and are a confusion of the two different natures of Christ, of which the divine penetrates everything and is ever-present: whereas the human can only be in one place, according to God's directive and decision. . . ."²³ We realize that the two points of view have converged. The "confusion of the natures" infringes upon the conception of *vere homo*, the true humanity of Christ,

²²Z V 489,5-9.

²³Z V 226,3-9.

and with it the miracle of the incarnation and of the grace revealed in it, and upon his also real historicity and the depth of the Lord's suffering. The scope of this Christology is therefore the assurance of finding God in the human Jesus; but it is also a protection of Christ's humanity against sliding into monophysitism or docetism, a protection of the identity of the risen Lord, the source of faith, with the historical Jesus. Lastly, it is the assurance of everlasting life with the glorified Lord who "sits at the right hand of the Father." In one word, Luther's Christology belongs to Christmas, Zwingli's to Easter or (still better) to His ascension: it speaks of Him to whom all power is given. From here stems his teaching about the State.

7. But the stress on divinity first calls forth a certain form of spiritualism (guided by the dogma of the Trinity). Man was dependent upon the *Holy Spirit* even before the fall. Since then all knowledge of God, in fact all knowledge of truth as well as natural Law, is especially dependent upon the *Holy Spirit* because "man is untruthful."²⁴ The Spirit and freedom of God are not bound to the history of salvation. Zwingli's

enumeration of pious heathens, whom he looks forward to meeting in Heaven, is famous.²⁵ But here it is necessary to observe that even this has nothing to do with human achievement. Wherever truth, however fragmentary, has been recognized among pagans, there had always been a special pronouncement from the Holy Ghost. Even knowledge of self and repentance stem only from the Spirit of God. Actually faith in Christ is His gift: "No one can come to me unless drawn by the Father" (John 6:44) is one of the most referred to texts quoted by Zwingli. The understanding of Christ's divinity and humanity is also a gift of the Spirit. Even more important is the fact that Christ is present in Spirit by virtue of His divinity. Thus He grants forgiveness, faith, comfort, assurance, peace with God and rises to true life. "The spirit of man cannot do this."²⁶ No one can understand the Word of God unless he is enlightened by God's Spirit: "Without the Spirit flesh perverts the Word of God and makes it the opposite."²⁷ On the other hand, the following points belong to the attributes of the Spirit: 1) Conformity to Holy Scripture, which is itself inspired by the Spirit; 2) the striv-

²⁴Omnis homo mendax, Ps. 116.11 = Ro. 3.4.—Z II 96,30 and *passim* quoted by Zwingli.

²⁵Cf. Rudolf Pfister, *Die Seligkeit erwählter Heiden bei Zwingli*, 1952.

²⁶Z V 968,24.

²⁷S V 773.

ing after God's honor; and 3) the humility of man. That the Spirit of God in His freedom does not allow Himself to be bound to creaturely existence is not an ontological consequence but a soteriological necessity: the merciful *praesentia Dei*, the presence of God, is a prerequisite of faith, not the contrary.²⁸

8. From these premises, derived from the revelation of God, it becomes evident that Christianity, evangelically understood, is the one true religion.²⁹ "The true religion or piety is that which holds onto God alone, to the exclusion of all other things."³⁰ "False religion or piety exists where man lays his trust in something other than God. Whoever trusts some form of creation cannot be truly pious. He is ungodly who accepts the word of man as if it were God's Word."³¹ Not only that God is, but also who He is—both must be revealed to us by God Himself.

9. *Faith* is "restfulness and assurance in the merit (*meritum*) of Christ,"³² and it is this faith which "provides salvation." The expression cannot really be accepted as it stands,

for it is grace which redeems; faith is drawn into the over-all action of the Spirit. The corrections which Calvin applies to Luther's terminology are also applied by Zwingli. *Justification*, which Zwingli likes to translate literally ("making justified") is to be understood along with forgiveness. The denial of justification by works is the great liberation; trust in one's own deeds belongs to the deification of the created. The new *work*, arising out of Spirit, faith, and love is described in a lively form: "The more faith grows, the more the work of all good things grows,"³³ because the believer is moved to such action by God. This faith is *experiencia* (experience) and *fiducia* (trust), which must be separated sharply from *fides historica* (historical faith without personal involvement) and *opinio* (personal opinion). Faith, in the true sense of the word, can only have God as its content, just as it also has a divine source.

10. Because Christ gives us faith—something which no man can give—the *Word*, out of which it stems, is the "inner Word," *verbum internum*, "spoken into" (*eingesprochen*)³⁴ by

²⁸Cf. Z V 583.

²⁹Cf. the Reformer's main work in Latin, *De vera et falsa religione Commentarius*. Z III 590-912.

³⁰Z III 669,17-18.

³¹Z III 674,20-24.

³²Z II 182,4-5.

³³Z II 183,7-8.

³⁴Z II 110,19.

the *Spirit* of the Lord. The outer word is ordained by God; it denotes the highest mandate and cannot be opposed, but it remains at every turn dependent upon the fact that the Lord Himself accompanies the word of man and opens the heart of the listener to it. The Lord's presence, vouchsafed in the Roman Catholic Church by the sacrament, cannot be guaranteed on the evangelical side merely by the sermon. Luther is amazed that the Spirit of God attaches Himself to the Word; Zwingli takes care to emphasize that the Word remains attached to the Spirit, and the proclamation of the Word knows itself to be dependent on the free gift of grace. The sermon witnesses to salvation, but it is the work of the Spirit which makes it actual.³⁵

11. This always leads, on the basis of the biblical challenge and the example of Christ, to *repentance*. Repentance precedes as well as succeeds faith. (In the case of Luther it is the predecessor to faith, whereas Calvin declared emphatically that there can be no repentance without faith.) For Zwingli repentance exists in the knowledge and denial of oneself and in guarding against a possible relapse. It exists also in the continual flight to Christ's grace—Romans 7 speaks

of the "reborn"—because sin always remains in the believer, "although it is mastered and held down by Christ."³⁶

12. In the discipleship of Christ the *Law* is not superfluous, for it is the steadfast will of God. Extrinsic commandments, even those in the Bible, lose their efficacy in Christ, especially the law pertaining to ceremony. But what applies to the inner man has been raised by Christ as the divine Lawgiver to everlasting validity. And this is precisely the commandment of love, which is referred to by natural law in vain. Just as forgiveness belongs to salvation, so does the "Law of Christ" also: he who is filled with love is happy in the Law—here it loses its juristic character and reveals itself to be a part of the Gospel. Against the opinion of Luther it is noted that "for him who loves God the Law is a Gospel."³⁷

13. However, even before this, the Law had revealed our "misery," but nowhere so apparently as in the Word of Christ. Our whole knowledge of *sin* presupposes instruction by the Spirit and by faith. Zwingli also differentiates between *peccatum originale* (original sin) and *peccata actualia* (sinful deeds). He bases the forms

³⁵Cf. G. W. Locher, *Im Geist und in der Wahrheit. Die reformatorische Wendung im Gottesdienst zu Zürich*. Neukirchen, 1957. S.16-19.

³⁶Z I 351, 30f.

³⁷Z II 232,13f.

on a translation of Augustine's *morbis* (illness), which has been misunderstood up to the present day. It does not mean infirmity, but an incurable breach. Our nature is "broken" in Adam, and totally so; we are wholly evil: "Flesh" is also our spiritual existence,³⁸ although in Zwingli's later writings the soul (not intelligence) is considered as that part of man to which the Holy Ghost speaks. Original sin is, as in the eyes of Augustine and Luther, love and perversion of oneself: it is always the rejection of the divine Spirit in favor of oneself and of creation. Physical death is the consequence and image of eternal death, in which we already partake.

14. Thus Zwingli represents the *servum arbitrium*, the teaching of unfree will in opposition to the optimism of the humanists—and answered Erasmus even before Luther did. Redemption occurs through grace on the ground of *election*.³⁹ Not only is predestination a special case of providence, it is also the basis for the assurance of salvation. Its definition is original: in the eternal decree the revelation of Christ holds precedence. The merciful election of the individual refers to Christ's reve-

lation, whereas it is God's justice which justifies him. Condemnation is hardly touched upon; we should believe in the election of our brother up to the point where the opposite could be proved, which is almost impossible. Here we recognize the root of "federal theology."

15. The earthly side of election and of the covenant of God is the existence of the *Church*. It is born of God's Word and governed by the *cathedra Dei* (the throne at the right hand of God):⁴⁰ the Pope is therefore the antichrist. The government of the Church takes place through the working of the Holy Spirit. After his experience with the baptists, Zwingli adds the point that the Spirit maintains the Church in harmony and order through the ministries to which civil magistrates also can belong.⁴¹ In the foreground stands the "shepherd" or "guardian," the "bishop," who preaches. The congregation watches over the life of its members and the preaching of its shepherd, and has *jus reformati*, the right to reform itself. Hardened sinners, especially those in connection with money, are to be refused Holy Communion. Yet the key ministry lies in the proclamation of the

³⁸Z II 99. Z III 660,10ff.

³⁹Cf. G. W. Locher, "Die Praedestinationslehre Huldrych Zwinglis. *Theol. Zeitschrift*, Basel, XII/5, 1956, S. 526-548.

⁴⁰Z I 26-35.

⁴¹Cf. Zwingli's letter to Ambrosius Blarer in Constance, Z IX 451-467.

Gospel (as in the Heidelberg Catechism). Forgiveness is the prerogative and action of God; this dare not be overshadowed by any institution of confession. In the light of Ezekiel 3 the Church has been given the position of prophetic guardian over public life: the nation is lost if this is neglected.

16. According to these conditions it is not surprising that the *sacraments*, enacted by man, are an answer and witness of the Church. They are "public signs of duty."⁴² They presuppose faith. They cannot, however, transmit grace nor relieve the stricken conscience. Yet there arises a symbolic analogy between the signs and that which they represent, wherein the sacrament contains an emphasis which surpasses the spoken word.⁴³

In his *Conclusions* Zwingli disputes the sacrificial character of *Holy Communion* on the basis of the Epistle to the Hebrews (the "once").⁴⁴ Soon afterwards the polemic against transubstantiation and consubstantiation arose. After the time of the letter from Cornelis Hoen⁴⁵ he professes the symbolic interpretation of the institutional words (*significat*), whereby the real presence of the Body of Christ in the elements is excluded. Zwingli does not look upon this interpretation as an impoverish-

ment, but more as profound progress. What concerns him in article 18 is the way we regard the eternal salvation that is wrought for us: "remembrance" (*memoria, anamnesis*). According to biblical texts he then unfolds his teaching: "Do that in remembrance of me!" Thus the Lord's Supper is giving thanks for Christ's gracious sacrifice (*eucharistia*), a celebration in remembrance of it and a communal meal. In opposition to Luther and Calvin, the communion of believers is the actor in the celebration and not Christ. The following points, however, have to be remembered. 1) "Remembrance" is not an intellectual procedure, which merely awakens associations with the past, but is a belonging to the present; *memoria* according to Augustine is the spiritual strength of realization and of consciousness. 2) From the very beginning Zwingli lays stress upon the Lord's Supper as representing the full presence of Christ to our souls through faith. For faith there is even His bodily presence, especially in what He has done for us (*His res gestae*). Here the gift of Holy Communion is revealed clearly. As a consequence of the discussion with Luther, Zwingli works upon this train of thought until he reaches a point very near the attitude of Calvin. He describes it in the fol-

⁴²Z III 759,19 *publica consignatio*.

⁴³S IV 11.

⁴⁴Z II 116ff.

⁴⁵Z IV 505-519.

lowing parable. "A husband, intending to travel into a far country, gives his wife his finest ring, on which is engraved his image, and says: 'Look, here I am, your husband; hold to me even during my absence and rejoice in me!' Thus he goes much further than if he were to say: 'Look, my ring!' With his words he gives himself and as it were says: 'I want you always to be certain that I am entirely yours!'"⁴⁶

But here also it is completely clear that the meaning which Luther attributes to "the sacrament of the altar" is taken by Zwingli to apply to Christ Himself. The main arguments against Luther are 1) the evidence of the symbolic form of expression in Holy Scriptures ("I am the vine"); 2) the text John 6:63 ("It is the spirit that gives life; the flesh is of no avail"); and 3) the bodily ascension of Christ. The debate is carried out philosophically on both sides. Luther uses scholastic arguments, and Zwingli those of humanist platonism: external signs can have no influence on the soul. These thoughts, however, stand in the service of the Christological decision: if atonement is won on the cross, then the comfort of the stricken

soul does not depend upon the celebration of the sacrament. This is an alternative which Luther did not recognize, and therefore could never understand. Zwingli's protest was however not rationalistic but Christological. "We do not derive the absurd from the situation—what is absurd in the eyes of *faith* is really absurd."⁴⁷ Christ is Himself both the fulfillment as well as the pledge of grace. Wherever faith is bound tightly to any ceremony, then for Zwingli the whole Reformation is in danger.

17. The same trust in the strength of God's Spirit leads to the theocratic ideal: the Reformation of the Church must also bring about a renewal of the *State*. The boundaries are fluid: "A Christian city is the same as a Christian congregation,"⁴⁸ and the magistrates must be aware that they are responsible for the well-being of Christ's sheep. They govern according to imperfect "human justice," which at the most gives "to each his own" (*suum cuique*), whereas divine justice gives us what does not belong to us. But within this boundary God restrains chaos by means of commandment and authority.⁴⁹ The task

⁴⁶S IV 38f.

⁴⁷Z V 618,8-18.

⁴⁸S VI,1 6.

⁴⁹Cf. "Von göttlicher und menschlicher Gerechtigkeit," 1523, Z II 458-525. Also in *Huldrych Zwingli: Von göttlicher und menschlicher Gerechtigkeit. Sozialpolitische Schriften für die Gegenwart*, ausgewählt und eingeleitet von L. von Muralt und O. Farner. Zürich, Rascher-Verlag, 1934. Also in *Zwingli-Hauptschriften*, Band 7 (*Der Staatsmann*), herausgegeben von R. Pfister, Zürich, 1942, Seiten 31-104.

of politics and business is the service of God, whereby the proclaimed Word has to remain timely in its demands and press for improvement in conditions. Here Zwingli encourages every citizen to maintain his right of opposition according to his responsibility.⁵⁰ The democratic Zwingli is of the opinion that the slavery in Babylon was God's punishment upon Israel for tolerating such a tyrant as Manasseh.

18. It is impossible for us to pursue the way in which a theocratic attitude overcomes Zwingli's humanism. "Education can be presented as the servant of wisdom, her mistress," whereby wisdom consists of the proper worship and love of God.⁵¹

IV. CONCLUSIONS

1. Characteristic of the Zürich Reformer is the combination of a theocentric and theocratic way of thinking with a spiritualistic Christology; the stress upon the objectivity of salvation in election and atonement, together with the application of healing in Spirit and faith; and the responsibility for communal life in

Church and State in combination with a humanist tendency in education. On the whole this was a Reformation which broke up on the periphery and then pushed through to its spiritual center, and from there returned back to the periphery. Its sober happiness must not be forgotten: "If you feel that the fear of God makes you more happy than sad, that is certainly the work of God's Word and Spirit."⁵²

2. *Luther* sees before him the troubled man and preaches to him the *solus Christus*, the Christ *pro me*. *Zwingli* sees before him the untruthful, selfish man and the confusion of his social life. He cries to the *solus Deus*, the *Deus noster* in the *Christus noster*. *Calvin* sees before him man as a disobedient individual. He calls him to order and salvation under the glory of Christ in His Church: *Domini sumus*, "we are the Lord's!"⁵³ In their teaching about the Word of God Luther and Calvin stand closer together against Zwingli. In Christology Zwingli and Calvin are in agreement against Luther. It is the same with the doctrine of the Spirit and the relationship between Spirit

⁵⁰ Z II 344. S IV 59.

⁵¹ S VI, I 375.

⁵² Z I 384, 17-19, at the end of the sermon "Of the Clarity and Certainty of the Word of God." Cf. the excellent English edition and the valuable introductions in *Zwingli and Bullinger. Selected Translations with Introductions and Notes*, by G. W. Bromiley. (*The Library of Christian Classics*, Vol. XXIV.) London, 1953.

⁵³ Inst. III, 7, 1.

and Word. But of all the Reformers Zwingli possesses the strongest pneumatological dynamic. In his teaching on election he has found the most helpful definition; it is a pity that in reformed church tradition this should soon have been replaced by Calvin's systematics. In their understanding of the Church Zwingli and Luther are united in the medieval image of *corpus christianum*, whilst Zwingli's theocratic will was realized more forcefully by Calvin with his modern outlook, in which he pressed for a free Church.

3. Considering our responsibility for transmitting fruitfully the Reformation inheritance, it is surprising that a correct understanding of Zwingli's theology can give men and women of today suggestions for tasks as well as for help. For example we can name the following points:

(a) Zwingli's unrestrained and open approach to philosophy, stemming from his allegiance to the biblical message and not in spite of it.

(b) His natural openness to the world of religion even in his harshest criticism of it.

(c) His ethical dynamic and cultic asceticism in conjunction with everything that can be called "service of God."

(d) His exemplary motivation for the socio-ethical problematic—not as an annex, but as being in the center of faith. This is in contrast to religious individualism, from which neither Lutheranism nor Rome has been able to free itself. Nor did the later Protestantism free itself of this.

(e) Lastly, I know of no other Reformer who has anticipated to such a degree the modern ecumenical-missionary watchword of the Church, which is only Church when it lowers its walls to public life and becomes "the Church for the world."

In all these different ways the voice of the misinterpreted Zürich Reformer has much of significance to tell us. "For the love of God do something brave!" Huldrych Zwingli cries.⁵⁴ And: "Truth has a happy face."⁵⁵

⁵⁴Z X 165,4.

⁵⁵Quoted from *Gott ist Meister. Zwingli-Worte für unsere Zeit*. Ausgewählt von Oskar Farner. (Zwingli-Bücherei 8.) Zürich, 1940. (From the *Enchiridion Psalmorum*, Z XIII ?.)

On Demythologizing

by SCHUBERT M. OGDEN*

IN INVITING ME to lecture to you, President Miller indicated that you would be interested in some word from me on the question of demythologizing. Since my own interest in this question continues unabated—and I become ever more firmly convinced that, when demythologizing is rightly understood, it is the only possible way forward for Protestant theology—I am happy to be guided by this indication of your interest, and so offer the following remarks under the general heading, "On Demythologizing."

This reference to what I shall say as "remarks" is deliberate. The question of demythologizing is astonishingly complex, and no brief statement such as could be made within an hour could more than scratch the surface in any case. Furthermore, since I have already written at some length on this question, what little I have to offer toward its clarification can be studied at leisure by anyone who cares to do so. But, more important still, experience has led me to conclude that (with due apologies to Kant) if discussions without lectures are blind, lectures without discussions are empty. Therefore, I do not

propose to take up our entire time together simply lecturing to you. Instead, I shall direct my remarks toward outlining a few of the essential points, hoping thereby to stimulate your own reflection and questions, which I shall then do my best to answer in the time that remains.

I. ON RELIGIOUS SYMBOLISM IN GENERAL

It would be generally agreed that, whatever is to be understood by the word "myth" (or "mythology"), it at least points us to the phenomenon of religious language or symbolism. Many, indeed, take the position that myth covers the whole ground of religious symbolism, that the only language in which religious experience—or, if you will, the experience of faith—can find expression is the language of myth. I do not myself take this position, since it seems to me, on careful analysis, to be incoherent and to give rise to needless paradox. I shall return to this point later. Nevertheless, I do agree that myth is an important *species* of religious language or symbolism, and that it is best approached by consider-

* A lecture delivered at Pittsburgh Theological Seminary, February 23, 1967.

ing it in relation to the larger genus to which it belongs. Accordingly, I turn, first, to a consideration of religious symbolism in general. I shall make five main points, which together outline my own approach to this more general question. But I am well aware, as you will be, that making them as baldly as I must raises a whole host of questions that need to be pursued much, much further than I shall attempt to pursue them here.

1. *Man is the symbol-making, symbol-using animal (animal symbolicum).*—It is the distinctive prerogative of the uniquely human being that it not only is but also knows that it is. Man has the capacity of consciousness or self-consciousness, and so is uniquely the creature of meaning. He is able to understand himself and his fellow creatures and the encompassing reality in which they have their origin and end and, through his thought and language, is able to bring this complex reality to a unique expression. As logos himself, he is able to grasp the logos of the reality which presents itself in his experience and to re-present this reality through symbolic speech and action.

2. *Man's capacity to discern meaning and to give it symbolic expression is what lies behind the whole complex phenomenon of human culture, including religion.*—Culture is

quite properly defined as the objectification of meaning in various symbolic forms; it is the re-presentation through speech and action of the complex reality of self, others, and the whole which is presented in our experience. What distinguishes "religion" as one cultural expression alongside of others (art, science, morality, etc.) is the attempt to express the ultimate meaning of man's existence by grasping the logos of the whole of reality that we encounter in our experience and re-presenting it through appropriate symbolic forms. Thus "religious symbolism," in this sense of "religious," comprises all forms of speech and action that serve directly and explicitly as currency for this attempt.

3. *Religious symbols are explicitly or implicitly cognitive in meaning.*—The determinative use or function of such symbols is to make claims about reality as experienced which are in some sense capable of being true or false. This is not to say that the *only* use of religious symbols is to assert truth-claims. Clearly, such symbols function not only indicatively, to make assertions, but also expressively, to convey feelings and convictions, and imperatively, to enjoin others to certain beliefs or actions. The symbols of religion embody confessions and injunctions, as well as proposals for belief. Nevertheless, if one tries to interpret reli-

gious symbolism as having a wholly "noncognitive" meaning, he is bound to fail. Implicitly, at least, all religious symbols are "cognitive."

4. *The cognitive meaning of religious symbols (or, as we may also say, the kind of truth-claims they make) is sui generis.*—Cognitivitiy means many things, not simply one thing; and the words "know" and "true" have a variety of uses, not merely one use. This must always be insisted upon against the imperialism of those who would make one use of "know" or "true" their only use. To determine whether a certain symbol (or kind of symbol) has cognitive meaning, is capable of being used to make a truth-claim, it is always wrong to ask whether it meets the truth conditions appropriate to some other symbol (or kind of symbol). One must ask, rather, whether it meets *its own* kind of truth conditions, which is to say, whether there are *some* specifiable intersubjective criteria or standards to which it may be referred to determine its truth or falsity. One can set about determining whether there are any such standards by (1) recalling that assertions always function as answers to questions; (2) establishing what kind of a question it is to which a given kind of assertion functions as an answer; and (3) clarifying the presuppositions of that kind of a question. Implied in these presuppositions will be

the criteria of truth relevant for judging assertions answering that kind of question.

Thus, for example, an analysis of the language of science which proceeds by these three steps discloses the following: *scientific assertions* presuppose that something which might not be the case at all in fact is the case, and they serve to answer the question of what that something is. Accordingly, a scientific assertion is true which so answers the question of what is in fact the case that we can successfully predict particular future events and thus avoid unpleasant or even dangerous surprises. Or, to give another illustration, analysis discloses that *moral assertions* presuppose that something which might not be done at all ought to be done, and that they serve to answer the question of what that something is. Accordingly, a moral assertion is true which so answers the question of what ought to be done that we can act in a way which maximizes the realization of human aims and minimizes their frustration.

5. *The kind of truth-claims religious symbols are capable of making becomes evident when they are seen to re-present answers to the question of faith, where "faith" is understood to mean the basic confidence that life is worth living.*—To exist as a man at all is to exist on the basis of faith in this sense of the word. Man lives

and acts, finally, only according to certain principles of truth, beauty, and goodness, which he understands to be normative for his existence. And invariably implied in this understanding is the confidence that these norms have an unconditional validity and that a life lived in accordance with them is worth living. In this sense, our experience of our selves and the world in relation to totality is always essentially religious or an experience grounded in faith. We are men at all only because of our inalienable trust that our own existence and existence generally are somehow justified or made meaningful by the whole to which we know ourselves and others to belong. But this trust is also continually called in question—or, rather, how we are to understand our trust and re-present it symbolically is constantly open to criticism by reference to the actual conditions of human life. Thus, for example, reflection on the "boundary situation" of death may completely shatter any quasi-animal-like assurance that life is worth living. Even so, the question of faith, to which religious symbols in one way or another offer an answer, is never the question *whether* there is a ground of basic confidence in life's worth—any more than the question answered by a scientific assertion is *whether* there is a world of fact which is somehow intelligibly ordered. The question of faith, rather, is *how* that

ground and our inalienable confidence in it can be adequately understood and symbolized.

Therefore, recalling our earlier examples of the analysis of scientific and moral assertions, we may summarize the results of an analysis of religious language as follows: *religious assertions* presuppose that something is and could not fail to be the ground of basic confidence in the worth of life, and they serve to answer the question of how that something is to be understood. Accordingly, a religious assertion is true which so answers the question of the ground of confidence in life's worth that we are able to accept ourselves and our world and affirm the norms governing our life, free from the anxiety that our life is ultimately worthless or without any point. Otherwise put, the criterion for the truth of religious symbolism holds that such symbols are true insofar as they so explicate our unforfeitable assurance that life is worth while that the understanding of faith they represent cannot be falsified by the essential conditions of life itself. This means, of course, that religious symbols are at once similar and dissimilar to the symbols of science. Like scientific symbols, they are true only insofar as they are confirmed by the facts of our experience. But, unlike scientific symbols, the "facts" in their case are not the variable details of our experience, but its constant structure.

The reality with which religious symbols must come to terms to be true is not the world disclosed by our senses, but our own existence as selves, as those who experience themselves and others to be finite-free parts of an infinite and encompassing whole.

II. ON MYTH IN PARTICULAR

So much for religious symbolism in general. We now need to ask about myth in particular, or, if you will, about the *differentia* of myth as one species of the religious language whose generic properties we have just tried to clarify.

I believe the word "myth" may be defined by means of three closely related statements. First, "myth" refers to a certain language or form of speaking which, like other languages, serves to re-present some field of human experience in a particular way. Second, the field of experience that the language of myth, like religious symbolism generally, serves to re-present is our original, internal awareness of our selves and the world as parts of an encompassing whole, i.e., as included in the circumambient reality within which all things come to be, are what they are, and pass away. Third, the particular way in which the language of myth re-presents this awareness is in terms and categories based in our derived external perception of reality as the object of our ordinary sense experi-

ence. (There are doubtless other characteristics of myth—for example, its typical narrative form—that would need to be included in a more explicit definition. But, so far as I can see, the characteristics covered by these three statements are the really essential ones, in which any others are more or less evidently implied.)

You will have recognized that it is the third of these defining statements which sets forth the specific difference of myth from religious language generally. What makes myth myth is that it re-presents the experience of faith in terms and categories whose proper function is to represent the very different experience which we have through sense perception. Thus I like to say, borrowing a concept of Gilbert Ryle, that myth by its very nature involves a "category mistake," i.e. (in Ryle's words), "the presentation of facts belonging to one category in the idioms appropriate to another." This is well illustrated by myth's typical misrepresentation of the divine transcendence as though it involved an immense spatial distance. When myth speaks of God (or the gods) as located somewhere "out there," "in heaven," it really intends to express our inner awareness of our selves and the world as parts of totality, as related to the encompassing reality from which we come and to which we return. But this, its true intention, is in fact obscured by the linguistic terms in

which it speaks: the category of space that its terms presuppose is based not in this inner awareness of our existence in relation to others and the whole, but in the very different perception through our senses whereby we objectify the world external to us. The point that I, along with Bultmann, wish to insist on is that this obscuring of its real function or intention is the distinctive trait of mythical language. Whatever its concrete contents, any form of speaking may be properly regarded as mythical that exemplifies an inappropriate use of categories, a "category mistake," of this particular type.

III. ON DEMYTHOLOGIZING

With this, we should be in a position to see why demythologizing is both possible and necessary. It is possible because the intention of myth itself is only very imperfectly realized by its own terms and categories. We may say, indeed, that myth by its very nature demands to be critically interpreted so as to overcome the conflict between the reality of which it in fact speaks and the linguistic forms in which it does so. But this necessity for demythologizing becomes even more obvious in face of the question of myth's truth. I have held that myth is a species of religious symbolism and that, therefore, the determinative use to which it is

put is cognitive, i.e., to make claims about reality, about our selves, others, and the whole, which are in some sense capable of being true. But because of the "category mistake" which makes myth myth, this contention that myth can be true presents a peculiar problem. If a mythical assertion is taken literally, and so judged by the criterion of truth naturally suggested by its terms and categories—i.e., by the *scientific* criterion of truth—it must sooner or later be rejected as false. On the other hand, if we try to judge a mythical assertion by the different criterion I have proposed as relevant to *religious* assertions, we have no choice but to take it as a symbol, whose meaning must first be translated into other nonmythical terms before its truth can be assessed. This is simply to say that we can verify a mythical assertion only by following the twofold hermeneutical procedure that Bultmann has called "demythologizing": we must take the assertion not literally but symbolically and so interpret it as to reallocate the "facts" of which it speaks to another, more appropriate "idiom." This means that the mythical assertion must be interpreted in terms of the answer it gives to the question of faith and that this answer must then be restated in terms in which such answers can be literally and properly given. Only after both of these steps are taken can one determine whether

a mythical assertion is true. For the truth of such an assertion is like the truth of a metaphor; it is actually the truth of the understanding of faith of which the assertion itself is but an inadequate symbol.

This brings us to the most disputed point in the whole demythologizing discussion — namely, whether it is possible, as I am here assuming, to restate the meaning of mythical assertions in nonmythical language. Critics of demythologizing have repeatedly maintained that this cannot be done. Some have held that since myth is the only possible language in which the experience of faith can find expression, any demythologizing that refuses simply to eliminate the experience of faith can only be remythologizing, the interpretation of one mythical assertion in terms of another. To this objection, I reply that there is no good reason thus to assume that myth covers the whole ground of religious language, while there are good reasons to assume the contrary. As soon as one grants that an assertion is mythical and is not to be taken literally, then he can continue to affirm that the assertion is true—or, at least, capable of being true—only if he can at some point translate it into nonmythical terms that *can* be taken literally. The only alternative is a *regressus ad infinitum* which stultifies the affirmation that myth is or can be true. Furthermore, it is simply a fact that not all reli-

gious language exhibits the same features, so that it is impossible to comprehend all of it under the word "myth" used with any definiteness. Isaiah's statement that the Lord is "an everlasting rock" (26:4) is clearly quite different from John's statement that "God is love" (I John 4:16). But what makes the case of some of the critics of demythologizing plausible is their demonstration of the inadequacy of the various attempts to translate myth into nonmythical terms. Many of them point to the fact that in the classical theological tradition the mythical utterances of Scripture have been badly treated by being restated in the terms of a so-called "Christian philosophy." The personal God clearly witnessed to by the scriptural myths has been utterly misrepresented in this tradition as the impersonal Absolute of the Greek metaphysics of being. Likewise, critics of Bultmann's use of Martin Heidegger's existentialist philosophy have seriously questioned whether it provides any more adequate conceptuality for translating the meaning of mythical assertions. My own view is that this question is completely justified, and that Bultmann's existentialist interpretation can no more be uncritically accepted than the metaphysical interpretation of traditional theology. Whatever Bultmann's intention in his existentialist interpretation—and it is clear, I believe, that his intention is not the reductionist

one often ascribed to him—the fact remains that it makes possible only a one-sided translation of scripture's mythical assertions. Myth does indeed re-present man's own self-understanding. But, as I have tried to make clear, myth, like religious symbolism generally, also re-presents an understanding of the total complex reality presented in man's most basic experience. It expresses an understanding of self, others, and the whole—or, as we may say in theological terms, of man, the world, and God—never simply an understanding of man, or of man and the world, alone. Therefore, I not only grant but insist that if myth is to be interpreted adequately, this cannot be done solely within the terms of a narrowly conceived existentialist philosophy. What is required, rather, is a complete metaphysical conceptionality in terms of which we may properly speak of God and the world, as well as of man or the self. Needless to say, if such a metaphysics is to provide any more adequate a demythologizing of the scriptural myth than was provided by classical metaphysics, it will have to depart from classical metaphysics at the very points which made an adequate interpretation of myth impossible. That there can be such an alternative metaphysics seems to me evident, and my own work just now is largely devoted to contributing toward its development and appropriation by

Protestant theology.

In short, my position is that the inadequacy of some attempts at demythologizing does not prove that every such attempt must fail. There are alternative approaches that deserve to be explored, and the task of exploring them is imperative. For the issue, in the last analysis, is not *whether* we shall demythologize, but only *how*. It is all well and good for theologians to agree with Reinhold Niebuhr that, while myths are never to be taken literally, they must nevertheless always be taken seriously. But this by itself does little more than set the task of an adequate treatment of mythical assertions. If we are actually to take responsibility for such assertions, we must be able to make use of terms and categories in which, unlike those of myth itself, our understanding of our selves and others in relation to God may be appropriately re-presented. The only alternative is to do the same thing badly, in terms and categories whose appropriateness we have not done the best we can to secure.

One final comment: If you have followed my argument, you will understand the rightness of Bultmann's statement that demythologizing does not mean the *elimination* of myth, but means, rather, its *interpretation*. The proponent of demythologizing need not assume—and I should say, cannot assume—that myth does not have uses which even

the most adequate interpretation in nonmythical terms cannot replace. Although, as I have insisted, the determinative use of all religious symbolism, and so also of myth, is cognitive, I have also stressed that religious language has other functions as well, and this seems pre-eminently true of myth. There is a certain richness in myth deriving from its noncognitive uses to express and to enjoin that makes any demythologizing seem poor by comparison. Furthermore, myth may even fulfill an important *cognitive* function, so long as it is clearly recognized as

myth and thereby demythologized or critically interpreted. In other words, I cannot agree with those who dismiss demythologizing as simply an uncritical return to an earlier liberal theology. Properly understood, it is not simply a return to any previous stage of theological reflection, but the one way open to us which really leads into the future. My own conviction is that the more resolutely we set out on that way, demythologizing with uncompromising radicality, the more surely we shall accomplish the theological task which is set for us in our time.

Book Reviews and Notes

The Jerusalem Bible. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1966. Pp. xvi + 1547 + 498 + maps. \$16.95.

The evaluations of this publication have been extravagant in their praise. "Best one-volume annotated Bible in existence . . . first-class . . . impressive achievement . . . quite remarkable . . . monumental . . . a landmark in biblical scholarship . . . without parallel . . . welcome and useful"—such encomiums this publication has received. *Time* gave it two columns. And probably these tributes are not an overestimation of its value.

The background of this book is an interesting story of international biblical scholarship. Not far outside the Damascus Gate of Old Jerusalem the Dominican Order has a biblical school—*L'Ecole Biblique*—which has long been held in highest repute by biblical scholars of all persuasions. After many years of detailed labor this school produced for a French publisher a one-volume, annotated translation which has been popularly referred to as *La Bible de Jérusalem*. The General Editor was Père Roland de Vaux, O.P.

That was 1956. The next year a group of English-speaking scholars with Father Alexander Jones as General Editor began work to produce an English counterpart to the famous French publication. (Two of the col-

laborators are of particular interest to us: Bishop John J. Wright, of the Diocese of Pittsburgh, and J. R. R. Tolkien, Oxford author of *The Lord of the Rings* trilogy.) The Second Vatican Council gave open impetus to biblical studies in the Roman Catholic Church, and the appearance of the new translation has been heralded on all sides. (An open *JB* was in the Catholic worship center at an interfaith meeting of laymen recently attended by the reviewer.)

The English translation was made freshly from the Hebrew and Greek texts. The antecedent French translation was followed only where dubious decisions of text had to be made. Nevertheless, a spot check indicates that the English and French are quite close. The General Editor hopes thus to carry out *aggiornamento*, by "translating into the language we use today" (p. v).

The book is more than a new translation; it is a study Bible of the highest quality. There are general and specific helps. Every principal division of the Bible has an introduction, and so do some individual books. Then there are aids to the text on every page. Finally there are supplementary helps at the end in-

cluding some fine maps. In these items the General Editor hopes to carry out *approfondimento*, by "providing notes which are neither sectarian nor superficial" (*ibid.*).

The book is beautifully and sturdily bound. It is a large, heavy volume—three inches thick and weighing almost five pounds—so a stout slip cover is a welcome addition. The format of this huge tome is generous indeed. One has the impression immediately of the enormous work which has gone into its production. In every way it is a sumptuous and elegant volume, designed to attract and hold the attention of serious students, those who will be willing to devote considerable time to reading it.

The text is arranged in single-column pages, with verse divisions indicated by a dot and marginal number. Poetry is printed as verse. Pericopes are separated by bold-face section headings which permit rapid orientation ("inscribe it on tablets to be easily read," as *JB* renders Hab. 2:2!). The system of marginal references and cross-references is detailed and helpful, but careful note must be taken of the instruction explaining their use. The footnotes, gathered in double-columns at the bottom of the right-hand page in any opening of the volume (i.e., the *recto*), are the most important of the aids to understanding Scripture. They include not only brief explanations of obscure

phrases and the like, but extensive commentary on biblical themes, such as "remnant" on Isa. 4:3 and "miracles" on Mt. 8:3. The footnotes also give brief justification for the many textual decisions which have had to be made prior to beginning the work of actual translation, by citing the ancient versions or by admitting that difficult passages have been corrected by conjecture.

The introductory articles to the OT books treat either units (e.g., the Pentateuch as a whole) or individual writings (e.g., Psalms; Job—but there is also an article on the Wisdom Books). Although easily readable and directly relevant, some discrepancy appears between these articles and the footnotes which accompany the text, not to speak of the translations themselves. The latter two exhibit a markedly "liberal" spirit and style, whereas the introductions tend to be didactic and "conservative." It is here that a few signs of denominational bias seem to appear, and more often the strains of what may fairly be called Christian dogma arise to come to the aid of OT problems, as in the rather banal justification given for the Christian usage of the Levitical law. Again, contemporary treatment of the critical and historical problems finds itself cheek by jowl with a conservatism which manages to retain the appearance if not the substance of older views, as in the discussion of

the sense in which the Pentateuch may be called "Mosaic."

This remembrance of things past jars rather noticeably with the translation, which is occasionally contemporary to the point of challenging the excellent guidelines of the General Editor, Fr. Alexander Jones, "The translator of the Bible into a vernacular may surely consider himself free to remove the purely linguistic archaisms of that vernacular, but here his freedom ends. He may not, for example, substitute his own modern images for the old ones . . ." (p. vi). On the whole, however, the translators have succeeded very well in conveying the strength and austerity of Hebrew prose. Compare, for example, their 'Akedah scene (Gen. 22) with the *KJV*! The dread *waw-conversives* have yielded up their secrets to Fr. Jones and his cohorts (cf. also the excellent treatment of the story of the succession to David's throne, II Sam. 9-20, I Kgs. 1f). Moreover, at numerous places the translators have not been afraid to admit defeat, and have let the end of a line taper off in dots, with a footnote to explain that the narrative is broken or the text is irretrievably corrupted.

The Wisdom Books and the Psalms are undoubtedly the crown of the whole work, a delight to read and a stimulus to further study. Old, familiar passages are still vaguely familiar but no longer old; Ps. 23 is

as fresh as "the meadows of green grass." Difficult passages such as Job 28 or Prov. 8 are handled delicately but firmly. Esther at last gives some sense of the ironic humor of Jewish piety in the face of suffering, and Daniel seems less self-righteous than before.

The prophetic books are perhaps the most difficult of all, and here it would seem that the translators have taken liberties with the text which recent studies have rendered unnecessary. Nevertheless, at every point one must be sure to be grateful for the tremendous task which an entirely new translation, not a mere revision, entails and which has been successfully achieved to a remarkable degree.

There are six NT introductory essays: Synoptic Gospels, Gospel and Letters of Saint John, Acts, Letters of Saint Paul, Letters to all Christians, and the Book of Revelation. In general, the critical conclusions follow those which have been held in modern Catholicism; but the scholarly reasons for these positions are carefully set forth. Thus, the priority of "Matthew Aramaic" is maintained; but it is allowed that the final form of Mark antedated the final form of Matthew. The argumentation takes adequate cognizance of contemporary Protestant scholarship even where conclusions are different. In criticizing these views we have to observe that Protestant scholars—even on

the same faculties—do not by any means agree on what Professor Markus Barth calls "the who-dunnits." So when *JB* attributes the Fourth Gospel and the Johannine Epistles to John the Apostle, some of us may hesitate while others will admit the possibility. In any case, the introduction allows that "the *corpus* of Johannine traditions . . . may well have been edited and published later, probably by John's disciples" (cf. the review of Brown's *Anchor* commentary elsewhere in this issue). Many readers will undoubtedly be surprised to read that "most critics nowadays . . . reject the Petrine authorship" of Second Peter. Such candor augurs well for the future of ecumenical biblical study.

In a publishing venture of this scope it would be little short of miraculous if there were no typographical errors. No miracle appears: see, for example, OT p. 785, where "Holy Spirit" is misspelled; p. 1451, where words in Hos. 1:5 are reversed; and NT p. 152, where Jn. 4:6 reads "Joseph's well." A less obvious problem is the occasional reference in the

OT notes to the Hebrew numeration of verses.

In order to provide for more efficient use of the notes there is a somewhat full "Index of Biblical Themes in the Footnotes." By checking the references there one can rather handily discover what the editors have had to say on these themes; and the study of both biblical passages and notes would be a highly profitable exercise in biblical theology.

Comparisons are inevitable even if odious. *The Jerusalem Bible* has some obvious advantages and a few disadvantages (for many, the price will be prohibitive). The inclusion of the so-called OT Apocrypha should be helpful. The combination of modernity with Catholic tradition is stimulating. One's own background and the peripheral purposes for which one procures a study Bible will tip the balances for some persons. In our judgment, however, for all who want to be abreast of Bible study today, this book is warmly recommended.

—Jared J. Jackson and
J. A. Walther.

Anderson, G. W. *The History and Religion of Israel*. London: Oxford University Press, 1966. Pp. x + 210. \$3.75.

The New Clarendon Bible, which will be based on the RSV, is off to an auspicious start with the publication of this first volume. In a most pleasing and readable way Professor Anderson of Edinburgh has presented his readers with a reliable guide to the historical events of the biblical period from the patriarchs to the Maccabaeans revolt, together with a running account of the religious struggles and developments of the people of Israel. It is a surprisingly successful condensation of *multum in parvo*, providing the beginner and those in need of review alike with a judicious over-view which is generally conservative in tone, i.e., Anderson uses the Books of Chronicles in his historical reconstructions, and generally places a high value on the historical worth of the biblical records. He handles the main questions fairly, giving all sides and his own judgment, but he has not dis-

tracted the reader with references to other secondary sources. The only footnotes are infrequent clarifications of knotty problems, and references to extrabiblical primary sources readily available in current popular books. The work would make a fine college textbook, alongside Kuhl's or some other introduction to the literature of the O. T.

There are two maps and twenty-one black and white illustrations, together with chronological tables, and Scripture and subject indexes. The book is clearly printed on glossy paper and furnished with a good binding. The Oxford Press has brought out a volume with the care for which it is justly famous (this reviewer found only one misprint, "Zepaniah," p. 124), a delight to the eyes, pleasing to hold, and a real bargain at the price.

—Jared J. Jackson.

Brown, Raymond E., S.S. *The Gospel According to John (i-xii). The Anchor Bible*. Vol. 29. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1966. Pp. CXLVI + 538. \$7.00.

One ventures a guess that, even without seeing Fr. Brown's second volume, this work will quickly take

its place as the leading commentary on the Fourth Gospel. The author's massive knowledge of the literature

and his painstaking, lucid handling of every detail of the book should provide the highest recommendation to most readers. And it must be added that this is also ecumenical biblical scholarship at its finest; Protestant readers will encounter no dogmatic stumbling-block.

The publication is timely; for, as the first section of the Introduction explains, Johannine studies have been developing vigorously. Long before the discovery of the Dead Sea Scrolls there was an active debate over traditions behind John's Gospel and influences on his religious thought. These and other appropriate matters are considered at length in the Introduction (which is really a book in itself).

On details of date, authorship, etc., Brown gives a fair analysis of the principal possibilities and a careful explanation of his own decisions. Much of this is influenced by the theory of composition which he holds. He posits five stages ("minimal steps," for the full details are probably "far too complicated to reconstruct"). Stage 1 was the existence of independent, traditional material, probably traceable to the eyewitness of John the Disciple. Stage 2 sees the development "in Johannine patterns" by preaching and teaching, probably furthered by John's own disciples, perhaps focusing in one particular disciple. Stage 3 is the organization into a distinct,

consecutive Gospel by "the evangelist," probably in Greek. This involved selection, which means there was Johannine material left outside this "first edition." Stage 4 is tentatively suggested as a re-editing to meet problems that had arisen; and it is not always possible to distinguish this from Stage 5, which is a final redaction "by someone other than the evangelist." The redactor added surviving Johannine material including the Prologue and chapter xxi. It will readily be observed that many critical decisions will stem from or depend upon this five-stage composition. The thorny problems of authorship and date may be handily dealt with on such a foundation. There is room for the Disciple and the Presbyter, and the obvious requirement of a late date for chapter xxi does not eliminate the possibility of earlier dates for more primitive portions of the text.

At this point it might appear that the author is producing some sort of reductionism to make room for everyone's theories. One may suggest in answer (a) that even a cursory reading of Brown's material will show how thorough and how decisive he is, and (b) that it is prejudicial to assume that analyses which make place for mediating views are intrinsically wrong.

Other introductory matters are dealt with at some length. "Crucial questions in Johannine theology"

are considered: ecclesiology, sacramentalism, eschatology, wisdom motifs. Aramaic sources, if they exist for this Gospel, are at the oral period before Stage 1. There is some justification for feeling a poetic format in Johannine discourses, and John has other distinctive characteristics of style. In short, the Introduction in itself is an extremely valuable contribution to Johannine studies.

The commentary proper follows the general pattern of this series: there is a new translation, notes on the text, and comment, general and detailed. Except for the Prologue (i:1-18) and the Epilogue (xxi), the Gospel is in two parts. "The Book of Signs" extends through chapter xii and is treated in this present volume. "The Book of Glory" will appear in Volume 30 along with commentaries on the Johannine Epistles. Full consideration is given to theories of displacements and rearrangements of the gospel materials, but Brown is sceptical of these; he thinks, indeed, that John's overall purpose (as stated, for example, in xx:30f) obviates the necessity for such ventures.

A translation should not be judged hastily, for one must live with it and use it under varying circumstances to appreciate its qualities. One may sense at once, however, that Brown's translation is fresh and idiomatic. In comparison with the same chapters in the *Jerusalem Bible*, these

seem to read somewhat smoother and to please the American ear more—though the *JB* is also very well done. Brown has perhaps made more exegetical decisions (e.g., "Shechem" for "Sychar" in iv:5); but these are justified in notes.

The Notes and Comments are full and useful; scholar and preacher will each find a wealth of resources. A good example in this volume is the Feeding of the Five Thousand. There is an extended comparison with the Synoptic records. The author's own conclusion is for an independent tradition, but the materials are so fairly presented that the reader can form his own judgment. And the data is up-to-the-minute; e.g., the complicated problem of the name of the pool in v:2 is decided with reference to Milik's analysis of the Qumran copper scroll.

No Greek text is set forth, but this proves to be no important weakness. Where it is necessary, Greek words are transliterated; and Brown generally avoids becoming so technical as to be obscure to the modestly-trained exegete. In addition to the verse-by-verse treatment of key words and phrases, there are helpful appendixes which contain word studies as well as essays. The treatment is wise and well-balanced. In Appendix I(1) the materials on *agapan* and *philein* are surveyed from Trench to Bernard, Bultmann, and Barrett. The conclusion is similar

to the author's criticism of a CBQ article on "eat" and "drink" in vi:53: "The differentiation seems oversubtle."

Special mention should be given to the Bibliographies. There are not only general lists of literature, but nearly every section of the text is given its own bibliographical treatment. A particular source of wealth is the almost fantastic coverage of journal articles. These are of special value to the scholarly researcher because they include Catholic studies and non-English writers.

With such a book one is tempted to be over-enthusiastic. The perfect commentary has not, of course, been written; and this is by no means a candidate for the honor. Every careful reader will surely find some places at which he parts company with Fr. Brown. Some will probably find difficulty with his Eucharistic interpreta-

tion in chapter vi. Some will not like his treatment of the raising of Lazarus because he has said too little—others, perhaps, because he has said too much. But honest critics will certainly praise the whole.

The reviewer who is aware of the other volumes in the *Anchor Bible* will raise a fundamental question as to identity in the series. Only one other volume, of course, has been published in the NT series; but it is a far piece from this present one—no one is likely to suggest that the Reicke work is nearly as important as Brown's. Though the spans of divergence in the OT series are not in every instance as great, the question is still there. One can hear the commentators who are still writing in the series grimly asking which volume is now the standard of achievement.

Goetschius, E. V. N. *The Language of the New Testament*. New York: Scribner's, 1965. Pp. xvii + 349. \$5.95. *Workbook*. Pp. 276. \$2.95.

In this time of constant quandary about the place of biblical languages in theological curricula, those who decide for teaching Greek have sought various ways to sugar the medicine so it will go down easily. Professor Goetschius of Episcopal Theological School, Cambridge, Massachusetts, offers this study text and

its accompanying workbook as a means of tailoring a workable knowledge of New Testament Greek to the needs of the ill-prepared or indifferently motivated student. His avowed "angle" is a use of modern linguistic science.

The material is presented in fifty carefully structured lessons with ac-

companying workbook exercises. Dr. Goetschius intends that this material is "to be used in a one-semester course (three hours a week . . .)"—or some appropriate modification of this plan.

The material is thoroughly presented. Although the dust jacket professes that non-traditional adaptation is a feature, there is a plethora of detail—including, for example, nearly complete paradigms of μ -verbs and the optative. Most of the examples are drawn from the New Testament text, and these are helpfully translated (a feature that has long recommended Nunn's *Syntax*). The matter of accents is wisely relegated to an Appendix. Explanations are lucid, and the typography of the book is beautiful.

Early chapters carefully present the basic grammar on the basis of an elementary linguistic analysis. This is acclaimed as the best available way to analyze sentence structure, but the author reverts to more traditional explanations less than half way through, preserving only certain elements of analytical vocabulary, especially "morpheme."

The reviewer admires the book but not for the purpose the author intends. One might suggest that Professor Goetschius knows his Greek extremely well but perhaps does not as well understand the students we have to teach. In Pittsburgh Seminary the contents of this book would have

to be covered at an average of more than ten chapter-sections per class session plus appropriate exercises. While some sections are only one sentence long, others contain extensive synopses of forms, some difficult and of rare occurrence.

There is an expressed avoidance of vocabulary—though it may be questioned how forms are to be mastered apart from vocabulary. With all due respect to linguistic analysis, one must remember that language is naturally learned by an early mastery of the most useful words, and elementary usage revolves around these words.

The reviewer would also question whether students will develop any enthusiasm for New Testament Greek by analyzing sentence structure and learning paradigms, even when these are illustrated by sentences from the New Testament. It is the experience of Pittsburgh Seminary instructors that most students quickly develop an interest in the language if they are introduced almost at once to the New Testament text. If the student learns to read the text for himself, he will then want to know how others have interpreted that text; and he can usually learn the necessary, fundamental, grammatical details in conjunction with his reading. This is probably a diametrically different approach from that of Dr. Goetschius; the reviewer suggests that a higher level of biblical compe-

tence can be achieved than that which this book aims to produce, and it may be done with less student resistance.

The difference in these two approaches may also be observed from the order in which certain material is introduced. This book waits until Chapter 45 to introduce *wa*-clauses, the perfect comes in 47, and the indefinite *nis, nū* is in 48. This is certainly based on a logical or theoretical order of presentation, for from the practical standpoint of reading the New Testament text these forms will be met almost at once and can

probably be learned as easily when there is a contextual need for such knowledge.

For one who is already "hooked" on the Greek New Testament this book may be heartily recommended for broadening and deepening acquaintance with the grammar and syntax requisite for advancing study. The reviewer confesses to having learned from this book.

The list of errata supplied is surprisingly small for the first edition of such a complicated publication.

—James Arthur Walther.

Wolf, Betty Hartman. *Journey Through the Holy Land*. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1967. Pp. xiv + 267. \$4.95.

This is the kind of book every traveler wishes he or she could write. It has a good balance of sound historical facts, personal experiences, and tourists' aids. It is informative, witty, and unusually readable. Many people travel, and many people write about their travels, but few have Mrs. Wolf's ability to say so much about so many things in an understandable, interesting, even exciting way. I am not being overenthusiastic: this book is worth its reading-hours!

The Holy Land has never been more lovingly translated into words.

Mrs. Wolf starts with the mention of the city of Jerusalem in the Book of Genesis and then takes you journeying with her as she visits places and unfolds the story of people and circumstances that have made this land holy to three religions.

In the chapter "For Those Who Have Eyes . . ." she likens the tourist to Ezekiel in his visionary visit to the valley of dry bones. The Lord had to prod Ezekiel to speak with the bones before any "action" took place. Thus, "the Holy Land does not yield her secrets to every peripatetic curiosity

seeker. She sits in reserve, warming to you only as you warm to her." Mrs. Wolf has done her talented best to bring the Holy Land to you—only a visit of your own could make it more real.

(The author's husband, the Rev-

erend Dr. C. Umhau Wolf, was Guest Professor of Old Testament at this seminary in 1964-65, and preached at the Fall Communion, 1965.)

—Anna Marie Walther.

Rogers, Jack Bartlett. *Scripture in the Westminster Confession. A Problem of Historical Interpretation for American Presbyterianism*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1967. Pp. 475. \$6.75.

For a veteran historian *Scripture in the Westminster Confession* would be a distinguished achievement. As a doctor's thesis, it is superb. In sheer bulk it is impressive; in its extensiveness of primary and secondary research it is indispensable; and its cogency of articulation makes it a mature work, indeed.

Precisely because we were and are so thoroughly entranced by Dr. Rogers's performance, our disappointment with the central thesis was nothing less than bitter. Before, with heavy heart, we take up the painful but necessary task of refutation, let us summarize. Put into one long and involved sentence this masterful, historical study reduces to this: the doctrine of Scripture found in the WCF is essentially that of Karl Barth; B. B. Warfield, on the other hand, erred fundamentally in his interpretation

while Dowey, Hendry, and other Neo-reformed interpreters went astray because of Warfield, whom they naively thought was right in his interpretation; thus, they fail precisely because they were not true to their own Barthian selves in the interpretation of Westminster.

Professor Rogers anticipates making his friends to the right and to the left unhappy because he does not vindicate either. What he has done, however, is to deal old Princeton a belly blow and tap the new Princeton on the wrist. He rejects Warfield for being Warfield and chides Dowey with not being Dowey. We have no objection to the legitimacy and necessity of his making judgments. It is done with competence, courtesy and sincerity, however wrong it may be.

The motif above is stated a dozen

times through the volume, though Barth's name is not mentioned much before the final pages. It seems superfluous to take space for citation but the reader may rightfully feel that if a serious criticism is to be made, the author's own words should first be presented. The following extensive quotation suggests the essential thrust of the whole manuscript and the relevance of the research to modern American Presbyterianism.

Contemporary Neo-Reformation theologians who originally drafted the proposed "Confession of 1967" acted rightly in restoring the emphases on the witness of the Holy Spirit and on Jesus Christ the Saviour as being the central content of Scripture. These emphases and their corollaries, the humanity of the words of Scripture and the presence of the Word of God in preaching, had been underemphasized in the Princeton Theology and American Presbyterian orthodoxy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Unfortunately, the Princeton Theology was closely identified with the Westminster Confession. Thus these emphases in the Confession of Faith were not heard in recent times since the Westminster Divines themselves were not studied anew. Neo-Reformation theologians acknowledge a debt to Karl Barth who led the return to these Reformation insights.... In the process of restoring Reformation emphases lost to the Church during several decades, the original authors of the proposed "Confession of 1967" omitted an equally valuable Reformation insight — that Scripture is the Word of God....

[Reviewer's note: This omission these drafters of the original Confes-

sion of 1967 made on their own and not as a reaction against the WCF. Still, it is odd that they did so, since as theologians they seem to agree with Barth's doctrine that Christ the Word of God encounters men through the words of God. The reviewer (and possibly Dr. Rogers) is inclined to think that we have here an extreme reaction against Warfield rather than an intended deviation from Barth. This is what was meant above by our saying that the Neo-reformed are not here true to their own Barthian selves. These words of ours will bring forth a good deal of rhubarb, of course, in the shape of disclaimers that since Barth does not consider himself a Barthian how can we be such, etc., etc.]

Fortunately, the United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. corrected the reaction present in the first draft of the proposed "Confession of 1967". The General Assembly in May, 1966, approved a revised version which unites the saving content of Scripture with the text of Scripture as the one Word of God. The text now reads: "The one sufficient revelation of God is Jesus Christ, the Word of God incarnate, to whom the Holy Spirit bears unique and authoritative witness through the Holy Scriptures, which are received and obeyed as the word of God written." (Pp. 453, 454.)

From this one can see Rogers' view of the theological development from the Reformation to the present:

1. The Reformation joined Christ

and the dynamic, written Word inseparably (eschewing natural theology).

2. The Westminster Divines continued this Reformation tradition.
3. Old Princeton (in the name of Westminster) separated what the Reformation and Westminster had joined together, introducing arguments for general and special revelation.
4. The Old Princeton position thus interpreted erroneously both the Reformation and Westminster.
5. Neo-reformed theologians correctly interpret the Reformation but fail to see that Westminster is a genuine Reformation document because, of all things, they accept Warfield's view of the Confession (p. 40).

What, according to Rogers, were the basal errors of Old Princeton? It wrongly supposed that the Westminster Divines were Aristotelian scholastics, advocates of natural theology and defenders of Inerrancy who elevated the unaided reason at the expense of the Holy Spirit; while, according to our author, they were Augustinian Ramists who affirmed divine revelation through a substantially inspired Bible which they accepted as such without argument on the internal testimony of the Spirit alone (*passim*).

What, according to the reviewer,

is the basal defect not of Warfield but of Rogers? It is not insufficient knowledge; it is not want of research; it is not lack of integrity; it is not ill-will; it is not prejudice; it is not historical incompetence; it is a failure in logical acumen. It is the prevalence of this fault that vitiates a masterpiece of research in the vital area of the conclusions drawn from the research. We shall submit some typical examples.

There is a logical confusion concerning knowledge. In Puritan theology one distinguishes between natural or speculative knowledge and saving knowledge. Dr. Rogers is fully aware of this distinction (for example, on pp. 354-356); but forgetting it, on occasions, he identifies what the Westminster Divines kept separate and thereby introduces confusion. For example, notice the following typical *non sequitur*: "The Westminster Divines . . . were on their guard against the Socinians and others who contended that natural reason could understand the content of Scripture without the illumination of the Spirit. . . . Samuel Rutherford asserts that there is no *saving knowledge* apart from the illumination of the Spirit" (p. 356, *italics ours*). But Rogers' illustration does not illustrate. Rutherford's assertion is that there is no *saving knowledge* apart from illumination. But the assertion is supposed to show how the Westminster Divines guarded against the

Socinian teaching that natural reason could *understand* Scripture without illumination. Rutherford is saying that natural reason cannot *savingly understand*. He is not saying that natural reason cannot *understand*.

Again, Rogers tries to cite Edward Reynolds in support of his own fideism, but note how he betrays himself. Interpreting Reynolds, Rogers writes: "Because only the spiritual way is saving knowledge, those who know God's judgments only by sense 'are said, in the Scriptures . . . not to know any of this . . .'" (p. 248). Reynolds says that men *know* God's judgment by *sense*. This is *knowledge* though it is not what the Bible calls "knowledge." The Bible, according to Reynolds, uses this term of *saving knowledge*. These and many other instances which could be given show that Dr. Rogers errs in maintaining that the Westminster Divines did not teach the unregenerate man's capacity to grasp revelation non-savingly. That is the point at issue. Rogers knows very well that Warfield never supposed that the Westminster Divines believed the unregenerate could have a *saving knowledge* of Scripture and Christ.

Nowhere is the breakdown in logical clarity more palpable than on the Inerrancy issue. The Confession's affirming the "infallible truth" of the Word of God does not, according to Rogers, involve Inerrancy. "Certainly," he writes, "the Westminster

Divines believed, and the Confession states, that the Bible is true and infallible. But to equate these terms with the modern concept of inerrancy is to impose upon the Westminster Confession criteria of proof and apologetic implications which had no place in their thinking" (p. 307). Here the problem with our author is more in the realm of candor than mere logic. Can the unqualified statement of the Bible's "infallible truth and divine authority" (chap. I,5) leave room for error? There is no restriction to "faith and morals" or any other restriction in the text or in the writings of the Westminster theologians. All Dr. Rogers could produce from their extra-Confessional writings was evidence that all Scripture was not viewed as of the same value but not any indication of error at any point. In fact, he gives many statements from the Divines themselves indicating either an inerrancy doctrine or a mentality compatible with it. In this area, Dr. Rogers even stoops to the "red herring" procedure. What does "modern concept" and "apologetic implications" have to do with whether Westminster implied or did not imply that the Scriptures are inerrant? Even his New Princeton mentors cannot bring themselves to agree with him though their sad alternative is to agree with B. B. Warfield.

Throughout the volume our author likes to say that the Westminster

Bible is not a "compendium of information" but bears witness to salvation in Christ (pp. 369, 379, 402, 406, 417) though he is aware that many of the Divines held precisely that. How then does he reach his conclusion? By another *non sequitur*. Because of the fact that the Word of God bears witness to Christ and his salvation it is wrongly assumed that it *does not therefore* provide an inspired compendium of information. This is a double logical blunder. First, what is to prevent the Word of God from testifying to Christ's salvation *and* to other information? Second, why may not this "compendium" be integral even to the revelation of Christ's salvation?

Lastly, Dr. Rogers thinks that Westminster used the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit in lieu of rational proofs for inspiration while Hodge and Warfield used rational proofs in lieu of the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit. This incredible conclusion is reached by the simple observation that the WCF referred to the Holy Spirit as alone *persuading* (pp. 450, 451) while Princeton argued that evidences *proved*. Evidences may prove while one convinced against his will may remain of the same opinion still (refuted but not persuaded). That proof by argument and persuasion by the Spirit are mutually exclusive is the saddest *non sequitur* of all. That the Westminster Confession of Faith

does not make this logical lapse any more than Warfield does is explicitly apparent in its famous statement.

We may be moved and induced by the testimony of the church to an high and reverent esteem for the Holy Scripture; and the heavenliness of the matter, the efficacy of the doctrine, the majesty of the style, the consent of all the parts, the scope of the whole (which is to give all glory to God), the full discovery it makes of the only way of man's salvation, the many other incomparable excellencies, and the entire perfection thereof, *are arguments whereby it doth abundantly evidence itself to be the word of God*; yet, notwithstanding, our *full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth and divine authority thereof*, is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit, bearing witness by and with the word in our hearts. [Italics by the reviewer.]

Eerdmans is to be congratulated on this publication, although it has too many errata noted and not noted and lacks a much needed index. The publisher does not stand to make much profit on a prestige volume of this sort. There is understandable reluctance to venture, therefore. Our young scholars, however, become discouraged by the difficulty of securing recognized publishers for worthy theses which frequently represent indispensable monographs in needy fields. Dr. Rogers' work certainly demanded publication in the interests of scholarship. At the same time, the general reader will find this solid book anything but ponderous.

—John H. Gerstner.

Reist, Benjamin A. *Toward a Theology of Involvement. The Thought of Ernst Troeltsch*. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1966. Pp. 264. \$6.00.

Professor Reist, of San Francisco Theological Seminary, here provides virtually the only full length exposition of Troeltsch's thought in the English language. Having the advantage of being able to look back on the historical impact of Troeltsch's work, as well as its relation to key figures such as Weber and Dilthey, it surpasses previous English language studies of Troeltsch in both depth and relevance to the present situation of Protestantism.

Readers will find here careful, but not pedantic, expositions of Troeltsch's major works, *The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches and Groups*, and *Historicism and Its Problems* (*Der Historismus und seine Probleme*—as yet untranslated), and also of some of his key essays. The sociological, philosophical, and theological aspects of Troeltsch's thought are all examined, and their function within Troeltsch's basic intellectual project is explained.

The all-pervasive problem which hounded Troeltsch, which neither he nor any other modern theologian solved (according to Reist), is the problem of historical relativism. Better, it is the problem of trying to affirm any absolute values in historical events, which are, by definition, events conditioned by previous history. Events in history always arise

from some definite relations with past events, and the same holds for the "values" affirmed in an event. Moreover, every such value is articulated in a form uniquely related to its social context, and gains its relevance for human life precisely from its relationship to that context. Precisely those individual characteristics that give relevance to some value in its original social context disqualify it for having relevance in another. "Time, like an ever-rolling stream, bears all its sons away." Hence, there is no permanent, enduring "essence" of any historically rooted value. In theological terms, there is no final revelation of God in any historical event, not even in Jesus. An abstract formulation of the distinctive characteristics of "Christianity" can be given, but that will not indicate in "sociological, realistic, and ethical" terms the peculiar relevance of "the Christian idea" of God and redemption to the present historical situation. If no such indication is given, however, that which makes Christianity a creative, historical force will be missed; and Christianity itself will be doomed to atrophy.

The significance of Troeltsch's category of "compromise," which is the focal point of Reist's analysis, has to be understood against this

background. Troeltsch read the history of the church as a series of compromises between the Gospel and the changing historical-social settings. By "compromise," Troeltsch did not mean a simple defection from the original Gospel, but a creative synthesis between its ethical and religious ideals and the new social and cultural conditions within which those who adhered to these ideals would have to live and act.

Troeltsch's "church," "sect," and "mystical" types of Christian group, designate what he regarded as the three chief ways in which Christians have responded to the dilemma of compromise or atrophy. The church type — e.g., medieval Catholicism, Calvinism, Lutheranism—accepts the necessity of compromise and attempts an all-embracing synthesis of the Gospel and culture. The mystical type turns away from the objective forms by means of which the church maintains its identity as well as its relationship to the world. It withdraws from the problem of effecting the synthesis with culture the church type seeks, and seeks instead a purely inner religious experience. The sect type is not as individualistic as the mystical type, and does seek to form a holy community. It differs from the church in trying to remain completely separate from "the world," shunning the sorts of means and institutions by which secular forms of human community are maintained.

As soon as the sect shows some concern for perpetuating itself, however, it inevitably transmutes itself into the church type.

Troeltsch's analysis seems to lead to the conclusion that only the church type of Christian group is able to articulate the Gospel in a way that allows it to be a culture-integrating, history-making force. Troeltsch knew that the older church types had ceased to function that way in modern societies with their scientific, humanistic cultures. But he had no answer to the problem he so painstakingly outlined. "All that is clear," he wrote, "is that [Christianity] stands in a critical hour of its development and that here very basic and daring innovations are necessary, which go beyond all hitherto existing denominations."

In the last chapter of the book, Reist attempts to provide some help in plotting the course for the needed innovations. Ebeling is attacked for trying to evade the problem of a "new compromise," and settling for yet another purely dogmatic version of "the essence of Christianity." Paul Lehmann's ethics is singled out as the most promising current effort to effect the new creative compromise Troeltsch called for. Nevertheless, only if Lehmann can show in his promised second volume that his concept of the humanizing action of God (in Jesus Christ, and through the *koinonia* inside and outside the

Christian churches) does in fact call for specific kinds of behavior and social organization which are new but really possible within urban, technological society, will the claim that he offers a solution to Troeltsch's problem be credible.

Where does this leave us? It leaves us with Troeltsch's unsolved problem still on our hands, and little more to

guide us toward a solution than the kind of double imperative we hear from Gabriel Vahanian: be involved in the struggle for viable forms of human society and cultural expression, and keep yourselves from idols. As W. H. Auden said over a decade ago: "Read *The New Yorker*, trust in God, and take short views."

—George H. Kehm.

Richardson, Alan. *Religion in Contemporary Debate*. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1966. Pp. 120 + index of names. \$2.75.

Dr. Richardson has brought out a slim volume which, beginning with a definition of the word "religion," moves on to discuss the Christian religion over against secularism, religious atheism, and the "death of God" notion. Two excellent small chapters are included on demythologization and the so-called "New Hermeneutic" (both highly critical), the latter of which includes a critique of the philosophical presuppositions of Heidegger. At times, Richardson seems to betray an arrogance over against the continental theologians which is hardly warranted. The two opening chapters "Is religion a good thing?" and "Religion as the Abolition of the Secular" are good. In the midst of all this contemporary debate, however, one wonders if we are

not sometimes simply quibbling over semantic confusion. At any rate, "religion" for Richardson is a system or way of life which (a) forms the human response to the wretchedness of the human condition, and (b) combines metaphysical notions expressed in formal propositions with an individualistic piety bearing no relation to daily life. He suggests we translate Bonhoeffer's *religionslos* as "unpietistic" or "unchurchy," to avoid confusion. On the other hand is (of course) Christianity which begins with the biblical attack upon "religion" and continues as the proclamation that "the encounter between God and man occurs as the result of the divine initiative." Somewhere you've read all this before, but that does not mean the book would not

be welcome on your shelves. Richardson has a clear, crisp writing style coupled with the ability to cut through problems to the central issue. It is this ability more than the much-

written-about subject material which is the salvation of the book. It would be an excellent addition for the pastor who lacks the time to dig through all the material.

Hughes, P. E., ed. *Creative Minds in Contemporary Theology*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1966. Pp. 482 + index of proper names. \$6.95.

With the passing years we have come to expect good things from Eerdmans. This will be considered one of the best. There are fourteen chapters. The first is on the creative task in theology, in which the editor characterizes the creative theologian as one who "brings from his store both old and new." The "old" is the authority of Scripture, the fact of sin, the centrality of Christ as Redeemer, and the fact that man is endowed with the ability to realize his own creative potentialities by God. The thirteen theologians and their introducers are: Karl Barth, by G. W. Bromiley; G. C. Berkouwer, by Lewis B. Smedes; Emil Brunner, by Paul G. Schrottenboer; Rudolf Bultmann, by Robert D. Knudsen; Oscar Cullmann, by David H. Wallace; James Denney, by I. Howard Marshall; C. H. Dodd, by F. F. Bruce; Herman Dooyeweerd, by William Young; P. T. Forsyth, by Samuel J. Mikolaski; Charles Gore, by Colin Brown; Rein-

hold Niebuhr, by Theodore Minnema; Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, by J. J. Duyvendek Wit; and Paul Tillich, by Kenneth Hamilton. In respect to fairness and scope of presentation, the treatments of Brunner, Denney, Forsyth, and Tillich seem best, to the reviewer. The essayists are responsible writers overall, and none of them is so over-awed by his subject as to fail of criticism. Each essay contains: a) a biographical sketch; b) an exposition of the theologian's work; c) a critique; and d) a bibliography. Reinhold Niebuhr is listed as a Lutheran which, for historical reasons, is not an accurate classification. It is easy to criticize what an anthology *lacks*, but it does seem strange that there is not one Old Testament theologian represented. A second volume is projected in the introduction. We hope it will have the same generally high quality as the first, which we wholeheartedly commend.

Freemantle, Anne. *The Protestant Mystics*. New York: Mentor Book, 1964.
Pp. 312. 95¢.

Mrs. Freemantle, well-known for *The Age of Belief* and established as an anthologist by *The Papal Encyclical*, has compiled an interesting selection of writings, both prose and poetry, which she calls simply *The Protestant Mystics*. The criteria for selection were simple: the author must be (in some vague way) a Protestant Christian; the selections must bespeak a revelation or a "flight of the alone to the Alone," and not be strictly meditative. For this latter reason, Evelyn Underhill, whom we should expect in any treatment of Protestant mysticism, is missing. The book brings back forgotten figures; Jakob Boehme, for example, is included. Most of the expected visionaries are here: Donne, Blake, Bunyan, Fox, Goethe, Kierkegaard, etc. There are 67 writers, ranging from Martin Luther to C. S. Lewis. Each of these visionaries, theologians,

and poets gives us a record of his individual experiences which resulted in a unique understanding of the wholeness of God and his communion with God.

The book is enhanced by a 25-page introduction by W. H. Auden, in which the venerable poet explains the situation in which mysticism arises, and the four distinct kinds of mystical experience (the vision of Dame Kind, the vision of Eros, the vision of Agape, the vision of God). In a lucid way, Auden shows us how the "protestant principle" and the "catholic substance" (to use Tillich's terms) have combined in every age to produce mystical thinkers.

The book is a strong antidote for those who swallow W. T. Stayce's maxim that "there are no Protestant mystics."

—Jay C. Rochelle.

Peerman, Dean (ed.). *Frontline Theology*. Richmond: John Knox Press, 1967. Pp. 170. \$4.50.

We are indebted to the *Christian Century* magazine for asking twenty of today's most prominent theologians to write on the subject "How I

Am Making Up My Mind." The magazine's editor Dean Peerman asked Associate Editor Martin Marty to write an introduction entitled

"American Protestant Theology Today," added the twenty previously published articles, and published the whole of it in a hard-back appropriately entitled *Frontline Theology*.

Most, if not all, of the writers are long on articulating the problem and short on providing solutions; but then this is a good summary of the state of American theology today. If significant answers can come only to those who are willing to ask significant questions, the theological world can look forward to some very exciting days.

The brave pastor might use this as the basis for an adult discussion group on contemporary theology, but he must be prepared to do his home-

work. This book alone isn't nearly enough, nor was it meant to be. The preacher who reads this book will find himself wrestling with questions that thoughtful Christians, laymen and clergy, ought to be asking.

Among the twenty theologians who contribute to this book are those that you would expect to find: Cox, Altizer, Hamilton, Pelikan, Brown, Gilkey, etc. While many points of view are represented, the conservative pastor will find few that speak his language.

Whether or not "God-talk" is necessary or even possible, there is much of it in this little book, and much of it is worth reading.

Valentine, Foy. *The Cross in the Market Place*. Waco, Texas: Word Books, 1967. Pp. 122. \$3.50.

This book is breezily written by a Southern Baptist who feels that the church should "get involved" in the social issues of its day. It may be rather inflammatory stuff for the Christian with a late 19th-century

theology, and I suppose there are a lot of such persons around, but for any who have done much reading in the last few years it is rather light weight and passé.

—Charles C. W. Idler.

The following books describe usefully *the action of the Church*. All appeared in 1966 except as otherwise noted.

There is ecumenical action. Volumes 5 and 6 of the excellent "Ecu-

menical Studies in History" published by John Knox Press report on

*Ecumenical Dialogue in Europe and
The Significance of South India.*

Prentice-Hall offers the first comprehensive source book of primary documents on "modern ecumenism": *Documents of Dialogue*, edited by Hiley Ward.

There is fresh Roman Catholic thinking. Familiar Catholic prophets speak in Scribner's *The New Church*, by Daniel Callahan; in Sheed and Ward's *Authority in the Church*, by John L. McKenzie, S.J.; and in Herder's *The Christian of the Future* (1967), by Karl Rahner. A Catholic prophet well-known in Germany becomes better known to Americans in Herder's *Christian Maturity* (1967), by Bernard Häring, CSSR, (who gave an address at this Seminary last winter). A Catholic prophet-pope speaks through a collection of the writings of John XXIII in Simon and Schuster's *An Invitation to Hope*

(1967), translated by John G. Clancy.

There is mission in the so-called non-Christian lands. It is set forth theologically in Abingdon's *Christian Mission in Theological Perspective* (1967), edited by Gerald H. Anderson, and written mostly by U. S. Methodists for U. S. Methodist annual consultations on mission. Two studies bear on the relation of Christianity to other religions: Eerdman's *The Church Between the Temple and Mosque*, by J. H. Barwick, and Prentice-Hall's *A Guide to the World's Religions* (1963), by David G. Bradley.

There has been development in evangelism. Its history is described in Eerdman's *History of Evangelism* (1964), by Paulus Scharpf, and in Harper and Row's *Pentecostalism*, by John T. Nichol.

—Walter R. Clyde.

Merton, Thomas. *Conjectures of a Guilty Bystander*. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1966. Pp. 320 + index. \$4.95.

Father Merton has written another book. Like his *Seven Storey Mountain*, this book promises to find a broad circulation among people outside the church as well as within. Since 1956, this genial Trappist monk has kept a diary not of the usual kind. It is a running commentary with and about the world

as Fr. Merton sees it; hence, the title. Merton is a perceptive thinker who expresses himself well. You will not agree with everything in this book, nor is this what is called for. You will appreciate it overall. It is not a book to "enjoy"; it is rather a book whose thoughts challenge you to a dialogue.

Father Merton has a healthy contempt of the world. He exposes the fallacies of our society with a gleeful, puckish abandon. But do not let this fool you. Merton is a monk who seriously believes one of his monastic vocations is to encounter the world in the hope of showing that world Christ as its regenerator. His capacity for loving criticism is enormous, from technology to politics, from religion to communism, from Barth to disarmament, from Bonhoeffer to Nazism.

The book is, of course, uneven in quality. This is due to the fact that it is entirely composed of bits and snatches of thought, many of which strike the reader as incomplete. It is not a difficult book to read, but its format is difficult. It seems as if the author threw all his writings into five bowls with slightly different labels on each bowl, and then dished up this thought-salad for our enjoyment. This is not a book you read straight through. You are better off sampling here and there, then chewing what you have bitten off until you get its full flavor. Here are a few *bon mots* to whet your appetite further:

"The struggle of Churchmen to maintain their places in the world by convincing the world that it needs them is, to my mind, a confusion and an indignity which 'the world' rightly regards as ridiculous. What does it imply? That 'having a place in the world' is a major concern of these

Churchmen."

"It is one thing to trust in God because one depends on Him in reality, and quite another to assume that He will bless our bombs because the Russians are atheists and He cannot possibly approve of atheists."

"A horrible book is being read in the refectory, a novel about convent life. All the cells are austere, all the nuns are severe, and sanctity consists in discovering the faults of others and mercilessly causing them to be punished and corrected. . . . It is an immoral book. . . ."

"Those who are faithful to the original grace (I should not say genius) of Protestantism are precisely those who, in all depth, see as Luther saw that the 'goodness' of the good may in fact be the greatest religious disaster for a society, and that the crucial problem is the conversion of the good to Christ."

"To say of someone 'I don't know him' means, in business, 'I am not so sure that he will pay.' But if he has money, and proves it, then 'I know him.' So we have to get money and keep spending it in order to be known, recognized as human. Otherwise we are excommunicated."

"Christian social action is first of all action that discovers religion in politics, religion in work, religion in social programs for better wages, Social Security, etc., not at all to 'win the worker for the Church,' but because God became man, because

every man is potentially Christ, because Christ is our brother, and because we have no right to let our brother live in want, or in degradation, or in any form of squalor whether physical or spiritual."

"The Church Militant: the Church 'that fights.' The Church that fights what? Why, Communism of course. What else? The Church that fights *only* Communism, or some other political system that is hostile to it, has ceased to be militant."

"Blaming the Negro (and by extension the Communist, the outside agitator, etc.) gives the white a stronger sense of identity, or rather it *protects* an identity which is seriously threatened with pathological dissolution. It is by blaming the Negro that the white man tries to hold himself together."

If you want to stretch your mind in an almost-entertaining way, by all means get this book.

—*Jay C. Rochelle.*

007—JEKYLL OR HYDE

Starkey, Lycurgus M. *James Bond's World of Values*. Nashville: Abingdon, 1966. Pp. 96. \$1.45 (paper).

Boyd, Ann S. *The Devil With James Bond!* Richmond: John Knox Press, 1966. Pp. 123. \$1.75 (paper).

The mere fact that the cipher 007 is recognized almost universally as the code name of James Bond should be sufficient fact to say that he has become a phenomenon in our day. Coupled to this is the multi-million dollar business that has been spawned by the thirteen novels of Ian Fleming dealing with this super spy and the score of motion pictures that have come from it. If this were not enough to warrant a review of two books dealing with this spy in a theological quarterly, I should add that even here at the Seminary we

now have a room officially designated 007 (significantly filled with tape recorder and other electronic devices). Be all this as it may, serious attention must be given to the Bond phenomenon, for it has had serious effect upon a wide age range, both within and without the church. The very fact that advertisers have latched on to this "bondwagon" is evidence that they think that the culture has been influenced by him and his activities. For instance, it is possible to purchase a \$30 black leather attaché case and an \$80 trench coat, both

with the 007 symbol. Also available are 007 cufflinks (\$5), shoes, shaving creams and deodorants—there is even an instance of a woman's nightie being sold with this cipher embroidered upon it. Obviously, James Bond is a hero even though his creator, Ian Fleming, died in 1964. American television is now swamped with characters and caricatures which found their beginnings in Fleming's spy novels.

The two books under review are as different as day and night. Lycurgus M. Starkey, Jr.—now senior minister of the College Avenue Methodist Church in Muncie, Indiana, and once Professor of Church History at St. Paul School of Theology, Methodist, in Kansas City—portrays James Bond as the ultimate in total depravity, whereas Ann Boyd—who holds an M.R.E. degree from Drew University and is a candidate for the doctorate at the same institution—sees Bond as a modern St. George who slays a host of dragons in contemporary disguise.

In Starkey's *James Bond's World of Values* we find five rather common sermons linked together under this title, the first four having originally been presented on "Frontiers of Faith" sponsored by the Broadcasting and Film Commission of the National Council of Churches. One of the chapters, "The Manly Art of Seduction" was carried in *Good Housekeeping* magazine. According to

Starkey there are five major areas in which James Bond's world of values challenges the Christian faith and ethic: sex, sadism, status, leisure time, and a narrow nationalism. In each of the chapters the author takes a point out of Fleming's novels and then draws a moral. He sees, for instance, moral decay in the matter of sex; "only twice in thirteen novels does he (Bond) fail to seduce the girl he fancies," and draws the conclusion that sex is to be enjoyed wherever you can steal it without any encumbrance or hangup. His conclusion is that the Christian sex ethic, on the other hand, with a biblical base may be expressed by the four "r's": reverence, relatedness, responsibility and renewal. These, in turn, are each supported by a scriptural text; but the exegesis turns out to be nothing startling, nothing new, and nothing that you haven't heard before from your own pulpit and others.

The chapter on violence tends to be weak and pallid. When love is discussed as an alternative to violence, it is done weakly and with little understanding of the violence that love itself may incur. The conclusion is that "Christians tend to be quite pessimistic and realistic about man, but optimistic and hopeful about God."

The third chapter is a rather worn-out rerun of Vance Packard's *The Status Seekers*. Chapter four tends to

leave the reader with the idea that a good Christian is one who should be walking around looking as if he has gall and kidney stones in an advanced degree. It is the old puritan idea that we shouldn't be too happy or involved in too many pleasures, but should be content with "serving God within our work."

Chapter five is quite different. This was not originally one of the series that Dr. Starkey did for television, and his perception here and his willingness to stand on a principle—and an unpopular principle in this kind of age—is seen. He points out in "For love of country" that James Bond's final norm for judging good and evil is the nation, and he takes to task the narrow nationalists and super-patriots who would talk always about America first, or my country, right or wrong, still my country. He takes to task the D.A.R. for preventing Marian Anderson from singing in Constitution Hall and preventing an American boy of Mexican descent from carrying the flag in a color guard; the John Birch Society leaders who insinuate the disloyalty of Presidents, defame churches, and ridicule the U.N., etc.; and comes to the conclusion that it's fine to love country provided it is "under God,"—that is, to love country and keep her critically aware that she is second to God.

The second book *The Devil With James Bond* by Ann S. Boyd is much more penetrating. Whereas Dr.

Starkey takes Ian Fleming and James Bond only as a point of departure into a full-grown sermonizing on the sins of our day, Mrs. Boyd makes a thorough examination of all of Fleming's works and comes to some very interesting conclusions with support from such notables as Soren Kierkegaard and Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Mrs. Boyd begins by saying that if the comic strip "Peanuts" tries to speak to children in a world come of age, the Bond novels are relevant to adolescent searching for values and a hero figure. She launches into a very careful analysis of the completed works of Ian Fleming. She insists from the outset that an occasional Bond movie or novel will never lead you to her conclusions; but after reading all of Fleming's novels, plus his own private comments in the press and other places, then a saga of a modern knight of faith emerges. Whereas Dr. Starkey quotes a great deal from the Bible, Mrs. Boyd quotes a great deal from the Bond novels.

She sees Ian Fleming as taking the old original "seven deadly sins" (envy, pride, covetousness, gluttony, sloth, lust, and anger) and suggesting that these have their own demonic counterpoints in our life today. At the top of his roster of sins is the spirit of accidie—indifference, carelessness, apathy. The rest of his list includes avarice, cruelty, snobbery, hypocrisy, self-righteousness, moral

cowardice, and malice. Her opening chapter is a careful study of the sin of apathy which, like a malignant tumor, is beginning to destroy man today. She sees in the incident of people passing by those who are in trouble on the streets and those refusing to come out of their apartment to help a woman being attacked a lack of understanding as to what it is to be truly human. Fleming himself in *The New Yorker* once accounted for Bond's amazing popularity by saying "I think the reason for his success is that people are lacking for heroes in real life today." Ann Boyd's conclusion is that Fleming's intent in writing this series was to "name and to destroy the modern gods in our society which are actually the expression of the demonic in contemporary disguise."

Mrs. Boyd retells the legend of St. George and the dragon and then begins to show by proof texts from the Bond novels how this legend is revealed almost completely, particularly in the novel *Dr. No*. Beside the dragon of apathy or non-involvement, James Bond manages to subdue the dragons of dehumanization and automation in the novel *Goldfinger* and others. On the matter of sex it is interesting how this woman interprets James Bond. She points out that "the association of sex without love" in James Bond is just about as false as the old middle-age image of "the chivalrous knight romantic-

ally in love without sex." She sees both of these ideas as false, and potentially destructive to human relationships and concludes, "if the image of the agent can dispel the myth of this immature ideal (the neurotic equation between sex and an idealized concept of romantic love), then perhaps James Bond makes a positive contribution to fidelity and genuine intimacy within marriage."

Again Mrs. Boyd returns to the idea that Ian Fleming parades the dragons of our day, one by one, in front of Bond to be shot down, and in this way his work is in line with other English moralists as Chaucer, Bunyan, Spencer, and others. For instance, *Goldfinger* is an outstanding example of avarice. He says at one place, "Mr. Bond, in all my life I have been in love. I have been in love with gold. I love its color, its brilliance, its divine heaviness. I love the texture of gold, etc." The sin of snobbery is illustrated by the Count de Bleuville in *On Her Majesty's Secret Service*. His villains personify hypocrisy as they attempt to deceive the general public by appearing as law-abiding citizens; they appear self-righteous in their attitudes; they illustrate moral cowardice and varying degrees of malice and cruelty.

The last two chapters of Mrs. Boyd's book become a ringing witness to the Christian standing in direct contradiction to not only the stoic conception of a noble apathy,

but also the epicurean form of serenity. She shows the depth, the pain, and the joy in the attempt to live out *agapē*. She points out that compassion is not a namby-pamby word, but a "gut-level response to the needs of persons."

One of the interesting questions that is raised in this book is that perhaps the reformers' zeal to put down and eliminate the idolatry of the saints has backfired and has succeeded in making possible a more shallow worship of celebrity gods such as "Superman" and "Batman." There is a necessity for super-human heroes in life, and "Secret Agent 007" may well be the new version of St. George—one who is involved in an authentic battle in real life.

So much for Mrs. Boyd's very

interesting theory. It is a book worth working through, for it is an idea that needs to be put forth in our day. The question as to whether Ian Fleming's James Bond is the vehicle by which this can best be expressed is open for debate. I still do not see James Bond as one who is involved in an *agapē* way of life, but rather as fatalistic, hedonistic, detached, and disengaged. But then perhaps if I read all thirteen novels I would change my mind. Certainly with one of Mrs. Boyd's statements I can take no exception. She says, "Don't try to read any of the Bond adventures seriously. Bond was meant for fun—for escape—and legitimately requires the willing suspension of disbelief."

—William R. Phillippe.

Wise, Carroll A. *The Meaning of Pastoral Care*. New York: Harper & Row, 1966. Pp. 144. \$3.50.

The author adopts a position that all of the healing which God can bring men comes through personal relationships. Pastoral care can only happen in a relationship which is completely open, free, and non-judgmental. The pastor must be so emotionally stable that he can be deeply empathic, and in such empathy he will be able to bring the

love of God meaningfully to others. Dr. Wise contends that Christianity answers need, but that it can do so only through interpersonal relationships. Sermon and sacrament are helpful means toward this end, but cannot replace the personal nature of pastoral care. The pastor is the one who must help people become truly themselves. To do this, he must first

of all be himself, and he must relate God to *all* the activities of his people. The novelty of Dr. Wise's approach lies in his stress on the pastoral responsibility to aid the *growth* of personality. One senses a difference here, implicitly hinted, from the dominant Rogerian method of non-directive counseling. In the concluding chapter, Dr. Wise analyzes the dilemma

of scholarship or practicality as it is found in many seminaries, also the concomitant problem that students cannot see their professors as pastors; and he offers a way out. This little book may signal a new tangent, or perhaps a breakthrough, in pastoral care. It is must reading for those who take *ministry* seriously.

—Jay C. Rochelle.

Wright, Kathryn S. *Let the Children Paint*. New York: Seabury Press, 1966. Pp. 168. \$4.50.

Joy is the basic emphasis of this book, an excellent one for everyone concerned with Christian education in the home and church. The author suggests that if the chief end of man is to glorify God and enjoy him forever, one way to give children the opportunity to do both is to let them paint. The first part of the book is

devoted to the theological and psychological place of creative expression. The second portion is a fresh approach to the practical. Directions are well written. The last chapter contains a wealth of resources including books, films, recordings, and slides.

—B. M. Burrows.

Psalm

Speak thanks to him who crisps the shining air,
Sing love to him who rescues from despair,
Dance joy to him who reunites two hearts,
Play peace to him who sanctifies the arts,
Write praise to him who hallows every day,
Paint faith to him who marks the holy way,
Mold hope to him who makes his will a call,
Give all to him who has forgiven all.

—Howard Vogt.




Pittsburgh Perspective

SEPTEMBER, 1967

Volume VIII

Number 3



PITTSBURGH THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

PITTSBURGH PERSPECTIVE

Volume VIII

SEPTEMBER, 1967

Number 3

Published four times yearly in March, June, September and December, by the Pittsburgh Theological Seminary, 616 North Highland Avenue, Pittsburgh, Pa. 15206, one of the seven seminaries of the United Presbyterian Church in the U. S. A. Second-class postage paid at Pittsburgh, Pa. Changes of address should be sent to the Seminary, care of the Director of the Mailing Department.

Editor: James Arthur Walther, Th.D.

Publications Committees

Faculty

Peter Fribley
Lynn B. Hinds, *Chmn.*
J. A. Walther

Student

Robert V. Mathias, *Chmn.*

J. Rowe Hinsey, *ex. off.*
William R. Atkins, *ex. off.*
William R. Phillippe, *ex. off.*

Circulation: William W. Hill

Secretarial Assistant: Mrs. Elizabeth Eakin

Contents

<i>Ad Hoc</i>	2
From the President's Desk	3
A Seminary Graduation Prayer	4
by Andrew T. Roy	
Paul's Treatment of Marriage in 1 Corinthians 7	5
by William F. Orr	
Toward Balance, Synthesis, and Understanding	23
by Marion A. Fairman	
Book Reviews and Notes	
Cassels, <i>Your Bible</i>	
Chifflet, <i>Water in the Wilderness</i>	
Fisher, <i>How to Interpret the New Testament</i>	30
Elliott, <i>The Language of the King James Bible</i>	31
Samuel, <i>Treasure of Qumran</i>	32
J. A. Walther	
Constantelos, <i>The Greek Orthodox Church</i>	33
Loew, <i>The Lutheran Way of Life</i>	34
Hughes, <i>Theology of the English Reformers</i>	36
Jay C. Rochelle	
Hitt, <i>Heroic Colonial Christians</i>	37
M. Edwards Breed	
Brown, <i>Ultimate Concern: Tillich in Dialogue</i>	38
Tillich, <i>The Future of Religions</i>	39
Tillich, <i>Perspectives on 19th and 20th Century Protestant Theology</i>	40
Jay C. Rochelle	
Sharpe, <i>Medicine and the Ministry</i>	42
Gordon E. Jackson	
Lloyd-Jones, <i>Spiritual Depression: Its Causes and Cures</i>	44
Boyd, <i>Free to Live, Free to Die</i>	45
Diem, <i>Kierkegaard</i>	45
Jay C. Rochelle	
Wagoner, <i>The Seminary</i>	46
Wm. R. Phillippe	
Morrison and Barnes, <i>New Testament Word Lists</i>	49
Editor	

Ad Hoc

AS A THEORETICAL *modus operandi* probably few schools would admit to accepting the rule, "Publish or perish." In effect, however, the professors who publish become most widely known; and their reputations in the scholarly world rise high on the scale. But when we are mindful of our student experiences, we know that the "rule" has no relevance for rating the effectiveness of teachers. Each of us has known one or more instructors whose influence upon us has been deep and lasting, whose competence in their respective fields was beyond question, who probably had certain elements of originality, and yet whose reputation was parochial because they did not get into the publishing game. One may venture a guess that in most cases these teachers made a deliberate choice, and the weight of their energy and labor was given to the demanding routines of the classroom and school. A few teachers are able to manage both disciplines effectively, but such genius is certainly not common.

The reputation of our senior professor, William F. ("Bill") Orr, as an effective teacher is legendary. Generation after generation of seminary students has advised underclassmen by all means to "get in an elective" with Dr. Orr. And this impression says little about the uncounted hours which he gives to non-academic needs of the students and to the common life of the seminary. Those who know him best do not wonder that he has never pursued a writer's reputation.

So it is with unusual joy that we are able to offer here a paper by our colleague. It was delivered to the Biblical Division and guests last February, but the substance of the study has engaged Dr. Orr's attention for a number of years. We encouraged him to offer the manuscript to a more prestigious journal than this, but we are proud and delighted that he insisted on publishing where many of his friends and former students will be most likely to read it.

THE SHORTER PIECE by Mrs. Fairman was delivered last winter at the Honors Convocation at Westminster College in New Wilmington, Pa., where she is a professor of English. We published other articles by her in June, 1965, and June, 1966.

—J. A. W.

From the President's Desk

A PRELIMINARY REPORT of a recent study of theological education in the Episcopal Church calls attention to three theses advanced a decade ago by Dr. Douglas Horton:

"In general, a community is not better than its churches.

"In general, a church is not better than its minister.

"In general, a minister is not better than his training."

If there is any truth in this trilogy, a heavy burden of responsibility is laid upon theological seminaries. Like a row of falling dominoes, if the seminaries fail to fulfill their function adequately, the quality of the ministry is lowered, a moribund church results, with unfortunate consequences for the life of the world.

For the seminaries this means renewed dedication to the task committed to us by the church. Faculties and administrations charged with the weighty responsibility of training the clergy must be alert to every possible improvement of facilities, curriculum, teaching methods, and personal influence over students. This alertness to the new, however, must be balanced by an equal alertness not to permit any of the treasures which come from the past to be lost for the sake of mere novelty. Dilettanteism has no place in theological education. Sound theological education brings out of its treasure "what is new and what is old" (Matt. 13:52).

The churches, too, are involved in the weighty responsibilities placed upon the seminaries. A fourth aphorism might be added to the above three: "In general, a seminary cannot be better than the support of its constituency will permit." If Dr. Horton's aphorisms are correct, the churches must realize that the seminaries stand very high on the priority list of their concerns. Ministry, church, community, and world depend on the successful functioning of theological seminaries. Do the churches recognize this? Do the seminaries really stand high in the esteem of church members? Do the seminaries lay claim to the interest, the prayers, the time, the support of those who make up our churches? The decade ahead will be a testing time for the seminaries. If the churches are to fulfill their mission in the future, can they afford to make theological education peripheral in their interests? This is a question that needs deeper pondering than we have yet been willing to give it.

—D. G. M.

A Seminary Graduation Prayer

O THOU who art great beyond our imagining, good beyond our believing, and loving beyond our deserving: rescue us from ourselves, our greatest danger, and give us to Thee, our only hope. Blind us to the things that draw us from Thee, that we may perceive the things that lead us to Thee, until, having found Thee more surely, we may boldly show Thee forth in our words and lives, as did those disciples who first felt the rushing wind and the arousing fire of Thy Spirit.

We recall with gratitude the persevering faith of the founders of this Seminary, who fashioned well out of little that which was destined to grow. We thank Thee for the generosity of friends, churches, and community which made it possible to transform material gifts into books, buildings, preaching, and teaching. We thank Thee for Board members who have undergirded the institution, and for staff who have stimulated imaginations and inspired us to endure gladly the disciplines of learning.

Thou hast, indeed, put our feet in a large room, and we are thankful. Forgive us for wasted opportunities, and for those moments when we have stood before Thee unconcerned and empty-handed. Forgive, transform, and strengthen, that we may be willing witnesses and faithful servants in the company of Thy son, whose men we are.

Look Thou with favor upon us now as we give into Thy keeping the years ahead—and the lives that have been molded, in part, by our study and worship together. May the members of this class carry from our midst only such things as are pure and true. May they do their work in the world with finish, and without fuss or self-importance; and come at last to hear Thee say, "Well done, good and faithful servants!"


Season their words with the salt of truth that their conversation may be good to the taste. May their thoughtfulness and their courtesy make it an ever greater joy to know them. Keep their spirits humble, their thinking straight, and their hearts sound. Turn them from hollow and empty things toward the true tasks that confront the Church in its world mission.

Deliver them from the timidity of silence when they ought to speak—and from absorption in their own thinking when they could be learning from

—Concluded on p. 29.

Paul's Treatment of Marriage in 1 Corinthians 7

by WILLIAM F. ORR



I HAVE INSTRUCTED STUDENTS, when they work out an exegesis of a passage, to study the passage for themselves by translating it, parsing all the words, looking up key words in concordances and lexicons, investigating whatever historical or geo-

graphical facts are to be discovered in Bible dictionaries to throw light on the passage, and then to arrive at their own conclusions about what the passage means. Only after all this is it a good thing to look at the commentaries to see what points the students themselves may have missed and whether or not they or the commentaries are right. For once I have followed my own instructions, and so I am presenting in this paper only the conclusions I have reached independently of the commentaries. I venture to confine this treatment to an exegetical study of some points in 1 Corinthians 7.

The chapter begins with the phrase, "Now concerning the matters about which you wrote."¹ Similar phrases introduced by *περὶ δέ* are scattered throughout the remainder of the book.² These all seem to refer to points which either a group of, or the whole church at, Corinth had mentioned in a letter where they were seeking information from the apostle about right policy in connec-

¹In the original presentation of this paper I referred to the Greek text. For editorial reasons, many of these instances have been rendered in the translation of the RSV. In other cases, most of which will be apparent, my own translation appears.

²Cf. 7:25, 8:1, 12:1, 16:1,12.

tion with certain problems. The first question which they had raised was that of relations between the sexes, perhaps occasioned by Paul's strictures on *πορνοί* in a previous letter which he mentions in 1 Corinthians 5:9. It is reasonable to assume that Paul picks up each of the items in connection with this perennial problem in the same order in which the Corinthians had raised them in their letter. This will explain what some people have felt to be a rather illogical arrangement of the topics treated in chapter 7.

Paul continues with a statement the wording of which is incomplete as the Greek stands; it says merely, "Good for a man not to touch a woman." Thus it is necessary to supply some copula or other word to complete the sentence. It is not certain whether we should insert the form *εστι* or *ειναι*. Likewise there is nothing in the wording to indicate whether the phrase is a statement of Paul or a citation from the letter of the Corinthians. In the latter case, it may be a statement of fact or a question. There are many places in Paul's writings in which *καλον* is used in a phrase "it is good" where the copula is omitted, e.g., 1 Corinthians 7:8, "it is good for them if they remain as I am" (this is in the form of a quotation after *λεγω* and probably implies *ειναι*) and 7:26, "that it is good for a man to be thus." The first of these examples is parallel to our

phrase in vs. 1. But in the first part of 7:26 a copula is present which occurs in the infinitive form—"this is good," and the "is" is in the form *υπάρχειν*—while in the second clause the verb *ειναι* is found. I suggest, therefore, that we are fully entitled to supply the infinitive of the verb "to be" and to understand the phrase to mean, "concerning the things of which you wrote, first, that it is good for a man not to touch a woman." Then this would refer to a statement or hypothetical proposition raised by the church rather than an opinion of the apostle (cf. vs. 8). In this case we may take literally the imperative mood of the main verbs in vs. 2, whereas if the statement in vs. 1 is the apostle's stated opinion, the imperatives in vs. 2 have to be interpreted very loosely in order to avoid a contradiction. (After raising this possibility, I consulted numerous commentators and found that none has understood vs. 1 in this way, though Robertson and Plummer in the *ICC* come very close to it.)

It is interesting to observe that the term for "man" in this verse is *ανθρωπος* and not *ανηρ*. This is somewhat striking because of the fact that *ανθρωπος* designates a human being rather than a male. However, a check through the concordances of the Old and New Testaments demonstrates at once that *ανθρωπος* in the plural probably includes members of both sexes, while sometimes in the singu-

lar it may refer to either one or the other in a general statement; but never, when a particular individual is referred to, does it mean a woman. It is used likewise on several occasions to refer to a man who is either married to a woman or is about to be (e.g., Mt. 19:5 and parallels, "a man shall leave his father and mother and cleave unto his wife"). Usually, however, the term seems to refer to a man who may be either married or not married, whereas if a man is married, he is likely to be referred to in contrast to his wife, by the term *avŋp*. Thus in our passage the word refers to any male whether married or not.

Now the verb *απτεσθαι* means literally to "touch, seize, or grasp." It is used sometimes in the OT to refer to a man's relationship with a woman. Billerbeck states in his commentary on the passage that the word means 'marry' so that the question would concern whether it is good for man to marry a wife. The investigation I made through the Bible indicates that this is not a correct interpretation, for in the passages in which it is used, *απτεσθαι* means physical intercourse, without reference to marriage. For example, Gen. 20:4, "Abimelech had not touched her" means he had not had intercourse with Sarah, and also 20:6, "I

did not permit you to touch her" has precisely the same meaning.³ Proverbs 6:29, "Thus the one who goes in to a woman that belongs to another man will not be considered innocent, neither will anyone who touches her." Obviously "anyone who touches her" means one who has intercourse and thus commits adultery with a woman married to another man. There is no instance where the word *απτεσθαι* refers to marriage. This means that our statement raises the question about physical relationship between the sexes rather than marriage itself, and thus has to do with the question as to whether all people, married or unmarried, should abstain from sexual cohabitation. The usual understanding of the phrase makes the apostle himself affirm that such abstinence is good.

Another question arises as to the meaning of the word "good." *καλον* means "good" in the sense of "beautiful, fitting, or excellent." Most of the commentators think here it means "valuable or advisable." Usually, however, in the phrase "it is good" in the NT the word means more than merely "advisable," rather, "almost necessary." For example, Mt. 18:8, "it is good for you to enter into life lame"; Mt. 9:1, "it is good for you to enter into life with one eye"; Mk.

³Quotations from the OT presuppose the usage of the Septuagint, of course, unless otherwise indicated.

7:27, "it is not good to take bread of the children and give it to the dogs"; 1 Cor. 5:6, "your glorying is not good"; etc. In most of these passages and others that could be cited, the "good" refers to something a little more than merely "advisable." It is a kind of understatement for "it is right," "it is necessary," or "it is decent." There are other passages, of course, in which it does mean perhaps "valuable" or "excellent," as in Mk. 9:5, "it is good for us to be here"; but elsewhere the stronger implication seems to be present. Since Paul immediately commands sex relations in marriage, the probability is increased that the statement comes from the letter that the church wrote rather than from the apostle himself.

In this case, his answer begins with vs. 2. "Now, because of acts of unchastity, let each man have his own wife and each woman her own husband." If the statement of the first verse is a basic principle laid down by Paul himself, he immediately decrees the opposite: "Let each man or woman have a partner in marriage." There is no reason to require that the command "let them have" means permission or concession. The grammatical form is the third imperative; and as the verb is usually understood, it means, "let each man and woman have a marriage partner." This seems to indicate that the apostle commanded universal marriage. How-

ever, if we give heed to the tense of the command, which is present, and if we bear in mind that the question concerns physical cohabitation, either in or outside of the marriage, we may eliminate the apparent contradiction. The rule for the interpretation of the present imperative in Robertson's *Grammar*, page 851 ff, requires in the positive command the meaning "keep on doing what you are doing," and in the negative "stop doing what you are doing"; while the aorist imperative means affirmatively "begin to do what you have not been doing," and as a prohibition "don't start what you have not been doing." Here the present imperative means to continue a condition rather than to begin one. Consequently it should not be understood as meaning that every man should marry a wife and every woman marry a husband. If it meant that, it should employ the aorist. A run down through the concordances reveals that in many instances the verb *εχειν* in reference to the relation between the sexes means physical cohabitation; cf. Ex. 2:1, "there was a certain man from the tribe of Levi who married one of the daughters of Levi and 'had her' and she conceived in the womb"; Deut. 28:30, "you will marry a wife and another man will 'have her.'" In these instances the verb "to have" refers to sexual relationships and not to the ceremony of marriage. Isa. 13:16, "and they will rend their children before them and

will plunder their houses and will have their wives," refers to the actions of the enemies of Babylon who will thus humiliate its inhabitants especially by ravaging their wives. There is no instance of the use of the present imperative of this verb to refer to the act of marriage. It seems justified, consequently, to conclude that the apostle is affirming that every married man should continue physical cohabitation with his wife and that every married woman should do the same with her husband. Thus the command denies that within marriage cohabitation should be broken off. Incidentally, the use of the possessive reflexive pronoun *εαυτον* and the adjective *ιδιον* implies monogamy. This passage is one of the few in the Bible which clearly indicates monogamy as requisite for the servants of God. As I see it, vs. 2 does not therefore recommend universal marriage because of acts of fornication, so much as it recommends continuance of physical relationships within marriage. The question of the marriage of those who are single is discussed in later paragraphs of this chapter.

Now the requirement of physical cohabitation in marriage is emphasized in vs. 3, where the husband is commanded to repay the debt to his wife and the wife likewise to repay the debt to her husband. The only reference that I have found to the idea of a marriage debt is contained

in the Billerbeck commentary on the passage which cites several extracts from the *midrashim*. In Ex. 21:10 the *Mekhilta* says, "he shall not reduce her food, her clothing nor her cohabitation." Rabbi Jonathan draws the conclusion that no one is justified in withholding an obligation which belongs to the very nature of marriage, such as cohabitation. Billerbeck himself concludes from several rabbinical passages that the marriage obligation included physical support, cohabitation, and provision for clothing. Paul seems to present the same idea here, for the continuation of the practice of physical intercourse is not a free option so much as it is the performance of the marriage obligation that cannot be cancelled by any religious scruple or ascetic idea. He states this obligation as equally binding on the husband and the wife, neither one having the right to deny the other.

This principle is enforced by an amazing statement which enunciates what we may call the principle of neurological interchange: "the wife does not have authority over her own body, but the husband has. Likewise also the husband does not have authority over his own body but the wife has." Here we have precisely the same balance of rights and the assertion of an absolute equality between the husband and the wife as stated in vs. 3. This equality of rights and obligations seems to me to be

uniquely stated here, for such an idea is found nowhere else in the Bible. However, something close to it is found in the writings of the stoic philosopher Musonius, quoted by J. Weiss: "The sum total of marriage is the sharing of life and the begetting of children for he says the one who marries and the one who is married come together for this purpose. It is necessary for each to live in such a way with the other and to produce children in common and to consider nothing whatever a private possession not even the body itself, but to consider all things to be common, when they agree with each other and make all things common, even including their bodies."⁴ The principle enunciated in Paul's statement involves the surrender of control over one's own body to the marriage partner. The verb *εξονταζειν* means to have the kind of authority over another that the kings or slave holders have over their subjects or that men have over their property. Hence this statement involves the free surrender in marriage of one's right to control his own body. Such a surrender, while it is the expression of a voluntary choice when one marries another, is not optional after the marriage but is a legal obligation. The marriage partner has a right to the enjoyment of the other person's body, though of course this right is mutual and equal

for both. If there is—as I think there is—a significant difference between the sexes in the matter of sex adjustment, then it follows that each one has the obligation to meet the needs of the other according to the other's need. In practical life this means that wives have no right to bargain with their husbands in reference to sex relationships or to bestow sex gratification as a reward for good conduct. On the other hand, men have no right to ignore the emotional needs of their wives or to fail to make the proper psychological preparation for sex relationships that women's emotional nature requires. The surrender of the authority over one's own body means that the other one has the right to receive personal and physical gratification. The provision of this gratification is not a virtue but is the payment of a debt and is simply yielding to the proper authority.

In vs. 5, Paul proceeds to emphasize the principle by commanding them not to deprive each other except in one instance, when by mutual agreement they may consent to abstain from cohabitation for a period of time in order that they may have leisure for prayer, and that they afterwards should resume their normal marriage relationship. Now this mutual agreement to abstain for the sake of prayer and to come back together again is based on the purpose

⁴Der erste Korintherbrief (1910), ad loc.

of restricting the temptation of Satan because of the lack of self-control. This particular concession is a little mysterious because it is hard to see why regular practice of married sex would interfere with regular prayer. Paul, however, seems to recognize that there might be occasions where both parties would concentrate for several days upon prayer to the exclusion of all normal life concerns. He does not specify how long these periods should be but indicates that they must be terminated by the resumption of the ordinary relationships. The temptation of Satan operates because of a lack of self-control. Now this power of Satan to tempt may be thwarted (1) by this special kind of prayer, and (2) by the regular continuation of sex relationships inside marriage. Usually the *akrasia* is understood to refer to inability to control sex desire. The argument is hence "because you cannot control your sex desire you need to gratify it by normal marriage intercourse so that Satan will not tempt you to harlotry or adultery." But a cognate word *akratης* is used in Proverbs 27:20, "The undisciplined people are licentious in their speech." I wonder, then, if another idea may not be implied based on the fact that Satan is the figure who accuses and who also stirs up strife. When for one reason or another marriage partners refuse regular sex satisfaction to each other, the door is open to anger and

hate; and this provides Satan a golden opportunity to stir up strife between the man and the wife and thus to give grounds for accusation against them.

Verse 6 says, "but I say this by way of concession and not by way of command." The question is, to what does "this" refer? According to the usage of classical Greek *οὗτος* generally refers backwards to something already mentioned. But this rule does not hold in 1 Cor.; for in 1:12 he says, "I say this, that each one of you says . . ." Obviously "this" refers to the *οὐτι* clause which follows. In 7:26, "I think this to be good, namely . . . were you bound to a wife? Do not seek a release from her." Again the "this" or the *τούτῳ* refers to what follows. And 11:17, "when I command this I do not praise you because you do not come together for the better but for the worse": the "this" refers to his subsequent discussion about the Lord's Supper which comes up only from vs. 20 on. Consequently we may conclude that here in vs. 6 the "this" refers to what he is going to say about the unmarried and the widows, which likewise comes up from vs. 8 on. Now those who insist that it refers backwards have difficulty in deciding where it lights. Some think it refers to the agreement to abstain for prayer, some to the injunction not to deprive each other, and some to the statement "let each man have his own wife." But as we

have seen, all of these statements are given in the imperative mood and properly mean commands. A command cannot be regarded as a concession. So when he says, "I say this by concession and not command," he must be referring forward. That would mean that his statements about the unmarried and the widows are by way of concession to human need. This conclusion may seem to be negated by the presence of the δε in vs. 7. I am willing to concede that for the most part δε should be regarded as adversative. But it appears that in the string of sentences from chap. 6 on through chap. 7 there are several instances where δε is not so much adversative as indicative of a shift of subject so that these should be translated not "but" but rather "now." For example, in vs. 3 the man is to repay the debt to the wife and likewise the wife to the man. Here δε καὶ is found. In 6:13, "the body is not for fornication but for the Lord. Now God both raised up the Lord and will raise us up." The second statement includes δε, yet it does not contrast with the previous but rather gives an additional truth that is logically connected with the previous statement. Also here in vs. 7 we may understand it to state "I say this according to concession, as I wish all men to be as myself." This discussion of the δε reminds us of a text problem: *Vaticanus*, the *Koinē* text, and one example of the Vulgate and the

Syriac read γαρ instead of δε. This would mean, "for I wish all men to be as myself" and gives the reason for his making the concession. We have to recognize that when *Vaticanus* and the *Koinē* text agree along with a couple of representatives of the Western text, we have no mean authority. Then this would clinch the case for referring the "this" forward to vs. 8.

The next paragraph in his treatment alludes to the unmarried and the widows. The unmarried are masculine, and the widows are feminine. Immediately this suggests the idea of a balance or parallel. The parallel to widows is widowers. Such a word χηρός exists in Greek but is not used in the NT and is not found in the Septuagint. Whatever may be the reason for the omission of this word, biblical authors apparently did not feel inclined to use it. I suggest, therefore, that in vs. 8 αγαποῦς means not "bachelors" but "widowers." Etymologically the term means "unmarried." The Greek word begins, of course, with *alpha privative*. Now to an English ear, the prefix *un-* in "unmarried" means "one who has not been married," whereas the *alpha privative* may mean both one who has not been married and one who is out of marriage, or as we might invent a word and say one who is "de-married." Liddell and Scott's unabridged lexicon states that αγαποῦς means both "bachelors" and "widow-

ers." I suggest therefore that we should understand him to say in vs. 8, "Now I am speaking to the widowers and the widows. It is good for them if they remain as I." Such an understanding will relieve several difficulties. In the first place, if he is talking about bachelors, there is a strange lack of balance between the terms "bachelors" and "widows." Secondly, from vs. 25 on he proceeds to discuss people that have not been married. And thirdly, at least what has been felt as a difficulty about Paul's own state is relieved. Many people who are aware of rabbinical law have felt that there is some historical difficulty about the assertions that Paul was a student of Gamaliel and was a member of the Sanhedrin Council that voted to condemn Stephen. Since in the *Mishnah* it is clear that a rabbi has to be married, if Paul were a rabbi, as evidence seems to indicate—at least the evidence of the book of Acts—then he could not have been a bachelor; but he could very well have been a widower. If we understand the term *ayapous* to mean "widowers," then Paul is urging them to remain the same way he is now, a widower; and yet, he does not insist on this because he makes the concession, "if they do not have self-control let them get married, for it is better to marry than to burn with a fever." Now this rationale of re-marriage may be felt by those with subtle perceptions to fit more accur-

ately the needs of widowers and widows than the more idealistic and romantic feelings of people in the first flush of love, as youths. It seems to be a fact that when people have enjoyed the physical relationships of marriage and are suddenly deprived of this by death or divorce, they are thrown into a very serious emotional dilemma. Desires that have been awakened and satisfied have a very strong power. And Paul is affirming that for these people it is better to marry again than to burn or be consumed by the physical and emotional fever imposed by present desolation. Now these propositions are the concessions to which he has referred in vs. 6. Additional argument for the reference of *ayapous* to widowers may be furnished by the other examples of its use in this chapter. For example, in vs. 11 he says of a wife who has left her husband, "let her remain *ayapous*, 'de-married,' or else be reconciled to her husband." Here *ayapous* means living in the state of separation from a husband. Also in vs. 34 we read, "and the unmarried woman and the virgin care for the things of the Lord." Here the unmarried woman is listed as an addition to the virgin and consequently does not have the same meaning. It means what it meant above, one who has entered an unmarried state either by separation or by the death of her husband. It seems, therefore, that we are justified in attaching this mean-

ing to the word in vs. 8. Hence Paul has so far discussed first, what is proper to married people, and second, what is proper for widowers and widows.

Then he discusses the question of divorce by affirming flatly for those who are both Christians divorce is forbidden, not by Paul's word, but by the word of the Lord, which means by the teaching of Jesus. He takes what Jesus says in Mt. and Mk. without the exception clause as absolutely binding on all his followers. However he goes on to express an opinion, which he states is not based on the teaching of the Lord, that when a Christian is married to a non-Christian, the situation may be different. In the first place, the continuance of the marriage depends upon the will of the non-Christian who does not accept the authority of Christ. If he is a Jewish husband, rabbinical law permits him to divorce his wife. If he is a Greek or a Roman, Roman law permitted either partner to divorce the other. Therefore he may choose to exercise this legal prerogative no matter what the opinion of the Christian partner may be. Paul here, as in the previous section, makes no distinction between the husband and wife inasmuch as he says that the case in point may be that of the believing husband married to an unbelieving wife, or a believing wife married to an unbelieving husband. Now first of all, if the unbeliever is

willing or pleased to live with the believer, the believer shall never divorce the unbeliever. If fears arise that contact of this close and intimate kind with an unbeliever should somehow pollute, pervert, or mislead the believer, Paul reassures his readers by saying that the unbelieving husband has been sanctified by the wife, and the unbelieving wife has been sanctified by the Christian husband. [This is a doctrine which has never been properly appreciated in the Church. It may be entitled the Doctrine of Uxorial Sanctification. Incidentally, for those who are dealing with the perplexities of modern married people, this verse may prove a gold mine; for many Christians in marriage are worried about their married partners who are not Christian and feel that they are obligated somehow to evangelize them. The trouble is that the attitude of an evangelist and that of a married partner do not fit together; and invariably the evangelist begins to harass, cajole, and harangue the other partner so that the partner is driven farther from Christian belief than before, and the marriage itself is jeopardized.] The only condition that Paul lays down here for the sanctification of the unbeliever is that he be pleased to live with the believer. Therefore the object of the believer is to make the marriage happy for the unbeliever. The close contact produces a corporal unity between

the two so that the unbelieving member of the marriage is sanctified by the faith of the believer. Now the mood and tense of the verb "sanctified" is perfect-indicative, which means that this has taken place and it continues in effect. It is without condition and is a statement of fact. He reinforces this astounding statement by the further fact that if it is not true, the children are unclean; but they are holy—holy because of their being children of believers, being united by the kinship in the family. In the same way, the non-Christian partner being united by the union of the flesh with the believer is holy.

The second condition is when the unbeliever refuses to live with the believer and exercises his legal prerogative of divorce, either because he has contempt for the Christian religion or for the partner who is a Christian. In this case the believer is to permit the unbeliever to depart without controversy or attempt to hold him to the marriage. Paul says in vs. 15, "the brother or the sister has not been enslaved in these kinds of cases," which seems to mean that in such a case the Christian who has been deserted and divorced is free to marry again. This, incidentally, is the ground for the Westminster Confession's old idea of desertion as a Scriptural ground for divorce.

The mysterious conclusion to these statements about the mixed marriage

is: "but God called you in peace. What do you know, woman, if you will save your husband or what do you know, husband, if you will save your wife?" Three grammatical points are striking. What is the meaning of *εν* with *εργητη*? How do we understand the two instances of *τι* in vs. 16, and what is the significance of the future indicative of the verb *σωσεις* in the "if" clause? If the preposition *εν* is taken to govern the locative, then the phrase means "you were in a condition of peace when God called you." And that doesn't seem to supply any intelligible idea in the context. If it be taken as instrumental it may mean "God called you by means of peace or in a peaceful manner." Perhaps the second of these is the true idea. Since God called you in a peaceful manner, you are to be related to other people in the crises of life in a peaceful manner. Usually the word "call" refers to the divine choice and command to a person to enter the Christian life to become a disciple or to accept some official function in the Church. There is a question as to whether in this context it could mean "God called you in a peaceful manner to become a Christian though you were married to an unbeliever who refuses to accept the Christian faith, and hence even in the distress of an enforced separation you should manifest the spiritual disposition that God had when he called you." Then the idea would be to let the unbeliever depart

in a peaceful manner without recriminations and outbursts of anger. If this is the case, the next verse raises the question: how do you know if you will save your husband? There are two ideas: one, "saving" here could be healing so that the manner in which the partner is permitted to leave might itself have an influence on getting him back. To save your husband or your wife may mean to restore the husband or wife to the original position in the marriage. However, there is another possibility in connection with the meaning of *τι* plus *ει*. This can mean, "how do you know, wife, that you will save your husband?" or "how do you know, husband, that you will save your wife?" Admittedly the word *ει* does not ordinarily mean "that," but sometimes under the influence of a Semitic use of the conjunction *'im* this meaning may be expressed by *ει* in the NT. If this is the meaning of the verse, then the question justifies letting the person go because you have no assurance that if you could keep him at home, you would be able to save the marriage situation. Now it is interesting to observe that we have an *if* clause with the future indicative. This kind of clause indicates that the condition is assumed to be real or unreal. And probably here it means to affirm that you don't know that such a condition will obtain. At any rate, I think we can exclude from our interpretation the idea that some

people have had that this verse is referring to Christian salvation and indicating that no wife or husband knows whether, if he or she acts better in the marriage, the soul of the other person may be saved. Such an understanding makes vs. 16 contradict vs. 14.

Verses 17-24 make statements about retaining the circumstances in which you existed before you become a Christian. While the injunctions are very illuminating about the historical circumstances of the time, they have no bearing upon the question of marriage. They seem to be thoughts somehow suggested to the mind of Paul by what he has said before, but I see no obvious connection and have difficulty understanding why this paragraph begins with the connective "except"—this is obviously regarded as a series of reminders which have to be borne in mind despite what has been said before. And since I find myself unable to see what the connection is, I will pass by the whole paragraph.

In vs. 25 Paul seems to resume the discussion of points about marriage raised by the letter; for he says, "Now concerning virgins I have no command of the Lord." If we are not off-base in understanding *αγαμοις* in vs. 8 to refer to widowers, then it follows that "virgins" here is a term to describe people who have not been married. Both in English and in Greek, "virgin" is female in the over-

whelming majority of cases; but sometimes a man even in English may be called a virgin and in Greek we have a clear instance of this in Rev. 14:4, "these (masculine) are those who have not been polluted with women, for they are virgins." Since the term is applicable to men, I suggest with trembling hesitation that the virgins in this verse mean both men and women who have never been married.⁵ If we indulge ourselves in the license of such an interpretation, the classifications in the chapter become very clear, something which by no means can be said of it if "virgins" means here only females. By taking it to mean unmarried persons of both sexes we discover that Paul is actually dealing with a different group from those he has discussed before. In the first paragraph of the chapter, he has discussed what is proper to married people; in the second paragraph, what is proper for those whose marriages have been or will be dissolved; third, those who are thinking of divorce; fourth, what is proper for those who are now involved in a marriage of mixed religion. Verse 25 considers (fifth) previously unmarried people whether male or female. This makes sense because in the first two paragraphs, he discusses conduct appropriate to the members of both sexes, and we may

anticipate that he would continue the same approach in our present paragraph. Paul indicates that he has no command of the Lord but is willing to give an opinion as one who has received mercy from the Lord to be faithful, or better, trustworthy. It is clear that Paul had not heard of the creative power which the Spirit bestowed upon the Church—according to Bultmann—of producing *ad hoc* sayings of Jesus at will to fit a *Sitz im Leben*. Paul always insists that he is fully equipped by the Spirit. He also received his Gospel by revelation and not from any man. In relation to Corinth he is the Father of the Church as no other man is. Now if any early Christian enthusiast or prophet would have been empowered by the Holy Spirit to produce at will appropriate sayings of the Lord to cover embarrassing situations or to answer difficult problems, certainly Paul himself should have been the most efficient agent of such production. But he lets us know that in connection with virgins, he has no command of the Lord, and he is not about to invent one. This indicates that he had knowledge of a collection of words of the Lord, the extent of which we do not know, that these words of the Lord had binding authority in the Church, and that when a situation arose to which any of

⁵Cf. J. Weiss, op. cit., p. 194: "Indeed under virgins must be included both men and women." Weiss thinks of a vow made between virgins which included a close relationship but not the cohabitation of marriage.

these words applied, Paul did not hesitate to recall them. Yet he did not on any occasion quote the words literally. I myself feel that this sentence justifies us in preferring the general attitude of Dibelius on the matter of the formation of the Gospel tradition to that of Bultmann. Since Paul knew of no word of the Lord concerning virgins, and since no such word is sound in the collection of teachings preserved in our Gospels, Paul is reduced to the necessity of expressing his opinion. He feels that this opinion will have some weight because the Lord has been merciful to him, first by converting him to the Christian faith, and next by calling him to be the Apostle to the Gentiles, neither of which great blessings he had deserved. Now the word *πιστός* here, as J. Weiss informs us, is "trustworthy," rather than "faithful." In the context it means the Gospel was entrusted to Paul in the full confidence that he would be worthy of this trust in passing it on uncontaminated to his hearers. So he feels that now as a result of this mercy, he is able to give a reliable opinion on a subject of virgins. But again we have a digression, or at least a transfer of attention from this particular problem to the general principle or condition in the light of which this problem as well as others must be solved. For he says, "I think

that this is good because of the present necessity that (*or because*) it is good for man to be thus: are you bound to a wife? Do not seek a release. Have you been released from a wife? Do not seek a wife. But even if you get married, you do not sin, and if the virgin gets married, she does not sin." This statement refers in the first part to men who are either married or released from marriage. Since the verb *λελυσαί* is in the perfect, I think it means an act which has occurred the effect of which is still present. And thus it is not to be understood as "Are you free now from marriage by not ever having been married," but it means "have you been released from a wife," presumably by her death. If you are such a person and marry, you do not sin. Now he takes up the virgin. There is an interesting verbal problem here because the Greek word for marry, *γαμεῖν*, means, as we have seen, the marriage which a man contracts. Here this word in the active is used apparently with a feminine subject, "the virgin" where the feminine article is used. However, several good manuscripts⁶ omit the article, in which case we would read, "if a virgin marries, he or she does not commit a sin"; and the use of *γαμεῖν* would be fitting if the word meant either man or woman. Again with great hesitation, we suggest that

⁶B.G. (*Boernerianus*, IX Century).

the omission of the article is justified, both by manuscript authority and by the proper interpretation of the passage.

Now the reason for Paul's general principle here in connection with both virgins and previously married persons—that they would do better not to try to change their present condition but yet are perfectly innocent if they do—is that the time is short. And in this short time, in view of the coming affliction before the return of Christ, those who are married will have special difficulty. It is a little hard for me to see why the special difficulty attaches to married people more than to single people in any prospective eschatological catastrophe, but Paul thought there would be. He also indicates that in the time between now and the coming of the Lord, people should live in their life condition as if they did not live in it: "the weepers as those who do not weep and the rejoicers as those who do not rejoice and the purchasers as those who do not own. For the shape of this world is passing away." Now to my mind it is not evident why such statements are not equally true in view of the universal imminence of death. And since this imminence is a characteristic of all generations, I cannot understand why the particular generation preceding the last days should have any different principles from all the other generations since presumably we are all going to die

and are going to face the judgment. Many modern scholars, by the way they write, seem perfectly clear in that there is such a difference and that NT ethics is determined by it. Paul indicates that the bachelor or widower will care for the things of the Lord more than one who has gotten married, and likewise, the widow or the virgin cares for the things of the Lord more than one who gets married. Here again I am afraid I cannot understand this; for the unmarried people I have known seem to be as perplexed about the cares of the world as any married people and in some instances, much more so. Paul, however, by caring or anxiety, may have meant a dedication of the whole life in a career. He might mean that an unmarried person can concentrate all his leisure time on some special service of God, whereas if he is married he must concentrate at least a good part of his time on the support of his family. Also in view of the idea that this is the last generation, he may have had in his mind that there is no need of having children. Of course, that would make a difference. If the world is coming to an end, that purpose of marriage is futile. Then of course, since we have discovered that the end did not come in that generation and hasn't come yet, whatever principles Paul laid down based on this assumption need a little revision. Yet even under his presupposition he insists

that either a man or a woman has a perfect right to marry in the face of the eschatological situation.

From vs. 36 on, we have another puzzling paragraph. There is no question that the virgin described here is a female. "If anyone thinks that he is acting shamefully towards his virgin, if she be past the ripe age and it ought to happen this way, what he wills, let him do. He does not sin. Let them get married. But who stands firm in his heart, not being under necessity, but has authority over his own will and has decided this in his own heart to keep his own virgin, he will do well. So that both the one who marries (?) his own virgin does well and the one who does not marry her will do better."

No collection of Scripture verses of such length bristles with more difficulties. As Lietzmann pointedly states: If anyone reads without prejudice verses 36-37, he will have no doubt though the phraseology seems a little clumsy that Paul is talking about a young man with his fiancee. But if he reads equally unprejudiced vs. 38 without reading the first verses he would have no doubt that he is talking about the father of a virgin daughter. It is not absolutely clear who is the subject of the phrase "if (he or she) is beyond the ripe age," or of the last phrase "what (he or she) wishes let him or her do." Here are the possibilities. (1) If anyone thinks that he is acting shamefully

towards his virgin, if he be past the ripe age, what he wills let him do. (2) If he be past the ripe age, let her do what she wishes. (3) If she be of a ripe age, let her do what she wishes. (4) If she be of ripe age, let him do what he wishes. So far as I can see, there is nothing whatever inside the verse to indicate which of these alternatives is correct. Some say that the imperative plural, *γαπειτωσαν*, requires the understanding that the young man is guilty of shameful postponement of marriage when his fiancee is beyond the ripe age and he ought to get married to her; for this verb say, "let them get married"; but the verse makes equal if not better sense if understood to mean, "if any father acts shamefully towards his virgin daughter, if she be beyond a ripe age, what she wills, let her do. She does not commit sin; let them get married." Obviously if she is going to get married, there would have to be two of them, therefore the plural is justified. Now vs. 37 says, "but if he stands firm in his heart and not having any necessity but has authority over his own will, and has decided in his own heart to keep his own virgin, he will do well." Some sharp-sighted observers have found in reading this verse that to consider it to refer to a father, the verse is a collection of grotesqueries—and I will admit that it does make a slightly humorous impression on me. But at the same time I find some

difficulty in seeing the precise appropriateness of these conditions to the state of an eager suitor for the hand of a girl. Some have thought that it is unfitting to describe the daughter of a man as his own virgin. But I have never heard this particular kind of language used in reference to a fiancee.⁷ It could be that it was perfectly appropriate in the first century for a young man to think of his fiancee as his own virgin; but as far as the dictionaries inform me, virgin was often used as a term for daughter. Next, I have been hard put to see what is the sense of a young man's not having necessity when he is engaged to a girl that would make it possible for him to postpone marriage indefinitely. What kind of freedom from necessity is involved here? Crudely, because of conditions that exist in our time, I think immediately of the idea that she is not pregnant; but that is hardly what the Apostle Paul has in mind. And if he is thinking of freedom from emotional necessity, I can see that this means nothing but a state of tepid love which would justify their releasing each other from an engagement as well as postponing marriage. And then I find it slightly grotesque to think of this paragon of a lover having authority over his own will, which would seem to imply that he

could just as well leave her as take her. I think it would be better to consider this verse as referring to her father also, when for some reason or other, as ancient fathers did, he has tried to determine the marriage destiny of his daughter. And perhaps under the spell of first-century Christian enthusiasm, he has committed himself, his wife, and his children to an absolute service of God with the idea that the Lord is likely to descend from the sky within the next year. Now he may be in the situation of finding that his daughter is perhaps interested in a young man but has not yet fallen in love with him, and he may be himself firm in his heart by believing that she should be kept single, and he may have the kind of relationship with her by which his will does have authority in her mind, and thus he is not under necessity because she has not yet gotten committed to love or the desire for marriage. Then he will do well to keep her as his virgin daughter. Possibly there is an additional note here that for all these reasons he has decided to continue to support her as his daughter without making any attempt to get her married off. In this case he will do well.

Now by interpreting the person in question as the father, the last verse makes perfect sense, for the word is

⁷Wendland, *Die Briefe an die Korinther*, p. 58, follows Kümmel in explaining it of a fiancee.

$\gamma\alphaμιζων$, which means "give in marriage" and does not mean "marry." There is no instance anywhere else in Greek literature for understanding $\gamma\alphaμιζειν$ to mean "enter into marriage." Those who take it this way in this verse have to resort to a slight textual correction. They say that the *iota* of this verb could have been confused with *eta* of the verb $\gamma\alphaμειν$. The difficulty of this is that this mistake has to occur twice in the same verse; furthermore I see no form that would be so confused except the future

participle of $\gamma\alphaμειν$ and this would produce the grammatical anomaly of having a man described as doing well before he does what he does. Therefore I think we are better off to understand the whole paragraph as referring to the father.

The last two verses of the chapter deal with the obvious fact that a wife is bound to her husband as long as her husband lives but is free to marry after he dies. Yet Paul thinks she will be happier if she remains single.

Toward Balance, Synthesis, and Understanding

by MARION A. FAIRMAN

THE FRENCH NOVELIST BALZAC had a neat classification for the human species. All men, he said, fall into one of three categories; either doers, or thinkers, or poets and prophets. I see, however, quite a distinction between poet and prophet. I would suggest, therefore, that modern man may be classified in four categories: the doers, the thinkers, the poets, and the prophets. The *doer* makes society go. He builds the things society needs to function. Indeed, he is the guts of the social system. I should like for now, however, not to be concerned with the doer but with the *thinker*, the man of science, the *poet*, the man of humane letters, and the *prophet*, the man of religion. And with these symbolic names, I should like to mean not three professional people but three sets of mind; to consider the variety of disagreement among these disciplines; to explore the tragic implications of a three-way split in our Western society revealed by the attitudes of the men of science, the men of humane letters, and the men of religion.

There is today a popular view of the thinker, the poet, and the prophet. The people know that the thinker, the scientist, provides facts and theories that increase man's knowl-

edge of the natural universe. Society puts a high value on the man of science because his work has paid off in enormous material prosperity and in man's unprecedented ability to control nature. The man in the street, on the other hand, gives short shrift to poets and prophets. To him, a poet is a useless luxury, an impractical type who belongs to lovers, and to second-graders who need exercises to develop their memories. Parents have been known to faint, and neighbors have been known to look askance at anyone who thinks seriously of becoming a poet. And as for the prophet—well, the man on the street occasionally gives him lip-homage, especially on Sundays; but frankly, the prophet gives the man on the street the creeping goose-flesh. To him, a prophet is a hollow-eyed, Bible-toting, "Robert Hall" nut, a left-over from the age of superstition whom one must tolerate because he marries and buries. Perhaps the only place in modern society in which these three men may be equally honored is in the halls of our colleges and universities.

But even in academic halls, we reluctantly admit areas of disagreement; we acknowledge an uneasiness over the three-way split in our society, a split which education in a

curious way, probably because of its formal divisions, continues. This curious separation among men of science, men of humane letters, and men of religion is, however, a modern phenomenon. In the Middle Ages, from all I can read and understand, science, humanities, and religion were strongly unified, a unification which, I have been informed, still largely prevails in the society of the Middle East, but a unification which surely must be under profound attack in the twentieth century. In the Western world, at least, from the seventeenth century on, a burgeoning science attacked the very foundations of letters and religion simultaneously. By the nineteenth century, the inroads of scientific thinking had forced literature into losing its prestige as a thing of value; poetry, for instance, had become simply that which entertains or beautifies, a degeneration of literature in "art for art's sake." In a similar way, the Copernican revolution dealt a shattering blow to those religious men who had assumed the sun went around the earth and could be stopped in its tracks as Joshua claimed. Darwin's discoveries and his and others' subsequent writings so shook man's understanding of his natural world that, unfortunately, theology succumbed to the attack of science by arguing scripture on scientific grounds rather than from other, more defensible bases.

In order to fight back against the

attack of science, men of literature and men of theology joined forces in a quest for new values. Between them, they exposed the argument with science as a false conflict, arguing with great effect that both literature and theology are about things which lie beyond scientific reasoning; suggesting that the poet and the prophet are not useless luxuries, but that both are essential to human life. Together, they insisted that the proper concerns of literature and theology are to express for man the meaning of life, to give to man his reason for being, to provide the *why* of it all. Together, men of literature and men of theology ground out the validity of arriving at truth through intuition and vision; together, they exposed the fallacy that truth is only that which can be measured, pointed to, hammered, nailed, eaten, expressed mathematically, or studied in a laboratory. They distinguished between the primary world with which men of science are concerned, and that world of words with which the subjects of literature and theology are expressed, that secondary world which can be felt and expressed only in words. Words themselves, excepting the language of mathematics, cannot penetrate the world of science. But by the same reasoning, the tools of science are only tools to enter the worlds of literature and religion.

Then, in a curious turn of events, literature, especially in poetic form,

more and more put itself forward as prophecy, perhaps because religion had been more seriously shaken by science than literature in that the very authority of Biblical revelation had been undermined by devastating, so-called "higher criticism." In any case, poetry attempted to fill the gap of disbelief opened by the attack of science on religion. Poetry tried to take the place of religion, a position most clearly articulated in the nineteenth century by Matthew Arnold, who writes:

The future of poetry is immense, because in poetry, where it is worthy of its high destinies, our race, as time goes on, will find an ever surer and surer stay. There is not a creed which is not shaken, not an accredited dogma which is not shown to be questionable, not a received tradition which does not threaten to dissolve. . . . More and more mankind will discover that we have to turn to poetry to interpret life for us, to console us, to sustain us.¹

Now, in the twentieth century, we know that literature was never accepted as a substitute for religion. And today both the poet and the prophet agree that literature is not a "surrogate for religion"² and that, though similar in language, literature and religion "differ in intention."³ But mutual suspicion is bred by this very similarity in the language, a similarity which will lend itself to our discussion. Theologian Krister

Stendahl's definition of religious language has been helpful at this point; he makes a distinction which relates the language of religion to literature as well as to science when he suggests that the language of religion is "poetry plus" rather than "science-minus." The suspicion lingers between poet and prophet, however, further augmented by the tendencies of modern literature to concern itself with the predicament of man, hitherto the province of religion, and often, through its skeptical attitude, to specifically repudiate the most fundamental and important religious beliefs. Indeed, the poet and the prophet frequently find themselves united only in their common envy of the thinker's prestige, a prestige for science which so permeates our society that knowledge which cannot be known by scientific study seems somehow to the undiscerning to be unreal, unnecessary, and unwanted!

Diversity may be seen among the thinker, the poet, and the prophet even in those things considered the virtues of each. To the thinker, to the man of science, the overwhelming virtue is intellectual detachment, that principle—indeed, the code of honor—by which he lives, that quality by which the subject is examined as an objective thing and dealt with by the human reason, that faculty by which

¹Matthew Arnold, "The Study of Poetry," *Selected Essays* (London, 1964), p. 46.

²Cleanthe Brooks, "The Formalist Critics," *Kenyon Review* xiii (1951), 72.

³Northrup Frye, *Anatomy of Criticism* (Princeton, 1957), p. 142.

the examination is conducted without subjectivity and the evidence presented without manipulation of the facts. Intellectual detachment, the ability to study the object and to report the results of rational evidence is prized as the supreme virtue of the man of science.

The poet, however, has always known what psychology has lately taught us, that reason alone can never suffice. The supreme virtue of the poet is his imagination, that imagination by which he gives shape, through words, to the chaos of life, that power by which he gives form to the alienation man experiences from his natural world, his fellowman, and his god. That genius by which the poet infuses the structure through which man may see himself, his society, and his destiny is the poet's creative imagination, his supreme virtue.

The supreme virtue of the prophet is neither intellectual detachment nor creative imagination. The virtue of the man of religion is his concern, concern for those things not confined to time and space, his regard for those values Tillich calls "ultimate," his insistence that the individual soul possesses mysterious possibilities beyond reason, beyond imagination. The prophet cares about a world beyond the primary world of the senses, beyond the secondary world of the imagination; the man of religion speaks of a world not seen, nor felt, but a world perceived, through faith.

To recall man to his own finiteness, to suggest to man a way of transcendence, to offer man the "courage to be" is the heart's concern of the prophet, his supreme virtue.

While the diversity of virtues in the thinker, the poet, and the prophet may at once suggest areas of misunderstanding, the tragic implications of such diversity are compounded when we realize that for each virtue there exists in each man a corresponding vice. If the virtue of the thinker is detachment, his vice is indifference. For the scientist to slip into the role of innocent bystander, to separate himself from the world of men, to lose the precious value of persons, is a vice. Perhaps it is well to remember Buchenwald or Auschwitz; whatever else we may wish to call it, the concentration camp was the realization of the scientific ideal, a terrible triumph of human ingenuity. Who, in what paralysis of indifference, planned the gas chambers? Those gas chambers where six million Jews were dispatched? Who, with what scientific efficiency, designed the extraction rooms? Those rooms where the teeth of the cadavers were pulled out for gold? Who, with what objectivity, blue-printed the drains? Those drains which carried the blood off so smoothly? Were those thinkers, those men of science, good fathers, devoted sons, willing, indeed grateful to draw their plans, design their rooms, make their blue-

prints so long as someone else would die instead of them? Indifference, the vice of the man of science, can build a world which enslaves men in mechanistic determination, a world which disregards human value, a world of evil created by paralysis of the human conscience, the human intelligence, and the human will. The vice of indifference makes a mockery of the virtue of scientific detachment.

If the virtue of the poet is his creative imagination, the vice of the man of literature is distortion of the image of man. The modern artist may and does produce works of great power; at the same time much modern literature takes the reader on a guided tour through the wastelands of contemporary life, accompanied by a running commentary on man's personal disease, his cultural malaise, and his global peril. Of course, we expect our artists to write of their own and our discomfort and disillusionment; but we yearn for recognition of the implications in man's collective tragedy much more than we desire reinforcement of the faceless hostility of the world. We look to our writers for some hint of how the self-enclosure of the ego may be broken, how we may gain release from the awful prison of our human plight. True enough, we want our poets, through their creative imagination, to be true to man as man. But the vice of distortion leads to a doleful assessment of the world, a terrible

looking inward; in vulgar language, a looking at our own bellybuttons, an introversion which is a kind of sickness in itself, scarcely less perilous than the complacency it wishes to exorcise. Distortion, that vice of the poet, leads man to and leaves him in despair, that black cloud that hangs over twentieth century literature.

If the virtue of the prophet is concern, the vice of the man of religion is anxiety, an anxiety to safeguard his belief at all costs, a too-quick defense sometimes falling into sentimental piety, a too-easy wiping away of man's responsibility for his own behavior, a too-easy ignoring of the evil in the world. More often, however, anxiety, the vice of the man of religion, denigrates the proper avenues of religion into a kind of unyielding dehumanization. If called upon to speak out for mankind, the prophet who rigidly identifies his belief with an organization or a hierarchy may be led, through the vice of anxiety, to undeviating conformity to the organization, to a defense of the hierarchy as though he were somehow defending the honor of God. Thus, in the early days of America, the New England clergy banished Anne Hutchinson and Roger Williams, doomed sinners to torture and mutilation, even, most inglorious of American religious histories, burned "witches" at the stake. In our recent world history, we have seen Pope Pius XII struggle "to the

point of suffering," as he has written, only to finally decline to speak out against the Nazis for the slaughter of the Jews. Often, this vice of anxiety takes the form of an immovable theological position. One kind of religious man is clearly labeled the fundamentalist, but we forget sometimes that the liberal stands also unbending in his uncritical cultural optimism. For that matter, the "God-is-Dead" theologians are evidently just as fixed in the inflexibility of cultural pessimism. The vice of anxiety may take another stringent, personal form. Many persons have been victimized by a kind of religious imprisonment, which regards any interest besides religion as either superfluous or blasphemous. Thus, religion, conceived of as a liberating force, through the vice of anxiety can deteriorate into an enslavement, which prevents the fullest development of man's highest powers in his individual and social aspects.

The challenge to the thinker, the poet, and the prophet is to work for a total view of man's natural world, of man's life, of his ultimate destiny. Somehow, a balance of intellectual detachment, creative imagination, and the heart's concern must be achieved. The virtues of the man of science, the man of letters, and the man of religion must be simultaneously affirmed; thinker, poet, and prophet must somehow complement each other; each must hold the virtues of the others in

paradoxical tension. In a similar way, the vices of the thinker, the poet, and the prophet must be vigorously denied. With no reluctance and no fear, thinker, poet, and prophet must scorn indifference, distortion, and anxiety, whenever and wherever they arise. It requires courage to live in paradox, the highest courage to affirm at one time the value of the natural world, the value of man's social world, and the world of eternal value. But each man needs the world of appearance so vital to the thinker; he needs the world of imagination brought into being by the creative artist; consciously or unconsciously, he needs that world of ultimate meaning witnessed to by the prophet, that world which gives man his reason for being. If the thinker, the poet, the prophet, can, with generosity, assert as valid the virtues of detachment, imagination, and concern; and if they can, with courage, refuse to yield to indifference, distortion, and anxiety, an area of tolerance may be achieved, a genuine tolerance, a creative tolerance which allows a total view of life, a life of freedom which permits, indeed encourages man to explore his natural world, his social world, and his world of eternity.

If we are living through, as I believe we are, what Jean Paul Sartre calls an "extreme situation," and if the great and sobering fact of our time is, as Stanley Romaine Hopper suggests, that we are in grave danger

of drowning in tidal forces "powerful enough . . . to nullify the bequest of centuries,"⁴ then we simply cannot afford the unhappy split among thinker, poet, and prophet.

⁴Stanley Romaine Hopper, *The Crisis of Faith* (Nashville, 1944), p. 15.

A Seminary Graduation Prayer—Concluded

others. Lay hold of each of them, and do not let them go. May Thy fatherly care shield them, the love of Thy dear son preserve them from evil, and Thy Holy Spirit be ever present to guide them. And may they never turn aside because of the weather they meet, but continue to praise and serve Thee through Jesus Christ the Lord.

—Dr. Andrew T. Roy,
Pittsburgh, May, 1966

Book Reviews and Notes

Cassels, Louis. *Your Bible*. Garden City, N. Y.; Doubleday, 1967, Pp. xvii + 267. \$4.95.

Chifflet, T. G. *Water in the Wilderness. Understanding the Bible*. Translated by Luke O'Neill. Foreword by Ignatius Hunt, O.S.B. New York: Herder and Herder, 1967. Pp. 141. \$3.95.

Fisher, Fred L. *How to Interpret the New Testament*. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1966. Pp. 172. \$3.95.

A spate of books has appeared essaying to help the uninitiated make the best use of his Bible study. The three considered here are diverse in origin, concept, and method; but each has its particular use.

Cassels is a widely-read newspaper columnist. One of his earlier books was noted in *Perspective* (March, 1965, p. 40). The heart of this present book is a proposed reading plan. After some very brief suggestions as to how to go about reading the Bible, the books of the Bible are introduced in an order which the author thinks will foster comprehension and interest. He begins with Luke-Acts and goes through the New Testament before tackling the Old Testament and Apocrypha.

The book should appeal to laymen with scant Bible knowledge. Unfortunately, there are questions to be raised about Cassels' notes. He is not abreast of scholarship on the Johannine literature; he recognizes that

there are problems about Apostolic authorship, but he does not come to tenable conclusions. This reviewer would dispute the author's judgment "to pass lightly over" Revelation. He suggests that 2 Peter and Jude reflect "some borrowing . . . one way or the other"; yet Jude is dated "around A.D. 80" while 2 Peter is confidently placed in the second century. The source of a substantial quotation from Bruce Metzger (p. 114) is nowhere identified.

Father Chifflet was general editor of the *Bible de Jérusalem* (see last *Perspective*) and writes with clarity and fine literary sensitivity. This is a substantial little book which should be enlightening and inspiring to all Bible students and should be of particular interest to Protestants since it reflects a Roman Catholic approach.

This is almost a "theology" of Bible study. Some sections are quasi-devotional (e.g., "The Bible Is the Book of Prayer"). Other parts are

quite reflective and require very careful attention. Some of the questions and approaches grow out of the Roman Catholic situation and will get by many others readers: still, they are profitable to think through (e.g., "The Bible is a mirror because, like Veronica's Veil, it preserves this image [of Jesus] for us"). We are reminded again how important Bible study has become in Catholicism today.

Fisher is a Baptist who has published with Westminster before. His present book is a very detailed "how-to" guide. He considers biblical interpretation in nine "steps" which are presented in some detail. There is help for the beginner and challenge for the more advanced student.

Every teacher has his own pet approach; so it may be unfair to be critical. There is some fine instruction in this book, but the reviewer offers several comments. First, from the standpoint of the unskilled beginner, there is too much and too little: too much technical detail ("synecdoche," "zeugma," "brachyology," etc., in Step 6.); and too little simply de-

tailed procedure (Fisher arrives too quickly at some results). Second, although a wealth of bibliographical data has been introduced, the selection is sometimes open to serious question; and one wonders if it might not be better to concentrate on fewer books and demonstrate their value and use at greater length—the layman is easily discouraged by a barrage of titles. Third, the development of some points is likely to prove tedious for many readers. Perhaps the author's choice of examples is not always wise. Galatians 3:1-3 might not be the best passage to illustrate "Procedures of Interpretation" for beginners. Finally, there are several typographical blunders—Griesbach misspelled, p. 53; "of" for "or," line 13, p. 105; *Constructio praegnans* garbled, p. 130—and an index would be very helpful in such a book.

A final suggestion: these books are valuable but are no substitute for a teacher-instruction situation. Church staffs should regularly provide such direction, and laymen may with good conscience prod for such help.

Elliott, Melvin E. *The Language of the King James Bible*. Garden City, N. Y.; Doubleday, 1967. Pp. x + 227. \$4.95 (indexed \$5.95).

"A concise, highly practical glossary explaining and translating every archaic or difficult-to-understand word or phrase in the King James

Bible." This is a beautifully produced book, but one must ask why. Everyone who is interested has long since known that KJV has many words and

expressions that make it difficult to read today. This suggests the question, "Who needs this book?"

For the modern reader there are many helpful translations, especially RSV; so why fight the problems of reading KJV unless it is for interest in its literary influence—and then one would think that the *Oxford Universal Dictionary* might be a more valuable aid. KJV is still widely used in liturgical situations, probably with justification; but in such a setting this new book does not seem to be of any special value.

But assuming that the book has a reason to be, it is open to other substantial criticisms. The first that struck the reviewer was that it completely ignores Bridges and Weigle's *The Bible Word Book*, which covers

much of the same ground in very adequate fashion (422 pp.). The articles in the latter volume are mostly of greater length than those in Elliott's book, but he does not even mention the earlier work in the Bibliography.

Some other strange matters appear. Words are included which hardly seem archaic or hard to understand: "gnat," "infidel," "Latin," "stink," "wafer." Minor changes in spelling are noted: "Handywork," "Jailor," "unreprovable." There is an eight-line entry on "Uncircumcision" but no entry at all on "Circumcision." There is a detailed entry on the phrase "pisseth against the wall" but none on "cover his feet."

This is one of the books you can do without.

Samuel, Athanasius Yeshue. *Treasure of Qumran. My Story of the Dead Sea Scrolls*. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1966. Pp. 208. \$2.65 (paper).

In *Perspective* VII.2.39, we reviewed John Trever's memoirs of the events connected with the coming to light of the famous scrolls. One might expect this book to be a detailed recounting of the same events by the man who purchased the first important group of scrolls when he was Syrian Metropolitan of Palestine and Transjordan. Actually, these details occupy less than a third of the pages, for the larger theme is the almost legendary tale of how a simple

Mesopotamian village boy survived fantastic hardships and became the first Archbishop of the Syrian Orthodox Church in the United States and Canada.

The author acknowledges that he has consciously reconstructed many incidents; but the facts, he avers, are "historic and unquestionable." His autobiography develops in the history of the Middle East in this century, and it is interpreted by one who had human cause to write with deep

bias but who has managed to spread over all a veil of Christian charity.

Archbishop Samuel professes to have had a long-time dream of ancient records in the desert, a hope stimulated by patristic allusions in Origen's Hexapla and in a record of Timotheos Catholicos. He recounts with excited memory the events which finally brought him to the American School with his scrolls. He speaks of Drs. Trever and Brownlee as "my sons," and Brownlee has written a helpful foreword. The author is less polemical than Trever; and although he hints at the scholarly skirmishes which finally brought the scrolls to Israeli Jerusalem, he is remarkably objective in his synoptic, ecumenical view of the role of the scrolls in our historical and spiritual heritage.

The good Archbishop writes with

a Semitic flair. His prose will be too florid for some readers—for example: "when the sun sucked his colors from the sky, the majesty of the mountains subtly increased as the crepuscular haze revealed the many cell-like recesses of the hillside barrens." But some will admit to enjoying a few hours with a writer who "lets himself go" and wrings beauty and sentiment from his vivid memory.

The book is illustrated, with His Grace appearing as regularly as the scrolls. There are a few notes on unpublished fragments, probably of value only in context. There are a number of minor typographic errors in the text. But in this time, when almost all of the scroll publications are scholarly contributions, one welcomes this moving, human story.

—J. A. Walther.

Constantelos, Demetrios J. *The Greek Orthodox Church: Faith, History, and Practice*. New York: Seabury Press, 1967. Pp. 124 + bibliography. \$3.50.

This short book is an able summary of the form and history of the Greek Orthodox faith. It is a very clear and easy-to-read presentation, and one will find it lively in spots.

A book like this is interesting because of the added privilege it affords the reader to understand the mind-

set of a Greek Orthodox writer. Several things are noticeable. For instance, the lamentable distinction made in modern biblical theology between Hellenistic and Hebrew thought is completely overlooked. The author offers Hellenic culture as the norm for Christian thought, and

rushes in where most Western writers fear to tread. He revels in the fact that Christianity was fully born in Greek culture, whereas most of us have learned at least to turn up our noses at this association. Again, he flatly asserts that Greek Orthodoxy is the true and right faith and practice of Christianity; this is somewhat refreshing in an enlightened age such as ours which fears to make such claims to Truth.

The book seems to be written for two purposes: the first is to inform the reader that Greek Orthodoxy is the oldest and therefore purest form of Christianity; the second is to defend Greek Orthodoxy from those cultured despisers who say it has no

social relevance. A possible third purpose in writing was to plead for official recognition as a separate faith within American religion. The chapter on what the Orthodox faith offers modern man is well-written. The book is marred by an undercurrent of protest that Greek Orthodoxy has been much-maligned in the past. Unfortunately, it is also overpriced in the cloth edition. I commend this book as an interesting introduction to the Greek Orthodox Church and the mind of its constituents; but it should be supplemented by some of the bigger books on the subject, e.g., Timothy Ware's *The Orthodox Church* (Baltimore: Pelican, 1963.).

Loew, Ralph W. *The Lutheran Way of Life*. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966. Pp. 164.

Dr. Loew has done an admirable job with a difficult task: presenting in popular narrative a theological position. He has fallen neither into the Scylla of over-simplification nor into the Charybdis of obscurity. Fortunately, the subject matter presents no great problems, for Lutheranism is remarkably uniform. Yet it takes a good writer to bring out this uniformity. Dr. Loew (whose long-time weekly column appears in the Sunday *Pittsburgh Press*) is such a writer.

The book emphasizes the cardinal tenets of Lutheran theology in easy

fashion, proceeding from the questions Luther re-emphasized in matters of faith and concluding with notes on the current Lutheran attempts to speak to contemporary culture. There are chapters on Justification, Grace, Word and Sacraments, and the Lutheran understanding of vocation. There are two historical chapters on the Reformation and the "American Translation" of Lutheranism. There is a fine chapter on worship which comes, appropriately, at the beginning of the book, and which will help non-Lutherans under-

stand why we have retained the historic liturgy. Loew shows, in this chapter, why Lutherans feel their theology is most notably expressed in their liturgy, which demonstrates that "Faith is a lively reckless confidence in the grace of God" (p. 17). The chapter on Sacraments explains well the "peculiar" Lutheran understanding of the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist, a doctrine which has always been, for both our Reformed and Roman brethren, hard to understand. Dr. Loew's good journalistic style and apt quotations make this a very good book for any interested reader; it is better than the dime-a-dozen "What is X" books that yearly clog book stores.

Two criticisms must be made: 1) In a book purposely written for non-Lutheran laymen, a chapter should be included on the history and nature of our Confessions. In a sense, the Lutheran Church is more bound to its confessions than other Protestant denominations. This fact and the Confessions themselves should be explained in more detail for non-Lutherans. 2) In an age when ecumenism is a fact of life, would it not be helpful to explain points at which there are differences of doctrine yet unresolved between Lutherans and others? It seems to the reviewer that

this would be helpful for non-Lutheran readers, particularly as the tendency is frequently to wink at them.

Corrections: p. 56: "demytholization" should read "demythologization"; p. 125: "Linbeck" should read "Lindbeck"; p. 121: Walther came to Missouri in 1839, not 1841; p. 184: Coates, Tomas, should read Coates, Thomas; p. 185: Albert Standerman should read Albert Stauderman; p. 188: note 6 is missing the page reference.

On p. 118, the impression is erroneously (and no doubt unintentionally) given that Luther wrote the Augsburg Confession. On p. 11, the Lutheran Confessions should include the three ecumenical creeds (Apostles', Nicene, Athanasian) and the Apology of the Augsburg Confession. It is, further, erroneous to say that "the Large and Small Catechism mark the core of a theological stability" (p. 11), when the statements of Lutheran churches throughout the world acknowledge the Augsburg Confession and the Small Catechism as our "core" confessions.

If you are seeking an accurate and readable treatment of Lutheranism for your own or your church's library, this is the latest and best of its popular milieu.

Hughes, P. E. *Theology of the English Reformers*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1965. Pp. 262. \$5.95.

Philip E. Hughes is to be admired for bringing out books which fill a void in our theological learning. He was the editor of *Creative Minds in Contemporary Theology* (see *Perspective*, VIII.2.54) which filled a void with respect to the overall aspects of the theology of some great theologians of this century. Now, in *Theology of the English Reformers*, he has given us a truly needed work, and one which is, to my knowledge, unique in its field.

The book is precisely what its title implies. The work of Hughes has been that of compiling and editing the very best writing of the many English Reformers: Cranmer, Jewel, and Latimer received most of the space. He seems to have been able to give us not only the best quotes from these men, but also to have been able to tell which of them are more important to stress in a work such as this.

Hughes' own contribution to the study has been that of systematization. He has culled theological principles from the Reformers, and he himself has then taken the responsibility to place them in order. There are seven long chapters: Holy Scripture, Justification, Sanctification,

Preaching and Worship, Ministry, the Sacraments, and Church and State. One may quarrel with the order but certainly not with the content. The book represents a rather conservative evangelical approach to the theology of the English Reformers, however. Anglo-Catholics will not be entirely satisfied, particularly with the chapter on the Sacraments. Moreover, the "prophetic" is generally elevated over the "sacramental" throughout the book. This should not detract, however, from its overall usefulness.

This is a book which the reviewer feels deserves a place on the shelf of any student, minister or layman, who would normally buy a book that attempts to give an overall picture of the theology of any of the branches of Protestant faith. It fills a needed void, as works on Anglican theology in general are rare indeed. Hughes' book certainly ought to be read by anyone who feels that the Episcopal Church has very little or no "theology." The topical index also contains short biographical sketches on the theologians cited, which are very helpful. The inclusion of a Scripture index would have enhanced the book.

—Jay C. Rochelle.¹

¹Pastor Rochelle is an ordained minister of the Missouri Synod Lutheran Church; he serves a congregation in the North Hills of Pittsburgh and is pursuing Th.M. studies at this Seminary.

Hitt, Russell T., ed. *Heroic Colonial Christians*. New York: Lippincott, 1966.
Pp. 254 + intro. \$4.95.

This book is a collection of profiles on four of the greatest Colonial American ministers, two of whom were laborers in the Great Awakening. The book deals with Jonathan Edwards, Gilbert Tennent, David Brainerd, and John Witherspoon.

The essay on Jonathan Edwards is longer than the other three by at least fifty pages. Courtney Anderson presents a carefully drawn picture of Edwards, tracing his ancestry and his personal spiritual development. He deals most objectively with the forces that made Edwards one of the foremost preachers in New England during his pastorate at Northampton for twenty-three years. The most helpful part of the essay is the careful analysis of Edwards' thought, as the author considers the content of the important works: *Divine and Supernatural Light*, the *Narrative*, *Religious Affections*, *The Freedom of the Will*, and other familiar writings.

One feels the depth of Edwards' mysticism, the strength of his writing and preaching, the sadness of his being forced to leave Northampton to serve the Indians at Stockbridge, and the pathos of his vindication by being called as president of Princeton College only to contract smallpox and die before he could ever really assume the active duties of the presidency. The book is worth reading

and owning if only for this one profile of Jonathan Edwards.

Russell T. Hitt's essay on Gilbert Tennent is as much a history of the Old Side - New Side controversy which arose because of the Great Awakening as it is the profile of Tennent. To those interested in the perennial discussion between saving grace as a personal experience or an ecclesiastical affiliation, the chapter is most informative and convinces the reader that while the church must operate to nurture the redeemed, the personal experience of conversion is the only valid one for acceptance of Jesus Christ as Lord and Saviour, and for church membership.

The chapter on David Brainerd by Clyde S. Kilby is the only one supplied with footnotes and references, which increase its usefulness. It contains an excellent section on Brainerd's attitude toward nature and people, demonstrating from the *Diary* and the *Journal* his almost complete lack of interest in or mention of any personal anecdote or appreciation of nature. Brainerd also never seems to have come to love the Indians to whom he ministered. There was a devotion to duty, a preaching of the Gospel, and a wonderful response by the Indians under the conviction of the Holy Spirit, but little evidence of what modern

psychologists understand as rapport or identification between Brainerd and the Indians. Kilby gives us a good analysis of the *Diary* and the *Journals*, which moved many men to missionary service. The chapter closes with a record of the influence of Brainerd, through Johathan Edwards' biography of him, on others who entered the ministry and the missionary service for Christ because of Brainerd's devotion to the Saviour.

Writing on John Witherspoon, Henry W. Coray deals with the man of action both in Scotland and America as preacher, educator, and patriot in the Continental Congress. We are treated to an insight into Witherspoon's wit, his ability as a fundraiser (what Scotsman isn't?), and his place as a shrewd and capable public servant. The author of the chapter on Witherspoon does not

deal as deeply with his subject's mind and spirit or the theology and faith underlying his active life as the reader wishes he might have. It is the picture of the active man, but a picture lacking in depth dimensions. We are given, however, an inspiring profile of one of America's most patriotic pastors, the only minister of the Gospel who signed the Declaration of Independence.

One wishes that the editor had also included chapters on the two influential British ministers of the Great Awakening in America, George Whitefield and John Wesley. An index, in addition to the brief bibliography given after each chapter, would have greatly improved the book in usefulness as a reference work.

—M. Edwards Breed, '42,
Jerseyville, Illinois.

Brown, D. Mackenzie, ed. *Ultimate Concern: Tillich in Dialogue*. New York: Harper & Row, 1965. Pp. 220 + bibliography + index. \$3.95.

This book is the central discussion from a seminar in the Spring of 1963 at the University of California, Santa Barbara. It was edited from tapes of the seminar, from which was omitted repetitive or extraneous material, and to which notes were added to clarify points or give references to

works by Tillich or cited by him. It preserves the classroom setting very well. The book falls into a whole series of questions by students and some faculty, and answers by Tillich. There are eight dialogues, each of which forms a chapter of the book. In these dialogues most of Tillich's

main concepts in theology are not only explained, but expanded by Paul Tillich himself. This book will probably be, in the future, one of the easiest introductions to the thought of Paul Tillich available, supplanting his earlier *Dynamics of Faith*, which the reviewer has often considered the best introduction to his thought and theology.

Among things in the book one will find (First Dialogue) a very thorough explanation of Tillich's crucial phrase, "Ultimate Concern," with emphasis on the precise meaning of ultimacy and concern, and suggestions for viable alternative phrases which capture the true meaning of "Ultimate Concern." In other discus-

sions, one will be led through the dialogue to understand other crucial terms of Tillich's theology, such as "idolatry" (Second Dialogue), "symbol" (Fourth Dialogue), "kairos" (Sixth Dialogue), and so on.

In this book, Tillich emerges as a man who has much to offer from the vast storehouse of knowledge which filtered through his analytical and systematic mind; but he also emerges as a man of wit, of dry humor, and a man who himself can be actually seen growing when a student asks a question which offers him a new insight or the chance to develop a new line of thought. This book captures Tillich as he will best be remembered: as teacher par excellence.

Tillich, Paul. *The Future of Religions*. Ed. by J. C. Brauer. New York: Harper & Row, 1966. Pp. 94 + pictures. \$2.95.

This is the first posthumous publication of Paul Tillich's work. It contains three essays on the contribution of Paul Tillich to theology. The first is "Paul Tillich's Impact on America," by Jerald C. Brauer. The second is "The Sources of Paul Tillich's Richness," by Wilhelm Pauck; and the last, "Paul Tillich and the History of Religions," by Mircea Eliade.

Four essays by Tillich, all of which are short, constitute a contribution in a novel form of theologizing. They are Tillich's initial attempts to come to grips with some of the problems

of modern man. For example, the first essay, "The Effects of Space Exploration on Man's Condition and Stature" deals with the shift (as Tillich puts it) from vertical relationships to horizontal relationships. Man now lives in a horizontal relationship and has gone about as far as he can go. Tillich's question in this area is regarding whether or not man's horizontal extension does not represent simply a kind of "forwardism" (as he calls it) without any real *telos*, any definitive goal. Two other essays, "Frontiers" and "The Decline and

Validity of the Idea of Progress," expand the philosophical encounter of theology with the fundamental aspects of modern life. The last essay, "The Significance of the History of Religions for the Systematic Theologian," is the last essay delivered in public by Tillich prior to his death on October 23, 1965. It is the outgrowth of a course at the University of Chicago on Christianity and the History of Religions. It is a "breakthrough" article, in that here Tillich for perhaps the first time began to rethink his systematic theology in dialogue with the non-Christian reli-

gions. This volume of essays, though short, says much about the man Paul Tillich and about the richness and depth of his mind. It says further that Tillich was still creating, was still beginning to break into new things even at the time of his death. Perhaps in this sense the book carries its greatest weight. For *The Future of Religions* is not a book which will stand as influential among all Tillich's works, yet it stands as a monument to the fact that, as Brauer says in his article, "Paul Tillich stood alone as the interpreter of Christian faith to American culture."

Tillich, Paul. *Perspectives on 19th and 20th Century Protestant Theology*. Ed. with Intro. by Carl E. Braaten. New York: Harper & Row, 1967. Pp. 245. \$5.95.

This major posthumous work of Tillich contains lectures delivered at the Divinity School of the University of Chicago during the spring quarter in 1963. This book is destined to become immediately an indispensable tool both for historians and theologians, since it is Tillich's way of showing the state of theology today on the basis of keen analysis of the culture and theology of the past. The title is somewhat of a misnomer, as Tillich digs beyond the 18th century into the Reformation—giving particular attention to the Protestant Scholastics, for whom he has deep respect "because they knew all the

right questions."

To give a broad suggestion as to the shape of this work, we might say that Tillich begins with the rise of the Enlightenment, goes on to show the "classic-romantic reaction against the Enlightenment" (including sections on Lessing, Schleiermacher, Hegel, *et. al.*) which gave rise to the "great synthesis," proceeds to the breakdown of the great synthesis through the split in the Hegelian school (through Strauss and Baur in the historical area, Feuerbach in anthropological approaches to religion) which led to Kierkegaard, Marx (whom he discusses as a theo-

logian), and Nietzsche. Following this breakdown, theology then had to find new ways of mediation, which were expressed in the Erlangen School, the "Back to Kant" movement, Harnack, and in our time through such representatives as Bultmann, Troeltsch, and Barth. Tillich does not discuss his own theology here; he does not need to because it shows through what he calls his "dialogue with history." Especially do we see the thrust of Tillich himself in his very high estimate of Hegel and Schleiermacher (while pointing out where they failed), and his dissatisfaction with both Bultmann (who should speak of "deliteralizing" instead of "demythologization," but who failed to move into systematics despite the help of Heidegger) and Barth (whose rejection of natural theology he sees as creating more problems than it solves). Tillich's alliance with the Middle Ages also pokes through in his high estimate of its mysticism, which he considers an essential ingredient in religion.

Tillich's approach seems to be based on several principles. One of these is that all history has an inner *telos*, or "end"; and a given period of

history must be interpreted on the basis of and in the light of its *telos*. The second principle is that the history of recent theology is a continuous series of attempts to unite the diverging elements of the modern mind. The third is that "all the theologians, especially the great ones, will try to answer the question: What is the relation between the classical and the humanist traditions?" (p. 4). The interpretation takes shape in the first part as Tillich discusses the rise of the "classical" and "humanist" traditions ("classical" in his terms is a somewhat broader synonym for "orthodox").

This is a brilliantly written book. The thumbnail interpretations of the individuals mentioned above would be worth the price of the book, but its true greatness lies in Tillich's ability to discern the inner dynamics of Protestant thought during these two critical centuries in our tradition. An ancillary benefit is, of course, that this book will answer the question, "Why did Tillich's own theology take the final shape expressed in the three volumes of *Systematic Theology*?"

—Jay C. Rochelle.

Sharpe, Wm. D. *Medicine and the Ministry*. New York: Appleton-Century, 1966. Pp. ix + 356 + selected bibliography and index. \$6.95.

A physician and assistant professor of pathology has written this book intended to be a medical basis for pastoral care. As such it is much needed and it fulfills to a considerable extent its purpose. This is a curious book in that it is splendid in some sections, rather commonplace in a few, and here and there contains some remarkable lapses in grammatical construction.

Chapters five through seven are worth the price of the book. They deal descriptively with neurotic reactions, psychotic reactions, and sociopathic character disorders and they do so well and with so little jargon that they will become part of this reviewer's book list for seminary work. On pages 102-115, for example, the author pictures the compulsive personality with great clarity and focuses on the clergyman's relation to this kind of person. Since the church has so many of these people and actually tends to support them in their compulsion, the section is all the more valuable. The chapter on anxiety is good and especially its description of the defenses the ego erects against anxiety. The clergyman needs to be aware of these defenses and their operations because they are also defenses against the communicating of the Gospel and the bringing of healing. The chapter which

deals with some sexual problems of pastoral concern should be very helpful on three problems: masturbation, homosexuality, and illegitimate pregnancy. The final chapter is excellent as it treats of the aging process, terminal illness, death and grief. This is empathic writing; the doctor has been there in a form of ministry other than medicine!

There are parts of the book which do not measure up to these. For example, the chapter on Counseling and Interviewing leaves much to be desired. The suggestion that a woman will be interviewed in her home only if her husband or another relation is at hand (p. 194) seems written out of another time. Perhaps the ethics of the doctor when examining females is insinuated into the clergy's role. Or the proposal that the clergyman may properly terminate the relationship when it is with a flirtatious and seductive woman by referring her to her physician (p. 198) vitiates pastoral counseling. Rather, the flirtations or seductive mode of working of the woman should become part of the counseling agenda as the pastor brings it out into the open so that it can be properly and realistically explored. Nevertheless, there are so many competent pieces of writing on counseling and interviewing that one

feels no great loss in this chapter. And the same can be said about the section on adolescence. While it is patchy and sketchy, there are superb treatments of this stage by other physicians so that one does not need to find satisfaction here.

Dr. Sharpe does not seem to fare so well when he moves away from the medical and descriptive aspects of his work and begins to suggest along psychotherapeutic and pastoral caring lines. His statement that the outlook for a hysterical patient is not hopeful (p. 73) is simply contrary to established therapeutic practice. His position as stated in the following is open to serious question: "Mental deficiency is absolute or relative; some people are so slow mentally that they could not manage their own affairs in *any* human society, however simple" (p. 76—*italics* his). Much depends upon what "human society" means. If it means non-structured and non-institutional, his statement may stand. But the *any* denies this meaning. Within an institutional structure which is also a human society the mentally retarded by and large can learn to manage their own affairs under caring supervision. When he counsels the clergyman to remain "firm, taciturn, and aloof" (p. 74) in dealing with the hysterical person, he rightly anticipates that little improvement will follow. (Another physician, Tournier, would have great difficulty with this

approach to healing!) Dr. Sharpe's dogmatic statement that a clergyman "must not probe anyone's fantasy life" (p. 95) is also open to serious question. Part of the problem, of course, is what is meant by "probe." If a clergyman has expertise in pastoral counseling, he will wisely and carefully use a client's fantasy life in his counseling of that client. Fantasies are a vital part of the counseling approach and belong to a skilled clergyman's technique. The author's proposal that clergymen escort a person to the nearest hospital accident room if a physician is not available if that person contemplates, or talks about, or is afraid of suicide seems a piece of poor advice. A hospital accident room would be one of the least satisfactory places this reviewer can think of!

Perhaps the author did not mean to be so all-inclusive as his writing suggests. There is support for this possibility because scattered throughout the book are lapses of style, incomplete sentences, utterances which need to be qualified, and sentences which do not make sense (e.g., pp. 62, 65, 69, 282). These errata are not the pattern but they happen often enough to indicate that the author did not write so carefully as he might. Perhaps some of his unwise counsel should be seen in this light. At any rate, most of his attempts to give guidance to the pastor do make sense. This physician has some in-

sight into the job of the clergy. The great strength of the book, however, is that the physician-author describes so aptly that part of the human situa-

tion in which pastoral care is the primary form of ministry.

—Gordon E. Jackson.

Lloyd-Jones, D. Martyn. *Spiritual Depression: Its Causes and Cures*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1965. Pp. 300. \$3.95.

Dr. Lloyd-Jones is a justly famous preacher who occupies the pulpit at Westminster Chapel in London, England. His best-known work is his two-volume series on The Sermon on the Mount.

Dr. Lloyd-Jones was a heart specialist before entering the ministry, and his thorough acquaintance with the medical and psychiatric world helps to make this book of sermons both relevant and well-informed. Here one will find not the run-of-the-mill assertions regarding the relation between medicine and religion, but rather a carefully thought-through position based on prior knowledge of the situation.

Spiritual Depression contains twenty-one sermons, each of which deals with some aspect of the central problem, which is the need for "a revived and joyful Church." Dr. Lloyd-Jones is appalled at the number of unhappy Christians who are to be

found in the Churches, Christians whose Christianity is overlaid heavily by a veneer of pessimism. In this series of sermons he attempts to confront the major underlying causes for such unhappiness or "spiritual depression" and suggests cures for these factors which have been hammered out of thorough exegesis of the Word of God.

There is so much that is good in this book that one either has to write a short review and commend it wholeheartedly to interested readers, or else one must write a long review taking into consideration all the many suggestions and "cures" Dr. Lloyd-Jones proposes for anxiety over salvation, fear of the future, and so on. This reviewer chooses the former course: the book is well worth the small price. Read, mark, learn, and inwardly digest it! It *may* benefit your preaching, but at any event it will benefit *you!*

Boyd, Malcolm. *Free to Live, Free to Die*. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1967. Pp. 114. \$3.95.

If this book was intended as a stimulating sequel to Boyd's book of prayers, *Are You Running with Me, Jesus?*, it is disappointing. Those who enjoyed the former book (the reviewer included) will not find the same freshness, the same *joie de vivre* that was abundantly present in the prayers. Though there will be sections of this book that are appealing (particularly the meditation for the morning of the 4th Day, the evening of the 14th day, and evening of the 19th day), it falls short of what we have come to expect from Malcolm Boyd.

Free to Live, Free to Die is a book of meditations for a thirty-day month, containing on the average one half page for morning, noon, and evening of each day. The book is very down to earth in its meditations; some

would say too down to earth in spots. It is an attempt, perhaps, to put into devotions what "religionless Christianity" is all about. The judgment as to success or failure is left to the reader.

Those who are particularly enamored of Malcolm Boyd will, of course, think that this is one of his best works. The reviewer, however, sticks by his opinion: better things have come from Boyd's pen, and better things will again come in the future. Boyd, when he is good, is very, very good; but when he is less than good Perhaps what most injures the book is the lack of any procedure. One would expect a book of meditations to have some order, lead to some crescendo. This one doesn't. It is one sustained trumpet blast, and many of the notes are sour.

Diem, Hermann. *Kierkegaard*. Richmond: John Knox, 1966. Pp. 124. \$3.50.

This little volume is well worth the price! It is by far the best introduction to the germinal thought of Kierkegaard to appear in English. It is very tough but highly rewarding reading. Diem has not only managed to expound Kierkegaard, but has also shown the development of his thought from *Either/Or* (1843) to the

devastating compendium *Attack Upon Christendom* (1851-4); Kierkegaard truly appears here as the "lonely knight," whose calling it was to "introduce Christianity into Christendom." Indispensable for the novice and the advanced Christian existentialist.

—Jay C. Rochelle.

Wagoner, Walter D. *The Seminary: Protestant and Catholic.* New York: Sheed & Ward, 1966. Pp. 256. \$6.00.

This is a needed and helpful book in this age of dialog with our Roman Catholic brethren, for it gives an insight as to the route taken by our Roman Catholic counterparts in their theological training. It is done with a friendly spirit on the part of Walter Wagoner after visits to several dozen seminaries and conversations with twice that number of Roman Catholic educators. It is not, however, truly a scientific or analytical study of Roman Catholic seminary life. Wagoner himself says that there are two ever-arching purposes to his study, "First, to ascertain which areas of Roman Catholic theological education may offer strength and assistance to Protestant theological education, and second, to mark out those areas of Roman Catholic theological education which are being most debated by Catholics."

It should be said at the outset, however, that the title is somewhat misleading. The book is about Roman Catholic seminaries, not Protestant, and the Protestant seminary is brought in only occasionally as a foil. This is not to weaken the impact of the book, however. The author himself suggests that a companion volume on the Protestant seminary should perhaps be written by a Roman Catholic.

Wagoner outlines very succinctly

the control over the Roman Catholic seminary that emanates from Rome by way of the "Sacred Congregation of Seminaries and Universities of Studies." The line of this control is clear and relentless. Pope Pius XII in 1956 wrote, "The professors of philosophy and theology, therefore, must be fully aware that they do not carry on their work in their own right and person, but exclusively in the name and authority of the Supreme Magisterium, and that they perform this ministry under the watchful eye and guidance of this same Magisterium." As an aside the author points out that a Protestant seminary administrator should rejoice in the fact that he only has to be sensitive to the wishes of his faculty, the criticism of the students, and the quarterbacking of the graduates, for in the Roman Catholic administrator's life he must also worry about directives from the sacred congregation in Rome, the desires of his bishop, and that, "long, long tradition of seminary life which began at Trent."

Wagoner feels that the Roman Catholic seminary is firm in its conviction that it is not primarily an intellectual center in the Church's life, but "primarily that place and those years wherein the seminarians are helped to devotional and spiritual

maturity" and points out that we must understand this principle if we are to understand the priesthood and theological education itself in that Church.

The study reveals that there is within the seminaries a real concern about the geographical, cultural, and psychological isolation of the seminaries, also their apartness from the layman. He quotes a Roman Catholic layman as saying, for instance, "When you finish seminary are you in touch with the main thought forms and problems of the world, as well as with the content of the Christian gospel? Are you able to speak the language that we speak, to share our troubles, to understand our dilemmas, to enjoy our joys? Are you buried in the 13th or 15th centuries? Are you still living in the 19th century Ireland or the 18th century France? Do you regard the world as essentially spoiled and naughty? Is your spirit fed with a false self-righteousness, nourished on closeted virtues? Do you expect us to react to you with the same instinctive genuflection that you show to your seminary superiors?" It would seem to me that these are just as relevant questions for the Protestant seminary graduate in many cases.

Mr. Wagoner also outlines the lay orders within the Roman Catholic Church and suggests that perhaps there is a lesson to be learned here for the Protestant.

Mr. Wagoner makes his usual and expected point that the Roman Catholic seminary should seek a university setting (as should the Protestant seminary) and that it should perhaps be a part of the American Association of Theological Schools. I wonder if this would tend, however, to raise or further water down accrediting standards in light of the poor performance of the AATS in the "degree nomenclature" battle.

In the chapter on celibacy and the Church militant, the author feels that the absence of women from seminaries obviously "makes it more difficult for the future priest to move with ease in intra-sexual society." And that "celibacy narrows the type and range of men who attend seminary and it eventually makes more difficult the relationship between clergy and laity." He feels that one of the greatest barriers to an increased number of Roman Catholic men coming into the clergy is the insistence on celibacy. He rightly sees, however, that a married clergy would lead to great economic stress within the Roman Catholic Church.

Under his chapter headed "Ecumenical Reflections" Mr. Wagoner sees within the Roman Catholic seminaries a satisfying increase in the number of Catholic-Protestant student body interchanges. He points out that Protestant theologians such as the Niebuhrs, Barth, and Tillich are being studied and that there has

been an interchange of faculty between Catholic and Protestant seminaries. It hurts me most that while Mr. Wagoner has a fine foreword in his book written by Roland E. Murphy, Catholic University, he does not make note in the body of the book that Roland was on our faculty for a year before going to the schools he does name as participating in such exchange.

A series of five appendices catalog material that is of some interest, particularly to the Protestant. I found the first appendix most helpful in that it outlined the educational divisions, from high school on up, of a typical Roman Catholic seminary student. I really felt that this should be in the body of the text rather than the appendix for it cleared up much of my misunderstanding when I finally came to it. Here he gives definitions for major and minor sem-

inaries, secular and religious orders, for instance. The second appendix is a rather exhaustive description of the various places of study in Rome where Mr. Wagoner feels more Protestants ought to go for advanced theological education. John L. McKenzie, S.J., has criticized Wagoner at this point, saying that he has "obviously been somewhat victimized by the Roman mystique" in thinking too highly of the institutions and libraries available in the city of Rome.

Mr. Wagoner displays his ivy-league erudition by sprinkling the pages with Latin phrases, but apart from that it is generally an enlightening book if you wish at least *some* understanding of what makes your Catholic counterpart tick—however, *nec scire fas est omnia*.

—William R. Phillippe.

Morrison, Clinton, and Barnes, David H. *New Testament Word Lists*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, n.d. Pp. XV + 125. \$2.95 (paper).

Planned as an aid "for rapid reading of the Greek Testament," these lists were prepared initially for McCormick Seminary students "to encourage summer reading." Included are words with a frequency less than ten. They are provided for each chapter of each NT book except the Synoptic Gospels, where the lists follow the Huck-Lietzmann *Synopsis* sections. Basic definitions from the Arndt-Gingrich-Bauer *Lexicon* are furnished. Other conveniences include an "Index of the Synoptic Parallels," a "Basic New Testament Vocabulary" (a check list of the words used ten or more times in the NT), "Principal Parts of Common

Verbs," and a table of reference parallels for Aland's *Synopsis*.

This book is at once an indispensable tool for all who want to make regular use of their Greek NT. The teaching staff at Pittsburgh Seminary has given it hearty endorsement and encourages its use as appropriate. Since over one third of NT vocabulary words occur only once, the handy value of this book would seem to require no further demonstration. If the price seems a little high for a paperback, consider the labor that has gone into the production of such an aid.

—Ed.




Pittsburgh Perspective

DECEMBER, 1967

Volume VIII

Number 4



PITTSBURGH THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

PITTSBURGH PERSPECTIVE

Volume VIII

DECEMBER, 1967

Number 4

Published four times yearly in March, June, September and December, by the Pittsburgh Theological Seminary, 616 North Highland Avenue, Pittsburgh, Pa. 15206, one of the seven seminaries of the United Presbyterian Church in the U. S. A. Second-class postage paid at Pittsburgh, Pa. Changes of address should be sent to the Seminary, care of the Director of the Mailing Department.

Editor: James Arthur Walther, Th.D.

Publications Committees

Faculty

Peter Fribley
R. L. Kelley, Jr., *Chmn.*
J. A. Walther
J. Rowe Hinsey, *ex. off.*
William R. Atkins, *ex. off.*
William R. Phillippe, *ex. off.*

Student

Robert V. Mathias, *Chmn.*
Editorial
Dikran Hadidian, *Chmn.*

Circulation: William W. Hill

Secretarial Assistant: Mrs. Elizabeth Eakin

Contents

<i>Ad Hoc</i>	2
From the President's Desk	3
On the Significance of Science for Religious Thought	5
by Harold K. Schilling	
The Claims of Our Heritage	23
by Donald F. Campbell	
Book Reviews and Notes	
Eliade, <i>From Primitives to Zen</i>	28
Norman Adams	
Myers, <i>Invitation to the Old Testament</i>	29
Jay C. Rochelle	
Rolston, <i>The "We Knows" of the Apostle Paul</i>	30
Mitton, <i>The Epistle of James</i>	30
Howard Eshbaugh	
Peale, <i>Jesus of Nazareth</i>	32
May, <i>Our English Bible in the Making</i>	33
Swete, <i>The Holy Spirit in the Ancient Church</i>	33
J. A. Walther	
Davies, <i>The Early Christian Church</i>	34
Patterson, <i>God and History in Early Christian Thought</i>	34
Dolan, <i>History of the Reformation</i>	35
Carnell, <i>The Burden of Soren Kierkegaard</i>	37
Jay C. Rochelle	
Harrison, <i>A Church Without God</i>	38
Lawson, <i>Comprehensive Handbook of Christian Doctrine</i>	39
Charles C. W. Idler	
Phillips, <i>Christ for Us in the Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer</i>	40
Smart, <i>The Divided Mind of Modern Theology</i>	40
Tillich, <i>Retrospect and Future</i>	43
Vogel, <i>The Next Christian Epoch</i>	43
Smith, <i>Questions of Religious Truth</i>	45
Brown, <i>The Ecumenical Revolution</i>	46
Read, <i>The Pattern of Christ</i>	47
Jay C. Rochelle	
Pospishil, <i>Divorce and Remarriage</i>	47
William H. Venable, Jr.	
Priester, <i>Let's Talk About God</i>	48
Bessie M. Burrows	
Special List	49
Books Received	54
<i>The Toy-Fixer</i>	57
A Poem by William Davis	

Ad Hoc

FOR TWO YEARS Alumni Day has had a "new look," and the response has been encouraging. Last May 9th the principal address was presented by Harold K. Schilling, a Christian layman who holds the esteemed rank of University Professor at the Pennsylvania State University. He is a physicist whose research fields have been ultrasonics and the philosophy of science. His professional achievements are too numerous to list, and he has served the National Council of Churches and the United Church of Christ. His address, "Post-Modern Science: Its Significance for Christian Faith," was a great experience in mind-stretching; and he fascinated his listeners with blackboard diagrams and illustrations. The substance of this message had appeared in an Abingdon Press book, *Religion and Western Culture* (edited by E. C. Cell) under the title "On the Significance of Science for Religious Thought." We are happy to bring this to you by special permission of The Board of Education of The Methodist Church.

LATER IN THE DAY Donald Fisher Campbell, pastor of the First Presbyterian Church of Stamford, Connecticut (the famous "fish" church), and a member of the class of 1937, led a devotional service. We share his sermon with you. And we thank Mr. Phillippe, who secured both of these manuscripts.

THIS ISSUE is the last under the present editorship. A study has been underway for some time looking to the increased effectiveness of our journal. Since the Editor will be on sabbatical leave beginning next June, Volume IX provides an opportune point to initiate changes. A newly appointed Editorial Committee of the Faculty will oversee the journal from now on, and detailed announcements will be made in the next issue. The Editor wishes to express his thanks: to the President for constant support and encouragement; to Mr. Enoch George of the Burgum Printing Company, whose invaluable help has been a silent contribution in every issue; to colleagues of the Faculty who have submitted articles, reviewed books, and helped on the Publications Committee; to Mrs. Elizabeth Eakin and Mr. William Hill, who have so faithfully handled the mechanics of production and mailing at the Seminary; and finally to some 6,000 readers and friends who actually provide a *raison d'être* for the journal. We look forward with enthusiasm and hope to the forthcoming volumes of *Pittsburgh Perspective*.

—J. A. W.

From the President's Desk

RELEVANCE continues to be the watchword of much popular current theology. So far as I can capture the "feel" of the use of this word, it seems to propose the approach of the "market analyst" in business. It is the function of such a one to determine what the public wants, or thinks it needs, and to produce that. "Success" is determined by the "marketability" of the product. It is not the quality of the product but the number of people who buy it that is decisive.

The experience of the Chrysler Corporation is a marked example of this. For some years Chrysler engineers believed that it was better to give the public a well-engineered car than a chrome-plated, poorly-engineered one. The firm almost went under. Market analysts finally rescued them by indicating that people did not want a well-engineered car nearly so much as a streamlined, highly decorated machine which would serve as a status symbol. So the Chrysler Corporation regained a fair share of the automobile trade by becoming responsive to public desires.

In our time the public does not seem to respond to theological concerns. Men are not sure that there is a god. How, then, can they be interested in talk about him? The problem, as Peter Berger has stated it, is "how to perpetuate an institution whose reality presuppositions are no longer socially taken for granted" ("The Sacred Ministry as a Learned Profession," *Theology*, October, 1967, p. 42).

Faced with this problem, the choice of the "radical" theologians seems to be clear. Accept the "reality presuppositions" of modern man and try to adjust theology to them. But can the adjustment be made in such fashion that it is anything more than a half-way station to the total disintegration of the theological enterprise? Berger suggests that if there is really no *other*, no one "out there," in Robinson's terms, then "one could do better things with one's time than theology," and Karl Marx's example may be salutary: "When he was certain that . . . the critique of religion was finished, he did not bother with it any more, but went on to concern himself with other things" ("A Sociological View of the Secularization of Theology," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, Spring number, 1967, p. 16).

The "radical" theologians, because of the dramatic nature of their views, will be widely discussed but will likely not take over the church. What seems to be happening, however, in the less radical segment of the church is a loss of nerve which is leading not so much to a drastic "adjustment" to modern reality concepts or a bold laying aside of theology, but the quiet retreat from it, an abandonment by default.

This seems to be influencing theological education at the point of new curricular proposals. To be "relevant," less time must be given to the classic theological disciplines and more to psychology, sociology, political action, etc. Does this not suggest that the theologian, *as theologian*, has little or nothing to offer to the world? Hence, the increasing desire to identify with other professions!

Two cautions may perhaps be in order here. First, if the minister's training neglects his own field of specialization in order to permit him to dabble in other men's fields, can he become sufficiently capable to be accepted by the professionals in these areas? Most certainly no minister in his right mind would think of tampering with other men medically, because such knowledge of medicine as he could gain in a few side courses in the field would not accredit him to function in this capacity. Is there not a parallel in other professions? A recent article by a sociologist decried a best-seller volume of a sociologically oriented theologian because of the ineptness with which he bungled his sociological facts and theories.

Second, if ministerial training belittles its unique field—theology—and gives a sort of smorgasbord curricular offering in the many fields now proposed, will not the minister finally work himself out of a job? G. R. Dunstan has recently pointed out that we ministers "have come to disbelieve in the knowledge characteristic of our profession, or indeed that there is any such knowledge . . . if the coming church is to be left with a clerical body possessing no distinct, characteristic, knowledge or belief, and no distinct professional character, then, I suppose there can be only one answer to such a question as this: What ministry has a clergyman to offer to a given parishioner whose ascertainable needs are being met satisfactorily by other professional attendants, the medical by the doctors, the social by the social workers, the legal by the lawyers? What has the clergyman, as clergyman, to say to

—Concluded on page 55.

*On the Significance of Science for Religious Thought**

by HAROLD K. SCHILLING

I

OUR QUESTION is whether or not contemporary science has any significance for religious thought, and more specifically, whether its world view may have any bearing on the problem of how we shall think of God.

Until rather recently this kind of question would have seemed superfluous, if not downright impertinent, to many people, for to anyone who "believed in God" it seemed obvious that since He created the world, many aspects of His nature must necessarily be discernible through His handiwork. Indeed, there flourished then a branch of Christian thought, called natural theology, devoted in large part to inferring or even "proving" God's existence, as well as His attributes, from man's knowledge of nature.

Today that approach is suspect. At least in Protestant circles it is widely regarded as inadequate and undesirable. For one thing, in retrospect its "proofs" now seem utterly uncon-

vincing. For another, the God it conceived now looks more like the far distant, aloof, inactive God of deism than the near, living and loving God of the Bible. Moreover, from its point of view, the theology that took as its point of departure the revelatory event of the Christ often seemed incongruous and intellectually embarrassing. In turn from the point of view of "revelation theology" it seemed to miss the main point of the gospel and therefore to be largely irrelevant, or even erroneous.

So it came about that natural theology was banished almost completely from Protestant thought. It now begins to look, however, as though this has not turned out to be an unmixed blessing. For one consequence of it has been that many theologians seem to have lost interest in nature and its study, and have become so completely preoccupied with history as to give the impression that it is the only locus of God's self-revealing activities. Science has thus come to have virtually no theological significance for them. This seems to

*See *Ad Hoc*, p. 2.

have been the situation for several decades.

In the meantime science has been marching on, and a remarkable new world view has come into being based on its recent findings. This has created some serious problems for theology. Fortunately this development has been accompanied by the appearance on the theological horizon of a relatively small but growing cloud of revived interest in these matters. While there is no disposition among Protestant theologians to return to anything like the old teleology-oriented *natural theology*, many of them are saying that we do need a *theology of nature* and of science. By this they seem to mean a theology that is based squarely on the revelation in Christ and God's "mighty deeds in history," and at the same time recognizes and seeks to understand God's "mighty deeds in nature" as these are related to history.

Now as a scientist who has had the opportunity of observing a considerable number of theologians in action as they have struggled with this problem, I have come to appreciate some of their difficulties. For one thing, I can understand why it is not at all obvious to them how natural science can have any relevance for them. It proceeds—as they grant that it must—quite without regard to any "hypothesis of a God." The term *God* does not, therefore, belong to its technical

vocabulary. In this sense it is utterly godless or secular. How then can it have any value technically for theology or contribute to its thought? Why then should theology be concerned with it? This is not an easy question. On the other hand, it is not the only question that is difficult. For this same secular science, with its new ways of thinking about the world is now characterized also by a new intellectual freedom and openness, by sharpened sensitivities and creativity in the humanistic sense, by genuine moral and ethical concerns, and it has deservedly become one of the most potent determinants of contemporary life not only in its physical aspects, but in its spiritual ones as well. How can theology possibly fail to profit from the emergence and flowering of such a science? How can it possibly function properly in terms of its own purposes, and make its contribution to the life and work of the world, unless its thinking is somehow related closely to those ideals, concerns, images and modes of thought of our times that are molded to so large an extent by science?

It is my belief that there are many aspects of the new science and its conception of the world that are destined to become useful, or even indispensable, to Christian thought. In support of this belief I should like to call attention at this time to three of these, namely its *depth*, its *un-*

boundedness or *openness*, and its *mystery*.¹ We shall begin with mystery.

II

IN A REMARKABLY ENLIGHTENED BOOK about the nature of theology, Karl Barth raises the interesting question of "how theology encounters a man—how it confronts him, and assumes concrete form in him."² His answer may be surprising, for he asserts that it begins with wonder—not, as is commonly supposed, with the submissive acceptance of a set of presuppositions or established doctrinal beliefs. By wonder he means open-minded astonishment; and he discusses this in the following way. "Wonder occurs when someone encounters a spiritual or natural phenomenon that he has never met before—it is for the moment something uncommon and strange and novel to him."³ It is therefore the root of all true sciences, and theology is one of these. The amazement of science is provisional or temporary; for always, when it confronts a new phenomenon or mystery, science immediately seeks to explain it; and as its understanding grows the mystery dissolves and

the wonder disappears. In theology, however, he says, it is different; for there one encounters the mystery of God, and therefore wonder never ceases.

Now it seems to me beyond doubt that what Barth says positively about theology itself is true, namely that its mystery is unfathomable and unbounded. But I wonder whether what he says negatively in this respect about science is equally true. May Barth not be missing something when he asserts that nature is such that all its mystery necessarily disappears under the prolonged gaze of science?

III

PERHAPS THOSE who, like Barth, insist on contrasting science and theology sharply with regard to wonder and mystery, do so because they hold to a conception of nature—and of science—that most scientists have abandoned.

There was a time when the reigning conception of nature was one of rather simple order. It was supposed that the apparent complexities of visible nature could be explained by appealing to hidden basic simplici-

¹These three terms are not used widely in the technical discourse of scientists. They are used by some and I can claim no credit for originating them. In my opinion they accurately connote the newer views.

²Karl Barth, *Evangelical Theology: An Introduction* (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1953); see especially pp. 63 ff.

³Ibid.

ties of substance and relationship. Thus according to the so-called Newtonian billiard ball conception of the world, as refined by Laplace, nature was thought to be explainable and its future completely predictable, at least in principle, in terms of very simple, unchanging elementary particles, and of abstract, synthesizing laws that described their motions.

In a sense this was a shallow, closed and unmysterious world. It was *shallow* in the analogical sense that science was expected to find its final explanations relatively close to the surface of things. Certainly no one would have dreamt then of the many depths of penetration into physical reality to which science has had to push its inquiry since then. It was a *closed* world in the sense that in principle it could have no surprises that could not have been predicted. For it was thought to be completely determined. And it was *unmysterious* in the sense that it was felt that eventually all questions about it could be answered—again, at least in principle. Final explanations were fully expected, certainly in their broad outline, if not in complete detail, and perhaps in the form of a grand all-inclusive equation. Later this extremely simple picture had to be modified for various reasons we can't go into now. Nevertheless, its general point of view, commonly referred to as mechanistic and deterministic, persisted until late in the

19th century, and had not completely disappeared early in the 20th.

The conception being espoused by scientists today is very different. It views nature as a *world of depth*, not as a shallow one; as an *unbounded world*, not a closed one; and as a *world of mystery* that is in the end not fathomable. How extensive the implications of this view are becomes apparent when one thinks about some of the most basic questions of science, such as what is matter? Or energy, or life, or mind? None of these can be answered adequately by appealing to the idea of a simple and closed world.

Consider, for example, the first of these: What is matter? Think how very much we mean by it today! To begin with, speaking quite unsophisticatedly, it is that primal stuff or reality that we become aware of through our senses, and is the physical basis of existence. It appears in various states, the solid, liquid, gaseous, and plasma states, that have remarkably different attributes. To describe its internal structure we must mention a whole hierarchy of building blocks, fields of force, and dynamic micro-structures. If we were to subject a bit of matter, such as animal tissue, to microscopic and sub-microscopic analysis, our findings would have to refer to *at least* the following entities found at different depths of its interior: cells, protoplasm, cell nuclei, chromosomes,

genes, crystals, chemical compounds, chemical elements, molecules, atoms, atomic nuclei, electrons, protons, neutrons, and still other subatomic particles.

Clearly this picture does not impress one with any shallow simplicity of the kind envisioned in either the early Newtonian conception or the later modified versions of it. Rather it is one of depths and of complexities, and the greater the depth, the greater the complexity. It indicates also rich qualitative variety.⁴ This shows up in at least three ways. First, there is the large number of species of so-called particles that differ from one another in being heavy or light in mass; electrically positive, negative or neutral; long- or short-lived; right- or left-handed in spin; and so on. Second, there is the variety indicated by the necessity of speaking of the subatomic entities as including not only particles but waves and fields. The third aspect of variety is displayed by the fact that going deeper discloses other kinds of reality, so to speak. Thus the realities of the microworld are so different in kind from those of the macroworld as to require radically different language, modes of thought, and theories to deal with them. This is why we must say ambiguously that entities like molecules, atoms, and elec-

trons are *somewhat like particles and somewhat like waves*. Nothing in the macroworld is like that. Then too there are in the microworld strange kinds of dynamic interactions and phenomena in which corpuscles of matter of various kinds appear or disappear; and to speak adequately of these we employ concepts like *fusion*, *fission*, and *transmutation*, and even the apparently paradoxical one of *anti-matter*. It is a most interesting situation when in discussing certain features of matter one must speak of anti-matter! And finally all this has led us to see that the ordinary laws of mechanics that apply to large bodies like stones and bullets, do not apply in the microworld; and this in turn has led us to invent a new kind of mechanics, namely quantum mechanics, to deal with its phenomena.

Now turning our attention in another direction, we note also that matter has the capacity for what I shall call aggregation. There is an endless hierarchy of aggregations of various sorts, e.g., aggregates called rocks, then those called planets, and then the stars, and at a higher level galaxies, and then even supergalaxies. Here too we see a succession of depths and levels, this time as we penetrate "outward" and "upward," rather than "inward" and "downward," into the depths of space.

⁴David Bohm in his *Causality and Chance in Modern Physics* (Harper Torchbook) uses the concept of "the qualitative infinity of nature" (p. 132 ff.).

Here too it must be noted that as we probe to greater depths, beyond the "surface appearance" of things, we do not find things to be simpler and simpler, as though converging toward some final simplicity, but more and more variegated, strange and complex. Beyond the so-called celestial sphere of nearby stars visible to the naked eye are depths of space and celestial expanse, each successively disclosed concentric shell of which reveals greater numbers and complexities than the preceding one. The description of the strange realities encountered by modern macroastronomy has required the use of new ideas quite at variance with those of classical astrophysical theory.

There are also depths in time, so to speak. Here we see matter in its temporal, evolutionary unfolding, in its transformation of hidden possibilities and potentialities into ever newly manifest actualities. According to present conceptions matter was "at the beginning," several billions of years ago,⁵ in the simple state of elementary particles which later aggregated to form atoms. Still later some of these came together to form molecules. Then very long molecules appeared, capable of reproduction, thus exhibiting characteristics we attribute to *life*. Later cells and still larger organisms came forth, then mind,

and finally social aggregations. Here is a most remarkable dimension or attribute of matter: this capacity to change in time, to manifest utterly new properties, phenomena and structures. For a long time it was all inanimate, and then some of it became animate. According to contemporary conceptions life is not an entity added to matter, but one of the states in which matter can exist. And similar remarks apply to mind.

No doubt in the future science will devote more and more of its attention to the investigation of life and mind. Already the biologists and psychologists are probing them at great depths, and the deeper they go the more complex and unbounded things seem to be. Indeed the concept of depth seems to have come into scientific language first through the term *depth psychology*. Without a doubt these explorations will further confirm the general conclusions about nature that we have drawn thus far mostly from advances in the physical sciences.

IV

AT THIS POINT it will be useful to bring together the ideas developed thus far by means of a few summarizing propositions.

P1. *Nature has extension not only*

⁵There are scientists who speak also of a still earlier stage in the history of nature, i.e., when there was no matter at all, after which it then appeared.

in space and time, but also in depth, or interiority. In support of this, it is necessary to point out only that science has always been an enterprise in probing beneath the surface appearance of things to discover more basic, constituent realities.⁶

P2. *In its depth the reality of nature has many recognizably different levels.*

P3. *Its depth is characterized by great complexity and rich variety.*

P4. *The degree of that complexity and variety does not decrease with depth, as though approaching a limit at some final boundary level, but seems rather to increase indefinitely.*

The history of science has not unearthed any evidence that with increasing depth complexity dissolves into some sort of ultimate simplicity. The evidence actually points the other way.

P5. *Nature seems then to be unbounded not only in space and time, but also in depth.* It is not a closed, but an open, world. The notion of unboundedness has been a familiar one in science for some time; for in physics ever since Einstein it has been common to speak of the space-time continuum as finite but unbounded. It should not then be too difficult to think of depth, or inter-

iority, in similar fashion. What this means is that the series of successive levels is unlimited; that, analogically speaking, there is no "bottom" if we go "downward," and no "top" or "ceiling" if we go "upward," into the depths of the space-time-depth continuum of nature.⁷ Apropos of this boundlessness of depth, David Bohm has made the exceedingly interesting suggestion, in harmony with his idea of the qualitative infinity of nature, that at great depths reality may be so very different that the concept of level itself may have to be abandoned for another, or be greatly modified or "enriched."⁸

P6. *Nature has not been fixed in time, but has been changing—"creatively," i.e., by the successive emergences of novelty. These have been characterized by increasing complexity and organization.* The evolutionary story of the long history of nature supports this generalization.

At this point of our summary let us introduce the term *mystery*. Many scientists have been saying recently that the process of scientific discovery has disclosed nature to be such that an answer to any given question opens up many new questions, and that the answer to each of these leads to still others, and so on in a diverg-

⁶See my "Seeing the Unseen" in *Wesleyan Studies in Religion*, 1963-64, (West Virginia Wesleyan College); also in *Motive*, October, 1963.

⁷I suggest that this be found to be true no matter what level we may begin our exploration downward or upward, inward or outward.

⁸Bohm, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

ing series of more and more, rather than a converging one of fewer and fewer, questions. Apparently increasing the known does not decrease the unknown. Here, it would seem, is genuine, unbounded openness and genuine unfathomable mystery. This conception enables us then to distinguish between temporary and permanent mystery, or between the superficial mystery and the mystery of depth. The history of science is a remarkable success story of the finding and resolving of transient mysteries. And yet that very history has shown also that the resolving of each such mystery has led to innumerable others; and that as the questioning has been pushed to deeper levels and added to our knowledge and understanding, it has at the same time disclosed more complexity and diversity. It is then by way of partial definition that I offer the seventh proposition. (P7) *Genuine, permanent mystery marks that state of affairs, or that quality of reality, because of which each answer to a question about reality leads to indefinitely more questions, and so on and on—in a divergent rather than convergent series.* I submit that it refers not to a subjective state of affairs, but to a definitely objective one. It is not conjured up by our minds, but is imposed on them by the way things actually are.

There are at least four other aspects of the permanent mystery of nature that call for recognition here.

In terms of present knowledge it seems that, like the space-time-depth continuum, (P8) *the network of so-called cause-and-effect relationships among physical entities existing in that continuum is also unbounded—open, not closed.* This signifies that nature is not deterministic, and that events are "brought about" by both "cause" and "chance"; that they are in part predictable and in part unpredictable. A symbolic scheme used for prediction at one level of depth, does not in general apply directly at others. Natural laws are not universal, but limited, in the range and level of their applicability. The hope of scientists to be able to find the grand all-inclusive equation, by which the physical universe could be fully explained and its future fully predicted, undoubtedly has had great motivating value, but it is doubtful that it is justified by any logic that takes into account the stubborn autonomies and limitless complexities in the depths of nature—as well as the implications of the next proposition.

P9. *There may now exist realms of physical reality with extension throughout space-time-depth of which we are not aware.* Certainly there are now realities to which man has no direct access through his senses, but which are known by indirect means. Magnetism is one of these. Electricity is another. Science was utterly unaware of the latter for a very long time, i.e., up to the seventeenth cen-

tury; and yet how boundless and all-pervasive it is now known to be! To suppose that there may not be still others just as pervasive, yet still beyond our ken, would be foolhardy indeed. A break-through into one or more of them could happen at any time. The possibility, or even probability, that, however much we may know at any given time, there may be entire realms or kinds of reality the existence of which we are not even aware, together with the impossibility of ever knowing whether this is or is not actually the case, is an important aspect of the genuine mystery of *things as they are*.

P10. But there are also questions about *things as they are to be*. In all likelihood *nature is still in the making and new realms of reality will appear in time*. This has happened in the past; why not also in the future? Since there is no evidence that such becomings are at all predictable—except by vague and very general long-range extrapolation of past trends—here is another component of genuine mystery.

The last element of mystery we should consider here resides in the unavailability of ultimate explanation or understanding. As has been said many times, (P11) *science offers explanations in only a limited and immediate sense, namely in answer to*

questions of how things happen, not of why—in a final sense. The latter remain utter mystery which its endless succession of how-questions and answers points to, but does not resolve. To answer the how-kind of questions science identifies pertinent empirical functional relationships, so-called laws of nature, that do in fact exist among observed variables and constants, or events, and then points to these as the explanations. In seeking to understand the explanations or empirical laws, it then constructs symbolic systems called theories which enable it to see a number of laws as being related conceptually, and by which both they and the individual events can be derived (predicted) deductively. A scientist speaks then of “understanding” a body of many facts or phenomena when he can in this way show them to be derivable from one theory. While this is a most impressive and exceedingly fruitful kind of understanding, it still leaves unanswered the haunting question of *why* nature is so structured that science has been impelled toward *those* explanations and *that* understanding rather than others. Presumably the world could have been different. Why not?⁹

Let us now reflect briefly upon these findings in the hope of guarding against some unwarranted impli-

⁹This question is considered most congenitally from a somewhat different point of view by Thomas F. Green, “The Importance of Fairy Tales,” in *The Educational Forum*, November, 1963.

cations. We present three more propositions as points of departure for these reflections.

P12. *From the very nature of mystery, as we have conceived it, we must be forewarned that it is impossible either to demonstrate or deny its reality in nature by either formal logic or the usual verification processes of science.* This follows from its essential openendedness, its unboundedness in space, time and depth. The discovery of lasting mystery as an objective quality of nature, is not an inevitable or certain consequence of scientific methodology.

On the other hand, (P13) *the evidence pointing to the reality of inexhaustible mystery can, and often does, become convincing, even if not compelling beyond any possibility of doubt, as it accumulates in time;* hence, the relevance of our earlier analysis.

It is now necessary to disavow an attitude toward the idea of ultimate mystery that was once widely prevalent, and is still not unknown in some quarters today. (P14) *The mystery of nature is not to be thought of as a realm that is sacrosanct, not to be invaded by human inquiry, "something we are not supposed to know."* In the life and thought of man it has been a perpetually beckoning and challenging mystery to which the response has been a compound of wonder and the search for understanding by all available means, of

confidence that the search will yield truth, and of a humble realization that, however many mysteries the search resolves and however much truth it does yield, the mystery still remains inexhaustible. Science has been this kind of a response.

Many scientists shy away from, or even positively object to, applying the word "mystery" to nature. They insist that the "mystery of the heavens" has disappeared, or that the "mystery" of life, and of mind, is rapidly vanishing. I suspect, however, that such insistence represents for the most part a reaction against the taboo conception of, and attitude toward, mystery, rather than a denial of the basically mysterious quality of things. Certainly the mystery of life—as also of mind and many other components of nature—is vanishing in one sense. Yet in another it is increasing. The more we know about how things are in fact, the more is the wonder that in fact they are not otherwise.

It is of a piece with our conception of nature's mystery, i.e., in terms of the endless cascades of questions it calls forth, that the spirit of science is commonly held to be symbolized more adequately by its restless questing than by its successful finding. Science would cease if it ever lost its insistence that no answer is ever beyond further questioning. Surely this is attributable not simply to the scientist's psychological make-up by

which he is sentenced forever to call things in question, but to the fact that the world he is trying to understand is inexhaustibly challenging—mysterious.

There are other aspects of nature about which we have been silent thus far. It not only builds up, but tears down. (P15) *Nature has apparently unbounded depths of destructiveness and inconsistency. This is one of the most perplexing components of nature's mystery.*

By its destructiveness we usually mean conflagration and flood, earthquake and tidal wave, hurricane and tornado, drought and famine, disease and epidemic. Though very real this is not all of it; witness, for instance, the prodigality of death in the so-called saber-tooth-and-claw competition for survival.

The term *inconsistency* refers to nature's irrationality in working against itself much of the time. While it has developed marvelously ingenious mechanisms and processes for the qualitative improvement of the species and of life in general, it has at the same time produced others equally potent for deterioration. Thus it exhibits helpful symbiosis, i.e., a relationship of interdependence between, say, two species of animals in

which each contributes to the other something that is indispensable and otherwise unavailable to it. Yet ironically there is also parasitism, in which one species lives on another, causing it much pain and suffering, and often even death. As an example of a less lethal, yet terribly agonizing kind of parasitism, Julian Huxley cites the case of fly maggots that live in the noses of various animals. A different kind of cruel inconsistency of nature is exemplified by the birth of monstrosities to normal parents.

In concluding this section I call attention, briefly without exposition, to three potent terms or concepts for which we are indebted to three theologians who have been doing much thinking about nature and science. Each of them denotes important shades of meaning beyond that of mere inconsistency, meanings that refer to aspects of nature that are objectively observable and very real. They do not enter the picture first through preconception or theory, but through direct experience. Bernard E. Meland speaks of nature as being characterized by both *manageability* and *unmanageability*. Paul Tillich's term is the *ambiguities of life*, and J. S. Habgood's the *untidiness of life*.¹⁰

¹⁰Bernard E. Meland, *The Realities of Faith* (Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 93; Paul Tillich, *Systematic Theology*, Vol. III (University of Chicago Press), Ch. I; J. S. Habgood, *Religion and Science* (Mills and Boon, London, 1964), Ch. I (soon to be published under another title by Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York). Though now a clergyman, Habgood is a highly trained scientist, and his book is Number Eight in a series entitled *Science and Society*.

VI

THE SUBJECT OF THIS SECTION is in a sense climactic for our study, for it shifts our attention to a much larger perspective, and connects history with nature. For the most part thus far our point of view has been terrestrial, even though we did mention astronomy briefly. We must now take a more explicitly transterrestrial look at nature, and adopt a cosmic stance. It seems trite to say that man cannot understand himself unless in an historic perspective. What seems to be forgotten too often, however, is that to be truly informing that perspective must take in more than human history, and must be seen in relation to the long sweeps of terrestrial pre-human history, and no less in the light of an ill-inclusive cosmic history.

Many converging lines of evidence indicate that the earth's age is about two billion years. In order to give us some sense of proportion as to various developments within that time, G. M. McKinley has worked out a remarkably enlightening time scale as follows.¹¹ Let the two billion years be represented by one calendar year, so that January 1 would be the beginning of terrestrial history, and December 31 the present. On this scale one day represents approxi-

mately 5,500,000 years, one hour somewhat more than 200,000 years, one minute about 4000 years, and one second roughly 65 years. According to contemporary understandings, on this scale the beginnings of life, in the form of self-replicating, long chain molecules, appeared in February. In April simple unicellular organisms emerged, and late in May the primitive invertebrates. Land plants came on the scene in the summer (midway in the two billion year span), and the large reptiles, brainy mammals and birds in the fall. "Then on the last day of the year, December 31, just some four hours before midnight, man appears walking gracefully erect and equipped with sensitive, marvelously sensitive hands. . . . An hour or so later he makes tentative efforts at social life, but it is not until the last minute of the year, that his first civilization is organized."

Clearly, human history is a very short interval in the totality of terrestrial history. This must not be lost sight of. And yet despite its brevity it is in many ways the most remarkable of intervals, considering how much has transpired within it. Apparently in no earlier interval of equal length was the rate of change ever so tremendous, and the frequency of emergence of novelty quite so high as in this one. Preparation for the appear-

¹¹G. M. McKinley, *Evolution: The Ages and Tomorrow*, Ronald, New York, 1956, p. 55 ff.

ance of mind took a very, very long time, but when it actually arrived on the scene activity took on an entirely new tempo and character, as when, after a full year's preparation of a small bud by a plant, there suddenly bursts forth in but a few moments a large, many petalled, multihued flower. What this means is that human history must not be regarded as a relatively isolated, independent invasion of terrestrial history, but as an event inseparably a part of it, and causally an outcome of its processes.

It is equally true, however, that terrestrial history is itself but an integral part of, and a causal consequence of the processes of, trans-terrestrial, cosmic history; and without doubt it is a short interval in it. Human history is then an even smaller fraction of cosmic history than it is of terrestrial history. A discovery of modern astronomy that for present purposes is especially significant is the high probability of the existence among the stars of myriads of planets suitable for habitation by beings with bodies and minds somewhat like ours. Harlow Shapley goes so far as to assert that "*millions of planetary systems must exist*, and billions is the better word," and that "we are not alone." If this is so, and there certainly seems to be no good reason for doubting it from a sci-

tific point of view, terrestrial human history is not only an exceedingly small part of a much longer celestial history, but is only one of very many other humanlike histories. Moreover, it seems likely that the origins of these did not coincide in time, and that therefore some—perhaps even many—human-like races of beings have existed elsewhere in space, and in their evolution have achieved high orders of physical, mental, and social development, long before ours was born, perhaps even before our planet was born. One wonders whether some of them may not even have come and gone, in some sense, long ago. (P16) *There is good reason to suppose that human history covers but a minuscule span of time in the total history of nature, and that the terrestrial race of man is but one of many human-like races that have emerged in cosmic history, of whose individual histories some overlap in time, and others do not. Here is another component of nature's mystery: the mystery of other inhabitable worlds and their histories—in the past, present, and future.*

VII

WE NOW TURN BRIEFLY to the question whether the scientific view of nature we have considered¹² can tell us anything about God. Might its

¹²The scientific view of nature that is embodied in the propositions of preceding sections, and will hereafter be referred to by the symbol SV.

imagery contribute significantly to the development of concepts and symbols of God that are truly meaningful in our time? Of course this is a far-reaching question that cannot be answered in a few pages; for, as I have suggested elsewhere, such conceptualization is formidable and demanding business, and requires the extensive exploration of three large areas of meaning with respect to the term "God"; meaning-by-empirical analysis, meaning-by-intuition, and meaning-by-postulation.¹³ The first and third of these require the kind of formal and critical analysis we cannot go into here and must reserve for another essay.

What we shall concern ourselves with now for the most part is the second meaning, that by-intuition. To focus our attention on this particular meaning is in a sense to ask our basic question in a somewhat different way: How may the insights of SV be helpful and illuminating as we think meditatively about God? The term *think* refers here not to the guarded, logically sequential reasoning that eventuates in carefully formulated conclusions, but to the more free-wheeling, yet no less potent, intuitive reflections and leaps of the imagination that proceed without precise definitions and yield informal conclusions. It may at times even be an

unconscious or subconscious awareness through "feelings in one's bones"—or what is sometimes called "thinking with the heart." It is the kind the psalmist must have been doing when he burst forth with, "The heavens declare the glory of God; and the firmament showeth his handiwork. . . ."

In proceeding along these lines I shall quite frankly be thinking as a Christian, i.e., a member of a historic community in whose experience God has been, and continues to be, very real, and for whom therefore the concept of God is truly meaningful. I am not seeking more "evidence for the existence of God," but more insight and more meaningful symbols for reflecting upon and worshipping the God I am already aware of—and I am asking whether such additional insights, meanings, and symbols can come at least in part out of science. At no time have I said or supposed that nature "reveals" God, or can provide a "foundation" for faith in God; and I shall not now repudiate that view. I *have* said, however, that science points beyond its own definitive findings toward the reality of ultimate mystery—which is a different matter—and I shall now urge the view that nature, once it is regarded as the "ongoing creation of God" ("His handiwork"), does through the eye of faith yield important in-

¹³Harold K. Schilling, *Science and Religion, An Interpretation of Two Communities* (Scribners, 1962), Ch. IX.

sights about God that are not discernible in any other way.

Remembering that we are now seeking meanings mostly with the eye of intuitive perception that sees things in wholes or in terms of overall patterns without benefit of prior detailed analysis, what might a latter day psalmist mean if upon reflecting broadly on SV he were to sing out a contemporary equivalent of "The heavens declare. . . ."? What might his first reaction be upon "seeing" so much that his predecessors of long ago are not likely to have seen? I suspect that it would be a reaction of overwhelming wonder, with a sense of tremendous, majestic, awe-full mystery; a mystery at once unbounded and unfathomable and yet perpetually beckoning and rewarding; a mystery that has yielded to the extraction of immense amounts of knowledge and truth and the resolving of countless mysteries, and yet remains essentially untouched and beyond understanding; a mystery of limitless spatial and temporal immensity, but also of innumerable dimensions and depths; a mystery displaying an infinity of qualitative variety, yet also of incredible cohesiveness and unity; consistency and ambiguity, order and disorder, causal predictability, and pure chance.

What a grand vision and spectacle of mystery SV does present! Perhaps its most remarkable feature, however, is its being eternally pregnant

with an inexhaustible potential for new actualities, together with a sensitive experimental adaptiveness to the needs of any particular situation, and an uninhibited openness toward the future. Moreover, looking back in retrospect upon its long developmental history, we can now see what no short range perspective could have shown; namely, that somehow the perpetual stirrings and pressures of new being within it, its moment by moment reactions and responses to situational dilemmas by tentatively trying now this, then that, and even its wasteful expenditure of substance and energy, have *in the long run* been goal-seeking, organizing, and creatively constructive in character—and are therefore meaningful. While scientists still debate over the idea of any "purpose" or "goal" in nature, there is little disagreement that as a matter of fact successive major emergences have built upon, not cancelled or negated, preceding ones, and that therefore the long-range developmental curve has been as consistently "upward," i.e., toward consciousness and sociality, as though these were actual goals.

Now I ask: Is it reasonable to suppose that from all this we can conclude nothing about God, as some theologians seem to insist when they say that we know nothing about God except what has been revealed through Jesus Christ? The ancient psalmists probably knew almost noth-

ing about the remarkable aspects of nature portrayed in SV; even so for them nature did declare God's glory. Is it credible that if such knowledge and insight had come to them they would have written it off as of no significance for their conceptions of, or faith in, God?

There are of course more specific aspects of SV—aside from the more general ones of mystery, depth, openness and goal-seeking—that may signify something about God. Among them are the following ones: that the processes of genesis, emergence, and developmental growth in nature have been operative for aeons upon aeons of time and in countless galaxies of planetary systems throughout endless space; and that in their depths all components of reality now seem to be dynamic rather than static, changing rather than fixed; and that their most basic constituent realities are now thought to be relationships, rather than substances in the old sense, and to be characterized by complexity more than simplicity.

To work out precisely these and many other implications of both the general and more specific aspects of SV for religious thought will, of course, require much more than the informal, intuitive "thinking with the heart" that we have engaged in here. For this task nothing less than the cold-blooded, critical, logically rigorous thinking, the empirical analysis and postulational theorizing of sys-

tematic theology, aided by the newer metaphysics and the resources of many other disciplines, will do. It is for just such a broad frontal cooperative attack upon the problem by many Christian scholars from many fields that I am pleading.

Finally I raise a question that reflects the "practical" mood of many people today, including many in the Church. What if the natural world does have many levels of depth, is unbounded and open, and truly mysterious—or not? Isn't this much ado about nothing? Does it really make any difference how we *think* theologically about God, and whether we do it in terms of mystery or not? What difference—in the way we work, play, love, hate, and die? This question too demands much more rigorous thought than we can give it here. Perhaps it is the most difficult one of all. I offer then only a few brief remarks about it.

First, there is a constant interaction between thought and act. Much more than is often realized, what we do is determined by how we think abstractly, and our abstract thought is determined by what we do. Much of this interplay is, of course, subconscious, and is known to be very potent in its effects—perhaps nowhere more so than in religion. This is of itself not sufficient, however, completely to shape the character of our attitudes and actions. To a large extent they are affected also by our conscious, deli-

berate thinking, including our "theoretical" thinking. Hence it does make a "practical" difference in our lives how we think consciously—theologically—about God. Some ways of conceptualizing God enrich our workaday lives and others impoverish them.

Second, it will make a very great difference whether we think of God as open, dynamic, creative mystery, or as a being whose nature can be known with considerable certainty and whose attributes can be specified by a closed and fixed doctrinal system. The one makes for intellectual and spiritual power, for adventurous faith, and expectant openness to the future, while the other tends to stultify, to substitute religious self-complacency for faith, and to make difficult the acceptance of the new and the passage into the future. If SV with its new appreciation of mystery can to any extent impel us in the direction of the former of these conceptions, its contribution to religious thought will be tremendous.

Its contribution would be even more significant, however, especially with respect to our situation today, if it helped us not only to see the theological implication of the reality of genuine mystery conceived intellectually, but to rehabilitate and sharpen our sensitivity to mystery in-

tuitively perceived—and to the related mysterious qualities of unboundedness and depth. The older scientific views of nature, as shallow, closed and unmysterious, tended to denigrate and blunt that sensitivity, with rather serious consequences. The newer ones seem to me destined to change much of this—if men will respond to them. It is my fervent hope that Christian thought, including theology, will increasingly be found to be leading in the response.

VIII

THIS LEADERSHIP is by no means negligible now. While Karl Barth, to whom I referred earlier, seems to have missed the genuine mystery aspects of nature and science's awareness of them, there are others who have not. It is well known, for instance, that depth, limitlessness, and mystery have played a central role in Paul Tillich's thought, and that he sees with great clarity that nature has these qualities. I was delighted to discover recently that he defines mystery essentially as I have in proposition P7.¹⁴

Bernard E. Meland's remarkable book *The Realities of Faith*¹⁵ presents what is probably the most comprehensive treatment of the implications of SV for theology that is available

¹⁴Tillich, *op. cit.*

¹⁵Meland, *op. cit.*

today. He has thought about these matters with amazing originality and depth of insight. I for one am greatly in his debt.

The stance toward contemporary science adopted by H. Richard Niebuhr in his *Radical Monotheism and Western Culture*¹⁶ is most appreciative and understanding, and his volume seems to me to present an especially hospitable theological climate in which to explore its meaning for Christian thought.

A theologian whose thought reveals a delicately balanced sensitivity to, and understanding of, the verities of both the gospel and of science is Daniel Day Williams. For a long

time he has insisted that we must pay more attention to the latter. His grand book *God's Grace and Man's Hope*¹⁷ shows that this can be done without sacrificing basic Christian truth.

For a technically less formidable book that shows gratifying understanding of SV and explores its significance for Christian thought with considerable cogency the reader is referred to Albert N. Wells' *The Christian Message in a Scientific Age*.¹⁸

There are of course other theologians who have made important contributions in this field, notably in Europe.

¹⁶Harpers, 1960.

¹⁷Harpers, 1949.

¹⁸John Knox Press, 1962.

The Claims of Our Heritage

by DONALD F. CAMPBELL

And he took up the mantle of Elijah that had fallen from him. II Kings 2:13a

THE STORY OF ELIJAH AND ELISHA is repeated in every generation. The prophets of God pick up the mantle of those gone before, and if they are of a serious mind, will, like Elisha, ask for a double portion of the spirit of those gone before.

"In every aspect of life we inherit from the past. We speak the language we inherited from our culture. Our lives are molded by the habits and customs, the thought forms and ideals of our family and nation. We are trained in the religious conviction and moral ideals of the family and church from which we come. We inherit the political organization, the industry and commerce, the accumulated knowledge and scientific achievements of the past. We are the heirs of the ages, inheriting buildings and cities, literature and music, paintings and sculpture, things we could not have won for ourselves."¹

Progress is only made possible by building upon our inheritance. Each generation is able to use the achievements of the past and carry them on to greater achievement.

It is occasionally my pleasure to attend the annual boat show at the New York Coliseum. Every year there seem to be new advances in design both inside and out. One would think that this would be impossible in light of the fact that boats may be the oldest conveyance known to mankind. Could we really make progress in boat design as well as in the techniques of boat building after three thousand years? It appears that we can.

Yet in the realm of religion there are many who believe that no progress can be made. In every generation men have sought for God and God has sought for men—revealing Himself to men as they have responded to Him. There was a long preparation for the coming of Christ; and since his day there has been built up a tradition by saints and martyrs, by humble Christians who taught the faith to their children, by preachers and professors, ministers and missionaries.

¹H. D. Budden of England.

As we look at the past—one hundred or two hundred years ago—we are today convinced that in understanding the fulness of the Gospel we have made some progress. The old time religion is not good enough for us.

We say this knowing that there are regrets because much of what was good and excellent a century or two ago has been lost along with some religious blindness and narrowness which in good conscience we can no longer tolerate.

Yet we dare not stretch the parallel between material progress and spiritual progress too far. There is in our religious heritage a profound difference. We are born into a so-called Christian culture, we may grow up in a Christian home, we may be trained in Christian thought and conduct. We are nurtured in the Christian Church. We may be ordained into its ministry, but that does not make us Christians.

When Elisha took up the mantle cast down by his predecessor it was an act of response and dedication. He was saying as Isaiah said in later days, "Here am I, send me." He had made his personal act of committal to God; and when the sons of the prophets met him, they knew him to be a God-possessed man.

There must be something of that in every Christian. To be born and trained in a Christian tradition is one thing. To have others know that we are committed to Jesus Christ day by day is another.

And in this day when the Christian Community, the fellowship, is so emphasized, we cannot afford to forget that there is something essentially individual in the Christian acceptance of our religious heritage.

All too often we who have the responsibility of shepherds look to some new novelty in a church program, some organizational genius, some new architecture or new liturgy to convey the power of the Holy Spirit to our people; and as good as these may be, they seldom bring Jesus Christ to our individual church members. There is no substitute for personal commitment—renewed again and again.

There are movements away from the Church of Christ in our modern world—just when we thought that religion was booming and church walls were bursting. Many who were nurtured in the Christian faith have abandoned their religious heritage, sometimes for the sake of pagan pleasures, sometimes for the sake of political theories, and sometimes, with some justification, because of their impatience with a church that seemed to be unconcerned about human wrongs—because the Church looked to self-perpetuation while forgetting self-sacrifice. In spite of this the Church grows. It appears

that each succeeding generation is increasingly willing to let go all the past for an unknown future. In some respects we know this is good and thank God for the exuberant faith and hope of some of our youth.

Maybe if we are young enough, we haven't met enough defeats to make us timid when looking to the future. But if we are not so young, if our hair is greying, our footsteps slower than they were a few years ago, if people think of us as beyond our prime, we do not feel too eager for conflict. We look for a greater measure of peace, less strife, less noise, less confusion.

At twenty-five we see few ghosts of the past. At seventy there are many. At thirty God gives us zeal and vision to match our faith, for seeing and tackling big jobs ahead. At sixty we just pray to finish some uncompleted task. Hence our holding on to the past is often motivated more by lethargy than by selectivity.

But to the committed Christian, age is not the important factor. There is always a future; it is always exciting. Hope is not as much related to age as it is to religious faith. The mantle of responsibility and faith that has fallen on you and me brings with it the best of the past, but we are *not* expected to be thereby *satisfied* with our heritage alone.

I hope not to be misunderstood when I say that the Church's greatest failure the past several years may well be due to its conservatism—our dependence upon past structure while forgetting the necessity for contemporary methods of evangelism and service. We have so endeavored to protect our sacred past that we have failed to look to the future. We know we must conserve the eternal truths—that Christ *is* the same yesterday, today, and forever. But while conserving the kernel, we have also held fast much of the chaff; and in doing so the world may be passing us by in the realm of active, intelligent service to mankind.

A businessman who used the methods of a generation ago would not long remain in this competitive field. A physics professor who used his 1930 lectures in class would be dismissed from any reputable school. Commerce, medicine, education are all based soundly upon the experience of the past, but they don't remain in the past. They advance or die. Can we expect the Church to be different? Elisha had a different task than Elijah even though God had not changed.

Several years ago Bishop Angus Dun preached a sermon entitled "The Church on the March." I'd like to quote or paraphrase a small portion of that sermon while adding a bit to it.

"God's people are still on the march. They don't make much noise about it. Their marching songs are rather feeble. Their commander is the same even

though some are not as sure of His way as were their fathers before them. They march somewhat the same direction, but there are many paths. Closed formation is not the order of the day, for there is the Presbyterian column, the Methodist battalion, the Roman army, the Episcopalian division, and many others. Their king is the same and although they carry many banners, they all carry one cross.”¹

The people of God now are called the Church, and this Church moves in many lands. In our own land the Church often faces the temptations of success where the gospel is easily corrupted into a success religion and the mission of the Church is presented as a success story. Here, few people ask if the Holy Spirit is reaching the lives of the people. They seem more interested in whether or not the Church is comfortable and whether they have more organizations and better music than the Church around the corner.

But the Church still moves. It touches some of the privileged to the point where they will give generously that the Church may continue and that the King may really have a kingdom of which they are not ashamed.

When one of the soldiers sacrifices beyond what is expected, even the officers are surprised. Within the ranks there are those who, though meaning well, are a drag upon the others. They have heard about the King but have never met him personally. They are a little unhappy about the journey—the end in view is too idealistic so they try to make the Church less than it ought to be. They refuse to carry their own weight, not really knowing the purpose of the march.

“Some fall out of rank after they fall out of step, because they have no stomach for the journey.”² They forget that the people on the march are a Christian fellowship supposedly encouraging one another.

A few desert the ranks because they don’t get along with their fellow soldiers. Others just ask for a transfer to another division—which is more suited to their style of march—usually slower.

But Christ’s Church is not held up in its progress entirely. Others step in and help close ranks. When one marcher has failed at least one other volunteer takes his place.

The captains, who are paid professionals, sometimes lose their *esprit de corps*; for they are more concerned about competition between divisions than in cooperation on the journey.

Thus, by some divine miracle, the Church of Christ moves on—midst

¹*Christian World Pulpit.*

²Angus Dun, *ibid.*

bickering and criticism of captains and men, midst gossip and pettiness—with some wise to the faults of others and blind to faults of their own. Still not even this can arrest the march. For the Church is of God and He forgives our stupidity. He knows that those who hinder by thinking they are helping may be insecure, short-sighted, or frustrated. Hence this love and mercy eventually opens their eyes to the purpose of the journey and they re-enlist for the duration.

Our critics see our faults while often ignoring what Christ is doing through his Church. I felt this when I read Harry Golden's amusing criticism in *Life* a few years ago. He wrote: "If I was faced today with the decisions my ancestors faced—become a Christian or die—I would pick a church fast. There is nothing to offend me in the modern church. The minister gives a sermon on juvenile delinquency one week; then reviews a movie the next; then everyone goes downstairs and plays bingo. The first part of a church that's built is the kitchen. Five hundred years from now people will dig up these churches and wonder what kind of sacrifices we performed."

I am sure you all realize the trepidation with which one minister preaches to his brethren—many of whom have had more experience in serving their Lord. Hence, I do not want to appear to scold an audience whose circumstances I do not know. I do know that pride—professional or otherwise—can destroy a minister's effectiveness. I also believe that self-rejection, self-degradation can do the same.

And no man dare take upon himself the *whole* burden of his own failure or the faithlessness of another, or what he believes is lack of faith on the part of his Church. The burden would be crushing and the martyrdom of the crushed would be false; for that burden has been borne for all times—from Israel's defection through the crucifixion and the fulfillment of promise on Easter morning, the promise pronounced so long ago through Jeremiah, "I will heal your faithlessness." It is a promise relevant to the Church in our day.

No man dare take upon himself that burden of faithlessness, but no Christian can deny Christ the right to bear that burden for us, for to do so could only mean a blasphemous silence in answer to his death and rising, as though it had been in vain. By the same token no man can accept the *credit* for any measure of success or spiritual progress the Church may enjoy. That, too, belongs to our Lord and Savior, Jesus Christ.

Book Reviews and Notes

Eliade, Mircea. *From Primitives to Zen: A Thematic Sourcebook on the History of Religions*. New York: Harper and Row, 1967. Pp. 544. \$8.00.

An ancient Chinese was very proud of his ecumenicity: when asked if he was a Buddhist, he pointed to his Taoist cap; when asked if he was a Taoist, he pointed to his Confucian shoes; when asked if he was a Confucian, he pointed to his Buddhist scarf.

Most of us may not be able to be so ecumenical, but the increasingly close relationship of cultures in our day demands that we decide what we are able to do vis-à-vis the non-Christian religions. The ever growing number of books about attitudes toward other faiths indicates our need to know our own minds in an age when we can no longer assume a priori the superiority of Christianity. Even a conservative like Hendrik Kraemer admits that in its empirical manifestations the Christian faith may be socially, morally, or ideationally less adequate than a particular expression of Hinduism or Buddhism. We may be convinced that in some sense Christianity is "absolutely" true, but how shall we react to Islamic success in African missions when Christian missions fail by association with the color-bar and colonialism? Again, how shall we evaluate a type of Japanese Buddhism which seems

to be as solidly based on grace and faith as Christianity? Why does Zen appeal to many occidentals who find Christianity quite unsatisfying?

As the proportionate number of Christians in the world declines rapidly in the population explosion and as the interrelatedness of all aspects of various cultures grows by leaps, the smug isolation of Christianity is in for a shaking up. In this situational context Christians are standing in the need of knowledge. We have been exploited both by earlier missionary accounts which evidenced an amazing failure to appreciate the good in other religions and by the modern picture-book accounts (*Life* magazine, et al.) which would have us believe there is nothing but good in other religions. What we require now is truth.

One of the ways to get at truth is to read the scriptures of the world and to study the reports about religious practices where there are no scriptures (primitives). The famous University of Chicago Professor Mircea Eliade has furnished us with one of the best books for this purpose. Even if one does not read it straight through as the author suggests, it is a mine of valuable refer-

ence on almost every conceivable theme of religion.

Nevertheless it is this thematic treatment which is troublesome. Granted the advantage of continuous discussion of sacrifice, for instance, one may assume a similarity or a contrast which would not be sustained by a contextual understanding of the particular cultures involved. Every theme of the book should have an introduction and commentary, which in fact are usually lacking.

The themes well illustrated in this "thematic sourcebook on the history of religions" include supernatural beings, myths of creation and origin, man and the sacred, eschatology, mystics, medicine men and prophets, theological speculation. Emphasis on primitive religion is strong—94 out of 300 entries. Of course the primitives are Eliade's specialty, but the

proportion seems askew. Cultic practices receive the largest number of pages. Chinese religions seem to be slighted—twelve pages on Taoism, only five on Confucianism. There is nothing from Mencius. Wisely nothing from Judaism or Christianity is included.

A total of 306 entries in 640 pages averages little more than two pages for each. This is the great problem of such a sourcebook. Space limitation is also responsible for the lack of sufficient commentary. The only index is an ethnographic one. There is a good bibliography. Despite inevitable weaknesses, Eliade's book is an excellent source of materials, particularly for the primitives, which would be difficult to find elsewhere.

—Norman Adams,
Westminster College.

Myers, Jacob M. *Invitation to the Old Testament: A Layman's Guide to Its Major Religious Messages*. New York: Doubleday (Waymark Books), 1967. Pp. x + 252. \$1.95 (cloth, \$4.95).

This paperback edition of Dr. Myers' *Invitation to the Old Testament* will be a welcome addition to church school libraries. It is geared for the layman and is excellently written. It covers, in brief, almost all of the books of the Old Testament

(missing are Deuteronomy, Ruth, Lamentations, Joel, Obadiah, Jonah, Malachi). Some of the books missing are treated in passing in other chapters. The chapters on Genesis, 1 and 2 Isaiah, and Jeremiah are especially edifying. Generously sprinkled

throughout the book are illustrative passages, translated afresh in sprightly fashion by Dr. Myers. The opening chapter is entitled "Why the Old Testament?" and forms an excellent introduction to the whole study. There are 31 chapters in all and, with supplementary readings in the Old

Testament itself, one could easily envisage the book being used for a year's course in Sunday School staff meetings. The cheaper edition makes it all the more inviting for study group use. (Dr. Myers is presently a visiting professor at Pittsburgh.)

—Jay C. Rochelle.

Rolston, Holmes. *The "We Knows" of the Apostle Paul*. Richmond: John Knox, 1966. Pp. 101. \$1.65.

A series of fifteen sermons by the editor in chief of the Board of Christian Education of the Presbyterian Church, U.S. Most of the sermons are based upon texts of Paul that begin with the words "we know" while the others are developed from texts that carry a similar idea in dif-

ferent language. The purpose of these sermons is to seek to give "assured knowledge" to the ultimate questions of human existence by presenting the affirmations of the early Church and asking a response to them in a "pilgrimage of faith."

Mitton, C. Leslie. *The Epistle of James*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1966. Pp. 256. \$4.95.

The bulk of this book by the editor of *Expository Times*, a British "evangelical" scholar, is an exposition of the text and a comparison of it with other parts of the New Testament in order to show that the letter of James is an integral part of the total message of the New Testament. A short appendix which presents the "introductory" problems concludes the

book.

Mitton demonstrates his thesis by the use of parallels illustrating scripture by scripture. This is done with care and caution, and he does not fall prey to exaggeration of parallels. Coupled with this is the acknowledgment and exploration of differences where they exist.

The occasional use of "weasel"

words (i.e., generalizations without any supporting evidence) to delineate or define words in texts detracts from Mitton's exegesis—e.g., "most commonly" (p. 22), "usually" (pp. 45, 105), "normal meaning", (p. 56), "straight forward" (p. 91), "in the Bible" (p. 134). What do these mean? How are they determined? These words appear to be used to overpower rather than to demonstrate truth.

The book's principal deficiency is in the discussion of the "key" words—righteousness, faith, law, and sin. The thoroughness that is apparent in the remainder of this work is displaced with a shallowness that is characterized by oversimplification. This is most unfortunate, for these words are focal points for both James and Paul (pp. 103-117 deal primarily with the relationship of Paul and James).

The exposition of the phrase "righteousness of God" in 1:20 is limited to the listing of two alternative meanings of righteousness. No mention is made of Paul's usage of this term in Rom. 1:17 that expresses the theme of that letter. Little is said of the Old Testament background of this word (and cognates) that shows it as deed, event, and relationship. In the discussion of "present" and "eschatological justification" it appears as if Mitton is ready to probe into the depths; but within a few lines conclusions are drawn, and

even these are unproven.

Faith suffers the same fate as Mitton describes the various meanings of faith. Faith is acceptance of doctrine. Faith is personal commitment in trust and obedience. Faith is the absence of doubt. Unfortunately these distinctions are not illustrated from the biblical text. The lack of any discussion of the relationship of the Hebrew *'emunah* and Greek *πίστις* is a glaring omission.

The discussion of law also contains inconclusive and incomplete arguments. Mitton asserts that the one who looks into the perfect law is moved to dissatisfaction. This is good Lutheran theology, but the text speaks of this man as the one who perseveres in the law and who acts. In reference to this "perfect law" Mitton states that no Christian could see this as a reference to the law of the Old Testament. Similarly he speaks of the Old Testament law with its imperfections removed. Both statements stand unsubstantiated and in contrast to Paul's declaration that the law is holy, and commandment is holy and just and good. Another conspicuous omission occurs in 2:10 as Mitton employs Deut. 27:26 to show that one must keep all the law, but no mention is made of Paul's usage of it in Gal. 3:10.

The assertion that Paul treats boasting as the fundamental human sin seems to be a page from Bultmann. The texts given to support this

conclusion do not speak of the sin of boasting but are exhortations to boast in the Lord.

A bewildering hermeneutic is used by Mitton as he seeks to show in 5:20 that it is ultimately only God who can bring salvation. He states: "James is being perhaps a little less than precise." Is this a statement of an exegete or a systematic theologian? How can one determine when a biblical writer is "less than precise"? While the interpretation of this particular passage is quite orthodox, the hermeneutic behind it is dangerous, a pandora's box for eisegesis.

As a whole the style and format of this volume suffer from inconsistency. Mitton's style is generally lucid as he presents alternatives with clarity, but occasionally there is a lapse as he writes in a more pedantic prose—e.g., pp. 153ff. Some sections have

notes, others none. There are some cross references to later or earlier discussions of words, but not many. The book would have been greatly enhanced by the constant employment of both these tools and/or an index. The transliteration seems unnecessary as the English word immediately precedes it, and in pp. 26-50 it is omitted. Mitton's use of textual criticism varies from an elementary explanation of the manuscripts (p. 54), to a useless occurrence (p. 212), to succinct presentations of method and conclusion (p. 130).

While this review expresses displeasure with some particulars, it is basically a wish that what is good could be made better, for this book is a most useful tool for those who would seek to know more about the "epistle of straw."

—Howard Eshbaugh.

Peale, Norman Vincent. *Jesus of Nazareth*. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966. \$3.95.

This is intended to be "a dramatic interpretation of His life from Bethlehem to Calvary." It is not a very good book. The author has attempted to tell the story of Jesus' life through the eyes of a fictitious nephew of Peter (i.e., Andrew's son); and there is a foil for this young man, a

friend who moves from rejection of Jesus to dying for him. This plot, the included details of Jesus' career, and a sampling of his teaching are related on some thirty-four pages (unnumbered); it was all but certain that nothing could be done well in such a compass. (The material first ap-

peared as a supplement to *Look Magazine*, but change of format could hardly help poverty of content.)

Selection of detail had to be arbitrary. The interpretative principle

seems to have been an effort to show Jesus as a young "rebel" who would be attractive to a contemporary, twentieth-century generation of young rebels. This adds artificially to arbitrariness and superficiality.

May, H. G. *Our English Bible in the Making* (Revised Edition). *The Word of Life in Living Language*. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1965. Pp. 163. \$3.95.

Professor May first published this book the same year the completed RSV appeared (1952). There have been significant developments since then, and the bibliography has expanded rapidly; so this revised edition renews the usefulness of this book. It "has been developed through the cooperative efforts of many denominations seeking through an interdenominational agency, the Cooperative Publication Association, to provide publications of sound educational value and practical usefulness."

Although only a dozen pages have been added to the total, data on recent English translations have been added; and the bibliographical refer-

ences have been updated. Some sections had to be added, e.g., on the *New English Bible*; some had to be completely rewritten, e.g., on the Dead Sea Scrolls. Dr. May's careful competence is evident throughout.

One must remark, while praising this revision, that the task of surveying this field is currently continual. Although *The Anchor Bible* is mentioned in this volume, the author could not mention the *Jerusalem Bible*, let alone less significant but equally contemporary works. (One might also observe with regret the price of this book has gone up over 43%.)

Swete, H. B. *The Holy Spirit in the Ancient Church*. Grand Rapids: Baker, 1966. Pp. viii + 429. \$6.95.

In *Perspective* VI.2 (June, 1965), 38, we noted Swete's *The Holy Spirit in the New Testament*. Baker's fine *Limited Editions Library* offers the

sequel, a reprint of Macmillan's original 1912 edition. It covers the period from the sub-apostolic writers to Gregory the Great. The material

in detailed studies such as this is durable and seldom duplicated. It is a notable service to theological studies

that such volumes are again available.

—J. A. Walther.

Davies, J. G. *The Early Christian Church*. New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1967. Pp. 368 + notes, bibliography, index. \$1.75.

Six chapters of solid reading, interestingly written, with special emphasis upon the original writers and not the thoughts of the author: that is the shape of this book on the first five centuries of Christianity. Each chapter, with the exception of the first (in which the pre-Christian and apostolic ages are covered), is subdivided into the following categories to make for convenient sampling: background, sources, expansion and

development, beliefs, worship, and social life. The section on background always draws a good picture of the pagan religions, the philosophy, and the politics of the period under discussion so that we might proceed to see Christianity developing in its historical context. The reviewer is not a historian, but of all the works on this period he has read, this is far above the rest in completeness, readability, and form.

Patterson, Lloyd G. *God and History in Early Christian Thought*. New York: Seabury, 1967. Pp. 163 + bibliographical notes. \$5.50.

The Episcopal book house, Seabury Press, is in the beginning stages of publishing an open-ended series (five volumes thus far in print or projected) called "Studies in Patristic Thought," under the general editorship of R. A. Norris, Jr., Associate Professor of Historical Theology at Philadelphia Divinity School.

This is the second volume in the series and is written by the Asso-

ciate Professor of Church History at Episcopal Theological School, Cambridge, Mass. The sub-title is, "A Study of Themes from Justin Martyr to Gregory the Great."

Briefly, what Patterson has chosen as his theme is as follows: there is a difference between "history" and *historia* (*Historie und Geschichte*). The former is a simple recounting of events, the latter involves an intel-

lectually revised version of past events. In other words, the former involves simply the setting down of facts, the latter involves some underlying and guiding philosophy. Now, granting this distinction in terms, we ought to be looking at early Christian writings to see the way in which they came into conflict with the *historia* of Greek and Roman civilization. One mistake of theology which we are living with today, says Patterson, is its confusion over these terms. We have inherited a framework which takes God's entrance into "history" seriously, but has failed to take God and *historia* seriously.

The remainder of the book is a carefully written discussion of the initial restraint of Christian writers to enter into *historia*, as seen in the period from Justin to Origen, followed by a growing interest in *historia*, finally ending with full-blown philosophies of history from a Christian viewpoint in Augustine and Gregory the Great (though their

views were different). He concludes his study by telling us that we ought be interested in both forms, both "history" and *historia*, but it is the field of *historia* where Christianity must do much of its apologetic work today. In other words, we are failing our mission unless we can say "precisely what we mean by that proclamation (of God working in the world) as it affects our understanding of the new events of which we are witnesses" (p. 163).

The book pays special interest to Christian thinking on the significance of the growth of the church, the beginning of the end of the Roman Empire, and the Constantine authorization of Christianity.

Though it is short, this is a very good book. It is no reflection on the subject matter to say that Seabury, like Fortress, is beginning to get a reputation for over-pricing its books. Doubtless this book will appear in paperback within a year.

Dolan, John P. *History of the Reformation*. New York: Mentor-Omega Books, 1967. Pp. 358 + index of names. 95¢

This is a history of the Reformation by a Roman Catholic historian who formerly taught at Notre Dame and now teaches at the University of South Carolina.

This paperback original consists of eight long chapters. The first chapter alone is worth the price of the book. In it, Prof. Dolan outlines the history of histories of the Reformation, both protestant and Roman Catholic, giving a short critique of a wealth of

literature for the beginning student.

The second chapter is a historical survey of the teachings of theologians regarding the church and the individual. Beginning with Augustine, Dolan moves us through Gregory, Anselm, Joachim of Flora, and many others to show the movement from individual reform or reform of the self within the church to the growing dissatisfaction with the curial structure developing within the Roman church.

The third chapter is a tracing of the roots and development of the conciliar movement, with emphasis upon this being a reform movement that was stifled by the papacy. The council of Constance is especially well treated, showing how it attempted reform in the hierarchy and structure of the church.

The fourth chapter treats of "two reformers who failed," Jean Gerson, chancellor of the University of Paris, and Nicholas of Cusa, the Cardinal. Both men attempted to place the framework of the church on a Christological basis, stressing the church as *congregatio fidelium*; but both men failed to bring about extensive reform.

Chapter five is a scathing denunciation of the medieval practices the church encouraged in its people: the magical and superstitious veneration

of relics and the abominable practice of indulgences. Dolan's judgment on the life of the medieval church is that it inculcated piety of the lowest level while neglecting charity. For this reason, the great leaders of reform in the 16th century, with the exception of Calvin, came from monasteries, and not from the laity.

Chapters 6 and 7 are a history, first, of the work of Luther, then of the split between Rome and the Protestants, then within the Protestant sects themselves. They are exceedingly fair in approach.

The final chapter is a critique of the Counter-Reformation, in which, among other things, Dolan suggests that Trent was ineffective not only because it spawned the Inquisition and the Index, but because it established seminaries which ultimately split the intellectual climate of the church off from Europe and indoctrinated men rather than teaching them (a lesson for us?), and finally because it failed at the crucial point of adequate definition of the essential nature of the Church. With the success of Bellarmine in pushing his viewpoint, the sight of the Council was focused, not on the Gospel, but on pre-Reformation ideals which, Dolan notes, even the most conservative Roman Catholic theologians today reject outright.

Carnell, Edward J. *The Burden of Soren Kierkegaard*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1965. Pp. 172 + index. \$3.50.

This introduction to the thought of Kierkegaard by an outstanding evangelical theologian is, on the whole, excellent. The chapter on "The Dialectic of Inwardness" is a bit cryptic at times, but this is only due to the fact that it is rather cryptic in the writings of Kierkegaard himself. One reads about the three *existence-spheres*, the "aesthetic," the "ethical," and the "religious" in Kierkegaard's writings, but to fully understand them escapes many devotees, and to communicate what Kierkegaard fully meant in this phase of his thinking requires genius. Carnell has done a fair job.

Carnell manages to make clear some points that are often hazy to those unfamiliar with the writings of S.K. For one thing, he very clearly sees that what Kierkegaard objected to in his theology was not the concept of objective truth, but rather objectivity, namely, dependence upon objective data to bring one into a position of faith. Kierkegaard reacted violently to rational "proofs" for Christianity basically because of three reasons: (1) it takes away the *risk* which at bottom constitutes an essential part of the nature of faith; (2) it makes intelligence and understanding the criteria for faith; and (3) it tends to give advantage to those contemporaneous with Christ. (Carnell

objects to the last point, feeling that there *was* some advantage to being one of the first disciples; we must disagree with him here.) For Kierkegaard, to sum, concern for proof in Christianity was a mark of unbelief. If you seek proof, you don't believe; if you believe, you don't need proof. S.K. objected that all the arguments for the existence of God are self-annihilating because they begin with some prior assumption of the existence of God: all the classical proofs were, to him, mere ways of verbalizing the prior conception of God's existence. For Kierkegaard, the only way to advance "proofs" for the existence of God is by taking him seriously enough to mediate his love in each moment of existence.

The book clearly shows where the touchstone of difference was between Kierkegaard and Hegel, against whose philosophy he vigorously and sometimes even caustically rebelled. Hegel, for Kierkegaard, made one primary mistake: this was to weave a system of philosophy in which the existence of the individual counted for nothing. In so doing, S.K. argued, Hegel constructed the architecture of a magnificent philosophical house—but no human being is really able to live in it because it does not affect him "existentially." It is a take-it-or-leave-it proposition. Carnell manages

also to show us that Kierkegaard did "take it" from Hegel at several points, particularly in his extension and clarification of the whole principle of dialectical thought—which Kierkegaard transposed into what we might call "dialectical existence": the continuous creation of Christianity, an infinite possibility for the future based on the decision of the individual. Kierkegaard saw that Hegelianism destroys this creativity by conceiving the mediation between antitheses in logical thought rather than in action. In other words, one can mentally solve all the problems of existence; but, in the end, this is

worthless because one has to act, to affirm oneself, in order to achieve true individuality (which, understand as S.K. understood it, is also true Christianity).

A short concluding chapter gives three points where Carnell agrees with the approach of Kierkegaard, and three where he does not. If you are looking for a starting point into the thought of Kierkegaard, relatively unfettered by the qualification of the author, look no further than this book. Carnell has allowed Kierkegaard to do most of the speaking—and he still has a lot to say!

—Jay C. Rochelle.

Harrison, Ernest. *A Church Without God*. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1967. Pp. 149. \$1.95 (paper; \$3.95, cloth).

In the first sentence the author cites the original title of this book as "Mother Church is Dead and Gone—What do the Children do Now?" This book by one of the God-is-Dead-boys goes on from there to be quite disconcerting. In fact Ernest Harrison goes out of his way to be abrasive. Even when he is taking a generally accepted position, which he does rarely, he states it in a way that makes it sound heretical.

Chapter one is the church's obituary; it is not eulogized. Chapter three

is God's obituary; He is. Harrison would have us get rid of God and the church, at least as we now have it; but like many other Radical Theologians, he would have us keep Jesus whose whole life was love for his fellow man. This love, however, "did not derive from any love of a greater person known as God." Thus he comes to a conclusion that makes it possible, even desirable, to be both Christian and atheist.

Subsequent chapters rationalize disbelief in a historical resurrection;

disclaim Jesus' belief in God; and reduce the Bible to "one of the sources we can use to discover who we are."

The chapter on "The New Morality" is adequate and a good introduction for those who have read little or nothing about it.

In spite of all this apparent negativism, I found the conclusion of the book on "The New Parish" most con-

structive and helpful. It revealed the author to be a good churchman! Not in the traditional sense, of course, but certainly as one who feels that the followers of Christ have many ministries and that these ministries can best be performed through a fellowship. This chapter has much to offer the pastor struggling with an all too traditional parish.

Lawson, John. *Comprehensive Handbook of Christian Doctrine*. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967. Pp. 287. \$7.75.

The subtitle on the cover reads: "A book that investigates all important issues to give a considered treatment of the whole system of the Christian faith for the thoughtful reader." It is quite comprehensive and highly readable, and can be a real study aid for clergy and laymen alike.

The author admits to striving for a particular point of view. Indeed such a book would be impossible without one. He has tried to describe the theology "accepted by the historic church," or conversely he has tried to construct "the Christian religion . . . (not) . . . radically different from what it has been through the centuries."

When there are sharply differing interpretations, they are carefully and fairly spelled out at the conclusion of the appropriate section. For instance,

the fourth section in the chapter "The People of God" is entitled, "The Doctrine of the Ministry." In this section is discussed "Ministerial Order." Following this there is a "Summary of Divergence: The Catholic View, the Evangelical View, and An Interpretative Statement."

All of this is generously documented historically and scripturally. Additional readings are suggested at the end of each chapter and the whole book is meticulously indexed for maximum use.

I doubt that many will want to sit down and read it from cover to cover. It isn't that kind of a book, but it can be a most useful tool and a welcome addition to both private and church libraries.

—Charles C. W. Idler.

Phillips, John A. *Christ for Us in the Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer*. New York: Harper & Row, 1967. Pp. 245 + appendix, notes, subject index. \$6.50.

The guiding theme for this book is the Christology of Bonhoeffer. Phillips stresses that he wants not to merely emphasize the changing character of Bonhoeffer's Christology, however, but that his ultimate goal is to show the Christological motivation for the shift in his thinking, which in the book comes to mean specifically in reference to the ecclesiastical thought of Bonhoeffer. Bonhoeffer in his life stressed a concrete Christology, which in his early writings took the shape of a heavy emphasis on the Church as the form of Christ in the world. It is this emphasis upon what he calls "concrete Christology" that Phillips seeks to develop through the chronological periods of Bonhoeffer's thought.

One of the interesting features of the book is that Phillips always takes pains to show Bonhoeffer's development in the light, not only of his

scholarly heritage, but also of the historical period in which he was working. So, for example, there are long discussions of his involvement in the Confessing Church, which made him set aside his "worldly" concerns to devote all his thought to the problem of the Church and the Christ.

The book suffers from two faults: one is that it reads all too much like a doctoral thesis with the footnotes relegated to the end of the book instead of at the bottom of each page; the second is that it will be incomprehensible to the layman. This is unfortunate, since otherwise it is an excellent book and deserves a wider reading than among clergymen and professional theologians.

On p. 59, there should be a comma following "juxtaposition," not a period. On p. 62 "criticism," and on p. 146 "incompatible" are misspelled. Note 1 to page 186 is wrong.

Smart, James D. *The Divided Mind of Modern Theology: Karl Barth and Rudolf Bultmann, 1908-1933*. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1967. Pp. 228 + notes and index. \$7.50.

Professor Smart has a remarkable capacity for writing books that no one else has thought of writing, but which always fill a need in a particular area of theology. It is a tribute

to his genius that one looks at each new book and says "I wish I had thought of writing that!" This latest work continues the proof of his ability.

Smart has written the book for the main reason that the movements rustling in the quarter-century during which Barth and Bultmann were doing their formative work are just now beginning to have their full impact felt in the English-speaking world. In addition, he feels that the situation in the life of the Church in America today parallels rather closely the era during which these two theological giants began their programs for the renewal of the Church through theology. For these reasons, the appearance of this book at this time in our history marks an important contribution to the current unrest in theology.

The book begins with a short assessment of the force of both Barth and Bultmann in American theology, and cites in particular two concurrent themes in both men's thought which have led us sometimes to believe that they are closer than they really are: both Barth and Bultmann are highly interested in preaching as the focal point of theology; both Barth and Bultmann are concerned with telling the world of the uniqueness of the Christian revelation, and particularly Christology.

A fine historical sketch of the milieu in which both men grew up leads us to the beginning discussions of their early thought, which are drawn from the writings of both men in the period 1908-1933. The earliest writings of both men show Barth

still influenced by Schleiermacher and Ritschl but beginning to show dissatisfaction with both thinkers; and Bultmann is coming to the fore as a bright new thinker in the "history of religion" school of New Testament scholarship.

From this point on, we are led progressively through the development of the thought of both men. Though they both moved in the same general paths because of historical forces at the time, the divergence between them was becoming clear. It becomes manifest in Bultmann's critique of Barth's *Romans* where it is apparent that Bultmann has not yet moved beyond "religion" and his interest upon religion as response to a transcendent God. Barth's emphasis upon the whole of faith as being objectively given by God was rejected by Bultmann. But the year 1922 finds them still united on the necessity for a new approach to exegesis which takes into account the scholar as both historian and theologian, if justice is to be done the text.

1923 was the year when the divergence became even greater. Heidegger moved to Marburg as professor of philosophy; and Bultmann was to fall under his spell, which is later to dominate his writing on the implications of New Testament exegesis. Barth, during that year, began to go backward, leaping the gap of the past centuries to dive into Luther, Calvin, and Zwingli. It was during that year,

also, that Barth had to defend himself against the criticisms of both Paul Tillich and Adolf Harnack. By 1925 Barth had dipped far into the past to the early church fathers, whereas Bultmann was moving ahead in an exegetical vein which was so subjective as almost to substitute anthropology for theology—as it appears Feuerbach had done before him.

The gulf was now fixed. All there was left to do was to draw out the implications. In 1926 Bultmann published *Jesus and the Word*, in which it became evident that he was totally disinterested in the historical background for the biblical picture of Jesus, but that he was interested in "rescuing" a kernel—or *kerygma*—from the words attributed to Jesus. Form criticism, coupled with the philosophical approach of Heidegger and the historical thoughts of Dilthey, were now the orbit in which he moved. In 1927, Barth published *Christian Dogmatics in Outline*, which he had begun in notes in 1924. Here it became evident that the gulf was fixed, especially with reference to Christology. Barth, in direct opposition to Bultmann, asserted the necessity for the historical medium of revelation, including the historical person of Jesus the Christ. To Bultmann, this was an impossibility; the

historical could not be associated with the divine word.

At the end of the period, Bultmann is operating in his sphere and Barth in his—"and never the twain shall meet." Professor Smart, having allowed primary sources to do most of the talking throughout the book, sums it all up very neatly for us when he says (p. 228): "There can be no question about the character of the issue. Shall theology be based on the word to which faith responds or shall it be based on the faith which responds to the word? Here two roads divide. On the first, theology is possible as a knowledge of God that has within it the only true knowledge of man. On the second, theology is possible only in the form of statements about the self-understanding of man which has been determined by God and it becomes difficult to prevent theology becoming no more than anthropology and soteriology." It is Smart's judgment that we must let the division stand, and that any attempt at reconciliation will lead to theological schizophrenia; they must remain "two isolated streams" in the discussion. Perhaps Dr. Smart has said what all along we have known but in our pride have been unwilling to confess. We have only to pick our individual stance; we cannot straddle the gap.

Paul Tillich: Retrospect and Future. Nashville: Abingdon, 1966. Pp. 63. \$1.00.

Here are five essays regarding the theology or approach of Tillich by five different men, assembled with an introduction by T. A. Kantonen.

"Tillich and the Nature of Transcendence" by Nels F. S. Ferré, criticizes Tillich on two counts: too little transcendence in his philosophy to keep it Christian, too little metaphysics in his kerygmatic theology to keep it Christian.

"Tillich and the Nontheological Meanings of Theological Terms" by Charles Hartshorne criticizes Tillich for giving too much freight to non-theological terminology which, he argues, linguistically cannot bear to

be the precise theological tools Tillich made it out to be.

"Paul Tillich: Theologian of Culture" by John Dillenberger sees in the Tillichian principle of correlation not only the central thrust of his theology but of his gregarious interests in life as a whole.

"Tillich's Christology and Historical Research" by James C. Livingston argues there is no real correlation between the two in Tillich.

"The Question Tillich left us" (by Joseph Haroutunian) is, "Why is there something and not nothing?" which Tillich showed demanded a religious answer.

Vogel, Arthur A. *The Next Christian Epoch.* New York: Harper & Row, 1966. Pp. 107 + index. \$3.50.

This is a creative reply to the "death-of-God" and "secular Gospel" proponents in contemporary theology. Dr. Vogel says that "this book is an attempt to champion the cause of recognized anthropomorphism" (p. 3). Stressing that the common goal of all contemporary reformers is to make Christianity realize its own nature and play its effective role in our daily lives, the author goes on to criticize some of these attempts.

Dr. Vogel analyzes well the whole

thrust of Van Buren upon the linguistic analysis of theological speech on the basis of the verification and falsification principles, his use of the concept of theological or religious "bliks" in language to perform the task of analogy between historical perspective and empirical reality. Vogel criticizes the stress in such writings upon consistency, since religious people are searching for truth and truth may at times be inconsistent to the secularist's eye. He charges

that the secularist allows a pre-conceived theory of truth to determine what Christianity must be, and that there is no unbiased approach to religious language shown by such critics of Christianity. Finally, through showing that the reason for the multiplicity of "language games" utilized by man is that man is able to view existence from various vantage points, Dr. Vogel is able to show that transcendence (a bad word for the secularist) is to be seen *within* the life of man himself; hence, "there is no necessity to take a big (or small) step from the world to get to God; instead, all we need to discover is what is involved in our life in the world as we actually live it" (p. 44).

The next two chapters form an extended discussion of the place of man in the world. Briefly, Vogel argues that man is man only in relation to the world, and that he is a question put before the world, a question which always answers itself in relationship to his findings in the world. Hence, man's mere existence is one of power; his occupation of space and time is a demonstration of his power. The question is, then, to what use will he put his power?

All of these factors in the socio-psychic makeup of man lead him beyond himself, in the search for the answers to questions which drive him to transcendence, which is "not the

bane of religion; it is the basis of it—as it is the basis of all distinctively human meaning" (p. 77). We are being led, through human experience, to a point beyond ourselves: "The whole movement of our being seeks its completion in consummate Being where freedom and order, person and context, coincide. In such a unity life is complete but not dull; no inadequacies can exist in it" (*ibid.*). Perhaps Vogel's final criticism of the secular gospel is this: "Religion involves us as subjects with God as subject; thus religious activity is more than, and escapes, complete expression. Secular analysis is predicated on the assumption that the lived can be reduced to the representative; what cannot be represented in scientific terms is said not to exist in empirical reality. Such an explicative method is incapable of studying religion because it cannot recognize religion for what it is in itself" (p. 82).

Vogel brilliantly explains the Trinity as being Christianity's most "inclusive and self-sufficient means of expressing the personal and social 'inclusiveness' of the Transcendent Source of reality," a point toward which the whole book may now be seen as driving in its emphasis upon personhood and personal interrelationships as being the clue to reality.

Though a short book, there is much meat in this one. Chew on it awhile!

Bloesch, Donald G. *The Christian Life and Salvation*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1967. Pp. 140 + notes, indices. \$3.50.

The purpose of the author in this book is to tie the Christian life in with salvation. He rejects, on the one hand, the emphasis of the "secular theologians" on what he considers a Christian life divorced from "salvation"; and, on the other hand, he rejects what he feels to be a flaw in Barth, Brunner, and Niebuhr: emphasis on salvation to the apparent exclusion of the Christian life. What we need, he says, is a viewpoint which recognizes that the way to salvation is Jesus Christ. "But we have here in mind not only Christ *for us*, but also Christ *with us* and Christ *in us*." To be more specific, what he means is that the Christian life, properly understood, is a *means* of salvation ("we are saved . . . through works in the sense that works that proceed from faith serve the advancement of our sanctification—p. 17), not only a sign, as stressed by Barth, Brunner, and Niebuhr.

Among other things, one questions

such a sweeping statement as "they (the Reformed and Lutheran orthodox theologians) did not fully discern the fact that each facet of salvation participates (at least to some degree) in every stage of this sequence (i.e., the *ordo salutis*)."¹ One fears a caricature here, particularly when thinking of such men as Hollaz and Chytraeus.

There is in this book a fine discussion of the terms of salvation as they occur in the Bible, along with some of the "cultural" terms such as *integration*, etc. It seems that adequate attention has been paid not only to the terminology, but to its temporal meanings. For example, there is a good discussion of justification as past, present, and future.

Although this book is a little arid in spots, and perhaps a little too technical, it presents an excellent case for the author's viewpoint, taking into consideration many contemporary theologians and their viewpoints in the process.

Smith, Wilfrid C. *Questions of Religious Truth*. New York: Scribner's, 1967. Pp. 123. \$3.95.

Four lectures by the Professor of World Religions at Harvard. "The Death of God?" is a critique of the

foundations of this movement. "Is the Qur'an the Word of God?", "Can Religions be true or false?" and

"Christian—Noun or Adjective?" All deal, in various ways, with the question of the validity of religious experience. A religion is substantially

true, Dr. Smith contends, if it receives commitment from its members and verification in their lives by the way they respond to it.

Brown, Robert McAfee. *The Ecumenical Revolution*. Garden City: Doubleday, 1967. Pp. 345 + two appendices, index. \$5.95.

Here is a book which will immediately take its place as "must" reading for anyone interested in doing his homework on the Ecumenical Movement, both Roman Catholic and Protestant. It contains two appendices: the first one is the Decree of Vatican II, *On Ecumenism*; the second is an extensive bibliography covering the Ecumenical Movement as a whole. A handy chart is printed as a separate slip-sheet which outlines "Milestones on the Road to Christian Unity," both Protestant and Roman Catholic. The book itself is copiously documented with pertinent material from primary sources within the Ecumenical Movement.

Originally planned as an up-to-date sequel to *An American Dialogue* by Brown and Gustave Weigel, S.J., this book was authored by Brown alone due to the untimely death of Fr. Weigel. It is dedicated to his memory and the memory of Alexander Miller. Brown notes that he would have chosen another Roman co-author, except that in his judgment the state

of the ecumenical movement is such that anyone can now write an objective report covering both sides of the divide, be he Roman or Protestant.

This book not only represents an history of the ecumenical movement from Edinburgh 1910 to the present, it is also an interpretation of the history of the movement, in which Brown shows his own seriousness about the third point of his own principles of dialogue: "a willingness to interpret the faith of the other in its best rather than its worst light."

Despite the documentary material (or perhaps because of it?) Brown has written a book which moves right along, which captures the attention, which deals with facts and statistics without the normally concomitant dryness of mouth. Brown concludes with three chapters of thoughts on the future thrust of ecumenism in the three critical areas of deeper common dialogue, the consolidation of common action, and the intensification of common worship. It is an important book!

Read, David H. C. *The Pattern of Christ*. New York: Scribner's, 1967. Pp. 94. \$2.95.

A book of seven powerful and beautiful sermons on six beatitudes and the beatitude at John 20:29, recounted by a master preacher whose theme it is to show that the beati-

tudes are for Christians, and that they are based on the whole scope of Christ's life and work.

—Jay C. Rochelle.

Pospishil, Victor J. *Divorce and Remarriage: Towards a New Catholic Teaching*. New York: Herder & Herder, 1967. Pp. 217. \$4.95.

Father Pospishil adduces biblical and historical evidence in an attempt to establish a basis on which the Roman Catholic Church can recognize the validity of divorce and remarriage. His book exhibits care, systematic thinking, and a concern for thoroughness. Much of its content is preoccupied with the technical details of Roman Catholic canon law. The treatment of the biblical materials, however, is quite interesting.

The author centers his argument around the distinction between what he calls "intrinsic dissolubility" and "extrinsic dissolubility." The Scriptures tell us, he says, that marriage is indeed not "intrinsically dissoluble"; i.e., the property of dissolubility is not inherent in the nature of the marriage contract, for man to take advantage of whenever he pleases. On the

other hand, the marriage contract could be dissolved by divine authority, which is not limited by the properties that inhere in the nature of the contract. This accounts for the permission of divorce in the Old Testament, and under certain special conditions in the New, as well as for the permission of divorce in certain special cases by the Roman Catholic Church itself at the present day. Thus the words of Jesus regarding divorce and remarriage, for example, in Matthew 19:9 and 5:32, express a desirable ideal but not a moral imperative, according to Pospishil.

In the first section of the book he examines most of the relevant biblical passages on marriage and divorce in detail. In the second section, he turns to the historical evidence from patristic times onward. This evidence,

he concludes, shows that there has been some recognition of valid remarriage after divorce in the writings of various fathers, popes, decisions of synods and councils, and penitentials and formularies, from approximately the third century to the sixteenth century A.D. He emphasizes the practices followed by the Eastern Church both before and after the final schism of 1054.

The third section of the book deals with "Divorce and Remarriage in Contemporary Life," and is a strong plea that the conditions of contemporary life necessitate ecclesiastical recognition of valid divorce and remarriage in a fairly wide variety of cases. He concludes that since marriage is only dissoluble by divine authority, and since the Roman Catholic Church is the human agency to

which God has principally delegated such divine authority, therefore the Roman Catholic Church uniquely possesses the authority to grant dissolutions of marriage and thus permit valid remarriage. He sets forth this consummating argument in a final chapter suggestively entitled "Let God Put Asunder."

A series of lengthy appendices presents *in extenso* quotations from the historical sources cited, with much interpretive commentary by Father Pospishil along the way. All in all this is a thought-provoking book, and should be of value to Protestants as well as Roman Catholics in seeking a biblically-based Christian attitude toward the whole problem of divorce and remarriage.

—William H. Venable, Jr.

Priester, Gertrude Ann. *Let's Talk About God*. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1967. Pp. 271. \$3.95.

Readers who have come to know the author, Gertrude Ann Priester, for her book, *Teaching Primary Children in the Church*, as well as her many fine articles in *Growing* and *Opening Doors*, will welcome this her most recent work. With it, they are most certain to be pleased.

In her introduction, the author suggests that there are still many who want to make conversation about God and worship of him a natural and satisfying way of life. Convinced of this, she has written a book which in a most appealing way will help parents of young children, and teach-

ers, Christian educators, and ministers associated with them to do just that, to talk about God.

Each of the seven sections of the book centers around an area in which children's questions and concerns about God most frequently arise—the world we live in; God and his people; Christmastime; Jesus and his teachings; Easter; followers of Jesus; and special days such as birthdays, times of trouble, or moving days. The thoughts are developed in each area through a series of stories, each story ending with a thoughtful, unaffected prayer. The stories are not marked for particular daily or weekly use, although they could be used in such a way. Rather, the suggestion is made that each family use the book as it fits into the particular home situation and need. Older primary children and young juniors will enjoy using the book by themselves. Discerning adults will find many special uses for the book as they plan for corporate worship involving children and adults.

Mrs. Priester is most sensitive to

the child and his needs. Stories from the Bible are related in the child's language. When they are from life today they are written about situations in which the child finds himself. Excellent use is made of biblical material throughout the book. Scripture references appear within the stories at appropriate times to implant truth. Delightful pictures drawn by Rosalind Fry are generously used throughout the book to add interest and meaning to the stories.

Mary Duckert, member of the Pre-communicant Education staff, United Presbyterian Board of Christian Education, says of the book, "At last we have a book about God for families which fills a variety of needs and fits into the many family patterns within any congregation." With this statement I would heartily agree. With its meeting of a variety of needs in adult-child relationships, the book, in some ways, could be called a *first*, a real contribution to Christian education.

—*Bessie M. Burrows.*

From time to time we receive from publishers books which we sincerely intend to review. The reasons are diverse why certain reviews never are written; the vicissitudes of faculty activity and editorial preoccupation are perhaps the basic problems. The following books are ones which we feel sure merit review but which are unlikely now to receive further space in this journal. We express our appreciation to the publishers for their willingness to supply these books, and we recommend these titles to our readers for their special consideration.

Bainton, Roland H. *Early and Medieval Christianity. Collected Papers in Church History, Series I.* Boston: Beacon Press, 1962. Pp. ix + 261. \$6.00.

Barker, William P. *As Matthew Saw the Master.* Westwood, N. J.: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1964. Pp. 160. \$2.95. Sermons by a PTS alumnus.

Barth, Karl. *Evangelical Theology: An Introduction.* New York: Holt, Reinhardt and Winston, 1963. Pp. 206. \$4.00. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1964. Pp. xii + 184. \$1.25 (Anchor Book).

Barth, Karl. *The Preaching of the Gospel.* Translated by B. E. Hooke. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1963. Pp. 94. \$2.50.

Bea, Augustin. *Unity in Freedom.* New York: Harper, 1964. \$5.00.

Beegle, Dewey M. *The Inspiration of Scripture.* Philadelphia: Westminster, 1963. Pp. 223. \$4.50.

Benko, Stephen. *The Meaning of Sanctorum Communio. Studies in Historical Theology.* Naperville, Ill.: Allenson, 1964. Pp. 152. \$3.85 (paper).

Bonhoeffer, Dietrich. *The Cost of Discipleship.* New York: Macmillan, 1963. Pp. 352. \$1.45 (paper).

Bowden, Robert J. *Were You There?* New York: Pageant Press, 1963. Pp. 121. \$2.75.

Brenner, Scott Francis. *The Art of Worship.* New York: Macmillan, 1961. \$2.75.

Clark, Gordon H. *Karl Barth's Theological Method.* Philadelphia: The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1963. Pp. 229. \$5.00.

Cochrane, Arthur C. *The Church's Confession Under Hitler.* Philadelphia: Westminster, 1962. \$6.50.

Cully, Kendig Brubaker. *The Search for a Christian Education Since 1940.* Philadelphia: Westminster, 1965. \$4.50.

Davies, W. D. *Christian Origins and Judaism.* Philadelphia: Westminster, 1962. \$5.00.

Ditzen, Lowell Russell. *Handbook of Church Administration.* New York: Macmillan, 1962. \$7.00.

Ellis, E. Earle. *Paul and His Recent Interpreters.* Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1961. Pp. 63. \$1.75.

Ferré, Nels F. S. *God's New Age*. New York: Harper, 1962. Pp. 160. \$3.00.
Filson, Floyd V. *Three Crucial Decades. Studies in the Book of Acts*. Richmond: John Knox, 1963. Pp. 118. \$3.00.

_____. *A New Testament History. The Story of the Emerging Church*. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1964. Pp. xi + 435 + Plates XVI. \$7.50.

The small book, a revision of the Smyth Lectures at Columbia Seminary, covers in rather popular form "a convincing and consistent account" of the limited period. The larger work essays in detailed fashion to present the more complete picture from background through formation of the canon. The *History* has quickly been established as a basic textbook.

Gärtner, Bertil. *The Theology of the Gospel According to Thomas*. New York: Harper, 1961. Pp. 286. \$5.00.

Gilkey, Langdon. *How the Church Can Minister to the World Without Losing Itself*. New York: Harper, 1964. Pp. 151. \$3.75.

Glen, J. Stanley. *Pastoral Problems in First Corinthians*. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1964. \$5.00.

Glen, J. Stanley. *The Recovery of the Teaching Ministry*. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1960. Pp. 125. \$2.75.

Godsey, John D., ed. *Karl Barth's Table Talk*. Richmond: John Knox, 1963. \$1.75 (paper).

Goodykoontz, Harry G. *The Minister in the Reformed Tradition*. Richmond: John Knox, 1963. Pp. 176. \$3.75.

Gordon, Ernest. *Through the Valley of the Kwai*. New York: Harper, 1962. Pp. 257. \$3.95. (Paperback, 1964).

Grant, Robert M. *Gnosticism*. New York: Harper, 1961. \$5.00.

Greenlee, J. Harold. *Introduction to New Testament Textual Criticism*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964. Pp. 160. \$3.50.

Hayward, John F. *Existentialism and Religious Liberalism*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1962. Pp. 131. \$3.95.

Hunt, George L., ed. (McNeill, John T., consulting editor.) *Calvanism and the Political Order*. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1965. \$4.50.

Huxtable, John. *The Bible Says*. Richmond: John Knox, 1962. \$1.75.

Kelly, J. N. D. *The Pastoral Epistles*. New York: Harper, 1964. Pp. 264. \$5.00.

Kitagawa, Joseph M. *Religions of the East*. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1960. \$4.50.

Lohmeyer, Ernst. *Lord of the Temple*. Richmond: John Knox, 1962. Pp. 116. \$3.00.

Lüthi, Walter. *The Lord's Prayer*. Richmond: John Knox, 1962. Pp. xii + 103. \$2.50.

MacGregor, Geddes. *The Hemlock and the Cross*. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1963. Pp. 255. \$5.50.

Martin, James P. *The Last Judgment in Protestant Theology from Orthodoxy to Ritschl*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1963. Pp. 214. \$4.00.

Marty, Martin E. *Church Unity and Church Mission*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964. Pp. 139. \$3.00.

McNeill, John T. *Unitive Protestantism. The Ecumenical Spirit and Its Persistent Expression*. Richmond: John Knox, 1964. Pp. 352. \$4.50.

Metzger, Bruce M. *The New Testament: Its Background, Growth and Content*. Nashville: Abingdon, 1965. Pp. 288. \$4.75.

Morton, A. Q., and McLeman, James. *Christianity in the Computer Age*. New York: Harper, 1965. Pp. 95. \$2.50.

Moser, L. *Counseling: A Modern Emphasis in Religion*. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962. Pp. 354. \$6.50.

Niebuhr, H. Richard. *The Responsible Self. An Essay in Christian Moral Philosophy*. New York: Harper, 1963. Pp. 183. \$3.50.

Northcott, Cecil. *Hymns in Christian Worship. The Use of Hymns in the Life of the Church*. Ecumenical Studies in Worship, No. 13. Richmond: John Knox, 1964. Pp. 83. (Paper.)

Osbeck, Kenneth W. *The Ministry of Music*. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1961. Pp. 192. \$3.50.

Paul, Robert S. *The Lord Protector. Religion and Politics in the Life of Oliver Cromwell*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964. Pp. 438. \$2.95 (paper).

An important work by a professor lately come to our faculty.

Ramm, B. *Special Revelation and the Word of God. An Essay on the Contemporary Problem of Revelation*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1961. Pp. 220. \$4.00.

Robertson, E. H. *The Bible in Our Time*. New York: Association Press.

A series of paperback booklets by the Study Secretary of the United Bible Societies in cooperation with the World Council of Churches, distributed by the American Bible Society:

- The Recovery of Confidence*. (1961. Pp. 63. \$1.00.)
- Bible Weeks*. (1961. Pp. 80. \$1.25.)
- The Bible in the British Scene*. (1961. Pp. 70. \$1.25.)
- The Bible in East Germany*. (1961. Pp. 93. \$1.25.)
- Methods of Bible Study*. (1962. Pp. 62. \$1.25.)
- The Bible in the Local Church*. (1963. Pp. 107. \$1.50.)

Robinson, James M., and Cobb, John B., Jr., editors. *The New Hermeneutic*, Vol. II. New Frontiers in Theology—Discussions among Continental

and American Theologians. New York: Harper, 1964. Pp. 243. \$5.00.

Runia, Klaas. *Karl Barth's Doctrine of Holy Scripture*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1962. Pp. ix + 225. \$4.00.

Schep, J. A. *The Nature of the Resurrection Body*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964. Pp. 252. \$4.95.

Schoeps, H. J. *The Theology of the Apostle Paul in the Light of Jewish Religious History*. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1961. \$6.00.

Shepherd, Massey Hamilton, Jr. *The Reform of Liturgical Worship*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1961. \$3.00.

Smart, James D., translator. *Revolutionary Theology in the Making*. Barth-Thurneysen Correspondence, 1914-1925. Richmond: John Knox, 1964. Pp. 249. \$5.00.

Smith, Charles W. F. *Biblical Authority for Modern Preaching*. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1960. \$3.50.

The Torah: The Five Books of Moses. A new translation of The Holy Scriptures according to the traditional Hebrew text. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1962. Pp. 393. \$5.00 (\$10.00, leather).

Thielicke, Helmut. *The Silence of God*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1962. Pp. xi + 92. \$2.50.

Thurneysen, Eduard. *A Theology of Pastoral Care*. Richmond: John Knox, 1962. Pp. 343. \$5.50.

Van Buren, Paul M. *The Secular Meaning of the Gospel*. New York: Macmillan, 1963. Pp. 205. \$4.95.

Van Til, Cornelius. *Christianity and Barthianism*. Philadelphia: The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1962. Pp. 450. \$6.95.

von Rad, Gerhard. *Deuteronomy, A Commentary*. (Old Testament Library Series.) Philadelphia: Westminster, 1966. \$5.00.

Watts, J. Wash. *A Survey of Syntax in the Hebrew Old Testament*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964. Pp. 164. \$3.95.

Williams, George H. *The Radical Reformation*. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1962. \$15.00.

Wilmore, Gayraud S. *The Secular Relevance of the Church. Christian Perspectives on Social Problems*. Westminster, 1962. Pp. 89. \$1.25 (paper).

Winter, Gibson. *The New Creation as Metropolis*. New York: Macmillan, 1963. Pp. 152. \$3.95.

Books Received

Bailey, F. C. *These, Too, Were Unshackled!* Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1962. Pp. 127. \$1.95.

Barbour, Hugh. *Reading and Understanding the Old Testament.* New York: Association Press, 1965. Pp. 320. \$5.95.

Barfield, Owen. *History in English Words.* Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964. Pp. 160. \$3.50.

Beaver, R. P., ed. *Christianity and African Education.* Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1966. Pp. 233. \$2.65 (paper). The papers of a conference at the University of Chicago.

Beegle, Dewey M. *God's Word into English.* Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1965. Pp. x + 230 + illustrations. \$2.25 (paper). This new edition (original, Harper, 1960) is updated by the addition of "Appendix F."

Bower, Robert K. *Administering Christian Education. Principles of Administration for Ministers and Christian Leaders.* Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964. Pp. 227. \$3.95.

Brill, Earl H. *Sex is Dead and Other Portmortems.* New York: Seabury, 1967. \$3.50.

Buber, Martin. *Between Man and Man.* New York: Macmillan, 1965. Pp. xxi + 229. \$1.45. Paperback edition of a 1947 British publication (notes updated).

Ecumenical Studies in History. Richmond: John Knox, 1966. \$1.75 (paper).

#3. Pelikan, Jaroslav. *The Finality of Jesus Christ in an Age of Universal History: A Dilemma of the Third Century.* (Pp. 71.)

#4. Every, George. *Misunderstanding Between East and West.* (Pp. 70.)

Griffith, Helen S. *The Sign Language of Our Faith.* Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1966. Pp. 96. \$1.95 (paperback reissue of a helpful 1939 publication).

Henry, Carl F. H. *The God Who Shows Himself.* Waco, Texas: Word Books, 1966. Pp. 138. \$3.50.

Howie, Carl G. *The Creative Era: Between the Testaments.* Richmond: John Knox, 1965. Pp. 96. \$1.45.

Jellema, R., ed. *Contemporary Writers in Christian Perspective.* Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1966. 85¢ (paper). Critical Essays; received so far:

Peter DeVries, by Roderick Jellema. (Pp. 48.)

Ernest Hemingway, by Nathan A. Scott, Jr. (Pp. 46.)

Edith Sitwell, by Ralph J. Mills, Jr. (Pp. 47.)

T. S. Eliot, by Neville Braybrooke. (Pp. 48.)

J. D. Salinger, by Kenneth Hamilton. (Pp. 47.)

Graham Greene, by Martin Turnell. (Pp. 48.)

William Golding, by Paul Elman. (Pp. 47.)

F. Scott Fitzgerald, by Edwin M. Moseley. (Pp. 47.)

In Search of Contemporary Man, by Kenneth Hamilton. (Pp. 48.)

Kenyon, Sir Frederic. *The Story of the Bible. A Popular Account of How It Came to Us.* New edition with supplementary material by F. F. Bruce. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1967. Pp. 150. \$1.95. A paperback reprint of the Second Edition (1964); a recommended, reliable summary, updated from the original (1936) edition.

Kierkegaard, Soren. *Works of Love.* New York: Harper, 1962. Pp. 383. \$6.00. A new edition of a classic work.

Klink, Thomas W. *Depth Perspectives in Pastoral Work.* Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965. \$2.95.

MacDonald, George. *An Anthology by C. S. Lewis.* A Dolphin Book. Pp. 152. 95¢.

Makers of Contemporary Theology. Richmond: John Knox, 1967. \$1.25 (paper).
Gabriel Marcel, by S. Keen. (Pp. 51.)
Martin Buber, by R. G. Smith. (Pp. vii + 45.)
McKelway, Alexander J. *The Systematic Theology of Paul Tillich. A Review and Analysis*. Richmond: John Knox, 1964. Pp. 280. \$5.50.
Pelikan, Jaroslav. *Obedient Rebels. Catholic Substance and Protestant Principle in Luther's Reformation*. New York: Harper, 1964. Pp. 212. \$5.00.
Pfeiffer, Charles F. *Egypt and the Exodus*. Grand Rapids: Baker, 1964. Pp. 96. \$2.95.
Pfeiffer, Charles F. *Ras Shamra and the Bible*. Grand Rapids: Baker. Pp. 73. \$1.50.
Ramm, Bernard. *A Handbook of Contemporary Theology*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1966. Pp. 141. \$1.95.
Shearer, Roy E. *Wildfire: Church Growth in Korea*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1966. Pp. 242. \$2.95.
Smith, C. M. *How to Become a Bishop Without Being Religious*. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1967. Pp. xii + 131. \$1.45 (paper). A Waymark Book reissue of a very popular title.
Smith, Wilfred Cantwell. *The Meaning and End of Religion*. New York: New American Library, Mentor Book, 1964. Pp. 352. 75¢. A paperback edition of a 1962 Macmillan publication—"A New Approach to the Religious Traditions of Mankind."
Stiles, Joseph. *Acquiring and Developing Church Real Estate*. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965. \$3.95.
Tennant, Roger. *Christ Encountered. A Short Life of Jesus*. New York: Seabury, 1966. Pp. 135. \$1.45. Paperback edition of a 1961 book; first published by S.P.C.K. as *Born of a Woman*.
Tiemann, William Harold. *The Right to Silence. Privileged Communication and the Pastor*. Richmond: John Knox, 1964. Pp. 160. \$4.00.
Tournier, Paul, et al. *Are You Nobody?* Richmond: John Knox, 1966. Pp. 77. \$1.00 (Chime Paperback).
Turnbull, R. D., ed. *If I Had Only One Sermon to Preach*. Grand Rapids: Baker, 1966. Pp. 151. \$2.95.
Wolf, William J. *No Cross, No Crown: A Study of the Atonement*. New York: Seabury, 1967. Pp. 211 + index. \$2.25 (paper). Paperback edition of a 1957 Doubleday publication. For comment cf. Robert Paul, *The Atonement and the Sacraments*, p. 277.

From the President's Desk—Concluded

such a man? The answer, surely, can only be, on this supposition, Nothing at all" (*ibid.*, pp. 438ff.). He, therefore, pleads—and I would join him heartily in the plea—"for knowledge, 'sacred knowledge,'" as the distinctive, characteristic and formative study of the sacred ministry" (*ibid.*).

Will a theological curriculum do anything more than delay "professional death" if it seeks to bypass the solid discipline of hard-core studies in the languages, history, and theology out of which theologians are made? And if we do not strive to be authentic theologians, do we have anything distinctive to offer the world? And if we have nothing distinctive to offer, should we not accept professional death and retire from the scene? Perhaps the day may come when true relevance will be found in the summons: "Let the theologian be a theologian."

This does not mean, of course, that *any* knowledge in *any* field can not be laid under tribute to the gospel, nor made to serve the ends for which the church exists in the world. It does mean, however, that the minister should enter each area of thought or activity with the distinctive contribution of a *theologian*, and it could be that if ministers were better theologians, casting theological light on every area of life through the preaching, teaching, and fellowship of the church, the laymen thus confronted might be better equipped to bring the meaning of the gospel to bear upon the whole fabric of society.

—D. G. M.

The Toy-Fixer

"Broken," said the little boy and climbed upon my knee.

"Broken," said the little boy and gave his toy to me.

Yes, his toy was broken; so he brought it here to me.

And now the toy is fixéd and the little boy is free;

And now the little boy is gone, and far away from me;

I wonder if his little toy broken ever more will be?

—*William Virgil Davis, '65.*

* Published in the *Winter Anthology—1960*, by the American College Poetry Society, Los Angeles.



15
2801





Deacidified using the Bookkeeper process
Neutralizing Agent: Magnesium Oxide
Treatment Date:

APR 1995



PRESERVATION TECHNOLOGIES, INC.

1114 William Flinn Highway

Glenshaw, PA 15116-2657

412-486-1161

Barbour Library

BV4070 .P51 v.7/8
/Pittsburgh perspective

PKTQ



3 5206 00067 3410